SIGAR HIGH-RISK LIST

HIGH-RISK LIST
High-Risk List, GAO listed four “challenges” for DOD: the acquisition workforce, contracting
techniques and approaches, service acquisitions, and operational contract support. 218
The challenges continue. A 2016 report by the DOD Inspector General faulted U.S.
military management of fuel contracts to support the Afghan Ministry of Interior, which
controls national police forces. The DOD IG found contract management by the Combined
Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) “not effective,” as efforts lacked coordination,
roles and responsibilities were not clearly defined, and CSTC-A did not enforce
reporting requirements or hold the ministry accountable when it failed to institute controls
over the contract-management process. 219
What has Changed since the last High-Risk List
Federal agencies have implemented or promised various improvements in contract management
for Afghanistan reconstruction. For example, DOD has transferred responsibility
and added personnel for managing a vehicle-maintenance contract to support the Afghan
National Army. 220 And Afghan President Ashraf Ghani, responding to fuel-contract corruption
exposed by SIGAR investigators, has created a National Procurement Council to
improve vetting and awards of government contracts. In recognition of SIGAR’s role in
exposing fraud, collusion, and bid-rigging in fuel contracts for Afghan forces, President
Ghani invited SIGAR to attend his procurement-review meetings and instructed officials to
cooperate with SIGAR personnel.
Other developments are not positive. Afghan insurgents have increased their activity.
The U.S. military and civilian-oversight presence in Afghanistan is shrinking. And corruption
continues to plague the country. For these and other reasons, contract management
remains a high risk to the reconstruction effort.
Questions for Policymakers
• If security conditions prevent U.S. access for direct management and oversight in some
areas, to what extent have agencies made reasonable plans for adequate and verifiable
remote or third-party monitoring of contractor performance?
• What steps have agencies taken to improve contract management and oversight,
particularly agency personnel’s adherence to existing regulations and policies and
contractors’ adherence to the terms of their agreements?
• Do some activities customarily let out to contractors need to be partially or wholly
returned to U.S. military or civilian-agency execution when a contingency operation is
likely to entail multiyear efforts in a non-permissive environment?
46
SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION