COAST ARTILLERY, JOURNAL - Air Defense Artillery

554 THE COAST ARTILLERY JOURNAL
In regard to the Group of Armies of the Imperial Crown Prince,
we may say that two of his Armies-the VII and XVIII-which together
comprised a total of forty-one divisions, would have met, on the
contrary, serious difficulties. These two armies had to cross the Meuse
on the narrow front of Fumay-Namur of about seventy kilometers
extension.
The four Armies of the Group of Armies of the Crown Prince of
Bavaria (II, XVI, VI, and IV), which together comprised sixty-eight
divisions, could never have crossed the Meuse between Namur and
Vise-a front of about seventy-five kilometers-due to the lack of
roads and bridges necessary for the passing of such a large force.
To regain the interior of Germany, the six Armies had available between
Fumay and Vise only three railways which were practically useless
because they all met at Aix-Ia-Chapelle.
Finally, the IV and VII Armies, in order to avoid the salient formed
by the Dutch Limbourg, would have had to follow a direction of march
from west to southeast. This would have considerably narrowed the
already insufficient zone of retreat of the XVII, II, XVIII, and VII
Armies, and therefore paralyzed their movements.
It is easy to imagine the consequent bottling-up which would necessarily
have taken place as a result of the hurried retreat forced by us
upon our enemy. Events have offered ample proof that the Germans
could not have broken off the combat without having left in our hands
all their materiel and most of their units.
As a matter of fact, the German retreat to the Rhine, carried out in
perfect ease, lasted nearly one month (I\ovember II-December 5), and
the VI German Army had to pass a large part of its forces across the
Limbourg, in order not to obstruct the movements of the IV Army.
WHAT WOULD HAVE HAPPENED IF THE STRUGGLE HAD
BEEN PROLONGED FIFTEEN DAYS?
Our offensive of 1\"ovember14 would have made inevitable in this.
brief period the capitulation in open field of almost the entire German
Army, and we have every reason to suppose that the latter would
have been driven to the last extremity not later than ]\"O\-ember25.
Our adversaries had to accept the conditions imposed at Rathondes.
in order to escape from an imminent and unparalleled disaster. This
acceptance was transmitted by wireless on the tenth. The protocal of
the Armistice was signed on the eleventh at 5:00 A. M., and at 11:00
A. M. it was put in force on the entire front.
We consented to the suspension of hostilities a few days before the
brilliant triumph, which we had every reason to believe our arms.
would have attained.