COAST ARTILLERY, JOURNAL - Air Defense Artillery

576 THE COAST ARTILLERY JOURNAL
The preceding volume left off at the end of 1916 with the German Government
committed to the attempt to gain victory by the unrestricted submarine campaign.
In this, the writer takes up briefly the situation at the beginning of 1917,
and points out the failure of either side to foresee the Russian collapse, the mistaken
optimism of the Entente allies, and, not without exaggeration, the growth
of the influence of Sea Power in the increasing effectiveness of the blockade of
Germany, but concludes that-
•.• the German attempt to win the World War on the sea must not
be considered as a last desperate resort, but as a carefully calculated effort
to win by means which were thought to be infallible.
The Chapter headings that follow are-
The Entrance of the United States, The First Shock ot the U-Boat
Campaign, The Object of the United States in the World _r, and The
Adoption of the Convoy System.
There follows a brief but fairly detailed account of the performances of the
German Raiders foot loose on the seas in 1917, and operating "not only without
naval bases, but also without any service of supplies whatever," with the statement
that they destroyed 272,000 tons of merchantmen and caused disabling
damage to 3700 tons in addition.
Next are taken up the allied control of shipping, the strengthening of the
blockade of Germany, and the increasingly successful operation of the convoy
system.
In the chapter entitled "The Shifting Conditions of 1917" a striking picture
is given. From the standpoint of Naval Warfare, some of the high lights are:
the continuance of the British policy of always keeping the Grand Fleet devoted
to the mission of defending against enemy attacks, the retention of the British
light naval forces as a close screen for the Grand fleet and the failure to dispose
them for anti-submarine warfare, the arrival and participation of the American
destroyers, and the decision for and inception of the great North-Sea and lesser
mine barrages.
The greater part of the subsequent chapters is necessarily a history of the
general situation to which the naval operations were incidental, with more detailed
accounts of the latter including the development and remarkable achievement
of the American transport system, the laying of the Mine Barrage, the
results of the U-boat campaign, and "the last minute plan for a desperate sortie
of the Battle Fleet."
The writer's conclusions are interesting, though perhaps not fully demonstrated:
More than has been the case in other wars. did the military events of
the World War depend upon naval strategy. Its military strategy and its
naval strategy must never be thought of as things apart. Only by looking at
the doubly braided strands can the true fabric be seen, and throughout the
whole pattern the record of Sea Power is written indelibly. Here is the
lesson of the far written sermon, for us never to let slip from our mindsthe
proof of the might and compelling force of Sea Power.
To the student of the history of the World War, who has not access to official
sources, the series will be all but indispensable. The last volume is a contribution
to the history of our country, which almost every educated American should own
and enjoy.-R. S. A.