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2016 Global Review of Constitutional Law

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Second, these developments seem to have<br />

been perceived by the judiciary themselves<br />

as an attack upon their position. Most notably,<br />

a representative body, known as the Association<br />

<strong>of</strong> Judges <strong>of</strong> Ireland, was found in<br />

2011 to represent members <strong>of</strong> the judiciary.<br />

That this was a direct response to the political<br />

environment was illustrated by the statement<br />

on the AJI website at the time that:<br />

The background to the foundation <strong>of</strong><br />

the AJI was the development, over the<br />

months that followed the change <strong>of</strong> government<br />

that occurred in March 2011,<br />

<strong>of</strong> a perceived difficult relationship between<br />

the judiciary and the executive,<br />

from the perspective <strong>of</strong> many members<br />

<strong>of</strong> the judiciary. 16<br />

Third, the government that took <strong>of</strong>fice after<br />

the <strong>2016</strong> general election is a minority coalition,<br />

the many parties in which are Fine<br />

Gael (the largest party in the previous government)<br />

and the Independent Alliance. The<br />

latter’s most high-pr<strong>of</strong>ile figure is a newspaper<br />

columnist who had previously criticised<br />

“cronyism” in the judicial appointments<br />

process on many occasions. It has been suggested<br />

that one <strong>of</strong> his key demands in government<br />

has been reform <strong>of</strong> the process and,<br />

specifically, that any new appointment body<br />

have a lay majority and a lay chairperson. In<br />

addition, however, he has continued as Minister<br />

to express strong criticism <strong>of</strong> the judiciary.<br />

He claimed on one occasion that it was<br />

obstructing reform, and on another that a<br />

declaration <strong>of</strong> judicial interests was required<br />

in case judges might “forget their oaths”.<br />

This prompted criticism from legal and political<br />

circles and an apparent response from<br />

the Chief Justice who warned in a speech<br />

against “inaccurate discussion and misrepresentation<br />

<strong>of</strong> the position <strong>of</strong> the Judiciary”.<br />

There are two aspects <strong>of</strong> this controversy<br />

that are constitutionally significant. The first<br />

is the specific question <strong>of</strong> how judges will<br />

be appointed (and disciplined) in the future.<br />

As with the law on abortion, this appears to<br />

be an issue where some form <strong>of</strong> change is<br />

likely in the medium term. The government<br />

is committed to reform, one <strong>of</strong> its constituent<br />

parts has identified this as a priority, and the<br />

main opposition party has also produced its<br />

own draft legislation (which largely received<br />

a more positive response from legal circles).<br />

Quite what the final details <strong>of</strong> these reforms<br />

will be is unclear, however. The government<br />

has outlined general principles but no draft<br />

legislation has yet been published. Given its<br />

minority status, it also cannot be assumed<br />

that the government will stay in <strong>of</strong>fice long<br />

enough to enact any legislation. However,<br />

the fact that there is broad political and judicial<br />

support for some kind <strong>of</strong> change means<br />

a commitment to reform (if not the policies<br />

currently proposed) may survive a change <strong>of</strong><br />

government.<br />

There also appears to be a degree <strong>of</strong> consensus<br />

that a judicial council would be useful<br />

but this seems less <strong>of</strong> a priority at present.<br />

While the judiciary have been vocal in making<br />

the case for the council, it should be<br />

borne in mind that it was first recommended<br />

by a special committee in 2000.<br />

The second aspect <strong>of</strong> this year’s controversy<br />

that merits attention is the more general<br />

question <strong>of</strong> whether this episode – following<br />

on from others – is a signal <strong>of</strong> more pr<strong>of</strong>ound<br />

change in the relationship between<br />

the judicial and political arms <strong>of</strong> the state.<br />

Relations between the two sides certainly<br />

seem strained in a way that appears without<br />

precedent since independence. The lack<br />

<strong>of</strong> trust on both sides and the willingness to<br />

engage in a degree <strong>of</strong> public criticisms that<br />

would have been deemed inappropriate even<br />

a decade ago are new dynamics in Ireland’s<br />

constitutional structures which raise longterm<br />

issues around judicial independence<br />

and the relative authority <strong>of</strong> both legal and<br />

political actors. 17 While the precise effect <strong>of</strong><br />

this change is a matter <strong>of</strong> speculation, it does<br />

seem clear—and likely unhelpful—that reforms<br />

with important long-term consequences<br />

are being formulated at a time <strong>of</strong> unusual<br />

turbulence in this relationship.<br />

MAJOR CASES<br />

The most significant decision <strong>of</strong> the year was<br />

probably that in Collins v. Minister for Finance.<br />

18 This was a challenge to the issuing<br />

<strong>of</strong> long-term promissory notes worth €30<br />

billion by the Minister for Finance to two<br />

effectively insolvent banks in 2010 as part<br />

<strong>of</strong> the response to Ireland’s severe banking<br />

crisis.<br />

Aside from the obvious importance <strong>of</strong> the<br />

subject matter, the proceedings were constitutionally<br />

significant because they raised<br />

novel issues relating to the separation <strong>of</strong><br />

powers and, specifically, the respective roles<br />

<strong>of</strong> the government and the Dáil (lower house)<br />

in budgetary matters, and <strong>of</strong> the courts in reviewing<br />

them.<br />

The plaintiff’s core argument asserted the<br />

existence <strong>of</strong> a general separation <strong>of</strong> powers<br />

principle that control <strong>of</strong> national debt and<br />

expenditure must be vested in the legislative<br />

branch. Substantial reliance was placed<br />

in this regard on Article 1.8 <strong>of</strong> the US Constitution<br />

and on the Federalist Papers. The<br />

specific breach alleged was that the Dáil had<br />

abdicated its constitutional function by conferring<br />

a statutory power on the Minister to<br />

issue debt without imposing either a statutory<br />

“debt ceiling” or, alternatively, a requirement<br />

to obtain legislative approval.<br />

This was rejected by the Supreme Court. The<br />

Court pointed out that the Irish Constitution<br />

contained no equivalent provision to Article<br />

1.8. Rather, “[t]he Constitution’s main control<br />

point on financial matters, is that the appropriation<br />

and therefore expenditure <strong>of</strong> all<br />

monies is required by Article 11 to be provided<br />

for ‘by law’”.<br />

However, the Court proceeded to hold that<br />

the phrase “by law” required more than a<br />

statutory basis for the act in question. Instead,<br />

it denoted a broader principle <strong>of</strong> legality<br />

which meant that a law formally enacted<br />

“must [also] be consistent itself with the dictates<br />

<strong>of</strong> the Constitution, and the order and<br />

16<br />

http://aji.ie/ (accessed March 31, 2014).<br />

17<br />

See Mr. Justice O’Donnell, “Some Reflections on the Independence <strong>of</strong> the Judiciary in Ireland in 21st Century Europe” (<strong>2016</strong>) 19 Trinity College <strong>Law</strong> <strong>Review</strong> 5.<br />

18<br />

[<strong>2016</strong>] IESC 73.<br />

<strong>2016</strong> <strong>Global</strong> <strong>Review</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Constitutional</strong> <strong>Law</strong> | 101

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