2016 Global Review of Constitutional Law
I-CONnect–Clough Center collaboration.
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Second, these developments seem to have<br />
been perceived by the judiciary themselves<br />
as an attack upon their position. Most notably,<br />
a representative body, known as the Association<br />
<strong>of</strong> Judges <strong>of</strong> Ireland, was found in<br />
2011 to represent members <strong>of</strong> the judiciary.<br />
That this was a direct response to the political<br />
environment was illustrated by the statement<br />
on the AJI website at the time that:<br />
The background to the foundation <strong>of</strong><br />
the AJI was the development, over the<br />
months that followed the change <strong>of</strong> government<br />
that occurred in March 2011,<br />
<strong>of</strong> a perceived difficult relationship between<br />
the judiciary and the executive,<br />
from the perspective <strong>of</strong> many members<br />
<strong>of</strong> the judiciary. 16<br />
Third, the government that took <strong>of</strong>fice after<br />
the <strong>2016</strong> general election is a minority coalition,<br />
the many parties in which are Fine<br />
Gael (the largest party in the previous government)<br />
and the Independent Alliance. The<br />
latter’s most high-pr<strong>of</strong>ile figure is a newspaper<br />
columnist who had previously criticised<br />
“cronyism” in the judicial appointments<br />
process on many occasions. It has been suggested<br />
that one <strong>of</strong> his key demands in government<br />
has been reform <strong>of</strong> the process and,<br />
specifically, that any new appointment body<br />
have a lay majority and a lay chairperson. In<br />
addition, however, he has continued as Minister<br />
to express strong criticism <strong>of</strong> the judiciary.<br />
He claimed on one occasion that it was<br />
obstructing reform, and on another that a<br />
declaration <strong>of</strong> judicial interests was required<br />
in case judges might “forget their oaths”.<br />
This prompted criticism from legal and political<br />
circles and an apparent response from<br />
the Chief Justice who warned in a speech<br />
against “inaccurate discussion and misrepresentation<br />
<strong>of</strong> the position <strong>of</strong> the Judiciary”.<br />
There are two aspects <strong>of</strong> this controversy<br />
that are constitutionally significant. The first<br />
is the specific question <strong>of</strong> how judges will<br />
be appointed (and disciplined) in the future.<br />
As with the law on abortion, this appears to<br />
be an issue where some form <strong>of</strong> change is<br />
likely in the medium term. The government<br />
is committed to reform, one <strong>of</strong> its constituent<br />
parts has identified this as a priority, and the<br />
main opposition party has also produced its<br />
own draft legislation (which largely received<br />
a more positive response from legal circles).<br />
Quite what the final details <strong>of</strong> these reforms<br />
will be is unclear, however. The government<br />
has outlined general principles but no draft<br />
legislation has yet been published. Given its<br />
minority status, it also cannot be assumed<br />
that the government will stay in <strong>of</strong>fice long<br />
enough to enact any legislation. However,<br />
the fact that there is broad political and judicial<br />
support for some kind <strong>of</strong> change means<br />
a commitment to reform (if not the policies<br />
currently proposed) may survive a change <strong>of</strong><br />
government.<br />
There also appears to be a degree <strong>of</strong> consensus<br />
that a judicial council would be useful<br />
but this seems less <strong>of</strong> a priority at present.<br />
While the judiciary have been vocal in making<br />
the case for the council, it should be<br />
borne in mind that it was first recommended<br />
by a special committee in 2000.<br />
The second aspect <strong>of</strong> this year’s controversy<br />
that merits attention is the more general<br />
question <strong>of</strong> whether this episode – following<br />
on from others – is a signal <strong>of</strong> more pr<strong>of</strong>ound<br />
change in the relationship between<br />
the judicial and political arms <strong>of</strong> the state.<br />
Relations between the two sides certainly<br />
seem strained in a way that appears without<br />
precedent since independence. The lack<br />
<strong>of</strong> trust on both sides and the willingness to<br />
engage in a degree <strong>of</strong> public criticisms that<br />
would have been deemed inappropriate even<br />
a decade ago are new dynamics in Ireland’s<br />
constitutional structures which raise longterm<br />
issues around judicial independence<br />
and the relative authority <strong>of</strong> both legal and<br />
political actors. 17 While the precise effect <strong>of</strong><br />
this change is a matter <strong>of</strong> speculation, it does<br />
seem clear—and likely unhelpful—that reforms<br />
with important long-term consequences<br />
are being formulated at a time <strong>of</strong> unusual<br />
turbulence in this relationship.<br />
MAJOR CASES<br />
The most significant decision <strong>of</strong> the year was<br />
probably that in Collins v. Minister for Finance.<br />
18 This was a challenge to the issuing<br />
<strong>of</strong> long-term promissory notes worth €30<br />
billion by the Minister for Finance to two<br />
effectively insolvent banks in 2010 as part<br />
<strong>of</strong> the response to Ireland’s severe banking<br />
crisis.<br />
Aside from the obvious importance <strong>of</strong> the<br />
subject matter, the proceedings were constitutionally<br />
significant because they raised<br />
novel issues relating to the separation <strong>of</strong><br />
powers and, specifically, the respective roles<br />
<strong>of</strong> the government and the Dáil (lower house)<br />
in budgetary matters, and <strong>of</strong> the courts in reviewing<br />
them.<br />
The plaintiff’s core argument asserted the<br />
existence <strong>of</strong> a general separation <strong>of</strong> powers<br />
principle that control <strong>of</strong> national debt and<br />
expenditure must be vested in the legislative<br />
branch. Substantial reliance was placed<br />
in this regard on Article 1.8 <strong>of</strong> the US Constitution<br />
and on the Federalist Papers. The<br />
specific breach alleged was that the Dáil had<br />
abdicated its constitutional function by conferring<br />
a statutory power on the Minister to<br />
issue debt without imposing either a statutory<br />
“debt ceiling” or, alternatively, a requirement<br />
to obtain legislative approval.<br />
This was rejected by the Supreme Court. The<br />
Court pointed out that the Irish Constitution<br />
contained no equivalent provision to Article<br />
1.8. Rather, “[t]he Constitution’s main control<br />
point on financial matters, is that the appropriation<br />
and therefore expenditure <strong>of</strong> all<br />
monies is required by Article 11 to be provided<br />
for ‘by law’”.<br />
However, the Court proceeded to hold that<br />
the phrase “by law” required more than a<br />
statutory basis for the act in question. Instead,<br />
it denoted a broader principle <strong>of</strong> legality<br />
which meant that a law formally enacted<br />
“must [also] be consistent itself with the dictates<br />
<strong>of</strong> the Constitution, and the order and<br />
16<br />
http://aji.ie/ (accessed March 31, 2014).<br />
17<br />
See Mr. Justice O’Donnell, “Some Reflections on the Independence <strong>of</strong> the Judiciary in Ireland in 21st Century Europe” (<strong>2016</strong>) 19 Trinity College <strong>Law</strong> <strong>Review</strong> 5.<br />
18<br />
[<strong>2016</strong>] IESC 73.<br />
<strong>2016</strong> <strong>Global</strong> <strong>Review</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Constitutional</strong> <strong>Law</strong> | 101