2016 Global Review of Constitutional Law

more through the right of the electorate – the
citizens of the state concerned—to determine
and decide whom they would like to see as
their representatives, as well as through the
disclosure and interpretation of the concept of
the electoral right.
After the delivery of the said judgment of the
ECtHR, measures were taken in Lithuania
to implement it. The Seimas adopted
amendments to the Law on Elections to the
Seimas, under which, a person who grossly
violated the Constitution and breached the
oath could stand in parliamentary elections
after a five-year period following his/
her removal from the office held. Such
provisions amending the law were evidently
incompatible with the doctrinal provisions
formulated in the Constitutional Court’s
ruling of 25 May 2004. Thus, it is no
wonder that the Constitutional Court, in its
ruling of 5 September 2012, recognised that
such amendments were in conflict with the
Constitution. The Constitutional Court held
that, in itself, the judgment of the ECtHR
may not serve as a constitutional basis
for the reinterpretation (correction) of the
official constitutional doctrine, and that the
renouncing of international obligations in
the sphere of human rights would not be a
constitutionally justified option. This led to
another important conclusion, namely that
the Republic of Lithuania is obliged to adopt
relevant amendment(s) to the Constitution.
In 2016, the Constitutional Court had to return
to this issue by assessing the constitutionality
of the resolution of the Seimas whereby
the Seimas had approved the conclusion
of the ad hoc Investigation Commission of
the Seimas for the Restoration of the Civil
and Political Rights of President Rolandas
Paksas. 5 Having found the resolution of the
Seimas to be in conflict with the Constitution,
the Constitutional Court reiterated that, in
order to remove the incompatibility between
the Constitution and the provisions of the
Convention, as well as to implement the
related judgment of the ECtHR, there is only
one way – to amend the relevant provisions
of the Constitution; any other way is
impossible under the Constitution.
The Seimas has repeatedly attempted to
implement the aforementioned judgment of
the ECtHR in a constitutional way, i.e. by
adopting the amendments of the Constitution,
which would lead to the elimination of the
incompatibility between the provisions of
the Constitution and the Convention, but
none of its attempts have been successful.
MAJOR CASES
Separation of Powers
The Constitutional Court has held more
than once that, after the Constitution has
directly established the powers of particular
institutions of state power, no state institution
may take over such powers from another
state institution, or transfer or waive them,
and that such powers may not be amended or
restricted by means of a law; otherwise the
principle of the separation of powers, which
is consolidated in the Constitution, would
be violated. The Constitutional Court had to
recall the said doctrinal provision in its ruling
of 22 December 2016. This case dealt with
the issue of the approval given by the Seimas
for the questionable proposals of an ad hoc
Investigation Commission of the Seimas
(hereinafter referred to as the Commission)
for the Restoration of the Civil and Political
Rights of President Rolandas Paksas. The
Constitutional Court set out the principled
provision that the Seimas may not approve
a conclusion of any possible content made
by an ad hoc investigation commission of
the Seimas, inter alia; any such proposals
formulated therein that would be incompatible
with, among other things, the requirements
stemming from the constitutional principle of
the separation of powers.
One of the proposals set out in the conclusion
of the Commission was to supplement the
provisions of the Statute of the Seimas
governing impeachment proceedings so that
the Seimas would be granted the competence,
under the specified circumstances, to review
and annul an impeachment against a person
without applying to the Constitutional Court
concerning this issue. The Constitutional
Court found that such proposal denied the
constitutional concept of the institute of
impeachment as revealed in the official
constitutional doctrine, under which two
independent institutions of state power—the
Seimas and the Constitutional Court—have
powers in impeachment proceedings; under
the Constitution, each of these institutions
in impeachment proceedings is assigned
specific powers corresponding to their
respective functions. If such proposal were
implemented, the Seimas would interfere
with the competence assigned to an institution
of judicial power – the Constitutional Court
– in impeachment proceedings and take
the powers granted to the Constitutional
Court. Moreover, by means of the proposals
(among other things, to regulate the legal
consequences of constitutional liability by
means of a resolution of the Seimas) as set
out in the conclusion of the Commission, an
attempt was made to interpret the provisions
of the Constitution in a way different from
that provided by the Constitutional Court
in its acts, thus denying the powers of this
court to officially interpret the Constitution
and interfering with the constitutional
competence of this court (as an institution of
judicial power) to administer constitutional
justice.
Therefore, this resolution of the Seimas,
whereby the Seimas had approved
the conclusion of the aforementioned
Commission, was ruled by the Constitutional
Court to be in conflict with, inter alia, the
constitutional principle of the separation of
powers.
Rights and Freedoms
The vast part of the constitutional justice
cases considered in 2016 comprised cases
significant for protecting and ensuring the
constitutional rights and freedoms of persons
(the right to fair proceedings, the right to
freely choose a job or business, the right to
receive fair pay for work, the right to social
security, the protection of consumer rights,
the equality of the rights of persons). Among
the cases in this category, particular attention
should be paid to three cases.
Firstly, in one of its cases, the Constitutional
Court had to assess the constitutionality
5
For more information on this case, see Chapter IV.1 of this report.
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