2016 Global Review of Constitutional Law

Slovakia
DEVELOPMENTS IN SLOVAK CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Tomáš Ľalík, Associate Professor, Comenius University; Kamil Baraník, Assistant
Professor, Comenius University; Šimon Drugda, LLM Candidate, Nagoya University
SLOVAKIA
THE CONSTITUTION AND THE
COURT
Slovakia became independent in 1993, with
the peaceful dissolution of the Czech and
Slovak Federal Republic. Its Constitution,
adopted already in 1992, fashioned a parliamentary
model of government and constitutional
supremacy. It divides the state powers
between the National Council (NC), a unicameral
legislature composed of 150 MPs;
the government; the presidency; and the judiciary.
An amendment to the Constitution in 1999
introduced direct election of the president to
the initial design. However, it is the government
that wields most executive powers and
bears the responsibility for their exercise to
the NC. The Constitutional Court of the Slovak
Republic (CC) is the principal guardian
of the Constitution (Art 124). A special body,
the Court is separate from the general judiciary.
The Constitution can be amended by a qualified
majority of 90 MPs, whereby the NC
turns into the constitution-maker. The Constitution
has already been changed 16 times
since its adoption (Figure 1), with the last direct
amendment adopted on March 30, 2017.
Most of the amendments were fairly inconsequential,
but a few managed to stir the
institutional equilibrium: the introduction
of the popular presidential election (1999);
a major pre-EU constitutional overhaul in
2001; establishment of the Judicial Council
to enhance the independence of the judiciary
(2001); or the introduction of Ombudsman.
These changes had important knock-on effects
that still resonate within the fabric
of Slovak constitutional law. The practice
of constitutional government was not yet
“liquidated” at the end of the millennium,
and relationships especially within the executive,
between the directly elected president
and government of the time, proved to be
problematic. The CC oft needed to guard and
interpret the Constitution in conflicts, as well
as mediate between the political branches at
the same time.
The CC was established to serve as the last
check in constitutional disputes. It wields
powers to 21 different types of proceedings
(the newest one is to review executive pardons;
March 2017 amendment). The Court
hears cases in the plenary sessions, or in one
of its four three-member Senates. The most
prominent of the Court’s powers is an abstract
constitutional review. The Court acts
as the Kelsenian negative legislator (Art 125)
to review parliamentary legislation against
the Constitution and its material principles.
Second, the CC is the ultimate interpreter of
the Constitution in interpretive disputes (Art
128), thereby, perhaps, acting as the “junior”
partner of the constitution-maker. 1 Both constitutional
interpretation and review are vested
in the Plenum and enjoy generally binding
effect (erga omnes). The Senates conduct the
concrete review in cases of alleged violation
of individuals’ constitutional rights (Art
127).
The CC normally seats 13 judges, appointed
for non-renewable 12-year terms (Art 134).
The NC nominates a double number of candidates
for each vacancy on the Court by a
1
To paraphrase Aharon Barak, The Judge in Democracy (Princeton University Press 2006). This is observable
in the pattern of constitutional interpretations, which come in periods of amendment dead spots.
But constitutional interpretation has its limits.
2016 Global Review of Constitutional Law | 181