2016 Global Review of Constitutional Law
I-CONnect–Clough Center collaboration.
I-CONnect–Clough Center collaboration.
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into force <strong>of</strong> the Fourth Amendment to the<br />
Fundamental <strong>Law</strong>, the Head <strong>of</strong> the Curia and<br />
the Chief Public Prosecutor can also submit<br />
a proposal for a review <strong>of</strong> constitutionality.<br />
The new regulation can still be qualified<br />
in this regard as a very restrictive one as<br />
to the control <strong>of</strong> legislation especially in<br />
comparison to the former solutions.<br />
DEVELOPMENTS AND<br />
CONTROVERSIES IN <strong>2016</strong><br />
As a result <strong>of</strong> a constitutional amendment<br />
in November 2010, a serious limitation<br />
<strong>of</strong> the competences <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Constitutional</strong><br />
Court was introduced. According to this<br />
amendment, the <strong>Constitutional</strong> Court may<br />
assess the constitutionality <strong>of</strong> acts related<br />
to the state budget, central taxes, duties and<br />
contributions, custom duties, and central<br />
conditions for local taxes exclusively in<br />
connection with the rights to life and human<br />
dignity, the protection <strong>of</strong> personal data,<br />
the freedom <strong>of</strong> thought, conscience and<br />
religion, or with rights related to Hungarian<br />
citizenship. Also, the Court may only annul<br />
these acts in cases <strong>of</strong> violation <strong>of</strong> the abovementioned<br />
rights. The restriction <strong>of</strong> the<br />
<strong>Constitutional</strong> Court’s competences was<br />
the answer <strong>of</strong> the alliance <strong>of</strong> the governing<br />
parties to a CC decision, which annulled a<br />
law on a certain tax imposed with retroactive<br />
effect. From 2010 to 2013, the two-thirds<br />
majority having the competence to adopt<br />
constitutional amendments overruled other<br />
decisions <strong>of</strong> the CC as well. 1 As a result <strong>of</strong><br />
the new system, the control <strong>of</strong> the legislation<br />
and the government (strictly cooperating with<br />
each other in this parliamentary democracy)<br />
became more difficult as the initiatives for<br />
the constitutional review <strong>of</strong> the problematic<br />
pieces <strong>of</strong> legislation became more frequent<br />
in procedures attached to concrete judicial<br />
cases, launched in constitutional complaint<br />
procedures. The high non-admissibility <strong>of</strong><br />
these constitutional complaints meant a<br />
severe restriction on the number <strong>of</strong> cases<br />
examined on the merits by the <strong>Constitutional</strong><br />
Court. 2<br />
Although the new provisions in the<br />
Fundamental <strong>Law</strong> on the competencies <strong>of</strong><br />
the <strong>Constitutional</strong> Court provide for several<br />
procedures to initiate the review <strong>of</strong> a piece<br />
<strong>of</strong> legislation, in reality, due to the abovementioned<br />
“court-packing” and the modified<br />
ways <strong>of</strong> the election <strong>of</strong> the members and<br />
the president, plus due to the competence<br />
restrictions, the <strong>Constitutional</strong> Court has lost<br />
much <strong>of</strong> its actual relevance compared to the<br />
period before 2010.<br />
The changes mentioned in Part II have led<br />
to a change in understanding the protection<br />
<strong>of</strong> the constitution and the protection <strong>of</strong><br />
constitutionality differently. We explain<br />
the result <strong>of</strong> this different understanding in<br />
Part IV with the <strong>2016</strong> cases. Interpretation<br />
<strong>of</strong> the CC has changed significantly<br />
towards a more deferential understanding<br />
<strong>of</strong> constitutionality. To summarize, not only<br />
the institutional challenges or the changes<br />
in the competence <strong>of</strong> the Court are worth<br />
mentioning when it comes to the Hungarian<br />
<strong>Constitutional</strong> Court but also, partly as a<br />
result <strong>of</strong> this, the actual composition <strong>of</strong> the<br />
judicial body. The change in the composition<br />
has led to a change in the understanding <strong>of</strong><br />
constitutionality. The cases below will show<br />
that the majority <strong>of</strong> the Court is willing to<br />
accept political proposals formulated as<br />
legislative acts and show deference for<br />
the legislative majority in sensitive cases.<br />
Sovereignty, democracy or the rule <strong>of</strong> law<br />
are understood differently from earlier<br />
concepts developed by the CC. This process<br />
is accelerated by the Fundamental <strong>Law</strong>’s<br />
closing and miscellaneous provisions where<br />
it is declared that <strong>Constitutional</strong> Court<br />
decisions issued prior to the entry into force<br />
<strong>of</strong> the Fundamental <strong>Law</strong> are repealed. Not<br />
only has the relation to former case law<br />
changed significantly in recent years but also<br />
the relation <strong>of</strong> the Hungarian constitutional<br />
order to its European and international<br />
counterparts. In <strong>2016</strong> the CC made<br />
reservations in the majority opinion with<br />
regard to the law <strong>of</strong> the European Union and<br />
dissenting opinions questioned the relevance<br />
<strong>of</strong> ECtHR decisions in the domestic<br />
constitutional interpretation <strong>of</strong> fundamental<br />
rights. It is also a major dilemma <strong>of</strong> <strong>2016</strong><br />
how the interpretation <strong>of</strong> the constitution<br />
is ruled by the Fundamental <strong>Law</strong>. The<br />
Fundamental <strong>Law</strong> declares in Article R (3)<br />
that the provisions <strong>of</strong> the Fundamental <strong>Law</strong><br />
shall be interpreted in accordance with their<br />
purposes, with the Avowal <strong>of</strong> National Faith<br />
(Preamble), and with the achievements <strong>of</strong><br />
our historical constitution. In <strong>2016</strong>, the<br />
<strong>Constitutional</strong> Court has started to take this<br />
provision seriously as we will see in Decision<br />
22/<strong>2016</strong> (XII. 5.) below.<br />
MAJOR CASES<br />
Decisions on elections and direct<br />
democracy’s impact on political competition<br />
In 2014, for the first time Hungarian<br />
citizens without residency in Hungary could<br />
participate in parliamentary elections and<br />
vote by postal voting. At the same time, postal<br />
voting is not allowed to Hungarian citizens<br />
residing in Hungary but who are abroad on<br />
election day. In Decision 3086/<strong>2016</strong> (IV.<br />
26.), the CC held that this difference in<br />
treatment did not violate the right to free<br />
elections (Article XXIII <strong>of</strong> Fundamental<br />
<strong>Law</strong>) and the right to non-discrimination<br />
(Article XV).<br />
According to the Court, the residence<br />
requirement expresses that residents have<br />
a more intensive connection to the political<br />
community so it can be expected that those<br />
voters will be at home on election day or go<br />
to an embassy or a consulate to cast a vote.<br />
The other argument was that although the<br />
possibility <strong>of</strong> voting by post seems to be an<br />
advantage, it should be regarded together<br />
with the electoral system, which gives nonresident<br />
voters only one vote for party lists<br />
(while resident voters can vote both for<br />
single member candidates and party lists),<br />
which is a disadvantage for non-resident<br />
voters. The easier method <strong>of</strong> voting was<br />
therefore considered by the Court to be<br />
a form <strong>of</strong> compensation for them. In our<br />
opinion, this raises serious concerns as to the<br />
principle <strong>of</strong> effective citizenship: that while<br />
1<br />
European Commission for Democracy through <strong>Law</strong> (Venice Commission), Opinion on the Fourth Amendment to the Fundamental <strong>Law</strong> <strong>of</strong> Hungary [CDL-<br />
AD(2013)012] 83.<br />
2<br />
The <strong>Constitutional</strong> Court <strong>of</strong> Hungary, ’Statistics’ accessed 14 February 2017.<br />
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