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2016 Global Review of Constitutional Law

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into force <strong>of</strong> the Fourth Amendment to the<br />

Fundamental <strong>Law</strong>, the Head <strong>of</strong> the Curia and<br />

the Chief Public Prosecutor can also submit<br />

a proposal for a review <strong>of</strong> constitutionality.<br />

The new regulation can still be qualified<br />

in this regard as a very restrictive one as<br />

to the control <strong>of</strong> legislation especially in<br />

comparison to the former solutions.<br />

DEVELOPMENTS AND<br />

CONTROVERSIES IN <strong>2016</strong><br />

As a result <strong>of</strong> a constitutional amendment<br />

in November 2010, a serious limitation<br />

<strong>of</strong> the competences <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Constitutional</strong><br />

Court was introduced. According to this<br />

amendment, the <strong>Constitutional</strong> Court may<br />

assess the constitutionality <strong>of</strong> acts related<br />

to the state budget, central taxes, duties and<br />

contributions, custom duties, and central<br />

conditions for local taxes exclusively in<br />

connection with the rights to life and human<br />

dignity, the protection <strong>of</strong> personal data,<br />

the freedom <strong>of</strong> thought, conscience and<br />

religion, or with rights related to Hungarian<br />

citizenship. Also, the Court may only annul<br />

these acts in cases <strong>of</strong> violation <strong>of</strong> the abovementioned<br />

rights. The restriction <strong>of</strong> the<br />

<strong>Constitutional</strong> Court’s competences was<br />

the answer <strong>of</strong> the alliance <strong>of</strong> the governing<br />

parties to a CC decision, which annulled a<br />

law on a certain tax imposed with retroactive<br />

effect. From 2010 to 2013, the two-thirds<br />

majority having the competence to adopt<br />

constitutional amendments overruled other<br />

decisions <strong>of</strong> the CC as well. 1 As a result <strong>of</strong><br />

the new system, the control <strong>of</strong> the legislation<br />

and the government (strictly cooperating with<br />

each other in this parliamentary democracy)<br />

became more difficult as the initiatives for<br />

the constitutional review <strong>of</strong> the problematic<br />

pieces <strong>of</strong> legislation became more frequent<br />

in procedures attached to concrete judicial<br />

cases, launched in constitutional complaint<br />

procedures. The high non-admissibility <strong>of</strong><br />

these constitutional complaints meant a<br />

severe restriction on the number <strong>of</strong> cases<br />

examined on the merits by the <strong>Constitutional</strong><br />

Court. 2<br />

Although the new provisions in the<br />

Fundamental <strong>Law</strong> on the competencies <strong>of</strong><br />

the <strong>Constitutional</strong> Court provide for several<br />

procedures to initiate the review <strong>of</strong> a piece<br />

<strong>of</strong> legislation, in reality, due to the abovementioned<br />

“court-packing” and the modified<br />

ways <strong>of</strong> the election <strong>of</strong> the members and<br />

the president, plus due to the competence<br />

restrictions, the <strong>Constitutional</strong> Court has lost<br />

much <strong>of</strong> its actual relevance compared to the<br />

period before 2010.<br />

The changes mentioned in Part II have led<br />

to a change in understanding the protection<br />

<strong>of</strong> the constitution and the protection <strong>of</strong><br />

constitutionality differently. We explain<br />

the result <strong>of</strong> this different understanding in<br />

Part IV with the <strong>2016</strong> cases. Interpretation<br />

<strong>of</strong> the CC has changed significantly<br />

towards a more deferential understanding<br />

<strong>of</strong> constitutionality. To summarize, not only<br />

the institutional challenges or the changes<br />

in the competence <strong>of</strong> the Court are worth<br />

mentioning when it comes to the Hungarian<br />

<strong>Constitutional</strong> Court but also, partly as a<br />

result <strong>of</strong> this, the actual composition <strong>of</strong> the<br />

judicial body. The change in the composition<br />

has led to a change in the understanding <strong>of</strong><br />

constitutionality. The cases below will show<br />

that the majority <strong>of</strong> the Court is willing to<br />

accept political proposals formulated as<br />

legislative acts and show deference for<br />

the legislative majority in sensitive cases.<br />

Sovereignty, democracy or the rule <strong>of</strong> law<br />

are understood differently from earlier<br />

concepts developed by the CC. This process<br />

is accelerated by the Fundamental <strong>Law</strong>’s<br />

closing and miscellaneous provisions where<br />

it is declared that <strong>Constitutional</strong> Court<br />

decisions issued prior to the entry into force<br />

<strong>of</strong> the Fundamental <strong>Law</strong> are repealed. Not<br />

only has the relation to former case law<br />

changed significantly in recent years but also<br />

the relation <strong>of</strong> the Hungarian constitutional<br />

order to its European and international<br />

counterparts. In <strong>2016</strong> the CC made<br />

reservations in the majority opinion with<br />

regard to the law <strong>of</strong> the European Union and<br />

dissenting opinions questioned the relevance<br />

<strong>of</strong> ECtHR decisions in the domestic<br />

constitutional interpretation <strong>of</strong> fundamental<br />

rights. It is also a major dilemma <strong>of</strong> <strong>2016</strong><br />

how the interpretation <strong>of</strong> the constitution<br />

is ruled by the Fundamental <strong>Law</strong>. The<br />

Fundamental <strong>Law</strong> declares in Article R (3)<br />

that the provisions <strong>of</strong> the Fundamental <strong>Law</strong><br />

shall be interpreted in accordance with their<br />

purposes, with the Avowal <strong>of</strong> National Faith<br />

(Preamble), and with the achievements <strong>of</strong><br />

our historical constitution. In <strong>2016</strong>, the<br />

<strong>Constitutional</strong> Court has started to take this<br />

provision seriously as we will see in Decision<br />

22/<strong>2016</strong> (XII. 5.) below.<br />

MAJOR CASES<br />

Decisions on elections and direct<br />

democracy’s impact on political competition<br />

In 2014, for the first time Hungarian<br />

citizens without residency in Hungary could<br />

participate in parliamentary elections and<br />

vote by postal voting. At the same time, postal<br />

voting is not allowed to Hungarian citizens<br />

residing in Hungary but who are abroad on<br />

election day. In Decision 3086/<strong>2016</strong> (IV.<br />

26.), the CC held that this difference in<br />

treatment did not violate the right to free<br />

elections (Article XXIII <strong>of</strong> Fundamental<br />

<strong>Law</strong>) and the right to non-discrimination<br />

(Article XV).<br />

According to the Court, the residence<br />

requirement expresses that residents have<br />

a more intensive connection to the political<br />

community so it can be expected that those<br />

voters will be at home on election day or go<br />

to an embassy or a consulate to cast a vote.<br />

The other argument was that although the<br />

possibility <strong>of</strong> voting by post seems to be an<br />

advantage, it should be regarded together<br />

with the electoral system, which gives nonresident<br />

voters only one vote for party lists<br />

(while resident voters can vote both for<br />

single member candidates and party lists),<br />

which is a disadvantage for non-resident<br />

voters. The easier method <strong>of</strong> voting was<br />

therefore considered by the Court to be<br />

a form <strong>of</strong> compensation for them. In our<br />

opinion, this raises serious concerns as to the<br />

principle <strong>of</strong> effective citizenship: that while<br />

1<br />

European Commission for Democracy through <strong>Law</strong> (Venice Commission), Opinion on the Fourth Amendment to the Fundamental <strong>Law</strong> <strong>of</strong> Hungary [CDL-<br />

AD(2013)012] 83.<br />

2<br />

The <strong>Constitutional</strong> Court <strong>of</strong> Hungary, ’Statistics’ accessed 14 February 2017.<br />

78 | I•CONnect-Clough Center

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