2016 Global Review of Constitutional Law
I-CONnect–Clough Center collaboration.
I-CONnect–Clough Center collaboration.
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ions, or even merely a statement aligning<br />
with the primary opinion. Dissents are rare.<br />
This strong consensus norm is, however,<br />
weakened by occasional dissensus on justification<br />
even where there is agreement on<br />
whether the appeal is allowed or refused. All<br />
judgments are read in open court.<br />
The business <strong>of</strong> the Court is mainly private<br />
law (including commercial law), criminal<br />
law and civil procedure. While rights cases<br />
are uncommon, constitutional rights are<br />
sometimes considered in criminal appeals.<br />
That said, the Court’s output is low in rights<br />
jurisprudence, international law and social<br />
policy.<br />
THE CONSTITUTION AND THE<br />
COURT<br />
The jurisdiction <strong>of</strong> the Supreme Court is<br />
set out directly in the Nigerian Constitution<br />
(sections 222, 223). While it has no advisory<br />
jurisdiction (abolished since 1963), it has<br />
limited original jurisdiction. But its purely<br />
appellate jurisdiction is the source <strong>of</strong> at least<br />
99 percent <strong>of</strong> caseload annually (100 percent<br />
in <strong>2016</strong>). The Supreme Court has the exclusive<br />
jurisdiction to hear appeals from the<br />
Court <strong>of</strong> Appeal, every decision <strong>of</strong> which is<br />
potentially appealable to the Supreme Court,<br />
at least with leave <strong>of</strong> either Court. Leave is<br />
not required for any appeal from decisions<br />
<strong>of</strong> the Court <strong>of</strong> Appeal in any civil or criminal<br />
proceedings on any question <strong>of</strong> law, or<br />
any question as to the interpretation or application<br />
<strong>of</strong> the Constitution. In addition, the<br />
Supreme Court must hear an appeal on any<br />
question as to whether any <strong>of</strong> the fundamental<br />
human rights provisions have been, are<br />
or are likely to be contravened in relation to<br />
any person, or an appeal for review <strong>of</strong> a death<br />
sentence imposed by a lower court. It may<br />
also hear appeals from the Court <strong>of</strong> Appeal<br />
on any question as to whether a person has<br />
been validly elected under the Constitution<br />
to the <strong>of</strong>fice <strong>of</strong> President, Vice President,<br />
Governor, or Deputy Governor, or whether<br />
the term <strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong>fice has expired or has ceased,<br />
or whether the <strong>of</strong>fice has become vacant.<br />
The original jurisdiction enables direct access<br />
to the Supreme Court in legal disputes<br />
between the central government and the<br />
States, or between the central legislature and<br />
the President or a State or a State legislature.<br />
This jurisdiction therefore serves federalism<br />
and the separation <strong>of</strong> powers functions. In<br />
addition, there is a quasi-original jurisdiction<br />
to entertain reference <strong>of</strong> ‘substantial<br />
questions <strong>of</strong> law’ from the Court <strong>of</strong> Appeal. 3<br />
Because <strong>of</strong> its extensive jurisdiction, the<br />
business <strong>of</strong> the Supreme Court consists<br />
mostly <strong>of</strong> mandatory appeals. It has no effective<br />
means <strong>of</strong> regulating the volume or<br />
content <strong>of</strong> its docket, and hence has almost<br />
no influence on its agenda. The result is that<br />
the Court is under severe caseload pressure<br />
and has significant arrears <strong>of</strong> work, mostly<br />
routine appeals. Except for criminal appeals<br />
and a few other categories, it takes perhaps<br />
up to ten years before an appeal is heard.<br />
DEVELOPMENTS AND<br />
CONTROVERSIES IN <strong>2016</strong><br />
Appointments to the Supreme Court, including<br />
the Chief Justice, are made by the<br />
President on the recommendation <strong>of</strong> the<br />
National Judicial Council (NJC). This twenty-member<br />
body, established by the extant<br />
Nigerian Constitution (1999), has a mandate<br />
that includes recommending persons for<br />
appointment to the superior courts and the<br />
headships <strong>of</strong> the courts, including the Chief<br />
Justice <strong>of</strong> Nigeria. In October <strong>2016</strong>, on the<br />
eve <strong>of</strong> the retirement <strong>of</strong> the 15th Chief Justice,<br />
the Council recommended to the President<br />
to appoint the ranking Justice, Walter<br />
Onnoghen, as the sixteenth Chief Justice. It<br />
has been a consistent practice since the appointment<br />
<strong>of</strong> the fifth Chief Justice in 1979<br />
for the recruitment <strong>of</strong> the Chief Justice to be<br />
made from within the Supreme Court strictly<br />
based on seniority. Ten successive appointments<br />
<strong>of</strong> Chief Justices spanning democratic<br />
rule and military dictatorship (1983, 1985,<br />
1987, 1995, 2006, 2007, 2009, 2011, 2012,<br />
and 2014) have adhered to the seniority preference.<br />
It was a surprise, therefore, that the<br />
President delayed accepting the recommendation<br />
<strong>of</strong> the NJC for four months (although<br />
in the meantime he appointed Justice Onnoghen<br />
as Acting Chief Justice immediately,<br />
the fifteenth Chief Justice retired in November<br />
<strong>2016</strong>).<br />
Although the government did not make its<br />
position <strong>of</strong>ficially known, it was clear that<br />
its view was that the recommendation <strong>of</strong> the<br />
NJC on the appointment <strong>of</strong> a Chief Justice<br />
was not necessarily binding. While it had<br />
some support within the legal pr<strong>of</strong>ession and<br />
the public, the government’s position was<br />
generally considered unfavourably as a thinly<br />
veiled attempt to take control the judiciary.<br />
Even if the position taken was noble, it<br />
was clearly misguided. Section 231(1) <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Constitution provides that,<br />
The appointment <strong>of</strong> a person to the <strong>of</strong>fice<br />
<strong>of</strong> the Chief Justice <strong>of</strong> Nigeria shall<br />
be made by the President on the recommendation<br />
<strong>of</strong> the National Judicial<br />
Council subject to confirmation <strong>of</strong> such<br />
appointment by the Senate.<br />
Before the present Nigerian Constitution,<br />
which created the NJC, the appointment <strong>of</strong><br />
the Chief Justice was firmly in the hands <strong>of</strong><br />
the executive. Under the 1960 Independence<br />
Constitution, the appointment was made by<br />
the Governor General on the advice <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Prime Minister, 4 and in the 1979 Constitution<br />
the appointment was ‘made by the President<br />
in his discretion.’ 5 The difference between<br />
the two was that the former was a Westminster-type<br />
constitution, with executive power<br />
vested in the Prime Minister and his cabinet,<br />
while the latter is a presidential constitution.<br />
There is, however, a clear shift in the present<br />
Constitution. The President is merely the titular<br />
appointor with only the power <strong>of</strong> formal<br />
appointment. He no longer has a free hand<br />
to select the Chief Justice, and indeed has no<br />
discretion at all since the NJC recommends<br />
only one person for appointment. In such a<br />
system, the best practice is that the recommendation<br />
is binding and where, in excep-<br />
3<br />
Constitution, s 295(3).<br />
4<br />
S 105(1).<br />
5<br />
S 211(1).<br />
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