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2016 Global Review of Constitutional Law

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ions, or even merely a statement aligning<br />

with the primary opinion. Dissents are rare.<br />

This strong consensus norm is, however,<br />

weakened by occasional dissensus on justification<br />

even where there is agreement on<br />

whether the appeal is allowed or refused. All<br />

judgments are read in open court.<br />

The business <strong>of</strong> the Court is mainly private<br />

law (including commercial law), criminal<br />

law and civil procedure. While rights cases<br />

are uncommon, constitutional rights are<br />

sometimes considered in criminal appeals.<br />

That said, the Court’s output is low in rights<br />

jurisprudence, international law and social<br />

policy.<br />

THE CONSTITUTION AND THE<br />

COURT<br />

The jurisdiction <strong>of</strong> the Supreme Court is<br />

set out directly in the Nigerian Constitution<br />

(sections 222, 223). While it has no advisory<br />

jurisdiction (abolished since 1963), it has<br />

limited original jurisdiction. But its purely<br />

appellate jurisdiction is the source <strong>of</strong> at least<br />

99 percent <strong>of</strong> caseload annually (100 percent<br />

in <strong>2016</strong>). The Supreme Court has the exclusive<br />

jurisdiction to hear appeals from the<br />

Court <strong>of</strong> Appeal, every decision <strong>of</strong> which is<br />

potentially appealable to the Supreme Court,<br />

at least with leave <strong>of</strong> either Court. Leave is<br />

not required for any appeal from decisions<br />

<strong>of</strong> the Court <strong>of</strong> Appeal in any civil or criminal<br />

proceedings on any question <strong>of</strong> law, or<br />

any question as to the interpretation or application<br />

<strong>of</strong> the Constitution. In addition, the<br />

Supreme Court must hear an appeal on any<br />

question as to whether any <strong>of</strong> the fundamental<br />

human rights provisions have been, are<br />

or are likely to be contravened in relation to<br />

any person, or an appeal for review <strong>of</strong> a death<br />

sentence imposed by a lower court. It may<br />

also hear appeals from the Court <strong>of</strong> Appeal<br />

on any question as to whether a person has<br />

been validly elected under the Constitution<br />

to the <strong>of</strong>fice <strong>of</strong> President, Vice President,<br />

Governor, or Deputy Governor, or whether<br />

the term <strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong>fice has expired or has ceased,<br />

or whether the <strong>of</strong>fice has become vacant.<br />

The original jurisdiction enables direct access<br />

to the Supreme Court in legal disputes<br />

between the central government and the<br />

States, or between the central legislature and<br />

the President or a State or a State legislature.<br />

This jurisdiction therefore serves federalism<br />

and the separation <strong>of</strong> powers functions. In<br />

addition, there is a quasi-original jurisdiction<br />

to entertain reference <strong>of</strong> ‘substantial<br />

questions <strong>of</strong> law’ from the Court <strong>of</strong> Appeal. 3<br />

Because <strong>of</strong> its extensive jurisdiction, the<br />

business <strong>of</strong> the Supreme Court consists<br />

mostly <strong>of</strong> mandatory appeals. It has no effective<br />

means <strong>of</strong> regulating the volume or<br />

content <strong>of</strong> its docket, and hence has almost<br />

no influence on its agenda. The result is that<br />

the Court is under severe caseload pressure<br />

and has significant arrears <strong>of</strong> work, mostly<br />

routine appeals. Except for criminal appeals<br />

and a few other categories, it takes perhaps<br />

up to ten years before an appeal is heard.<br />

DEVELOPMENTS AND<br />

CONTROVERSIES IN <strong>2016</strong><br />

Appointments to the Supreme Court, including<br />

the Chief Justice, are made by the<br />

President on the recommendation <strong>of</strong> the<br />

National Judicial Council (NJC). This twenty-member<br />

body, established by the extant<br />

Nigerian Constitution (1999), has a mandate<br />

that includes recommending persons for<br />

appointment to the superior courts and the<br />

headships <strong>of</strong> the courts, including the Chief<br />

Justice <strong>of</strong> Nigeria. In October <strong>2016</strong>, on the<br />

eve <strong>of</strong> the retirement <strong>of</strong> the 15th Chief Justice,<br />

the Council recommended to the President<br />

to appoint the ranking Justice, Walter<br />

Onnoghen, as the sixteenth Chief Justice. It<br />

has been a consistent practice since the appointment<br />

<strong>of</strong> the fifth Chief Justice in 1979<br />

for the recruitment <strong>of</strong> the Chief Justice to be<br />

made from within the Supreme Court strictly<br />

based on seniority. Ten successive appointments<br />

<strong>of</strong> Chief Justices spanning democratic<br />

rule and military dictatorship (1983, 1985,<br />

1987, 1995, 2006, 2007, 2009, 2011, 2012,<br />

and 2014) have adhered to the seniority preference.<br />

It was a surprise, therefore, that the<br />

President delayed accepting the recommendation<br />

<strong>of</strong> the NJC for four months (although<br />

in the meantime he appointed Justice Onnoghen<br />

as Acting Chief Justice immediately,<br />

the fifteenth Chief Justice retired in November<br />

<strong>2016</strong>).<br />

Although the government did not make its<br />

position <strong>of</strong>ficially known, it was clear that<br />

its view was that the recommendation <strong>of</strong> the<br />

NJC on the appointment <strong>of</strong> a Chief Justice<br />

was not necessarily binding. While it had<br />

some support within the legal pr<strong>of</strong>ession and<br />

the public, the government’s position was<br />

generally considered unfavourably as a thinly<br />

veiled attempt to take control the judiciary.<br />

Even if the position taken was noble, it<br />

was clearly misguided. Section 231(1) <strong>of</strong> the<br />

Constitution provides that,<br />

The appointment <strong>of</strong> a person to the <strong>of</strong>fice<br />

<strong>of</strong> the Chief Justice <strong>of</strong> Nigeria shall<br />

be made by the President on the recommendation<br />

<strong>of</strong> the National Judicial<br />

Council subject to confirmation <strong>of</strong> such<br />

appointment by the Senate.<br />

Before the present Nigerian Constitution,<br />

which created the NJC, the appointment <strong>of</strong><br />

the Chief Justice was firmly in the hands <strong>of</strong><br />

the executive. Under the 1960 Independence<br />

Constitution, the appointment was made by<br />

the Governor General on the advice <strong>of</strong> the<br />

Prime Minister, 4 and in the 1979 Constitution<br />

the appointment was ‘made by the President<br />

in his discretion.’ 5 The difference between<br />

the two was that the former was a Westminster-type<br />

constitution, with executive power<br />

vested in the Prime Minister and his cabinet,<br />

while the latter is a presidential constitution.<br />

There is, however, a clear shift in the present<br />

Constitution. The President is merely the titular<br />

appointor with only the power <strong>of</strong> formal<br />

appointment. He no longer has a free hand<br />

to select the Chief Justice, and indeed has no<br />

discretion at all since the NJC recommends<br />

only one person for appointment. In such a<br />

system, the best practice is that the recommendation<br />

is binding and where, in excep-<br />

3<br />

Constitution, s 295(3).<br />

4<br />

S 105(1).<br />

5<br />

S 211(1).<br />

146 | I•CONnect-Clough Center

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