2016 Global Review of Constitutional Law

cial interests of the Anglophone community
seems to be the only way forward. Second,
the resort to violent suppression of unarmed
demonstrators in order to impose the will of
the ruling elites will certainly restore some
order but can, at best, only provide an uneasy
peace. As the number of unarmed demonstrators
killed by the army increases and the
government continues to deny that there is a
problem, the real risk of anger and frustration
forcing people to resort to terrorism will
increase. A respected former Francophone
minister, who had worked as a governor in
the Anglophone regions, has warned of this
turning into a ‘new Boko Haram.’ 11 Finally,
the current crisis is an excellent illustration
of a defective decentralisation design that
has done nothing more than hand over absolute
power to a small clique.
Cameroon has reached a critical cross-road.
The bi-cultural character of the country is
not only a historical fact but a daily reality
that cannot be ignored or wished away.
As Robert Robertson rightly points out,
‘the creation of effective strategies to handle
the reality of human diversity is one of
humanity’s most pressing challenges, as recent
wars, ethnic cleansing, genocides and
the restless tides of refugees and displaced
persons demonstrate’. 12 Solving Cameroon’s
present predicament needs an urgent solution
at the heart of which is a new credible
decentralised framework in which all citizens
of the country have a stake. There is the
need to make the Anglophone community
feel Anglophone and Cameroonian. There is
no longer any sense in pretending that there
is no Anglophone problem. Nor can it be
simplified further as an Anglophone versus
Francophone problem. It is more of a political
problem created by the ruling elites with
entrenched interest in preserving a ‘divide
and rule’ policy.
It can be argued that a credible decentralisation
design can address these problems.
This will, however, need a fundamental revision
of the present obsolete and dysfunctional
Constitution. In doing this, a leaf can
be borrowed from the Canadian experience
where the French-speaking Quebec province
that had been agitating for secession from
the rest of Canada signed the Meech Lake
Agreement, which could have paved the way
for a major amendment to the Canadian constitution
until it failed to be ratified. Section
2(1)(b) of this Constitutional Amendment
Act proposed to recognise, inter alia, ‘that
Quebec constitutes within Canada a distinct
society’. This provision also proposed to recognise
‘that the existence of French-speaking
Canadians…and English speaking Canadians…constitute
a fundamental characteristic
of Canada.’ An even closer example
to emulate is the Nigerian ‘federal character’
principle, which was first constitutionally
entrenched in the 1979 constitution and is
backed by the Federal Character Commission
(FCC). This Federal Executive body
established by the Federal Character Establishment
Act No 34 of 1996 implements
and enforces the federal character principle
which ensures fairness and equity in the distribution
of public posts and socio-economic
infrastructures among the various federating
units of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.
This body also ensures that appointments to
public service institutions fairly reflect the
linguistic, ethnic, religious, and geographic
diversity of the country.
In the light of the above, it is contended
that the only way to resolve the present political
crisis in Cameroon in a peaceful and
sustainable manner that addresses the perception
of Anglophone marginalisation and
exclusion from the benefits of the nations’
resources and accommodate the secessionist
threats is to design an asymmetrical decentralised
system which recognises the two
distinct cultures in the country. One of the
critical features of such a framework is the
constitutional entrenchment and protection
of a bi-cultural principle which recognises
the two inherited cultures based on dynamic
equity. A fundamental aspect of the bi-cultural
principle must be a requirement that
all institutions, laws, policies, practices, and
appointments to public posts must comply
with the bi-cultural character of the country.
A national commission must be established
under the Constitution to supervise
the implementation and enforcement of this
principle. There is thus need for a constitutionally
entrenched and legally enforceable
framework that recognises and protects the
two distinct cultures on an equitable basis.
A constitutionally entrenched ‘regional character
principle’ is needed to ensure equity
and prevent nepotism and any feelings of
exclusion and marginalisation. Ultimately,
as in many conflict situations, a carefully designed
decentralisation framework offers the
best way to deal with the Cameroonian crisis
than the militarily imposed peace sought by
the ruling political elites.
11
See, David Abouem à Tchoyi, ‘Cameroun – Opinion: Le problème Anglophone pourrait devenir le noveau Boko Haram,’ http://www.cameroon-info.net/
article/cameroun-opinion-le-probleme-anglophone-pourrait-devenir-le-nouveau-boko-haram-278841.html (accessed in February 2017). In fact, the Boko
Haram insurgency in the northern part of Cameroon and Nigeria is a reminder of the dangers of exclusion and marginalisation, whether perceived or actual.
12
In, The Three Waves of Globalization: A History of a Developing Global Consciousness (Fernwood Publishing and Zed Books 2003), 13.
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