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2016 Global Review of Constitutional Law

I-CONnect–Clough Center collaboration.

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Following a similar logic, the BCC invalidated<br />

a question on whether the regional<br />

directors <strong>of</strong> police should be directly elected.<br />

The judges held that the appointment <strong>of</strong><br />

directors is a prerogative <strong>of</strong> the Executive,<br />

ins<strong>of</strong>ar as direct election has the capacity to<br />

affect the balance <strong>of</strong> powers and therefore<br />

requires a GNA.<br />

The third invalidated question related to the<br />

possibility <strong>of</strong> electronic voting. A referendum<br />

on this question had already been carried<br />

out and although its turnout failed to pass<br />

the legal threshold for binding referendums,<br />

the Parliament deliberated to introduce electronic<br />

voting once the technical possibilities<br />

had been explored. Mainly because <strong>of</strong> that,<br />

the BCC held that another referendum on the<br />

same issue would undermine the principle <strong>of</strong><br />

legal certainty and thus the rule <strong>of</strong> law. Also,<br />

it would force the Parliament to disrespect<br />

its own lawful decisions, which would constitute<br />

a violation <strong>of</strong> the constitutional status<br />

<strong>of</strong> the legislature.<br />

The referendum was ultimately carried out<br />

on the three other questions which were upheld<br />

by the BCC. These dealt with the character<br />

<strong>of</strong> the electoral system and mandatory<br />

voting. The organisers <strong>of</strong> the referendum bitterly<br />

attacked the BCC and the President for<br />

trying to “obstruct the will <strong>of</strong> the people”.<br />

Decision 6/<strong>2016</strong> from 14 June <strong>2016</strong>, case<br />

number 1/<strong>2016</strong><br />

This case stemmed from the biggest banking<br />

crisis in the country since 1997—the 2014<br />

bankruptcy <strong>of</strong> the Corporate Commercial<br />

Bank, the fourth biggest bank in the country.<br />

The closure <strong>of</strong> the bank ultimately led to the<br />

resignation <strong>of</strong> the government and pre-term<br />

elections. In this case, the BCC was asked<br />

to assess the constitutionality <strong>of</strong> the law on<br />

bankruptcy, according to which only the<br />

Prosecutors and the bank syndics (<strong>of</strong>ficials<br />

appointed by public bodies to be in charge <strong>of</strong><br />

the insolvent bank) are entitled to judicially<br />

challenge the decision to declare the bank<br />

insolvent. Shareholders and the owners <strong>of</strong><br />

the bank were not entitled to appeal this decision,<br />

which—as argued by the challengers<br />

from the Supreme Court <strong>of</strong> Cassation—violated<br />

their rights and the principle <strong>of</strong> the rule<br />

<strong>of</strong> law.<br />

The BCC rejected these claims by stating<br />

that the declaration <strong>of</strong> a bank in insolvency<br />

is a very specialised procedure in which the<br />

interests <strong>of</strong> depositors are paramount. The<br />

Court held that its power to review decisions<br />

<strong>of</strong> specialised bodies is limited in such cases,<br />

and although the judges saw flaws in the<br />

law, they deferred to the judgment <strong>of</strong> the legislature.<br />

The challengers’ claims <strong>of</strong> lack <strong>of</strong><br />

legal protection and violation <strong>of</strong> the equality<br />

<strong>of</strong> arms principle were also rejected on these<br />

grounds. All in all, the BCC declined to protect<br />

the rights <strong>of</strong> the owners and shareholders<br />

in this controversial judgment on the basis <strong>of</strong><br />

the extraordinary character <strong>of</strong> the situation,<br />

which implied greater deference to the discretion<br />

<strong>of</strong> political and expert bodies.<br />

Decision 3/<strong>2016</strong> from 8 March <strong>2016</strong>, case<br />

number 6/2015<br />

In the area <strong>of</strong> healthcare rights, the BCC has<br />

been traditionally deferential to the legislature.<br />

In this case, however, the judges overruled<br />

a relatively central element <strong>of</strong> a healthcare<br />

reform proposed by the government. The<br />

reform aimed at introducing two distinct tiers<br />

<strong>of</strong> public medical services. Under the first tier,<br />

supposed to cover the most common and most<br />

serious medical conditions, all citizens would<br />

have instant access to services as guaranteed<br />

by their standard healthcare insurance. For the<br />

second tier, they would either have to enter<br />

a waiting list or pay an additional amount <strong>of</strong><br />

money in order to gain immediate access to<br />

healthcare. The judges agreed that the Parliament<br />

had the right to introduce such a reform.<br />

The BCC found, however, that it was for the<br />

Minister <strong>of</strong> Healthcare to define the services<br />

under the two tiers. The Court argued that<br />

the Constitution required that such decisions<br />

needed to be taken only through the passage<br />

<strong>of</strong> parliamentary legislation and not by an administrative<br />

normative act because they affect<br />

inalienable rights. As to other aspects <strong>of</strong> the<br />

healthcare reform, the Court again showed a<br />

considerable deference to the will <strong>of</strong> the legislator.<br />

8<br />

Rights and Freedoms<br />

Decision 11/<strong>2016</strong> from 4 October <strong>2016</strong>,<br />

case number 7/<strong>2016</strong><br />

In a concrete referral from 28 April <strong>2016</strong>, the<br />

SAC challenged the procedural lack <strong>of</strong> an<br />

appeal mechanism against juvenile detention<br />

orders. This constituted a possible violation<br />

<strong>of</strong> the Constitution, which requires judicial<br />

control to be exercised over the legality <strong>of</strong><br />

any detention. In support <strong>of</strong> its application,<br />

the SAC invoked the judgment in the A and<br />

others v. Bulgaria case where the ECtHR<br />

held Bulgaria in violation <strong>of</strong> the ECHR for<br />

not providing a legal remedy for detainees to<br />

judicially appeal juvenile detention orders. 9<br />

The BCC proclaimed that the Prosecutor’s<br />

Office, which authorises juvenile detentions,<br />

belonged to the judiciary so that, strictly<br />

speaking, a judicial body was involved in<br />

the detention process. Notwithstanding this<br />

finding, the Court qualified detention orders<br />

by the Prosecution as individual administrative<br />

acts which are challengeable before<br />

the regular courts. Although the challenged<br />

norm did not explicitly mention an appeal<br />

mechanism, the Court ruled that such remedy<br />

was implied in the constitutional order on<br />

the grounds mentioned above. The contested<br />

norm was thus declared not to be unconstitutional.<br />

The Court explained that ECtHR’s<br />

opposite finding was related to the fact that<br />

the Bulgarian Government, in its role as defendant<br />

in the A. and others v. Bulgaria case,<br />

had argued mistakenly that detentions could<br />

not be judicially appealed, while in fact, the<br />

constitutional order implicitly allowed such<br />

challenges before the ordinary courts.<br />

This decision raises several concerns with<br />

regard to the legal regime <strong>of</strong> juvenile detention<br />

in Bulgaria. On the one hand, the Prosecutor’s<br />

Office, when exercising its detention<br />

authority, is considered part <strong>of</strong> the judiciary<br />

and thus exempted from additional judicial<br />

scrutiny under article 30.3 <strong>of</strong> the Constitution.<br />

At the same time, however, juvenile<br />

detention acts <strong>of</strong> the Prosecutor are considered<br />

ordinary administrative acts, which are<br />

individually challengeable under Art 120.<br />

8<br />

See decision 8/<strong>2016</strong>, case 9/2015.<br />

9<br />

ECtHR, A. and Others v. Bulgaria, no. 51776/08, 29 November 2011.<br />

<strong>2016</strong> <strong>Global</strong> <strong>Review</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Constitutional</strong> <strong>Law</strong> | 35

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