La Red de Alta Velocidad Europea: Más un mosaico poco efectivo que una realidad

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35 Table 5 - Overview of costs per km and comparison with estimates Audited line Total length (km) Total cost (million euro)** Initial estimated cost (million euro) Actual cost overrun (%) Initial construction cost per km (million euro) Final completion cost per km (million euro) Berlin-Munich 671 14 682 8 337 76.1 % 12.4 21.9 Stuttgart-Munich 267 13 273 1 838 622.1 % 6.9 49.7 Rhin-Rhône 138 2 588 2 053 26.1 % 14.9 18.8 LGV Est Européenne 406 6 712 5 238 28.1 % 12.9 16.5 Madrid-Barcelona- French Border 797 12 109 8 740 38.5 % 11.0 15.2 Eje Atlántico 165 2 596 2 055 26.3 % 12.5 15.7 Madrid-León 345 5 415 4 062 33.3 % 11.8 15.7 Madrid-Galicia* 416*** 5 714*** n/a n/a n/a 13.7*** Turin-Salerno* 1 007 32 169 n/a n/a n/a 31.9 Milan-Venice* 273 11 856 n/a n/a n/a 43.4 *No cost estimates available at line level, so impossible to estimate potential overruns. **As of the time of the audit and also for non-completed lines: Stuttgart-Munich, Madrid-Galicia and Milan-Venice. ***Calculated on a stretch Medina del Campo-Galicia and therefore excluding the 133 km of overlap with Madrid-León HSL. Source: ECA. All figures are expressed in nominal terms. 54. Delays at project level were also significant: eight of the 30 projects we audited had been delayed by at least one year, and half of the lines (five lines out of the ten audited) had experienced delays of more than one decade. The Milan-Venice line is forecast to have the longest delay compared to initial estimates (18 years). 55. The highest project cost overrun was 83 %, for the “Stuttgart 21” station (Picture 2), which received 726.6 million euro in grants from the EU.
36 Picture 2 - Construction works on the Stuttgart 21 station Source: ECA. 56. For this project, because of unrealistic initial cost estimates for tunnelling in a densely populated city centre, and insufficient assessments of geological, environmental and local community cultural heritage aspects, construction costs have soared. The total construction costs of 4.5 billion euro estimated in 2003 has been increased to 6.5 billion euro in 2013 and to 8.2 billion euro (latest estimate available in January 2018). This means that there is a difference of 3.7 billion euro from the original agreement. So far, all funding partners have refused to cover more than the costs set in the original funding agreement. 57. There will also be a significant delay in completing the works for this station, as it was originally planned that the construction works would be completed by 2008. The start was already delayed from 2001 to 2009, and current estimations are that the works will be completed by 2025.
Page 1 and 2: EN 2018 NO 19 Special Report A Euro
Page 3 and 4: 2 CONTENTS Paragraph Abbreviations
Page 5 and 6: 4 Annex I - European High-Speed Net
Page 7 and 8: 6 ERTMS (European Rail traffic mana
Page 9 and 10: 8 V. The quality of the assessment
Page 11 and 12: 10 (ii) making EU co-funding suppor
Page 13 and 14: 12 all planned high-speed rail infr
Page 15 and 16: 14 Member States, to remove bottlen
Page 17 and 18: 16 13. Although these sums are sign
Page 19 and 20: 18 Figure 4 - Overview of audited l
Page 21 and 22: 20 22. Although the relationship is
Page 23 and 24: 22 two or more Member States, as th
Page 25 and 26: 24 30. This limits the EU added val
Page 27 and 28: 26 Picture 1 - Missing link at the
Page 29 and 30: 28 Decision-making lacks reliable c
Page 31 and 32: 30 Figure 5 - Differences in constr
Page 33 and 34: 32 Table 4 - Cost of the audited hi
Page 35: 34 unrealistic. This was not questi
Page 39 and 40: 38 speed rail. However, when assess
Page 41 and 42: 40 (iv) From Paris to Strasbourg, t
Page 43 and 44: 42 16 km/h 37 . The number of stati
Page 45 and 46: 44 74. To be successful and competi
Page 47 and 48: 46 be successful 43 . In 2016, only
Page 49 and 50: 48 Box 2 - The operations of the Sh
Page 51 and 52: 50 Seamless and competitive cross-b
Page 53 and 54: 52 Picture 5 - Passengers waiting a
Page 55 and 56: 54 90. Directive (EU) No 2012/34/EU
Page 57 and 58: 56 A strong and independent regulat
Page 59 and 60: 58 The principles of sound financia
Page 61 and 62: 60 106. Each Member State must have
Page 63 and 64: 62 6. In the upcoming CEF Regulatio
Page 65 and 66: 64 ANNEX I European High-Speed Netw
Page 68: 66 Country HSL Project Code Project
Page 72: 68 ANNEX IV Key HSR Data per Member
Page 76 and 77: 70 ANNEX VI A citizen’s view: Ass
Page 78 and 79: 72 given to the fastest and slightl
Page 81: 74 Averages by visited country Euro
Page 85 and 86: 76 ANNEX VIII Map of the catchment
Page 87 and 88:
High-Speed Line Eje Atlantico 78
Page 89 and 90:
80 High-Speed Line Est Européenne
Page 91 and 92:
82 High-Speed Line Torino - Salerno
Page 93 and 94:
High-Speed Line Berlin - Munich 84
Page 95 and 96:
86 High-Speed Line Madrid - Lisbon
Page 97 and 98:
88 High-Speed Line Figueres - Perpi
Page 99:
90 Analysis of stations ANNEX IX Co
Page 102 and 103:
XI. The Commission refers to its re
Page 104 and 105:
calculation of the socio-economic v
Page 106 and 107:
depend on the size of the country a
Page 108 and 109:
As regards CEF, the Commission does
Page 110 and 111:
operators, the Commission has recen
Page 112 and 113:
Since 2000, the EU has been investi
Page 114 and 115:
ES los auditores, una velocidad med
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La Red de Alta Velocidad Europea: Más un mosaico poco efectivo que una realidad

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