Organized Crime In The New Millennium

Organized Crime: An Evolving Challenge for U.S. Law Enforcement
characteristics of what he dubs the “Godfather Model”—rigid hierarchy—and the “Facebook
Model”—dynamic network. 123
Advantage: Networks Challenge Law Enforcement
The shift to networked structures may suggest that criminals are more elusive than ever as the
illicit world evolves rapidly, while law enforcement “plays by yesterday’s rules and increasingly
risks dealing only with the weakest criminals and the easiest problems.” 124 According to one
study, when combating agile drug cartels, a number of impediments hobble law enforcement
officials. Most broadly, the hierarchical authority embodied in bureaucratic structures complicates
the decision-making process. 125 Additionally, law enforcement potentially faces
interagency coordination problems that further complicate, and decelerate, decision making,
comprehensive legal and bureaucratic constraints to action, and ambiguous incentive
structures that undermine some agents’ willingness to share information—and others’
commitment to winning the war on drugs. 126
Yet another challenge for law enforcement investigating more-networked organized criminal
groups may arise from constraints in extraterritorial jurisdiction. While some criminal actors in a
network may conduct business offshore or overseas and federal law enforcement does have
extraterritorial jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute individuals who criminally violate U.S.
interests abroad, this jurisdiction does not necessarily cover all crimes committed by organized
crime groups. 127 Further, jurisdictional issues can present substantial diplomatic and practical
challenges for law enforcement.
Disadvantage: Networks Have Exploitable Weaknesses
Some of the strengths suggested by network structure can also be interpreted as weaknesses.
Their inherent compartmentalization potentially impedes efficient information sharing, as key
players keep peripheral actors in the dark about important aspects of complex schemes. This
suggests that highly networked organizations more effectively engage in simpler criminal
conspiracies. Decentralization can undermine the development of strategy and slow down
decision making. It may also encourage excessive risk taking by peripheral actors who are not
controlled by hierarchical roles rooted in rules enforced by the organization. Decentralization
possibly also nurtures challengers who compete with core leaders and foster organizational
instability. 128 Maintaining networks also likely requires “time-consuming” effort geared toward
“building and fostering relationships.” 129
123 Garzón, Mafia & Co. pp. 23-24.
124 Intelligence Committee Futures Working Group, Futures, p. 2.
125 Kenney, From Pablo to Osama, p. 132-133.
126 Ibid.
127 See the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1968, Title XII of P.L. 99-399. For more detailed
information regarding the United States extraterritorial jurisdiction as well as the specific crimes included in this
jurisdiction, see CRS Report 94-166, Extraterritorial Application of American Criminal Law, by Charles Doyle.
128 Mette Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and Calvert Jones, “Assessing the Dangers of Illicit Networks: Why al-Qaida May Be
Less Threatening Than Many Think,” International Security, Fall 2008, pp. 16-33.
129 von Lampe, “Re-Conceptualizing,” p. 9.
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