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Conflicts to Watch in The New Millennium

Conflicts to Watch in The New Millennium

Conflicts to Watch in The New Millennium

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withdrawal of U.S. troops, Trump upended that balance; <strong>in</strong>creased the odds of a bloody<br />

conflict <strong>in</strong>volv<strong>in</strong>g Turkey, its Syrian allies, Syrian Kurds, and the Assad regime; and, <strong>in</strong><br />

so do<strong>in</strong>g, potentially gave the Islamic State a new lease on life by fuel<strong>in</strong>g the chaos on<br />

which it thrives.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Trump adm<strong>in</strong>istration’s earlier policy of <strong>in</strong>def<strong>in</strong>itely reta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g a military presence <strong>in</strong><br />

Syria was always of questionable value. It was unclear how 2,000 U.S. troops could<br />

curb Iranian <strong>in</strong>fluence or create mean<strong>in</strong>gful pressure on the Assad regime. <strong>The</strong> fight<br />

aga<strong>in</strong>st the Islamic State is not over, but it need not require ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g U.S. troops on<br />

the ground. That said, a precipi<strong>to</strong>us withdrawal presents one major risk: it will leave the<br />

People’s Protection Units (YPG) – the Kurdish-dom<strong>in</strong>ated armed group that partnered<br />

with U.S. forces aga<strong>in</strong>st the Islamic State and now controls roughly one-third of Syrian<br />

terri<strong>to</strong>ry – perilously exposed.<br />

“<strong>The</strong> real question for the U.S. should not have been whether <strong>to</strong> stay or go, but under<br />

what timetable and what conditions <strong>to</strong> withdraw.”<br />

<strong>The</strong> YPG could now face an attack from Turkey (which considers it a terrorist<br />

organisation due <strong>to</strong> its affiliation with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or PKK) or by the<br />

Assad regime (which aims <strong>to</strong> reassert control over the entirety of the country, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g<br />

the oil-rich north east). Should disorder ensue, the Islamic State could seize the<br />

opportunity <strong>to</strong> stage a comeback by regroup<strong>in</strong>g and recaptur<strong>in</strong>g some of the terri<strong>to</strong>ry it<br />

has lost over the past two years.<br />

In short, the real question for the U.S. should not have been whether <strong>to</strong> stay or go, but<br />

under what timetable and what conditions <strong>to</strong> withdraw.<br />

Both the U.S. and Russia should have an <strong>in</strong>terest <strong>in</strong> prevent<strong>in</strong>g an all-out scramble for<br />

the terri<strong>to</strong>ry abandoned by the U.S. because it could revitalise the Islamic State and<br />

because (from Russia’s perspective) it could result <strong>in</strong> Turkey controll<strong>in</strong>g more of<br />

Moscow’s ally’s land. Avert<strong>in</strong>g this scenario will require Wash<strong>in</strong>g<strong>to</strong>n and Moscow<br />

(separately or <strong>in</strong> tandem) <strong>to</strong> persuade Turkey not <strong>to</strong> launch an assault on YPG-held<br />

terri<strong>to</strong>ry, <strong>to</strong> persuade the YPG <strong>to</strong> lower its armed profile, and <strong>to</strong> facilitate a deal between<br />

Damascus and the YPG that entails the return of the Syrian government <strong>to</strong> the north<br />

east coupled with a degree of Kurdish self-rule <strong>in</strong> the area. Such an outcome would<br />

simultaneously allow Syria <strong>to</strong> res<strong>to</strong>re its sovereignty, reassure Turkey by limit<strong>in</strong>g YPG<br />

authority and firepower, and protect the Kurds from military attack. It might be <strong>to</strong>o late <strong>to</strong><br />

achieve this goal. It is not <strong>to</strong>o late <strong>to</strong> try.<br />

6. Nigeria<br />

Nigerians will go <strong>to</strong> the polls <strong>in</strong> February 2019 <strong>to</strong> elect a president and new federal<br />

legislature, and aga<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong> March <strong>to</strong> choose state governors and lawmakers. Nigerian<br />

elections are traditionally violent affairs, and conditions this time around are particularly<br />

combustible.<br />

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