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FAMILY LAW<br />
improper to preclude declarations in such<br />
circumstances and would “place people<br />
claiming under [the Domestic Partnership]<br />
provisions at the very disadvantage which<br />
the provision is designed to remove.” 13<br />
Recently “living together” was<br />
considered in the light of the “peripatetic<br />
lifestyle” of an airline pilot 14 and his partner.<br />
The couple spent their limited contact time<br />
at a wide range of locations. In making the<br />
declaration, the court considered the longterm<br />
plan of sharing a house and the public<br />
presentation of the couple to be important.<br />
It was held that although the test of “living<br />
together” is not primarily locational, it has<br />
an important locational element.<br />
SITUATIONS TO CONSIDER<br />
In practice, there are numerous issues<br />
that one might encounter in regard to one<br />
person “living with…” another. The writer<br />
has encountered the following situations in<br />
various contexts:<br />
Two partners took a “break” in their<br />
relationship. Was the applicant “living<br />
with…” the deceased in a close<br />
personal relationship?<br />
Like Ross and Rachel, applicants must<br />
be conscious if they took a “break” in their<br />
relationship: “Where one partner determines<br />
not to live together with the other and in that sense<br />
keeps apart, the … relationship ceases even if the<br />
separation is merely to enable one party or the other<br />
to decide whether the relationship should continue.” 15<br />
There is evidence that a couple<br />
separates but hours before the death of<br />
a partner. Are they “domestic partners”<br />
at the date of death?<br />
The answer would depend on when the<br />
couple separated. If separation took place<br />
on the same calendar day, the declaration<br />
could still be made as the legislation<br />
requires the declaration to relate to a “certain<br />
date.” 16 If, however, the separation occurred<br />
before or at 23:59.59, and the deceased<br />
died at, or after, 00:00.00 (so technically the<br />
next day), the court would technically be<br />
unable to make the declaration at the date<br />
of death.<br />
What if one partner spent time in<br />
hospital due to health issues or moved<br />
away to work?<br />
As long as the applicant could convince<br />
the court that they have satisfied the<br />
factual and temporal basis for a domestic<br />
partnership, it is unlikely that the above<br />
situations would preclude a declaration.<br />
Both the applicant and the deceased<br />
own separate residential properties.<br />
Would this affect the merits of a<br />
declaration application?<br />
This is a common issue and one that is<br />
frequently targeted in cross-examination.<br />
Whilst not a determinative factor, multiple<br />
residences might dilute the contention<br />
that the relevant persons were “living<br />
together.” Conversely, it has been held<br />
that “the maintenance of separate residences is<br />
necessarily inconsistent with parties having a de<br />
facto relationship.” 17 If such issues are live<br />
in a contested application, it is imperative<br />
that they are carefully considered and<br />
addressed before trial.<br />
The applicant and the deceased only<br />
live together in the same residence<br />
for a small part of each week. Is an<br />
application for a declaration likely to<br />
fail?<br />
There are several cases that consider<br />
this question; it is “clearly established …<br />
that the fact that, for example, the parties live<br />
in the same residence, for only a small part of<br />
each week does not exclude the possibility that<br />
they are “living together as a couple on a genuine<br />
domestic basis...” 18 Addressing this issue will<br />
be specific to the facts of each case. For<br />
example, repeated visits by an applicant to<br />
the residence of a deceased for a “singular<br />
purpose, without more…” was deemed<br />
insufficient to satisfy the court of the<br />
existence of domestic partnership.<br />
The couple was forced apart by<br />
circumstance such as drug addiction,<br />
child protection intervention or fear<br />
for the safety of a person. Could those<br />
parties still be deemed to live together?<br />
This question is very much determined<br />
by the unique circumstances of a particular<br />
case. The court would consider the nonexhaustive<br />
statutory factors carefully.<br />
Evidence to support such a declaration<br />
could include:<br />
• Written evidence of the reasons for<br />
separation;<br />
• Telephone records showing frequent<br />
calls;<br />
• Receipts for purchases or taxis near to<br />
the other partner;<br />
• Text and email messages;<br />
• Photographs;<br />
• Oral evidence of other witnesses.<br />
The applicant maintained “singlestatus”<br />
for Centrelink or other meansrelated<br />
benefits during the lifetime of<br />
the deceased. Does this mean that a<br />
declaratory application will fail?<br />
Evidence of lies within, or<br />
inconsistency with, official documents<br />
such as Centrelink applications are<br />
not uncommon; nor are they strictly<br />
determinative. 19 Practically, proving<br />
a propensity to deliberately mislead<br />
government agencies would reflect poorly<br />
upon the misleading party. Evidence of<br />
such conduct may create more serious<br />
problems for an applicant.<br />
FINAL REMARKS<br />
Though it may appear at first blush<br />
that an Applicant did not “live with” their<br />
partner, there might be circumstances that<br />
explain the separation without determining<br />
the relationship. Living apart does not<br />
necessarily preclude living with and<br />
practitioners must carefully consider the<br />
unique circumstances of each case. B<br />
Endnotes<br />
1 R v Bong [2013] SASC 39<br />
2 M, S v Public Trustee [2017] SASC 71<br />
3 Section 11B(3) FRA 1975<br />
4 Section 11A(B) FRA 1975<br />
5 Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336<br />
6 Re Fagan (1980) 23 SASR 454 amongst others<br />
7 (1987) 21 NSWLR 677<br />
8 R v Creamer [1919] 1KB 564, 569<br />
9 Main v Main [1949] 78 CLR 636<br />
10 Nugent-head v Jacob [1948] AC 321, HL<br />
11 Re Fagan (dec’d) (1980) 23 SASR 454, 464<br />
12 Re Estate of Sigg (dec’d) [2009] VSC 47<br />
13 Re Estate of Sigg (dec’d) [2009] VSC 47<br />
14 Re Hawkins [2018] NSWSC 174<br />
15 Hibbertson v George (1989) 12 Fam.L.R. 725<br />
16 Section 11A FRA 1975<br />
17 Jonah v White [2011] FamCA 221<br />
18 Jonah v White [2011] FamCA 221<br />
19 Aranas v Berry [2002] NSWSC 355<br />
<strong>September</strong> <strong>2019</strong> THE BULLETIN 41