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FAMILY LAW<br />

improper to preclude declarations in such<br />

circumstances and would “place people<br />

claiming under [the Domestic Partnership]<br />

provisions at the very disadvantage which<br />

the provision is designed to remove.” 13<br />

Recently “living together” was<br />

considered in the light of the “peripatetic<br />

lifestyle” of an airline pilot 14 and his partner.<br />

The couple spent their limited contact time<br />

at a wide range of locations. In making the<br />

declaration, the court considered the longterm<br />

plan of sharing a house and the public<br />

presentation of the couple to be important.<br />

It was held that although the test of “living<br />

together” is not primarily locational, it has<br />

an important locational element.<br />

SITUATIONS TO CONSIDER<br />

In practice, there are numerous issues<br />

that one might encounter in regard to one<br />

person “living with…” another. The writer<br />

has encountered the following situations in<br />

various contexts:<br />

Two partners took a “break” in their<br />

relationship. Was the applicant “living<br />

with…” the deceased in a close<br />

personal relationship?<br />

Like Ross and Rachel, applicants must<br />

be conscious if they took a “break” in their<br />

relationship: “Where one partner determines<br />

not to live together with the other and in that sense<br />

keeps apart, the … relationship ceases even if the<br />

separation is merely to enable one party or the other<br />

to decide whether the relationship should continue.” 15<br />

There is evidence that a couple<br />

separates but hours before the death of<br />

a partner. Are they “domestic partners”<br />

at the date of death?<br />

The answer would depend on when the<br />

couple separated. If separation took place<br />

on the same calendar day, the declaration<br />

could still be made as the legislation<br />

requires the declaration to relate to a “certain<br />

date.” 16 If, however, the separation occurred<br />

before or at 23:59.59, and the deceased<br />

died at, or after, 00:00.00 (so technically the<br />

next day), the court would technically be<br />

unable to make the declaration at the date<br />

of death.<br />

What if one partner spent time in<br />

hospital due to health issues or moved<br />

away to work?<br />

As long as the applicant could convince<br />

the court that they have satisfied the<br />

factual and temporal basis for a domestic<br />

partnership, it is unlikely that the above<br />

situations would preclude a declaration.<br />

Both the applicant and the deceased<br />

own separate residential properties.<br />

Would this affect the merits of a<br />

declaration application?<br />

This is a common issue and one that is<br />

frequently targeted in cross-examination.<br />

Whilst not a determinative factor, multiple<br />

residences might dilute the contention<br />

that the relevant persons were “living<br />

together.” Conversely, it has been held<br />

that “the maintenance of separate residences is<br />

necessarily inconsistent with parties having a de<br />

facto relationship.” 17 If such issues are live<br />

in a contested application, it is imperative<br />

that they are carefully considered and<br />

addressed before trial.<br />

The applicant and the deceased only<br />

live together in the same residence<br />

for a small part of each week. Is an<br />

application for a declaration likely to<br />

fail?<br />

There are several cases that consider<br />

this question; it is “clearly established …<br />

that the fact that, for example, the parties live<br />

in the same residence, for only a small part of<br />

each week does not exclude the possibility that<br />

they are “living together as a couple on a genuine<br />

domestic basis...” 18 Addressing this issue will<br />

be specific to the facts of each case. For<br />

example, repeated visits by an applicant to<br />

the residence of a deceased for a “singular<br />

purpose, without more…” was deemed<br />

insufficient to satisfy the court of the<br />

existence of domestic partnership.<br />

The couple was forced apart by<br />

circumstance such as drug addiction,<br />

child protection intervention or fear<br />

for the safety of a person. Could those<br />

parties still be deemed to live together?<br />

This question is very much determined<br />

by the unique circumstances of a particular<br />

case. The court would consider the nonexhaustive<br />

statutory factors carefully.<br />

Evidence to support such a declaration<br />

could include:<br />

• Written evidence of the reasons for<br />

separation;<br />

• Telephone records showing frequent<br />

calls;<br />

• Receipts for purchases or taxis near to<br />

the other partner;<br />

• Text and email messages;<br />

• Photographs;<br />

• Oral evidence of other witnesses.<br />

The applicant maintained “singlestatus”<br />

for Centrelink or other meansrelated<br />

benefits during the lifetime of<br />

the deceased. Does this mean that a<br />

declaratory application will fail?<br />

Evidence of lies within, or<br />

inconsistency with, official documents<br />

such as Centrelink applications are<br />

not uncommon; nor are they strictly<br />

determinative. 19 Practically, proving<br />

a propensity to deliberately mislead<br />

government agencies would reflect poorly<br />

upon the misleading party. Evidence of<br />

such conduct may create more serious<br />

problems for an applicant.<br />

FINAL REMARKS<br />

Though it may appear at first blush<br />

that an Applicant did not “live with” their<br />

partner, there might be circumstances that<br />

explain the separation without determining<br />

the relationship. Living apart does not<br />

necessarily preclude living with and<br />

practitioners must carefully consider the<br />

unique circumstances of each case. B<br />

Endnotes<br />

1 R v Bong [2013] SASC 39<br />

2 M, S v Public Trustee [2017] SASC 71<br />

3 Section 11B(3) FRA 1975<br />

4 Section 11A(B) FRA 1975<br />

5 Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336<br />

6 Re Fagan (1980) 23 SASR 454 amongst others<br />

7 (1987) 21 NSWLR 677<br />

8 R v Creamer [1919] 1KB 564, 569<br />

9 Main v Main [1949] 78 CLR 636<br />

10 Nugent-head v Jacob [1948] AC 321, HL<br />

11 Re Fagan (dec’d) (1980) 23 SASR 454, 464<br />

12 Re Estate of Sigg (dec’d) [2009] VSC 47<br />

13 Re Estate of Sigg (dec’d) [2009] VSC 47<br />

14 Re Hawkins [2018] NSWSC 174<br />

15 Hibbertson v George (1989) 12 Fam.L.R. 725<br />

16 Section 11A FRA 1975<br />

17 Jonah v White [2011] FamCA 221<br />

18 Jonah v White [2011] FamCA 221<br />

19 Aranas v Berry [2002] NSWSC 355<br />

<strong>September</strong> <strong>2019</strong> THE BULLETIN 41

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