Report Investigation of gas blowout on Snorre A - Well Integrity ...
Report Investigation of gas blowout on Snorre A - Well Integrity ...
Report Investigation of gas blowout on Snorre A - Well Integrity ...
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• N<strong>on</strong>-c<strong>on</strong>formities.<br />
In this category you will find the observati<strong>on</strong>s that the PSA believes are violati<strong>on</strong>s <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
the regulati<strong>on</strong>s.<br />
• Improvement items.<br />
This category includes observati<strong>on</strong>s where the PSA does not have enough informati<strong>on</strong><br />
to c<strong>on</strong>firm that there have been violati<strong>on</strong>s <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> the regulati<strong>on</strong>s.<br />
• Barriers that have functi<strong>on</strong>ed.<br />
This is a category showing compliance with the regulati<strong>on</strong>s.<br />
Chapter 5.1 describes 28 n<strong>on</strong>-c<strong>on</strong>formities. Several <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> the n<strong>on</strong>-c<strong>on</strong>formities are repeated in<br />
the planning and executi<strong>on</strong> phases. In additi<strong>on</strong>, they can be related both to failure <strong>on</strong> the part<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> individuals and groups in Statoil and with the drilling c<strong>on</strong>tractor, and they include both<br />
management and subordinates <strong>on</strong> land and <strong>on</strong> the <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g>fshore facility. Am<strong>on</strong>g the repeated n<strong>on</strong>c<strong>on</strong>formities<br />
are:<br />
• Lack <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> compliance with governing documents.<br />
These n<strong>on</strong>-c<strong>on</strong>formities are largely related to governing documents in c<strong>on</strong>necti<strong>on</strong> with<br />
planning <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> drilling and well operati<strong>on</strong>s 22 , as well as procedures for well c<strong>on</strong>trol in<br />
c<strong>on</strong>necti<strong>on</strong> with drilling and completi<strong>on</strong> operati<strong>on</strong>s. 23 Lack <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> compliance with<br />
procedures is repeated in all phases <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> the operati<strong>on</strong>, particularly during the planning.<br />
• Inadequate understanding and implementati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> risk assessments<br />
This largely occurs in the planning phase, but also in the executi<strong>on</strong> phase. The<br />
investigati<strong>on</strong> shows both downgrading <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> priority for risk reviews, lack <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
understanding for comprehensive risk and in <strong>on</strong>e case, risk c<strong>on</strong>tributi<strong>on</strong>s were<br />
removed from the detailed program.<br />
• Inadequate management involvement.<br />
There was little involvement <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> management during the planning. The planning also<br />
appears to be characterized by deficient management <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> resources. Nor were special<br />
competence units sufficiently c<strong>on</strong>sulted in order to reveal deficiencies in regard to risk<br />
assessments, or in relati<strong>on</strong> to training in the use <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> procedures. The investigati<strong>on</strong> has<br />
also revealed inadequate c<strong>on</strong>trol procedures in c<strong>on</strong>necti<strong>on</strong> with approval <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> the<br />
program.<br />
• Inadequate c<strong>on</strong>trol in the use <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> governing documents.<br />
The Statoil divisi<strong>on</strong> that draws up and checks the use <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> governing documents<br />
(Process owner B&B) has not managed to identify deficiencies through internal<br />
audits 24 .<br />
• Breach <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> requirements for well barriers.<br />
The planning did not include an evaluati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> which c<strong>on</strong>sequences the various suboperati<strong>on</strong>s<br />
and input regarding changes in progress would have <strong>on</strong> the overall well<br />
barrier scenario. Pressure tests <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> well barriers were not planned. They re-opened a<br />
22 Ref. document list, Item 26. WR0442 ”Planning <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> Drilling & <strong>Well</strong> Operati<strong>on</strong>s”<br />
23 Ref. document list, Item 31.WR0436 ”Drilling and completi<strong>on</strong> operati<strong>on</strong>s”<br />
24 Ref. document list, Item 66: ”<str<strong>on</strong>g>Report</str<strong>on</strong>g> from internal audit <strong>Snorre</strong> RESU in June 2004” (c<strong>on</strong>ducted by process owner B&B)<br />
25