Report Investigation of gas blowout on Snorre A - Well Integrity ...
Report Investigation of gas blowout on Snorre A - Well Integrity ...
Report Investigation of gas blowout on Snorre A - Well Integrity ...
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TABLE OF CONTENTS<br />
1 INTRODUCTION ...............................................................................................................................................7<br />
1.1 THE PSA'S FOLLOW-UP OF THE INCIDENT ....................................................................................................7<br />
1.2 MANDATE FOR THE PSA'S INVESTIGATION GROUP......................................................................................7<br />
1.3 LIMITATIONS..................................................................................................................................................8<br />
1.4 METHODS.......................................................................................................................................................8<br />
1.5 INTERVIEWS, VERIFICATION ON THE FACILITY AND EVALUATION OF DOCUMENTS....................................8<br />
2 STATUS PRIOR TO THE INCIDENT ...........................................................................................................9<br />
2.1 HISTORY / DESCRIPTION SNA.......................................................................................................................9<br />
2.2 HSE BEFORE OPERATIONS START-UP ...........................................................................................................9<br />
2.3 WELL HISTORY AND STATUS OF P-31A PRIOR TO THE INCIDENT................................................................9<br />
3 COURSE OF EVENTS.....................................................................................................................................11<br />
3.1 FIRST PART: PLANNING OF THE OPERATION ...............................................................................................12<br />
3.2 SECOND PART: COMPLETION PHASE OF PLANNING AND START-UP OF WELL OPERATION ........................14<br />
3.3 THIRD PART: THE WELL CONTROL SITUATION DEVELOPS..........................................................................17<br />
4 POTENTIAL OF THE INCIDENT................................................................................................................23<br />
4.1 ACTUAL CONSEQUENCES ............................................................................................................................23<br />
4.2 POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES........................................................................................................................24<br />
5 OBSERVATIONS..............................................................................................................................................24<br />
5.1 OBSERVED NON-CONFORMITIES .................................................................................................................26<br />
5.1.1 N<strong>on</strong>-c<strong>on</strong>formity 1. Applied method in internal audit has not revealed deficient compliance with<br />
governing documents...........................................................................................................................................26<br />
5.1.2 N<strong>on</strong>-c<strong>on</strong>formity 2. Milest<strong>on</strong>es in the planning have not been implemented in accordance with<br />
governing documents...........................................................................................................................................26<br />
5.1.3 N<strong>on</strong>-c<strong>on</strong>formity 3. Planning with deficient well barriers in c<strong>on</strong>necti<strong>on</strong> with perforati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> the tail<br />
pipe 27<br />
5.1.4 N<strong>on</strong>-c<strong>on</strong>formity 4. The c<strong>on</strong>sequence <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> changes in the planning not sufficiently analyzed..............27<br />
5.1.5 N<strong>on</strong>-c<strong>on</strong>formity 5. Inadequate transfer <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> experience in c<strong>on</strong>necti<strong>on</strong> with well integrity.................28<br />
5.1.6 N<strong>on</strong>-c<strong>on</strong>formity 6. Planning with changed well barrier when cutting scab-liner............................28<br />
5.1.7 N<strong>on</strong>-c<strong>on</strong>formity 7. Risk assessment in c<strong>on</strong>necti<strong>on</strong> with planning and pulling <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> scab-liner............28<br />
5.1.8 N<strong>on</strong>-c<strong>on</strong>formity 8. Planning and pulling through the BOP ...............................................................28<br />
5.1.9 N<strong>on</strong>-c<strong>on</strong>formity 9. Inadequate management involvement in c<strong>on</strong>necti<strong>on</strong> with assigning priority to<br />
the peer assist review...........................................................................................................................................29<br />
5.1.10 N<strong>on</strong>-c<strong>on</strong>formity 10. Inadequate approval procedures...................................................................29<br />
5.1.11 N<strong>on</strong>-c<strong>on</strong>formity 11. Signature page does not c<strong>on</strong>form to governing document...........................30<br />
5.1.12 N<strong>on</strong>-c<strong>on</strong>formity 12. During planning, the meeting for review <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> overall risk is cancelled.........30<br />
5.1.13 N<strong>on</strong>-c<strong>on</strong>formity 13. Lack <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> transfer <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> experience after previous incidents...............................30<br />
5.1.14 N<strong>on</strong>-c<strong>on</strong>formity 14. Implementati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> tail pipe perforati<strong>on</strong> ........................................................31<br />
5.1.15 N<strong>on</strong>-c<strong>on</strong>formity 15. Executing link does not stop the operati<strong>on</strong> before perforati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> the tail<br />
pipe 31<br />
5.1.16 N<strong>on</strong>-c<strong>on</strong>formity 16. Inadequate handling <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> n<strong>on</strong>-c<strong>on</strong>formities .....................................................31<br />
5.1.17 N<strong>on</strong>-c<strong>on</strong>formity 17. Unclear procedure for drilling and completi<strong>on</strong> operati<strong>on</strong>s.........................32<br />
5.1.18 N<strong>on</strong>-c<strong>on</strong>formity 18. Inadequate approval <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> HAZOPs ..................................................................32<br />
5.1.19 N<strong>on</strong>-c<strong>on</strong>formity 19. HAZOPs have not been communicated to the executing link ......................33<br />
5.1.20 N<strong>on</strong>-c<strong>on</strong>formity 20. Pr<str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g>essi<strong>on</strong>al expertise does not assess overall risk......................................33<br />
5.1.21 N<strong>on</strong>-c<strong>on</strong>formity 21. Risk c<strong>on</strong>tributors are removed from the detailed program..........................33<br />
5.1.22 N<strong>on</strong>-c<strong>on</strong>formity 22. Scab-liner is perforated, cut and pulled........................................................34<br />
5.1.23 N<strong>on</strong>-c<strong>on</strong>formity 23. Lack <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> preparati<strong>on</strong> for a well c<strong>on</strong>trol situati<strong>on</strong>...........................................34<br />
5.1.24 N<strong>on</strong>-c<strong>on</strong>formity 24. Inadequate well barriers when pulling scab-liner through BOP................35<br />
5.1.25 N<strong>on</strong>-c<strong>on</strong>formity 25. Inadequate risk assessments in c<strong>on</strong>necti<strong>on</strong> with swabbing..........................35<br />
5.1.26 N<strong>on</strong>-c<strong>on</strong>formity 26. Kelly cock was blocked...................................................................................36<br />
5.1.27 N<strong>on</strong>-c<strong>on</strong>formity 27. Late c<strong>on</strong>firmati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> pers<strong>on</strong>nel overview......................................................36<br />
5.1.28 N<strong>on</strong>-c<strong>on</strong>formity 28. Inadequate logging.........................................................................................36<br />
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