Transocean Proxy Statement and 2010 Annual Report
Transocean Proxy Statement and 2010 Annual Report
Transocean Proxy Statement and 2010 Annual Report
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An inability to obtain visas <strong>and</strong> work permits for our employees on a timely basis could hurt our operations <strong>and</strong> have an<br />
adverse effect on our business.<br />
Our ability to operate worldwide depends on our ability to obtain the necessary visas <strong>and</strong> work permits for our personnel to travel<br />
in <strong>and</strong> out of, <strong>and</strong> to work in, the jurisdictions in which we operate. Governmental actions in some of the jurisdictions in which we operate<br />
may make it difficult for us to move our personnel in <strong>and</strong> out of these jurisdictions by delaying or withholding the approval of these permits.<br />
For example, in the past few years, we have experienced considerable difficulty in obtaining the necessary visas <strong>and</strong> work permits for our<br />
employees to work in Angola, where we operate a number of rigs. If we are not able to obtain visas <strong>and</strong> work permits for the employees<br />
we need to operate our rigs on a timely basis, we might not be able to perform our obligations under our drilling contracts, which could<br />
allow our customers to cancel the contracts. If our customers cancel some of our contracts, <strong>and</strong> we are unable to secure new contracts on<br />
a timely basis <strong>and</strong> on substantially similar terms, it could adversely affect our consolidated statement of financial position, results of<br />
operations or cash flows.<br />
Failure to comply with the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act <strong>and</strong> the Bribery Act <strong>2010</strong> recently enacted by the U.K.<br />
could result in fines, criminal penalties, drilling contract terminations <strong>and</strong> an adverse effect on our business.<br />
The U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”) <strong>and</strong> similar anti-bribery laws in other jurisdictions, including the Bribery<br />
Act <strong>2010</strong> recently enacted by the U.K., generally prohibit companies <strong>and</strong> their intermediaries from making improper payments to non-U.S.<br />
officials for the purpose of obtaining or retaining business. We operate in many parts of the world that have experienced governmental<br />
corruption to some degree <strong>and</strong>, in certain circumstances, strict compliance with anti-bribery laws may conflict with local customs <strong>and</strong><br />
practices. If we are found to be liable for FCPA violations or, once implemented, violations under the Bribery Act <strong>2010</strong> (either due to our<br />
own acts or our omissions, or due to the acts or omissions of others, including our partners in our various joint ventures), we could suffer<br />
from civil <strong>and</strong> criminal penalties or other sanctions, which could have a material adverse effect on our business, financial condition, <strong>and</strong><br />
results of operations.<br />
Civil penalties under the anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA could range up to $10,000 per violation, with a criminal fine up to the<br />
greater of $2 million per violation or twice the gross pecuniary gain to us or twice the gross pecuniary loss to others, if larger. Civil<br />
penalties under the accounting provisions of the FCPA can range up to $500,000 per violation <strong>and</strong> a company that knowingly commits a<br />
violation can be fined up to $25 million per violation. In addition, both the SEC <strong>and</strong> the DOJ could assert that conduct extending over a<br />
period of time may constitute multiple violations for purposes of assessing the penalty amounts. Often, dispositions for these types of<br />
matters result in modifications to business practices <strong>and</strong> compliance programs <strong>and</strong> possibly the appointment of a monitor to review future<br />
business <strong>and</strong> practices with the goal of ensuring compliance with the FCPA. On November 4, <strong>2010</strong>, we reached a settlement with the<br />
SEC <strong>and</strong> the DOJ with respect to certain charges relating to the anti-bribery <strong>and</strong> books <strong>and</strong> records provisions of the FCPA. In<br />
November <strong>2010</strong>, under the terms of the settlements, we paid a total of approximately $27 million in penalties, interest <strong>and</strong> disgorgement of<br />
profits. We have also consented to the entry of a civil injunction in two SEC actions <strong>and</strong> have entered into a three-year deferred<br />
prosecution agreement with the DOJ (the “DPA”). In connection with the DPA, we have agreed to implement <strong>and</strong> maintain certain internal<br />
controls, policies <strong>and</strong> procedures. For the duration of the DPA, we are also obligated to provide an annual written report to the DOJ of our<br />
efforts <strong>and</strong> progress in maintaining <strong>and</strong> enhancing our compliance policies <strong>and</strong> procedures. In the event the DOJ determines that we have<br />
knowingly violated the terms of the DPA, the DOJ may impose an extension of the term of the agreement or, if the DOJ determines we<br />
have breached the DPA, the DOJ may pursue criminal charges or a civil or administrative action against us. The DOJ may also find, in its<br />
sole discretion, that a change in circumstances has eliminated the need for the corporate compliance reporting obligations of the DPA <strong>and</strong><br />
may terminate the DPA prior to the three-year term. Failure to comply with the terms of the DPA may impact our operations <strong>and</strong> any<br />
resulting fines may have a material adverse effect on our results of operations or cash flows.<br />
We could also face fines, sanctions <strong>and</strong> other penalties from authorities in the relevant foreign jurisdictions, including prohibition<br />
of our participating in or curtailment of business operations in those jurisdictions <strong>and</strong> the seizure of rigs or other assets. Our customers in<br />
those jurisdictions could seek to impose penalties or take other actions adverse to our interests. We could also face other third-party<br />
claims by directors, officers, employees, affiliates, advisors, attorneys, agents, stockholders, debt holders, or other interest holders or<br />
constituents of our company. In addition, disclosure of the subject matter of the investigation could adversely affect our reputation <strong>and</strong> our<br />
ability to obtain new business or retain existing business from our current clients <strong>and</strong> potential clients, to attract <strong>and</strong> retain employees <strong>and</strong><br />
to access the capital markets. See “Item 7. Management’s Discussion <strong>and</strong> Analysis of Financial Condition <strong>and</strong> Results of Operations—<br />
Contingencies-Regulatory matters.”<br />
Our labor costs <strong>and</strong> the operating restrictions under which we operate could increase as a result of collective<br />
bargaining negotiations <strong>and</strong> changes in labor laws <strong>and</strong> regulations.<br />
Some of our employees working in Angola, the U.K., Norway <strong>and</strong> Australia, are represented by, <strong>and</strong> some of our contracted<br />
labor work under, collective bargaining agreements. Many of these represented individuals are working under agreements that are subject<br />
to annual salary negotiation. These negotiations could result in higher personnel expenses, other increased costs or increased operational<br />
restrictions as the outcome of such negotiations apply to all offshore employees not just the union members. Additionally, the unions in the<br />
U.K. sought an interpretation of the application of the Working Time Regulations to the offshore sector. Although the Employment Tribunal<br />
endorsed the unions’ position that offshore workers are entitled to 28 days of annual leave, at the subsequent appeals to date, both the<br />
Employment Appeal Tribunal <strong>and</strong> the Court of Sessions have reversed the Employment Tribunal’s decision. However, the unions have<br />
intimated their intention to lodge a further appeal to the Supreme Court which may not be heard until the fourth quarter of 2011 or 2012.<br />
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