26.12.2012 Views

Transocean Proxy Statement and 2010 Annual Report

Transocean Proxy Statement and 2010 Annual Report

Transocean Proxy Statement and 2010 Annual Report

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

Create successful ePaper yourself

Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.

An inability to obtain visas <strong>and</strong> work permits for our employees on a timely basis could hurt our operations <strong>and</strong> have an<br />

adverse effect on our business.<br />

Our ability to operate worldwide depends on our ability to obtain the necessary visas <strong>and</strong> work permits for our personnel to travel<br />

in <strong>and</strong> out of, <strong>and</strong> to work in, the jurisdictions in which we operate. Governmental actions in some of the jurisdictions in which we operate<br />

may make it difficult for us to move our personnel in <strong>and</strong> out of these jurisdictions by delaying or withholding the approval of these permits.<br />

For example, in the past few years, we have experienced considerable difficulty in obtaining the necessary visas <strong>and</strong> work permits for our<br />

employees to work in Angola, where we operate a number of rigs. If we are not able to obtain visas <strong>and</strong> work permits for the employees<br />

we need to operate our rigs on a timely basis, we might not be able to perform our obligations under our drilling contracts, which could<br />

allow our customers to cancel the contracts. If our customers cancel some of our contracts, <strong>and</strong> we are unable to secure new contracts on<br />

a timely basis <strong>and</strong> on substantially similar terms, it could adversely affect our consolidated statement of financial position, results of<br />

operations or cash flows.<br />

Failure to comply with the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act <strong>and</strong> the Bribery Act <strong>2010</strong> recently enacted by the U.K.<br />

could result in fines, criminal penalties, drilling contract terminations <strong>and</strong> an adverse effect on our business.<br />

The U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”) <strong>and</strong> similar anti-bribery laws in other jurisdictions, including the Bribery<br />

Act <strong>2010</strong> recently enacted by the U.K., generally prohibit companies <strong>and</strong> their intermediaries from making improper payments to non-U.S.<br />

officials for the purpose of obtaining or retaining business. We operate in many parts of the world that have experienced governmental<br />

corruption to some degree <strong>and</strong>, in certain circumstances, strict compliance with anti-bribery laws may conflict with local customs <strong>and</strong><br />

practices. If we are found to be liable for FCPA violations or, once implemented, violations under the Bribery Act <strong>2010</strong> (either due to our<br />

own acts or our omissions, or due to the acts or omissions of others, including our partners in our various joint ventures), we could suffer<br />

from civil <strong>and</strong> criminal penalties or other sanctions, which could have a material adverse effect on our business, financial condition, <strong>and</strong><br />

results of operations.<br />

Civil penalties under the anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA could range up to $10,000 per violation, with a criminal fine up to the<br />

greater of $2 million per violation or twice the gross pecuniary gain to us or twice the gross pecuniary loss to others, if larger. Civil<br />

penalties under the accounting provisions of the FCPA can range up to $500,000 per violation <strong>and</strong> a company that knowingly commits a<br />

violation can be fined up to $25 million per violation. In addition, both the SEC <strong>and</strong> the DOJ could assert that conduct extending over a<br />

period of time may constitute multiple violations for purposes of assessing the penalty amounts. Often, dispositions for these types of<br />

matters result in modifications to business practices <strong>and</strong> compliance programs <strong>and</strong> possibly the appointment of a monitor to review future<br />

business <strong>and</strong> practices with the goal of ensuring compliance with the FCPA. On November 4, <strong>2010</strong>, we reached a settlement with the<br />

SEC <strong>and</strong> the DOJ with respect to certain charges relating to the anti-bribery <strong>and</strong> books <strong>and</strong> records provisions of the FCPA. In<br />

November <strong>2010</strong>, under the terms of the settlements, we paid a total of approximately $27 million in penalties, interest <strong>and</strong> disgorgement of<br />

profits. We have also consented to the entry of a civil injunction in two SEC actions <strong>and</strong> have entered into a three-year deferred<br />

prosecution agreement with the DOJ (the “DPA”). In connection with the DPA, we have agreed to implement <strong>and</strong> maintain certain internal<br />

controls, policies <strong>and</strong> procedures. For the duration of the DPA, we are also obligated to provide an annual written report to the DOJ of our<br />

efforts <strong>and</strong> progress in maintaining <strong>and</strong> enhancing our compliance policies <strong>and</strong> procedures. In the event the DOJ determines that we have<br />

knowingly violated the terms of the DPA, the DOJ may impose an extension of the term of the agreement or, if the DOJ determines we<br />

have breached the DPA, the DOJ may pursue criminal charges or a civil or administrative action against us. The DOJ may also find, in its<br />

sole discretion, that a change in circumstances has eliminated the need for the corporate compliance reporting obligations of the DPA <strong>and</strong><br />

may terminate the DPA prior to the three-year term. Failure to comply with the terms of the DPA may impact our operations <strong>and</strong> any<br />

resulting fines may have a material adverse effect on our results of operations or cash flows.<br />

We could also face fines, sanctions <strong>and</strong> other penalties from authorities in the relevant foreign jurisdictions, including prohibition<br />

of our participating in or curtailment of business operations in those jurisdictions <strong>and</strong> the seizure of rigs or other assets. Our customers in<br />

those jurisdictions could seek to impose penalties or take other actions adverse to our interests. We could also face other third-party<br />

claims by directors, officers, employees, affiliates, advisors, attorneys, agents, stockholders, debt holders, or other interest holders or<br />

constituents of our company. In addition, disclosure of the subject matter of the investigation could adversely affect our reputation <strong>and</strong> our<br />

ability to obtain new business or retain existing business from our current clients <strong>and</strong> potential clients, to attract <strong>and</strong> retain employees <strong>and</strong><br />

to access the capital markets. See “Item 7. Management’s Discussion <strong>and</strong> Analysis of Financial Condition <strong>and</strong> Results of Operations—<br />

Contingencies-Regulatory matters.”<br />

Our labor costs <strong>and</strong> the operating restrictions under which we operate could increase as a result of collective<br />

bargaining negotiations <strong>and</strong> changes in labor laws <strong>and</strong> regulations.<br />

Some of our employees working in Angola, the U.K., Norway <strong>and</strong> Australia, are represented by, <strong>and</strong> some of our contracted<br />

labor work under, collective bargaining agreements. Many of these represented individuals are working under agreements that are subject<br />

to annual salary negotiation. These negotiations could result in higher personnel expenses, other increased costs or increased operational<br />

restrictions as the outcome of such negotiations apply to all offshore employees not just the union members. Additionally, the unions in the<br />

U.K. sought an interpretation of the application of the Working Time Regulations to the offshore sector. Although the Employment Tribunal<br />

endorsed the unions’ position that offshore workers are entitled to 28 days of annual leave, at the subsequent appeals to date, both the<br />

Employment Appeal Tribunal <strong>and</strong> the Court of Sessions have reversed the Employment Tribunal’s decision. However, the unions have<br />

intimated their intention to lodge a further appeal to the Supreme Court which may not be heard until the fourth quarter of 2011 or 2012.<br />

AR-18

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!