The EU, the EEU, and the War in Ukraine: Political Risks and Management Options

Florence Ertel / Julian Plottka
all this was done with the backing of Nazarbayev, who called on the Kazakh citizens to support
Tokayev (Eastblog 2022). All in all, Tokayev proceeded with the “de-Nazarbayevication” very
cautiously. The new government is a very good example that the changes do not mark a total
breakup with the old elites: eleven of the new members of government already served in the
previous one. This can be interpreted as a clear signal that beneficiaries of the old system do
not need to worry much about their privileges. As Tokayev’s power is still potentially disputed
by rivals in the regime, the established elite continues to set clear limits on how far reforms can
go without becoming too painful for the oligarchs. On one hand, the elite remains a factor limiting
Tokayev’s ability to pursue reforms and fulfil the protesters’ demands. This could result in
new pressure for reforms from the streets. On the other hand, too far-reaching reforms to fulfil
citizens’ demands can also be a potential risks to system stability as the possibility of another
coup d’état initiated by rivalling groups in the regime cannot be ruled out.
While the Kazakh president’s early reactions to the protests in January 2022 included the promise
of socio-economic reforms, his reform agenda has changed since 24 February 2022. On
16 March 2022, Tokayev addressed the Kazakh people with an early state of the nation address,
detailing his reform agenda in ten thematic clusters. Nine of the ten clusters dealt with the
political system of Kazakhstan, covering the powers of the president and parliament, a reform
of the electoral system, the electoral process and the law on political parties, human rights, the
administrative system and decentralisation (President of the Republic of Kazakhstan 2022b).
Only the tenth thematic cluster comprised anti-crisis measures to mediate the economic fallout
from Western sanctions on Russia. The first emergency measures were controls on capital
flows as the tenge was closely following the Russian ruble in its decline. About six weeks after
the Russian invasion, the exchange rate of ruble and tenge had stabilised. A second priority was
the stabilisation of food prices by boosting national agricultural production, a challenge which,
as outlined before, could be crucial for maintaining stability in Kazakhstan. Additional economic
measures remained vague, but the president did announce his intention to initiate a structural
reform package of de-bureaucratisation in the economic and public administration to increase
the efficiency of crisis responses (President of the Republic of Kazakhstan 2022b).
This economic reform priority is completely different from what citizens protesting in January
2022 had in mind when calling for socio-economic reforms. The proposed measures consider
citizens’ concerns; they do reflect that the government has understood how crucial socio-economic
development is for maintaining its legitimacy. However, the proposed agenda mainly
moderates expectations. The measures are realistic in that, given the previously described
geopolitical and economic circumstances, stabilising the economy and preventing any further
deterioration of citizens’ economic situation are the only achievable objectives in the short term.
As the Kazakh president is aware that business as usual in domestic politics is a fundamental
threat to his and the system’s legitimacy, he focuses on political reforms. Regardless of geopolitical
circumstances, he can follow up on his previous reform agenda addressing the Kazakh
political system. Based on additional legitimacy generated by the protests in January, he can
speed up the process. Thus, the reforms proposed in the state of the nation address and those
26 Wirtschaft und Management · Band 33 · März 2023