The EU, the EEU, and the War in Ukraine: Political Risks and Management Options

Florence Ertel / Julian Plottka
Since the Russian annexation of Crimea, it has been discussed whether Russia is a potential
threat to Kazakh territorial integrity. Both countries have more than 7,000 kilometres of land
border, and the fact that a quarter of Kazakh citizens are ethnic Russians (mostly living in the
country’s north) could be used as a pretext for Russian claims to Kazakh territory. The Russian
government has never tried to defuse such fears, but regularly stokes them. In 2014, Russian
president Vladimir Putin observed that his Kazakh counterpart had “created a state in a territory
that had never had a state before. The Kazakhs never had any statehood. He created it.” (The
Diplomat 2022). Bearing in mind the allegations of Russian propaganda against Ukraine, Putin’s
words are quite ambivalent. The latest incited dates back to August 2022, when former Russian
president Dmitry Medvedev called Kazakhstan an “artificial state” in a social media post.
“In this century Kazakhstani authorities implemented resettlement policies of various ethnic
groups inside the republic which can be qualified as genocide of Russians. And we do not intend
to turn a blind eye to this. There will be no order until the Russians get there” (The Diplomat
2022). 9 Considering that Kazakhstan is not a major military power but one of the largest uranium
suppliers and has been nuclear-free since 1996 (Deutschlandfunk Kultur 2021), it becomes clear
how dependent the country is on Russian goodwill not to challenge its territorial integrity.
Unlike Georgia and Ukraine, which have both moved closer to the West in the past decade, there
is little probability that Kazakhstan would turn to the EU and away from the EEU. As the Russian
government continues to prove, however, that speeches about a new Russian empire are no
cheap talk (see the annexation of Crimea and the proxy war in Ukraine since 2014, and the war
against Ukraine since 24 February 2022), Kazakhstan faces a foreign policy dilemma. On one
hand, positive relations with Russia are essential for Kazakhstan’s security. Open confrontation
between the two countries would entail severe political risk for the Kazakh government. On the
other hand, too much dependence on Russia could also become a political risk as the example
of Belarus shows.
Against this background, the foreign policy dimension of the developments in January 2022 is
of particular interest. President Tokayev described the demonstrators as terrorist gangs trained
abroad and called for temporary deployment of a CSTO peacekeeping force. This reference
to foreign influence was a necessary precondition for the deployment of CSTO troops, as the
organisation does not interfere in internal affairs of its member states. Previous calls by CSTO
member states for deployment of troops were rejected on this basis. This time, Armenian prime
minister Nikol Pashinyan, as serving chairperson of the CSTO, immediately agreed to the deployment.
Russian paratroopers arrived the next day. The CSTO peacekeeping force also included soldiers
from Armenia, Belarus and Tajikistan. While violent clashes continued and Kazakh security forces
were allowed to fire without warning from 7 January 2022, it is important to note that CSTO
troops from abroad were not involved in the clashes but protected official buildings. Therefore, it
9 The post was deleted later on and Medvedev claimed his account had been hacked.
28 Wirtschaft und Management · Band 33 · März 2023