The EU, the EEU, and the War in Ukraine: Political Risks and Management Options

Florence Ertel / Julian Plottka
to commemorate the victory over Nazi Germany (RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty 2022b). On a
symbolic level, Kazakh foreign policy is moving as far away from Russia as possible without
publicly condemning the Russian war against Ukraine. This course earned Tokayev the support
of the Kazakh people and has strengthened his position (Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace 2022).
In other areas, pursuing multi-vector foreign policy is even more difficult. Tokayev has also
emphasised Kazakhstan’s economic integrity with regard to the sanctions against Russia by
taking measures to “overcome difficulties and challenges together” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs
of the Republic of Kazakhstan 2022), to ensure the functioning of the economy in the crisis.
Furthermore, he states that the resulting challenges should neither be underestimated nor
exaggerated. This can be seen as a clear signal to both Russia and the sanctioning rest of the
world – especially the European Union. The sanctions are neither condemned nor explicitly
welcomed. These developments cannot meet Russian expectations, as a member state of
the EEU with close trade relations with China and the West would be the perfect backdoor to
circumventing Western sanctions. However, the Kazakh government has sent clear signals to
the EU that it is willing to comply with Western sanctions (Cornell/Barro 2022: 17). On another
level, Kazakhstan is also approaching the EU, signalling clear interest in deepening cooperation.
The question how to “further strengthen bilateral relations” between the EU and Kazakhstan was
discussed at the EU-Kazakhstan Cooperation Council in June 2022, especially with regard to
economic relations and alternative trade routes to connect Europe and Asia. (European Council
2022)
That this foreign policy course creates tension with Russia has been shown by the three-time
shutdown of the main export route for Kazakh oil, which crosses Russia. The terminal to load
Kazakh oil on ships in the Black Sea has been closed twice since 24 February 2022. In March
damage following a storm and in June the search for World War II underwater mines were cited
as reasons to justify shutting down the export facilities. On 5 July 2022, a local Russian court
ordered the third-time closure of the pipeline of the “Caspian Pipeline Consortium” due to noncompliance
with environmental protection regulations. Incidentally, the decision was taken a day
after Kazakh president Tokayev discussed additional exports to Europe with the president of the
European Council, Charles Michel (Deutsche Welle 2022a). The Kazakh government reacted by
discussing alternative options to export oil and gas through Azerbaijan (Wiener Zeitung 2022)
and the court soon ordered a reopening of the pipeline. Recent speculation about a trade war
between Russia and Kazakhstan is clearly exaggerated (Deutsche Welle 2022b). The Russian
government seems to show signs, however, that Kazakh foreign policy is slowly approaching red
lines that Russia is not willing to see crossed.
While Kazakhstan’s current foreign policy course clearly eases internal contestation over Kazakh
relations with Russia and wins support for the president, pursuing a multi-vector foreign policy
is becoming increasingly difficult. Contestation between Kazakhstan and Russia is rising. As
the Russian government starts to think in terms of friends that are with Russia, and foes that
30 Wirtschaft und Management · Band 33 · März 2023