The EU, the EEU, and the War in Ukraine: Political Risks and Management Options

Oxana Karnaukhova
Following the Strategy, the EU goes beyond governments and looks at civil society participation,
demonstrating its ‘blindness’ to the authoritative presence of most of their visions, as ‘as experts
on the ground, they often lead the process of sustainable development’ (Von der Leyen 2019).
The difficulty with this approach is the failure to understand that all Central Asian elites are
interested in maintaining a system of patrimonial rule. Moreover, Central Asia presents itself
as an arena of intra-regional competing leadership projects, shared between Kazakhstan and
Uzbekistan respectively. In particular, Uzbekistan’s concerns about its own sovereignty, its
leadership position in the region and its ‘safe belt of friendly neighbours’ (Development Strategy
2017) demonstrate the complexity of intra-regional ties and influence the interpretation of the
content of the partnership with the EU.
To understand the internal mechanisms of Central Asia’s inclusion in relations with the EAEU,
attention should be paid to the concept of the ‘near abroad’ as an area of direct interest and
strengthening Russia’s leadership position in the Eurasian region. The concept of the ‘near
abroad’ in Russian foreign policy has been and remains an important concern of the Russian
Council on Foreign Affairs, which supports and promotes Russia’s geopolitical interests in the
region. This position is illustrated by the Collective Security Treaty. The Consortium was created
as an extension of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in 1992 before the NATO-
Russia summit in Rome and expanded into an organization in 2002. It meant an alliance of Russia
with Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. The last two mentioned countries later joined
the EAEU, with Kazakhstan as a founding state.
In 2001, the Agreement on the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC), signed by the Russian
Federation, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, gave new life to the Eurasian
Community Customs Union. The Treaty confirmed the hierarchy within the Union’s membership
and Russia’s privileged position: 40% of the vote was given to the Russian Federation. Russian
became the official language of the Union (see the 2000 Treaty on the Eurasian Economic Union).
Armenia joined the EurAsEC as an observer in 2003, and Uzbekistan became a member in 2006.
Intraregional integration efforts faced competition from a stronger player and lost out (CACO
and EurAsEC merged in 2005). Regional actors had different views on the cooperation regime
and their political hierarchy meant that intra-regional attempts rather quickly led to a merger into
larger inter-regional institutional structures with influential decision-making leaders.
In 2011, as prime minister, Putin announced the creation of “a powerful supranational association
capable of becoming one of the poles of the modern world and serving as an effective bridge
between Europe and the dynamic Asia-Pacific region, that is, to transform the Customs Union of
Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan into the Common Economic Space and then into the Eurasian
Union” (Putin 2011). The system of bilateral and regional multilateral agreements makes
Eurasian integration more comprehensible for existing members and potential participants, and
the emphasis on scrupulous adherence to the principle of economic sovereignty makes it more
resilient to global challenges. An important addition is the assertion of Russian leadership in
global economic, political projects, especially in the so-called security regions, i.e. Central Asia.
44 Wirtschaft und Management · Band 33 · März 2023