06.01.2013 Views

NODULE X7 OSWALD IN MINSK AND THE U2 DUMP: JANUARY ...

NODULE X7 OSWALD IN MINSK AND THE U2 DUMP: JANUARY ...

NODULE X7 OSWALD IN MINSK AND THE U2 DUMP: JANUARY ...

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.

<strong>THE</strong> U-2 <strong>IN</strong> 1958<br />

On March 2, 1958, the Soviet detected a violation of their airspace by a "military jet<br />

aircraft." In March 1958 Model Airplane News published a story about the U-2, complete<br />

with drawings. The article observed: "An unconfirmed rumor says that U-2's are flying<br />

across the Iron Curtain taking aerial photographs." On April 21, 1958 the Soviets<br />

identified the aircraft as a Lockheed U-2 type. Soviet Aviation, the official newspaper of<br />

the Red Air Force, subsequently published articles about the U-2.<br />

On April 21, 1958, the Soviets issued a press release accusing an "American military<br />

reconnaissance aircraft of the Lockheed U-2 type, having appeared from the direction of<br />

the Sea of Japan" of having violated Russian airspace. U-2 pilot Francis Gary Powers<br />

reported that in the fall of 1958:<br />

There was no longer any doubt they knew about the overflights. Our<br />

evidence of this was of the most conclusive kind. Although none of the<br />

pilots had actually seen them, electronic equipment on returning U-2's<br />

indicated the Russian were now sending up rockets attempting to bring us<br />

down. At our altitude we weren't too worried about MIGs, but we were<br />

beginning to be concerned about SAMs, surface-to-air missiles. By this<br />

time a few of the unknowns were disappearing from the U-2 overflights.<br />

We now knew that the Russians were radar tracking at least some of our<br />

flights; it was possible that they had been doing so from the start.<br />

Equipment on board recorded their signals; from their strength it was<br />

possible to tell whether they were "painting," this is tracking the flight.<br />

However this could only be determined after returning to base and<br />

studying transcriptions. There was still no way, while in flight, to know for<br />

sure.<br />

We also knew that SAM's were being fired at us, that some were<br />

uncomfortably close to our altitude. But we knew too that the Russians<br />

had a control problem in their guidance system. Because of the speed of<br />

the missile, and extremely thin atmosphere, it was impossible to make a<br />

correction. This did not eliminate the possibility of a lucky hit. In our<br />

navigation we were careful to ensure our routes circumvented known SAM<br />

bring us down.<br />

<strong>THE</strong> U-2 <strong>IN</strong> 1959<br />

The press reported that a U-2 landed in a Japanese rice paddy in September 1959.<br />

Knowing the Soviets were aware of the U-2 and were intent on shooting one down,<br />

President Eisenhower considered suspending the flights. He told his intelligence<br />

advisors during a February 2, 1960, meeting, "If one of these aircraft is lost when we are<br />

engaged in apparently sincere deliberations, it would be put on display in Moscow and<br />

ruin my effectiveness." The CIA was insistent that the U-2 flights over the Soviet Union<br />

be continued, even expanded, because they brought back invaluable data. President

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!