06.01.2013 Views

NODULE X7 OSWALD IN MINSK AND THE U2 DUMP: JANUARY ...

NODULE X7 OSWALD IN MINSK AND THE U2 DUMP: JANUARY ...

NODULE X7 OSWALD IN MINSK AND THE U2 DUMP: JANUARY ...

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

Create successful ePaper yourself

Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.

collectively more than 50 years of experience in Soviet counterintelligence<br />

work.<br />

Based upon the review of this voluminous material and the results of some<br />

collateral investigation it has been concluded, contrary of some collateral<br />

investigation in the 1968 paper, that SAMMY is what he says he is, that he<br />

is knowledgeable in the areas and to the extent that he should be, and he<br />

has a logical explanation for his acquisition of information which normally<br />

would not have been accessible to him in his claimed positions. It is<br />

believed impossible that he developed this detailed knowledge by KGB<br />

briefings only. The consistency between previous and current interviews is<br />

substantial proof of this. If he was dispatched by KGB he was given a<br />

"green light" to tell everything he knew. This is believed incredible,<br />

particularly because of his connections with ranking KGB officers and<br />

because his information is closely related to that furnished by various<br />

other sources. Collectively these sources have seriously damaged SIS<br />

operations and have rendered valuable assistance to Western<br />

Counterintelligence. They have supplied the key to practically all<br />

successful counterintelligence operations during the past five years. To<br />

hold that they are all "Plants" is preposterous. While SAMMY admittedly<br />

during previous interrogations, exaggerated and in some instances lied<br />

about his KGB rank and his personal involvement in some cases, there is<br />

no reasonable basis for now doubting his bona fides.<br />

The current interrogation of SAMMY by SOLIE is being handled as<br />

indicated in number six above and has been productive. Based upon the<br />

results summarized in the attached paper, the conclusion is inescapable<br />

that the persons who handled previous interrogations and evaluations of<br />

SAMMY were either incompetent or for reasons of their own persisted in<br />

the attempt to prove the February, 1964, conclusion that he was not bona<br />

fide. There was a definite failure to take elementary steps to clarify<br />

questioned matters. A good example is the insistence that KGB could not<br />

have placed "metka" (powder) on the clothing of JOHN V. ABIDIAN<br />

because he did not employ a Soviet maid until 16 months after his arrival<br />

in Moscow. The current interrogation of SAMMY developed that KGB was<br />

aware that ABIDIAN had an American girl friend who sent her maid to<br />

clean ABIDIAN's apartment. Recent interview of ABIDIAN by SOLIE<br />

confirmed this; the maid therefore could have had access to his clothing<br />

beginning 6 months after his arrival in Moscow. Other examples of<br />

inadequate interrogation and collateral investigation are set forth in the<br />

attached paper:<br />

RECOMMENDATIONS

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!