NODULE X7 OSWALD IN MINSK AND THE U2 DUMP: JANUARY ...
NODULE X7 OSWALD IN MINSK AND THE U2 DUMP: JANUARY ...
NODULE X7 OSWALD IN MINSK AND THE U2 DUMP: JANUARY ...
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WFO believes that SAMMY is a bona fide defector and that his isolation<br />
and detention re based on erroneous conclusions and unsound grounds<br />
and are incompatible with the American system of justice.<br />
Yuri Nosenko was freed in April 1969. He was put on the CIA payroll as an independent<br />
contractor.<br />
YURI NOSENKO'S HSCA TESTIMONY<br />
In 1979 the HSCA questioned Yuri Nosenko about why the Soviets allowed <strong>OSWALD</strong> to<br />
remain in Russia. He said two psychiatrists determined he was insane, and if they tried<br />
to deport him he might commit suicide: "Simply a mentally unstable person, they didn't<br />
want to go it on any such action." Yuri Nosenko declared that, although extensive KGB<br />
resources were devoted to physical and technical surveillance of <strong>OSWALD</strong>, the KGB<br />
never interviewed him.<br />
In 1964 Yuri Nosenko had supplied different information to the FBI: <strong>OSWALD</strong> was put<br />
under<br />
…passive observation to make sure he was not an American intelligence<br />
agent temporarily dormant...in view of instructions from KGB, Moscow, no<br />
active interest in <strong>OSWALD</strong> could be taken in Minsk without obtaining prior<br />
approval from KGB, Moscow. No such approval was ever requested or<br />
granted and based on his experience, he opined that the only <strong>OSWALD</strong><br />
coverage during his stay in Minsk consisted of periodic checks at his place<br />
of employment, inquiry of neighbors and review of his mail.<br />
Yuri Nosenko explained: "Well I told them there was work done against <strong>OSWALD</strong>; it<br />
was ordered, passive work, it's called passive. Whenever it's ordered not to make an<br />
approachment, not to make a contact, not to make a recruitment, this is passive."<br />
<strong>THE</strong> YURI NOSENKO <strong>IN</strong>CUBUS<br />
When ANGLETON was deposed in HUNT v. WEBERMAN in 1979, he stated:<br />
Well, I will simply say that during my tenure the [Nosenko] case had never<br />
been resolved...and, Mr. Helms, in his testimony before the assassination<br />
committee recently, had words to the effect that the problems of Nosenko<br />
were still an incubus that hung over our heads...I have never in a, as a<br />
matter of policy and as a matter of professional judgement, come to any<br />
conclusion other than the case was unresolved. That was the official<br />
position and I can speak to my tenure. That was the official position of the<br />
former Deputy Director of Operations, i.e., the Clandestine Services,<br />
Thomas Karamessines. It was reflected in the FBI disseminations of his<br />
reports to the effect that they were from a defector whose bona fides had<br />
not been resolved...There were many speculations that the so-called