NODULE X7 OSWALD IN MINSK AND THE U2 DUMP: JANUARY ...

1965 or 1966, he became Deputy Chief, Soviet Russia Division. He went to Europe as
Brussels Chief of Station in 1967, and retired there in 1972. The HSCA called him as a
witness. Tennent Bagley was convinced Yuri Nosenko was bogus for the following
reasons:
(1) The CIA was unbelievably lucky to have found him. Tennent Bagley
added, "the key word in that last sentence is 'unbelievably.'"
(2) There were contradictions in Yuri Nosenko's testimony that could not
be explained by Yuri Nosenko's personality flaws or memory. According to
Tennent Bagley, when he reviewed OSWALD'S KGB file, "Nosenko was
already a willing secret collaborator of the CIA. Therefore he must have
been alert when dealing with this matter of such obvious importance to the
United States and to his own country...Nosenko told us some of these
events only 10 weeks after they happened, so there wasn't time for them
to become dim in his memory."
(3) "Ten years removed from this case I can still remember at least 20
clear cases of Nosenko's lying about KGB activity and about the career
which gave him authority to tell of it..."
(4) The cases Nosenko revealed for the first time were useless.
Tennent Bagley believed that the KGB had interviewed OSWALD:
(5) Here was a young American, LEE HARVEY OSWALD, just out of the
Marine Corps, already inside the USSR and going to great lengths to stay
there and become a citizen. The KGB never bothered to talk to him, not
even once, not even to get an idea whether he might be a CIA plant. Can
this be true? Could we all be wrong in what we've heard about rigid Soviet
security precautions and about their strict procedures and disciplines...?
Of course not.
(6) Yuri Nosenko gave the CIA the location of several microphones in the
American Embassy, Moscow. Tennent Bagley stated Anatoliy Golitsyn
had given CIA the same information six months previous. Yuri Nosenko
produced a list of microphones in the American Embassy, Moscow, from
1960 to 1961. He said, at great risk, he kept this document in a KGB safe
he shared with two subordinates. Yuri Nosenko never plausibly explained
the circumstances which prompted his retention of this list until 1964,
when he produced it for the CIA in Geneva.
Anatoliy Golitsyn had provided, in the first months after his defection,
information that led to: "the final uncovering of Kim Philby; to the first
detection of several important penetrations of European governments; and
pointers to serious penetrations of the United States Government.