NODULE X7 OSWALD IN MINSK AND THE U2 DUMP: JANUARY ...
NODULE X7 OSWALD IN MINSK AND THE U2 DUMP: JANUARY ...
NODULE X7 OSWALD IN MINSK AND THE U2 DUMP: JANUARY ...
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Nosenko states that when <strong>OSWALD</strong> appeared at the Soviet Embassy in<br />
Mexico City, the First Chief Directorate of the KGB at Moscow was<br />
advised of his interest in returning to Russia and the First Directorate<br />
consulted the Second Directorate. This could only have occurred in late<br />
September or early in October 1963, but then Nosenko says following the<br />
assassination no file on <strong>OSWALD</strong> could be located at the KGB center in<br />
Moscow. This seems unlikley. [NARA FBI 124-10169-10063]<br />
YURI NOSENKO'S IMPRISONMENT<br />
ANGLETON knew for a fact that no matter how you cut it, Nosenko was not for real.<br />
The CIA kept Yuri Nosenko locked up for five years under prison-like circumstances. He<br />
was tortured and deprived of basic human necessities. Helms commented: "One of the<br />
first problems we had with him in the United States was he liked to drink and carouse.<br />
One of the reasons to hold him in confinement was to get him away from booze..." Yuri<br />
Nosenko undertook numerous polygraph tests. One of these tests, according to Helms,<br />
"was designed as sort of a psychological trick on Nosenko to indicate that he wasn't<br />
telling the truth." He was administered LSD.<br />
Some in the Bureau were convinced Yuri Nosenko was real:<br />
The FBI perceived Nosenko's statements about <strong>OSWALD</strong>, depending<br />
upon a subsequent, definitive resolution of Nosenko's bona fides, to be the<br />
most authoritative information available, indicative of a lack of Soviet<br />
Governmental involvement in the assassination of President Kennedy.<br />
The FBI found no substantial basis to conclude that Nosenko was not a<br />
bona fide defector...<br />
YURI NOSENKO'S REHABILITATION<br />
In 1967 Bruce Solie, of the CIA's Office of Security, wrote a critique of a lengthy report<br />
Tennent Bagley had prepared on Yuri Nosenko. Bruce Solie determined that Yuri<br />
Nosenko had not been dispatched. During the tenure of the HSCA, Bruce Solie, Chief of<br />
the Security Analysis Group, supplied the Committee with many of its documents.<br />
In 1968 the FBI issued a Top-Secret Nosenko Report.<br />
It is noted that a brief chronology of events is set forth in the preface to the<br />
WFO paper. It is indicated therein that Sammy is considered by CIA as a<br />
part of a large scale KGB deceptive operation. In addition to those<br />
comments, it is noted that a paper prepared in December 1964 by CIA as<br />
an agenda for proposed CIA-FBI conference, concluded that Nosenko<br />
was dispatched by the KGB in March 1962, as one part of a broad<br />
provocation effort conceived as early as 1959 and set in motion in the