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1982 

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1 

Repressive state 

apparatus 

46 died in detention 

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IJJ131 '1 '*'*• > « : 

T w « « a K rm * II « 'P, ;> 

~4 |J M.4 flf 4.4 I'll J.H! 

£ pirn tM x a Am « JI a ;» ;*.** 

>,

INDEX 

DCTENTIONB; Awbia raports Pwjpj 1 

(A)FOW 

DETENTIONS: investigating lnquaata 

WTBODUCTION TO POLITICAL ECOOfT 

- part 4 NO* 19 

'ORGANISING ttlEN'i rasponas 1 pags 16 

rmponw 2 paga IB 

raaponaaS -P«a» 19 

TEADCftS IN SOUTH AFRICA...' 0*3* 20 

ETHNICITY AND CLA88 IN GAZAhKbUJ Paga 22 

iNFonuncN 

\atrlkas in ths watal industry paga 26 

labour action paga 20 

courts i paoa 34 

SUPPLEMENT: 'sbldargata' and tha politic* 

of Afrikanar natlanaUa** 

ADDRESS 

EuITQRI*, ADDRESS! 

PO Box 93174 

2143 Yaovilla 

SOUTH AFRICA. 

aCRK IN PR0GFES6 22 - April 1962 

by Kavln Huaphrsy 

Tha natura of Fork In Prograas, which la to 

Slaulata dabata and praaant controvarslal viawa 

a aida rang* of subjects, ansuras that tha 

opinions axpraswad do not nacsssarily reflect the 

viBnta Of tha sdltorial cgilactiva. 

ThU laaua of Vortc In Prograss adltad and publlahsd 

by an atfltorlal oollaotlva of 40 Joriasan strsat, 

2001 bTMPrfontain, and printad by aachad, 94 siaaonds 

straatt 2001 Johannesburg. 

RATES 

All rats* ara for fIva U 

Ratas in SOUTHERN AFRICA 

Individuals, trada urlcns and 

cuswunlty organisations! R 7tS0 

Institutions and librarias: R15,00 

Croup distributions (par copy) R 1,00 

Raducad ratas waive a eartain nuabar or 

coapliaantary capias can ba arrangad on 

rwquaat. 

SECOND O.ASS AIRMAIL RATES 

^STERN_ELBOPE and BRITAIN 

Individuals: R20,00 

Organisations: R25,00 

U3A and CANADA 

Individuals: R2S,00 

Organisations: R35,00 

SURF ACE MAIL WES OUTSIDE SOUTHERN AFRICA 

Individuals: R ?t50 

Organisations:*. R12,60 

Important: If pay**** is aado in non-Rand 

currancy, plsasa add bank and conversion 

charges. 

Plaaaa spacify tha adltlon ahlch you wish 

your subscription to bagin with. ^ \ JT^^M 

Chsoua B and Postal Ordara to 

to *ff* IN PRQSBEg. 

4 ^ - I J 

,:-: I 

J i^ arr -* 

•y 

• • $ 

EDITORIAL 

Thsra aara t*o particularly plaaaing raaturaa 

about thia IMua of aork In Progress i in tha 

firat place, aany aora ptopis aara involvad in 

writing and producing tha publication than haa 

previously Man tha cesa* Thia la a develccmnt that 

will hopefully continue, as It alloaa for a "ore 

divarsa sat 0f interests to praaant Information and 

views. 

Sscondl/i tha thraa raaponaas to tha IIP 21 

article* 'Organising wcwen? 1 follow a pattarn ahich 

la encouraging: ahort responses to particular 

aspacts of notarial praaantad ara a uaaful aay of 

proaotlng dabata on tha issues praaantad In «P. 

Thaaa sorts of raaponaaa allow thosa who ara not 

ksan to writ* langthy srtlclss to oontrlbuta to 

debates, and anaura that MP raaalna a fott* for 

dlffarant and conflicting intarpratatlons of 

social reality and aaya of undarstandlng it* 

Tha fact that ao aany aora contributors vara 

Involvad in this adltlon aaant that tha aditora had 

too such aatarial. Alraady paga specs haa bmun 

lncrastsd frda tnls lsaua with tha Introduction of a 

largar layout grid, and tha prasantatlon of all 

inforwation fsaturaa in a aora conpraaaad foraat. 

Daspita this, cartain contributions could not ba run 

bvcausa of lack of spaca: wa apologias to tha 

contributors affected, and to raadsrs for thia, 

and guarente* thair appaaranca in tha naxt wTP> 

Tha sdicorlal collactlva alee to doubla 

distribution of WIP in tha couraa of tha naxt yaar* 

This will by no aeana ba easy, givan that KP la not 

coaaanlally diatributad. Rsadars ara accordingly 

aafcad for sudQastions on how to raaoh a largar 

audlanca both through tha aadlua of individual 

subscription*, and group distribution scHaaaa. 

Idoas for expansion would ba aoat walcoaa. 

•

» 

DETENTIONS: 

Rabie Reports 

JUBT two days after the flaport of the Rabie Commission 

into Security Laglelation ems weds public, trade 

unionist Neil Aggett died ehile In security police 

ouetody. The Rebie Commissioners put fprewrd certain 

propoeale 'with a view to the protection of detainees" x 

if this additional 'protection had already been in 

fares, could the outcoee of Nell Aggstt'e prolonged 

incarceration and interrogation have been different? 

Evan the briefest glance at the nable proposals 

regarding detention lndlcotes that the Commission 

report offers almost no change to the systam of 

detention as it currently exists. The section of 

( the report dealing elth detention of paopla for 

purposes of interrogation offers little comfort for 

ttiqae ooncarned elth the conditions under ahich 

detainaea are held and questioned. Nor, it eust be" 

stated, would the table propoeale have of farad any 

additional protection for thota detainees who nave 

recently found thaaaelvaa-in the sards of 

/Johannesburg's General Hoepltal* For the 

racoaaandationa flowing fro- the Coaalsalon report do 

little ear* then regulariee and give legislative 

legitimacy to the detention ayetaa as it already 

* This can be shown by coaparing the Rabie 

propoeale with the detention systea as it 9 

currently exists* In this regard, see the table 

on> this page. 

If the heble propoeala had bean in force in 

November last year, when Nell Aggett eaa detained 

for purposes of interrogation, hoe would his 

detention conditions have been alterad? m 

m Ha aould have bean visited by a aagistrate every 

teo weeks - ahich muet have happened st any rats; 

a Hs could have bean examined by a district surgeon - 

RABIE PROPOSALS 

Visits to dstalneee by a 

two week's 

tiatrate every 

Visits to tfatalneea by a district surgeon" 

%y%ry two 

Tne setting to of an inspectorate of 

detainees, ampowsred to visit detainees 

and to sake writtan representations to 

the Minister 

Police be empowered 

to allow people not connected with 

Interrogation to see detainees 

A 30-day limit be placed on detention 

unless the Minuter, on the advice of the 

Commissioner of Police, authorises 

further attention 

After 0 months of detention, a review ~~ 

board appointed by the Minister must 

examine the caea. The board than raporte 

to the fctinioter, who may or may not accept 

their recommendations as to the release 

or continued detention of the detains* 

Preventive detention propoaod, together 

with a review board to examine auch cases 

Potential state witnesses in security 

trials may be detained at the discretion 

of the attorney general 

Any policeman of or above the rank of 

warrant officer may detain a person for up 

to 46 hours as a preventive measure; a 

magistrate may extend this period for 

another 12 days on request of the police. 

This detention is not for interrogation, 

nor does it appaar that the detaining 

policeman muet beliave that a crime has 

or is likely to be, committed 

?ras«v*i ; a*'>::ii' : j 

visits to detainee* by a magletrate every 

two weeks (section 0(7) of Terra-lam Act 

Visits ahare necessary to detainees by s 

district surgeon (paction 8 of the police 

-rant for detention) 

While there is no legislation regarding thlst 

much an inspectorate was est up by thenpolice 

minister Krugsr after the death of 

Steve Biko in 1977 

6oth the Consniealoner of Police and the head 

oT security police ampowered to grant access 

to detainees in to*"** of section 2 of the 

police warrant for detention 

Section 6(1 J of the Terroriaw Act Allows for" 

Indefinite detention- However* ones a month 

police are required to lnfona the Minister 

why aach detainee ahould continue to be held 

(•action 0(2)) 

nWlaw proceecfinge unoWtaRan by a board 

appointed by9 and responsible to the 

Minister exist in respect of preventive 

detention (section 10 of the Internal 

Security. Act. 

In terms of aeotlort 6*3) of the Terrorism 

Act, a detainee may *t any time mafca 

written representatlone to the Minister as 

to why he/she should be released. The 

Minister may. at eYW time, order the release 

of A detainee (flection 6> 

Section TO of the internal security Act 

provides for preventive detention, together 

with a review board to examine auch detentions 

Potential state witnesses in security trials 

may be detained at the discretion of the 

attorney general 

Section, 10 of the Internal Security Act 

provides for preventive detention. 

Section 22 of the « « General Laws 

Amenowent Act provides for detention for 

interrogation purposes for MP to 14 days. 

Any policeman may, if he believes that a 

a crime haa bean, or is likely to be 

committed, may arn#sf a auapect, and hold 

the arrested person for 40 hours before 

bringing them to court or releasing them

which is p-plicltly provided for in the detention 

•arrant currently used by security police; 

B He would neve been visited by the Inspector of 

detainees - which presumably did happen; 

e The Commissioner of Police could have allowed e 

friend or family member to visit hie for a short 

period, under police supervision - and this did 

occur during December 1961; 

e After 30 deys in detention, the police mould have 

had to explein to the Minister why Nell could not 

be released. They eight neve said that he had not 

answered all questions to their satisfaction; or 

that other detainees had Implicated him in some 

offense; or Just that they had not yet finished 

interrogating him. Prasummbly this did happen et 

the end of Omcember. and again at the end of January, 

as ssctlon 6(2) of the Terrorism Act makes provision 

for these procedures. The Minister did not order 

Weil Aagett'3 release then. One doubte that the 

Rabie proposals, If Implemented, would have made any 

difference; 

a Of course, if Hell had lived through 6 months of 

detention, the Rebio Commissioners would have wanted 

e review board appointed by the Minister to exemine 

his came. This board would not have been obliged to 

hear evidence from Hell - or even to have seen him. 

If the board rsccwmmnded hell's release, the Minister 

could have ignored this recommendation, 

a If Hell - or any other detainee - lived through 

ell of this, and waa charged, the attorney generel 

could refuse to ellow bail. This la currently the 

case, and is also a Ruble Commission proposal. If, 

like most detainees, Neil hed not been charged, the 

Rabie proposals would have ellowed his continued 

detention as a potential state witness, or as a 

'danger to state security*. This, too, can happen to 

any detainee In terns of already existing security 

legislation. 

In the light of the above, there seeme little 

room for doubt as to hoe auch difference the Rafale 

proposals would have made to Heil Aggett's life - 

or death, HOT does there seem eny reason to 

believe that the proposed edded 'protection* for * 

detelneea would neve prevented Thozemlle Gqwetha or 

Sam Kiklne from finding themselves under security 

police guard in the psychiatric wards of a hospital. 

The Rabie Commission accepted that detention for 

the. purposes of interrogation by security police was 

a necessary part of security legislation. In ttyeir 

summary of flndlnga, the commissioners argued that 

information obtained froa persona In detention 

is the most Important and, to a large extent, the 

only weapon of the Police for enticipetlng and 

preventing terroristic end other subversive 

activities, and also that information obtained 

in this eay may in appropriate cases be used as 

evidence in the triel of persona charged.... 

The Ccmmisalon finds that It is essential to 

retain this measure (para 14.5) 

In its own terms, the commissioners are correct: in 

the summary of their terms of reference, they write 

that 

To be able to Judge realistically < lf the question 

(sic) of the necessity, edequocy, fairness end 

efficiency of leglsletlon relating to the 

protection of lntemel security, regard should 

• ••.be hed in the first instance to society as 

It la at present end as it is likely to be in 

the forsooable future (perm 14.2). 

The Report then goes on to state thet there can 

be no doubt as to the need for security legislation - 

Including detention provisions - given the nature 

of society as it currently is, and is likely to be 

in the near future. This le particularly so in 

the light of 

the terrorism and sabotage committed In the 

Republic during the past fee years, the 

likelihood thet these activities will continue 

to increase In the fnreeeaUls future, the fact 

that these ectivities are planned and Committed 

by the supporters of organisations whose elm 

la to over throe by violence the existing order 

in the Republic, the fact that in their 

ectivities to echleve this aim thaee orgenlsatlona 

receive the support and assistence of communist 

countries, and the feet that these ectivities 

are carried on from territories bordering the 

Republic -, end the Commission believes thet 

the measures it recowatends are necessitated 

by ths exigencies of the situation in which the 

Republic finds itself (para 14.2). 

what the Commission declines to consider is 

the sort of society South Africa is, end why it 

needs the protection of security leglsletlon and 

detention In order to survive in Its current form. 

Indeed, the Commission explicitly exjûdes this from 

the terms of Its investigation end report. 

Put In its briefest and simplest form. South 

Africa Is a society in which the eajority of the 

inhabitants are governed without even the sembfonce 

of their consent and participation. The Rabie report 

acknowledges thet there is a view* which claims that 

the 'non-white sectors of the populetion' heve no* 

part in governing the country, end thet this is the 

reason for resistance which led to the adoption of 

security lews. The Commission admits that msny people 

have concluded that there is no hope for peaceful 

change In South Africa, and that violence is the 

only outlet for frustrated political end economic 

aspirations. But this ths Commission sees es being 

part of the political arena, while ite mandate 

involves a Jurldico-legel viewing of security lawa 

in the light of present end likely future events. 

Of course, it would be facile to suggest thet 

in ell societies which are governed without the 

active consent end participation of the majority, 

repressive security leglsletlon exists in the form * 

proposed by Rabie. Those societies which regard 

themselves as capitalist democracies Include both 

repressive end ideological aechanlame to ensure the 

passive consent of the awfcjorlty of people. There is 

ruling class and stete repression in, for example. 

North Aaerlca end western Europe - but in those areas 

the majority of inhabitants have some limited control 

over parts of their lives via trade unions, political 

parties, the right to vote in elections from city 

level upwards, etc. In e South African context, 

even these limited institutions for controlling 

conflict between rulers end ruled are largely 

absent. * 

As such, the Rabie Gomel sal oners are correct ehen 

they claim that detention end other security 

legialation is necessary to maintain society in its 

present form. The real issue, then, is whether 

society should be emintained as It is, and If not. 

In what directions it should be altered. But these 

questions are pieced beyond the scope of Rable's 

investigation, which llalts Itself to quostione of 

how best to protect those interests which currently 

P«0* 2

dominate In South Africa. 

In these terms, the recommendations of the 

Rsbls commissioners are largely understandable. 

For society con only be maintained in ite current 

fom through the us» of ever-increasing repression 

end control. Commissions of Inquiry such as those 

heeded by wlehmhn end Riaftert dealt with sspects of 

control of Motions of the working class; the Rabie 

report dials with ths other aids of a funds—ntally 

undemocratic society , namely rapreeelon. 

Having said this, hoaavar, a littla more could 

hava bssn expected of tha fteble Commission - at lsast 

as far as tha protection of detainees is concamad. 

within their terms of reference, tha commissioners 

ara bound to justify and legitimate datsntion for 

tha purposes of interrogation: as tha rsport argues. 

this is probably tha most important way in which tha 

pellca gather information. But tha coaalsalonars 

could still hava looked at tha possibility of 

protecting dstalnees from security police bent on 

obtaining lnforeatlon. John Ougerd, director of 

tha University of Wlteatarsrond's Centre for Applied 

Legal Studies, hea looked et this question in regard 

to the conduct of British police in northern Ireland. 

He point* out that in 1978, the European Court of 

Huasn Rights condeaned various fores of interrogations 

used by the British es 'inhuman end degrading 

treetsant', in violation of the European Convention 

on Husan nights. Partially in response to this, 

British authorities atteapted to counter allegations 

of aantal tortur* of dete'inees: a detainee may not be 

held for sore than 5 days for purposes of 

lnterroget ion. 

Moreover in teres of the 1979 Bennett Coesittee 

Report into Police Interrogation Procedures in 

Northern Ireland, ehich today guides police 

conduct, detainees are allowed vleits from 

their leeyersefter 48 hours, interrogations 

era to be aonitored by closed-circuit TV, 

police "interviews should not lest longer 

then the interval between noioal seal times, 

or extend over eaal breaks, or continue after 

aldnlght except for urgent operational reasons'. 

(John Ougard, writing in the Sunday Tlese, 

07.02.8ZJ. 

f Surely it would not heve been too such to 

bxpect a Commission heeded by an Appeal Court 

Judge to exealne the effects of prolonged solitary 

confinement. For even If detslnees are not tortured 

or eaaaulted In a direct physical earner, aeny 

claim that detention in solitary conditions la a 

form of torture. The recent ceeee of Sea Kikins 

and Thoznmile Gqesthe - both admitted to psychiatric 

wards ss s result of prolonged detention - occurred 

efter Rabie had completed hie report. So did the 

adeisslon for observation of awaiting trial prlsonara 

Mthenjene end Keye, both of whoa had been in detention 

for long periods before appearing In court. But if . 

the Rabie Coasissloners had wanted to look at the 

effects of detention, they could heve studied a 

trial which took piece in tha Eastern Cape Supreme 

Court during 1976. The first state witnsss in thtsw 

proceedings wes Vuyo Bsleni of Port Elizabeth, who 

told the court thet while in detention he hed tried 

to cut his wrists end area with e razor blede. The 

witness then stood down, end ess adaltted to the 

Fort Englend Hental Hospital for observetlon. A 

few days later, tha eedlcal superintendent of that 

hospital reported thet Vuyo Beleni had gone Into e 

pyechotic state, ripped off hie clothes, snd now 

needed peychletrio treatment. 

Ouboequently, the ouperintendent of the Tower 

•ante! hospital testified that ha had 'certified* . 

Beleni, whoa ha classified as a hysteric, not 

fully rasponslbls for his actions. The aadlcel 

superintendent explained that in detention, effinitios 

built up beteeen detainees and their captors: the 

fact that Vuyo Bsleni was unwilling to give evidenoe 

•gainst his friends, but waa required end expected to 

do eo by police.and the court, could heve led to his 

breekdawn. 

There ere other esses of eental disintegration 

which can bs laid at tha door of the systsa of 

detention and interrogation: Vuyo Bslenl*s ie given 

es one example which should heve alerted tha Rabie 

Commissioners to the dangers of the system es it 

exists. Given that tha Terrorism Act explicitly 

authorises detention in solitary conditions, the 

Reble commissioners could have proposed thet this 

not bs permitted becauss of its dengerous effects 

on the aantal health of detelnses. Without even 

alleging thet physical torture Is s component of 

'interrogation techniques, it can be suggested that 

those people found by inquests to have committed 

suicide in detention were driven to this by e 

combination of solitsry confinement end Intense 

interrogation. fteble*e report does nothing to alter 

this ss the usual manner of extracting information 

from detainees by security police. 

Regarding the regular end persistent sllsgetions 

of physical torture and assault es e method of d 

intarrogating detainees, Rabie does nothing to deel 

with the oft-expressed belief thet thie doee indeed 

happen. It ie vary difficult to prove - In e legal 

sense - that detainees era torturwd and aesaulted. 

The whole system of detention is e closed, self-* 

perpetuating one, with no group of people 

Independent of tha state having the right of access 

to detainees. In e few cases - especially where 

detainees heve died - clear indications of easeult or 

torture have emerged. But in general, the veil of 

secrecy which Is one feature of tha detention system 

has prevented Independent scrutiny of Interrogation 

techniques. 

Tekw, for example, tha Inspectorate of detelnees 

which then-police minister Kruger met up af tar the 

death of Steve Biko - end which tha Rabie report 

pute forward ea a *nae* proposal to protect detelnees. 

The inspectorate is responsible only to the Minister - 

end reports to hie on a confidential basis. In one 

recant case, e detainee complained to Transvaal 

Inspector teuton that he had bean tortured while 

under interrogation. In the subsequent trial, tha 

detelnee * now charged - subpoenaed Houton to 

produce the documents in which the complaint had 

been recorded, wbuton refused to produce the 

documents, claiming that eectlon 6(6) of the 

Terrorism Act Justified the withholding of tha 

documents from the defence teem. Huch the same 

happened in regard to statements wade to 

magistrates by detainees alleging aeaaulta. fteble'e 

proposals do not alter the cloead, eelf monitoring 

nature of the detention system.

• The Johanneaburg-fce&ad Detainees' Porants Support 

Committee (OPSC) responded to the Rabie proposals on 

detention in tha following way: they argued that 

there vara thraa main faaturaa of tha currant 

datantlon system, namely 

tha total discretion of tha Minister and tha 

Security Polica from tha moment of detention, 

tha lack of lndapandent monitoring of thalr 

arbitrary axarclaa of power, and tha 

vulnerability and depandanca of detainees on 

thalr interrogators. 

Tha OPSC want on to say that they saw 'nothing in 

tha (Rabie) recommendations ehlch indicates any 

change in these respects - indeed, we suspect that 

these features are being entrenched' (SUr, 04.02.62}. 

Tha OPSC became even mora aware of the 'closed* 

nature of tha system a few days after responding to 

Rable's report • whan Nell Aggett was found dead in 

his detention call. Before his death, a number of 

relatives suspected that certain detainees were 

being mal-treated during interrogation - through 

sleep deprivation, prolonged periods of enforced 

standing under interrogation, and in some cases, 

other assaults and torture, what could parents 

and raletlvee do about their suspicions? 

Some we-faers of the committee felt that en 

application should be wade to tha Suprejee Court, 

restraining security police from assaulting or 

bringing undue pressure to bear on detainers. 

But the OPSC faced a major problem in this regard. 

How could they convince a court that they had good 

reason to believe their reletives were being mal 

treated? Often, the basis of tha allegations 

involved a whispered word, a smuggled message - 

sometimes passed on at second or third hand. 

No court could order an independent investigation 

of the condition of a detainee: a Judge is not even 

permitted to call the detainee to give evidence, or 

empower an independent lawyer or doctor to consult 

with the detainee. 

Even if it" ess possible to obtain a court order 

preventing aal-traatment of a detainee, how could 

this be monitored? would the detainee be told of the 

court decision, and who could ensure that it would 

be obeyed by all who had access to the detainee? 

Only thoee within the closed system are in a position 

to do that. 

There was another reason why no reletlve brought 

en urgent application to the Supreme Court - even 

after Mrs Helen Suzman made known the allegation 

that Neil Aggett hed been essaulted before he was 

found dead In hie call. If an interdict was applied 

for - even If it was granted - how could the OPSC 

be sure that tha detainee mentioned would not be 

victimised In some way? Possibly by tha withdrawal 

of reading material or food parcels (where those are 

permitted); or even the possibility of assaults or 

other pressures. 

The discussion on this problem involved very 

difficult decisions for relatives of detainees. 

Neil Aggett was dead - and according to one detainee, 

had been beaten before his death; a number of others 

were in hospital. How could other detainees be 

protected? 

In the event, no court application was brought - 

partially because of the difficulty in proving 

allegations of ma1-treatment- But one thing was 

made vmry clear: the so-called safe-guards for 

detainees currently in force are of almost no use 

at all. And the Rabie proposals do nothing more 

than perpetuete e closed, self-contained end self- 

regulating system of detention for the purposes of 

lnterrogetion• 

As already mentioned, the Rabie report does 

not look at the question of solitary confinement as 

a way of extracting information from detainees. 

Neither does the Commission deal with other 

interrogation techniques: what of sleep deprivation, 

or prolonged standing in one spot? How does the 

Commission feel about these methods? They remain 

silent - and egaln fall to offer any new protection 

to those detained under a system which has caused 

the death of at least 50 people - and severely 

affected the mental and physical health of hundreds, 

if not thousands, of others. 

• 

In this regard, it la worth mentioning the role 

of the attorney-general's office in tha detention 

system. Often those held in detention far the 

longest periods involve detainmes which the office of 

the attorney^general has designated potential state 

witnesses in political trials. This does not mean 

that the person held has agreed to testify - or even 

that he/she will be called as a witness. It is 

sufficient that the attorney-general feels that tha 

potential witness might be intimidated, or might, 

abscond, or that it is in the 'interests of the 

administration of Justice'; the parson can then be 

held In conditions ehlch are effectively the same 

as those applying to section 6 of the Terrorism Act, 

for s period of up to 6 monthe. 

In practice, those held by the ettorney-general 

as potential state witnesses have previously been 

section 6 detainees. Their transfer to section 12 

page 4 

of the Internal Security Act Is largely administrative: 

In the recent cases of Journalists Themi Unzwal and 

Zwelakhe Slsulu, they were detained by security polica 

in mid-1961. Early in 1962 they were transferred to 

section 12(b) of the Internal Security Act. Until 

amswai's appearance in court, and Slsulu's release in 

February 1982. they received no visits from family, 

friends, lndapandent doctors or lawyers. For them, 

12(b) must have been much tha seme as section 6 - 

and it was tha office of the attorney-generel which 

was responsible for their detention under 12(b) and 

for the conditions of detention. 

Tha Rabie proposals retain provisions for tha 

detention of potential state witnesses. This is not 

surprising, given the general approach of the 

Commission. But it is worth emphasising that 

detention provisions ore not only administered by 

security police, and that the offices of tha 

respective ettornays-generel are integrally 

involved in the lengthy detention of people under 

conditions similer to those existing under section 6 

of the Terrorism Act. 

Over the past 0 months, a considerable amount of 

energy has been expended in focusing on the issue 

of detention and security detainees. Large-scale 

police raids, followed by the detention of trede 

unionists, community workers and students initially

Ma+i-lightwd soee of the IMUN involved; further 

attentions, the death in security police custody of 

Neil Agoett, the hospitallMtlan of e nuaber of 

MCtiort 6 detainewe and the report of the Beble 

Coeertsslan itself continued to focus attention on 

the systssi of interrogation and detention. In tha 

aejor urban arees-detainee support group* vara tat upt 

aeetlnge held, publicatiora produced. 

But ifv aa haa baan argued above, the atata naads 

security legislation to Maintain society in its currant 

fom, it auat ba aaKad any opposition groups hava 

given so wuch attantion to this particular Issue, 

After all, tha systaa of detention is Just ona eore 

aspact of an undaaocratio ruling group attempting to 

•iinUin its poser, thile tha call aay hava baan 

for tha unconditional ralaaaa of all datainaaa 

and tha abolition of dstantion-ralatad legislation, 

fee hava aarloualy baliavad that govamaant aould taka . 

nota of such a doasnd. It tharafora bacoass 

i»port«nt to look at ahat aort of issue datsntlon Is - 

and ehy it has racantly oosaaandsd so auch attantion. 

| Ona obvloua anaaar to this question ralataa to 

stteepts at protacting thosa who ara currently in 

detention, and thoea who may ba hald In tha future. 

Ear liar, it aas argued that in ruling class terms, 

Rsbla was correct to rare— nd tha aaintananca of a 

syatsn of interrogative datantion if South Africa was 

to ba rsproducad as an undaaocratlc, non-participatory 

society. But it aas also arguad that ona could hava 

expected tha Ooaaleoton to put forward proposals 

ahlch provldad for tha protactlon of detainees froa 

solitary conflnaaant, sleep deprivation, phyaical 

assault and osntal torture. Glvan that such ssfs- 

guards hardly exist in tha currant situation, a focua 

on tha ahola datsntlon syataa aarvas tha function of 

Monitoring ahat occurs in datantion, and bringing 

prassura to baar regarding datantion conditiona. Thia 

aay, in cartain casaa, ba of protactlva valua to 

thosa undargoing Interrogation, 

In this contact, attsapta to organisa profasaional 

bodias and groupa -ith a direct concern in tha aystaa 

of intarragatlon and datantion * lawyers* aadical 

practitionars, paychologiata and paychiatriata * 

aay ba ona aay of trying to protect detainees froa 

tha affaota of tha systaa. *- 

7 A sacond raason for focusing attantion on » 

detentions Involves tha aay in ahlch that iasus oasts 

light on othar aspects of tha social aystaa. OVar tha 

past faa yasrs, it haa becoew* fashlonsbla for cartain 

privileged raprassntativas of tha ruling claaaaa to 

argue that tha South ATrlcan stata is bant on a 

reformist progrs—•. All that is holding govamaant 

back from iaplaaantlng a aida ranga of reforms, thay 

argue, la tha right aing natura of cartain National 

Party alaaanta, sactiona of tha civil asrvioa, ate. 

rwnat tha datsntlon issua doaa is to ahoa that tha 

I so-callsd rafora progra—« of tha *varlig' wing of 

1 govamaant lnvolvaa a high dagraa of coarclon, 

frapraasion and control. Elections to tha South African 

Indian Council go hand in hand -ith tha datantion of 

entl-BAXC activists; thosa unionists aha opposa 

tha 'nee deal' on labour relations, and she assist 

lnstaad in tha building of strong, democratic unlona, 

ara detained. Qpsn oppoaltion political activity, 

if it lnvolvaa aasa participation, sasas to load to 

tha calls. Tha ahola ayataa of datantion 

demonstrates that currant atata initiatlvaa mmy 

involva changs - but not nacaaaarily in tha direction 

in shlch tha aajority of South Africana went. Thosa 

oho ara involved in organising and facilitating aasa 

opposition to government** pollclss — ba thay tha 

progresses of PV Boths's ganarala, Plat Koornhof *s 

bureaucrats or Fania Botha's Dapartaant of laanpowor 

Utilisation - face tha dsngsr of atata rapraaaion in 

ona of ita forms. 

But having said this. It auat ba notad that 

detention In ltaalf is a Halted lsaua. Rejection of 

'datantion-aithout-trial*, of datantion in conditions 

of solitary conflnaaant, of interrogation tachniquaa 

ahlch involva coarclon and astipulation of aind and 

body • this is a platforai shlch a broad apectrua of 

organised intaraata, froa raprasantativaa of 

' enlightened * capital through to tha left, can 

support. But precisely bacausa auch a broad and 

potentially conflicting sat of Interests can support 

tha issua, ita content, limits and paraemtera nwed 

to ba assaasad vary carefully. 

•ith thia in aind, a nuabar of points can ba 

raiaad in tha hopa that consideration of thaa will . 

ba conatructiva for those involved in tha datantion 

lsaua. 

1. It needs to ba asked ahlch groups and individuals 

ara bast placad to facilitate tha Mobilisation and 

organisation of those profsssions ahlch hava en 

intaraat in tha lssusa and conditiona of datantion, 

(Thia la ona of tha activities ehicn can potentially 

provide soas protactlon for datainaaa, in tarsal of 

aonltoring conditiona, prasauring for safsguards, ate). 

Of ita natura, thia la a limited activity: tha 

Majority of thosa involved In tha profassiona ara 

likely to occupy lntsrasdiata positions on tha 

political spactrvj*. Aa such, it U unlllcaly that 

profasaional bodias can go aach bayond attaapts to 

laprova conditiona aithln tha aystaa of datantion. 

In thasa taraa, it should ba esfced ahathar thosa 

on tha political laft ara bast suited for engaging 

•ith tha profassiona ovsr tha issua of detention, 

or whathar this is better undartafcan by individuals 

within tha profassiona sho ara kaan to consolidate 

progrsaalva viewpoints in thair sphsrs of activity. 

Thar* aay ba an argument that attaapts by tha 

political laft to intarvana with profasaional 

groups on an explicitly left-wing basis ara counter- 

productive, and Unit tha role strlch such professional 

groups can play vis-a-vis tha datantion issue. 

2. Much of tha activity around detentions haa involved 

a protest coaponant - public eoetlngs, picket 

protests, petitione, letter writing* religious 

services. It can ba arguad that this is a lag it lasts 

and iaportant terrain of activity for cartain groupa - 

especially aooarate lntarasts which hava retained or 

developed a concern end conscience about tha direction 

in shlch South African society la sjoving. Thle, for 

sMeapls, hee been en area of activity for the 

Johannesburg Oetainaee* Parents Support Cowaittee, 

shlch has been both active end successful in its 

chosen sphere of politics. 

But it dose need to be asked whathar thasa ara 

tta aorta of activities or issues shlch tha left

^ -f : - r/ - 1 '- • • • ' " T • .' 

should be expending time, tn*rgy end resources on * 1 

especially ehan they an already balng undertaken by 

other groups. 

3. If organised laft wing lntsrsets are going to 

undertake certain detention-related activities'In 

allianca with othar groups closer to tha cantra 

(ag Ubaral oroupa)t tha terms, oatura and function 

of thla allianca need to be worked out and apaclflad 

In aach case* For example ^ sane have saan a purpose 

In trying to inject a graater left-wing contant 

Into tha actlvltlaa of pradcftlnantly white, llbaral 

groups* ehsthar this should ba tha function of an 

allianca cvar a limited issue like datantion needs 

to ba aesasead in tarns of productivity and effect. 

Thla la not to suggest that thara la no placa 

for co-operation bataaan llbaral groups and thosa 

further laft, Thla la especially so ragerting 

.mutual information inputs, ideas and support In 

times of crisis. But It does naad to ba asked 

ehether organlsad groups to tha laft of cantra are 

bast occupiad in liberal, protest and/or 'preesura- 

group 1 politics ovar tha Isaua of datantlons ehan 

th|i la already balng undartakan by 'centra* groups. 

An assessment of thasa quastlona can possibly 

serve to develop both tha atratagy and tactics of 

thosa eho saa themselves as part of democratic 

opposition in South Africa. * 

•• 

i 

,i - 

SL-J/feC 

' ^ ^ •- 

. 

i * 

* r< ., v- V- fr. . *: -• ? .*. ;% -,.: : , . - •;- • -•' \ 

NEIL Aggett, Transvaal secretary of tha African Food 

and Canning Workers* Union, -au by no aaana tha first 

trade union leader to ba detained in tarns of South 

Africa's security legislation. Neither was ha tha 

first trada unionist to dla In tha custody of aacurlty 

police. Before him, unionists Ilka Lookemart 

Ngudla (1963), Caleb meyaklmo (1969), Luke Uazeembe 

(1976), Lawrenca Ndzange (1976) and Elijah Lou (197?), 

dlad ahlla balng held for tha purposss of 

interrogation by aacurlty police. 

Stata action against trada union officials aaa 

not uncoaaon befora 1960: for example', a number of 

paopla aaaoclatad with tha African Mine WonXara' 

Union aara chargad as a result of tha aasaiva 1946 

ains workers 1 strike. But in 1990 tha naa National 

Party governmsnt anactad the Suppression of Communism 

Act. Tha provisions af that Act ware used in an' 

attempt to destroy, or at least weaken. Independent 

militant trada unionism*. Of thosa uniona affected 

by government's use of this, and other, anti- 

working class legislation, tha Food and Canning 

•orkere* Union (FCTU) and African Food and Canning 

•orkara' Union (A-FCau), warrant special consideration. 

For ovar tha dacades, FOau anrJ A-FCW hava andurad 

aava aftar wave of stata action against thair 

officlala. Nail Aggatt's datantion, and 

aubaaquant daath ahlla in security police custody, 

la tha latest In a long Una of actions which hava 

affected tha organisation of workers In tha food 

and canning industry. 

•hy hava FCeu and A-FCau attracted so much 

atata action? .that kind of unions ara thay that ao 

many of thair offlciala hava baan bannad, datalnad, 

banished, triad, foread Into exile? Ihat followa 

Is a short summary of soaa of thair hiatory, in an 

attaapt to contaxtuallaa-atata action* against 

indepandant trade uniona, and to aituata tha daath. 

in di etantion of tha Tjwjnev*al aacretary of tha 

A-FCIPJ. 

"•*-".».: .-• kM 

iit|i|'i I.V i . i/i'l . .if'li 

.1 Tha Food end Canning ftrk.ro' Unlgn eas 

established in tha Western Cap« during 1941. having 

bean organised byj**y Alexander, • trade union and 

political figure of note in .oxîng claas struggles 

until forcad into exile by a sariaa of banning and 

house arrest order*, ahan workers met to 

establish the union's Paorl branch, thay wara unable 

to obtain a hall In which t

Baper* (LK8), beceuoe of *ta anti-union ecUvitiee 

auoh as tha sdthdreeal of atop order facilities and 

the victimisation of union leaders. Tha outcoas of 

tha conauear boycott raelnde ona of tha acre recent 

dispute at Fettl's and Mania, share a boycott of 

products vat launched In support of tha workers 1 

Oasasnde, In 1909, as in the latter emm, tha FCwu 

son recognition fro" aanagasint, and antarad into mn 

agrooaant ow wages snd working conditions. 

FCSU and A-FCWJ aara involvad in a large nueber 

of activities underteksn by tha Congress Alliance 

(anion Involvad tha African National Congress, 

Congress of Oaaocrata, tha South African Indian 

Congress, Colourad Paoplaa" Congrass, and tha 

9outh African Congress of Trada Unions]* Tha unions 

playad a asjor rola in tha formation of tha South 

African Congrass of Trada Uniona (SACTU), ahich aaa 

tha trada union wing of tha Congraas Allianca, and 

aelntalnod effiliation to SAcru until such tlaa as 

state repression foread SACTU into exile. 

Tha diaput* at UOB, refar red to* above, intagrally 

Involvad tha FCfU'e relationship to tha Congrass 

Allianca through Its affiliation to SACTU, Tha 

coneuaer boycott or U03 producta was led by 

Congraasp snd raproaantaUvas of tha Allianca sore 

involvad In negotiations alth UCB during tha course 

of tha dispute. 

•hen the Bantu Education Act eas passed, FCSU 

supported the AHC's call for a boycott of bantu 

education schools. The union eleo psrtidpated 

in activities related to the Congress of the 

People. Miefcin of the FCWU aanagaaant conlttee 

attended an August 1954 conference to plan the 

Kliptoen congress, end union aaabire eat up groups 

to discuss ahat the Congress of the People eaa about, 

FCSU and A-FGW eere involved in SACTU'* 1957 

£1 e dey campaign, end union ewasbers esre prominent 

in aoee of the stay-et-*oas oella of the period. 

For eneple, a 3-day stay-eeay e i celled in May 

1961, oppoaing the declaretion of South Afrioa as 

a napubllc. The cell received slssd and petohy 

aupport, but on the Rand, Tflt of food end cennlng 

workers stdyed away froe wort for the whole 3-day 

period- 

But it eould be e eistaks to see the union es 

e 'paper organlaatlon 1 , involved in national politics 

to the detriesnt of factory floor organisation. Froe 

its formation in 1941, FC*U grew in strength, faming 

branches over the western and eastern Cape, and up 

the eest coast, A separate union ese foraid in 

Johannesburg end Durben, end in 1903 thla 

aMlgaaatad vlth FCVu to fore e netlonelly-beeed 

union. 

At SACTU'a inaugural conference, held in March 

195S. FCWU ees the largeet union repreeented $ 

(9 000 •ewfcsrs), with A-TOW bslng the third 

largest (3 600 eaebsrs). By 1*2, FOV had 8 052 

*a**ers, ahile A-fCtu hed groan to include 9 565 

neebare. Indeed, the unions saaaad to be 

strengthened by their affiliation to SACTu, and in 

turn eere e beck-bone of SACTU ectlvltlea. One 

union offlciel explained this in the following way: 

Zt la not enough Juet to be effilleted. In 

every toan share our Union la in existence we 

auat help SACTU to organise the unorganleed 

workers and build SACTU into e powerful 

all-in national trade union centre. 

Oeaplte the forael existence of teo separate 

unions, a high dsgres of non-recial sorting clssa 

unity has bean displayed by union aeabart over aeny 

years. One exaaple of this involved the 1997 striks 

St BpwkhewVwse Food Products, in Cspe Toan. Initially, 

coloured workers froa tha FCWU sent on strike, but 

ahsn A-FCWU •aetjari arrived et the factory gatee, 

they Joined the striks. 27 african eortere were 

charged as a reault, and et the trlel one explained: 

I didn't have anything to gain for ayself. The 

reason I didn't go to sort was thst I wanted to . 

support ay Coloured brother workers who eere on 

strike. 

During the course of this striks, the * 

congraas organlsatlona (AW, 8AXP0, COD and SACTU) sent 

e Joint delegation to see Spekhenhaa asnsgeesnt ebout 

re-opening negotiations with the striking eortare. 

The 19SS InduetrUl ConcilUtion Aasnosjsnt Act 

ettacksd the Internal scope end regulation of 

registered unions: no further 'mixed* unions eould 

be registered, already existing 'aixed' unions sere 

to be compelled to separate into unl-raclal branches, 

and racially lntegratad congreeses snd shop-floor 

esMtlnga were prohibited. Tha aajorlty of SACTU 

affiliates* being unregistered unions, eere not 

effected by this Act, but soaa of the best organised 

snd strongest unione eare registered. Ona of these 

eas the FCWU. 

Initially, SACTU atteapted to fox* a united front 

of trade union groupe to oppoae the legislation, but 

TUCGA end the other co-ordinating bodies prefsrred 

to oppoae SACTU rather than the goverrasent in poser. 

A two-year debate over the issue of rag 1st ration 

took piece In SACTU: the optlone posed involved the 

formation of unl-racial uniona; dividing unione into 

racial branches; or de-regicterlng in defiance of 

the lew. Oscar Ifciethe, who until his detention in 

I960 wee still organising for A-FUU, aaa one of those 

aho ergued for de-registration et the tlae. 

Finally, FCJU reluctontly decided to comply with 

tha nee Act: while expressing total opposition to 

It, the union felt that until there eas greetar unity 

in the trade union eovaeent it eould rejasln registered. 

Given the growing strength and influence of 

m u end A-fcwu, It eas inevitable that action eould 

be taken against the unione. 8oae etteapte to awaken 

thee involved edsdnistrativs action. For exaaple, in 

195? tha lege Board claiaed that FCVU wee 

'unrepresentative' end could therefore not partlcipete 

in the Board's investigation of the induetry. Thie 

was despite the fact that FC*J had -era than SI* 

of eorkere in the industry unionised. 

In 1958 ths «ege Board actually lapoeed cuts for 

certeln cetegoriee of eorkere in the food snd canning 

Industry, evwj only the union's strength end relation- 

snip to ths Congress Alliance prevented these sage 

cute froe being lapleswsntad. At ebout the asm tlae, 

the Induetry wae daclered •essential' by govsrnaant, 

evening that there eas a total prohibition on all 

strike activity, 

llth tha passing of tha 1900 Suppression of 

Cosvjunlaa Act, government began rawoving trade union 

offlciala fro- their union position*. In 1963 the

original organiser of the Fomj, general secretary 

Ray Alexander, was banned. Bhe ees replaced by 

Dacky Lan who was In turn banned frow gatherings in 

1954, and prohibited fraa all trada union activity 

in 1956. 

Ourlno this period, union president Frank 

Uarquard ees banned in '.954, aa vara Sua Coa of 

tha unlon'a Port Elizabeth branch, and Sarah 

Ventsel, aacratary of tha Borceeter branch, 

than tha unlon'a first general eecretaryf Ray 

Alexander, wee ordarad by government to resign froe 

tha union* sorters etruok in protaat throughout tha 

Caps. . Moot of thase protaat strike* took* place in 

the eastern Cape, but there sere work stoppagae in 

Port Ellaabeth and East London as sell, 100 afrloen 

aoaen edgrente struck in Eaet London, and coepoeed 

tha follosino tribute to their banned general 

secretary! 

By encouraging African workere to organles, you 

have brought new hope and dignity to thouaands 

of workere. Sobeya Bibona (as -ill seat again). 

In 1999 Elizabeth flafaklng, preeident of the 

A-FCKJ aee benlahad from har hoae in Pearl to a fare 

in a remote, eead-deewrt area, 80 miles free tha 

nearest large town. Taking only the youngest of 

her 11 children, aho slipped out of South Africa 

into exile. Frances Beard, eecretary of tha FCSU'e 

Port Elisabeth branch, eaa detained by security police 

in 1962, and bemad in January 1963, Held In 

aolltary confinement for a year, ahe ems finally 

convicted in teres of the Buppreeelon of Coeaunlae 

Act, and eentenced to 5 years lapriaoneent. On her 

release, ahe sea banished to the Northern Traneveel, 

a thousand alias froa her hoae. 

The list of officleie removed froa FC*U and 

A-FCWU la very long, eafcel Balfour, Traneveel 

general secretary of the A-FOFJ aes benned in 1962, 

and oonfinad to a aaell house in fioodepoort; Liz 

Abrahaae, aho acted ae FOPJ ganerel aacratary after 

the banning of Ray Alexander and Beaky Len, ees 

hereelf restricted in 196*. And Mery Hoodley, who 

hed organleed worker* on tha East Rand into FCBU in 

the 1900a, see held under 90-day detention in 1963. 

Barred free trade union eork in 1963, ahe regained 

banned for all but 3 days of the next VJ yetre, dying 

a restricted person in October 1979. 

Thoea arrested in the Treason Trial Included 

A Hshlengu of tha A-FCSU. 6 Oaaone and Frances 

Beard of FCBU'e Port Elizabeth branch, than tha 

atete of emergency eee declared in 1960, end the 

MC end PAC banned, Beard, tasbel Belfour and Oscar 

UpethA were detained. Subsequently, Lily Oladrlcha, 

aacratary of the FCBU benefit fund in Port Elizabeth, 

Inevitably, state action had ita effects on 

the unions, and gradually FCJBJ retreated to ita 

Veetern Cape base, share only a fee brenchee remained 

active. But the davelopaent of nee Independent 

trade union grouping* in the 1970a gave FCeU a nee 

lapetua, and by 1979 tha union eaa atrong enough 

to take on the eenageaont of Fettle* and Mania in 

• protracted strike - and eventually ein recognition. 

It ees during thla atrika that a conaueor boycott 

of F • M products eaa launched in support of tha 

eorkere* daaends - a tactic pravlouely used by tha 

union in an earlier period. In the 1960s workers 

free the union sere involved in tha boycott of 

potatoes in the Transvaal, and oranges In tha 

eeetem Cape, 

The F • m atrika served to underline the F0BU*e 

policy of non-reoUl eorker solidarityj both afrlcen 

and coloured workers eere Involved in the atrika 

activity, and norweclel eupport groups were aet up 

around the country to undertake tha boycott of 

f • I products. 

Union aeebers have been Involved In militant 

atrlke activity in e number of inatancee over the 

paet fee years - at Baa Harvest in Baldhana Bay 

(sea *1P 11:26-27), and at Krcariviar Apple Co-op 

(eee JJP 13:23-55}, for exajaple. firanchee have bean 

eat up or reactivated in Uohenneeburg and East 

London - the latter having bean involved in the 

oppoaition to Ciskaien 'lnOependenee*, ahich obvlouoly 

affects a majority of union aeabara. Indeed, a number 

of FCBU unionist* were detained by Clakel authorities 

in 1B80 end 1BS1, ehlla £e*t London branch, aacratary 

BonlaUe Noruehe aee held by South Afrlcen eeourlty 

police for 7 aonthe before being celled ee a witnaee 

in a political trial, then he refused to testify, 

he ees eentenced to one yeeê lagrlsoneent. 

Ho account of etata action agminet leaders of 

FCIU and A-FCiU le complete without aentlon of 

Oscar up nth*: involved in A-FCBU for over 3 dacedaa 

(intarruptad by banning orders and leprlsoneent), 

he Is currently standing trial In Cape Toan eith 17 

others. Detained in August 19B0 In tha context of 

the Cape Town bus boycott, the etate refuaaa even 

to allow thla ?1-yeer old veteran of trede unionlae 

ball, despite falling health and vary little evidence 

implicating hie in hie trial. In eany ways* Hpetha's 

Involvement In trade union, community and political 

atrugglaa eyaMliees the hlatory of FCBU and A-FCwu - 

Including tha eysteaetlc atteoke aede by the state 

on these unions. 

This Is the context in ehlch Hail Aggett'a 

deeth should be viewed. Ae aacratary of tha Transvaal 

branch of A-FCW, he ees Integrally Involved In the 

resurgence of eorker orgenleatlon. His death robe 

A-FCBU in particular, and the Independent union 

eoviaint in general, of a valued and important 

member. But the union has outlived the nuearoua 

previous attacks on its officials. As a recant 

press report noted, 

On general policy lesuae the unions 1 

etence reaelne within an eatabUehad 

tradition. There is e bedrock belief in 

industrial unionlae, non-reclellae and rank 

and file control (Star. 1fi.01.B3). 

It io these featuree which ahould enable 

FCfU endÂ-FCsnj to aurvive the death of an 

organlaar, as well as any future actions ehlch the 

stete la planning against the independent trade 

union movement*

[DETENTIONS: 

Investigating 

Inquests 

IN response to Neil Agpatt's death In detention, and 

the approach of the inquest into the circumstances 

of his death, it is important to focus attention on 

the procedures followed in inquests- This article 

looks at some features of the inquest with regard to 

political detainees. It includes concrete examples 

illustrating tha role of police, the presiding 

magistrate, and state pathologists. Other legal 

proceedings resulting from deaths in detention are 

also considered. 

The Inquest Act, Wo 5ftôf 1950 

IT ia essential to understand the purpose and alma of 

an Inquest in order to realise that the limitations 

contained in the various provisions of the Inquest, 

Act lay inquest proceedings open to such abuse as to 

prevent tha achievement of those aims. 

An Inquest Is not a criminal trial in ahlch 

people are found guilty and than sentenced. An 

inquest is a hearing Consisting of 

1) e magistrate; 

2) a public prosecutor; 

3) a parson representing those aith an interest in the 

outcome of the inquest (hereafter referred to MM a 

lawyer); and 

4) any witnesses that are necessary to assist the 

court in the search for tha truth. 

The function of both the public prosecutor and the 

lawyer is to present the magistrate with the facts 

surrounding tha death of tha deceased* The magistrate 

than has to arrive at a decision as to the 

circumstances of the deceased's death, and whether it 

aas caused by any act or omission on the part of 

anyone. It oust be stressed that the role of tha 

public prosecutor is only to lead the evidence, 

and not to attempt to exonerate or apportion blame; 

it is certainly not the public prosecutor's role to 

put the beliefs and past actions of the deceased on 

trial,

examine the moker of the iUt#Mnt in order to 

ascertain the truth of the ellegatlons contained in 

the statement. Hwvir, the magistrate may decide 

to call th« parson who made tha statement to giva 

evidence - but than tha magistrate haa tha discration 

to determine which quaationa tha lawyer ahould be 

alloaad to ask. 

After all tha avldanca (such aa it is ) has baan 

hesrd* tha Magistrate 'shall racord a finding,... 

a) aa to tha identity of tha deceased person; 

b) aa to the cause or likely cause of death; 

0) as to the dete of death} 

d) aa to whether tha death eas brought about by any 

act or omission Involving or amounting to an 

offence on the part of any person*. 

Zf the amglstrate is unable to record any finding, 

then he/she must record that fact. No reasons need be 

given by the.magietrete for coning to any of tha 

findings. 

If the moglfttrete states 

1) that the court is unable to record e finding, or 

2) that tha death eas brought about by an act or 

omission involving or amounting to an offence on 

the part of any person, or 

3) if requested to by the attorney general, 

then the magistrate must give the file of the inquest 

to the attorney general who may then, in hie 

discretion, reopen the InQuost. 

There mrm certain offences that the Inqueat Act 

does set out, the Boat important being that "any 

person who prejudices, influences or anticipates the 

proceedings or findings of an inqueat....shall be 

guilty of an offence 1 . Sentence is a maximum of 

R900, or 6 months, or both. Thie offence eas 

Introduced In 1979, not long after the conclusion 

of the Biko inquest. 

Bearing in elnd tha fact that tha public 

prosecutor and the aaglatrate ere public eervants in 

the pay of the state, and the extent of the discretion 

thet ie given to the megletrete, It le clear that 

the Inojjest Act is vulnerable to ebuae. The 

magistrate can, with the uee of the discretionary 

powers, direct end channel the events in the 

inquest to the extent of almost excluding the party 

representing the relatives of the deceased* 

An effective summary of the Act is to compare the 

embit of the magistrate'a discretion with the rights 

of representstiveeof the deceased. 

The following fall elthln the magistrate's discretion: 

1) Vhether a medical examination should be held or 

not (eectlon 3(2)). 

2) thether the deceased's body should be disinterred . 

or not (section 3(d)). 

3) Who should be present at the poet mortem besldee 

tha district surgeon and police. 

4) Tha date of the Inqueat - 'reasonable notice.*.to 

be given to the spouse or relative, provided the 

spouse or relative is available 9^S the giving of such 

notice eill not, in the opinion of the magistrate, 

unduly delay the inquest 1 (section ?). 

5) which witnesses should be celled to give evidence. 

6) which assessors should alt with the Magistrate to 

decide on the findings: must alao get Ministerial 

sanction for this (section 9(0). 

?) which persons should be excluded froe the place 

of the lnqueet - '....the mmgietrate holding the 

lnqueet mey In hia discretion exclude froe the place 

where tha lnqueet le held eny person whose presence 

thereat is, in his opinion not necessary or desirable' 

(section 10). 

a) wnich questions way be put by Interested partlee 

to the witnessee - 'Representatives of interested 

parties aay only put such questions as the magistrate 

aay allow* (section 11(2)). 

9) whether and when the inquest should be ertjournod 

(eectlon 12(1», 

10) which documents should be eoMesible In proof of 

the facts stated therein (section 13(1)). 

11) Ihether the person making the above-mentioned 

affidavit shell be celled to give evidence 

(section 13(2)). 

12) Whether evidence Should be taken on commission 

or not (section 15). 

13) whether Interested pertlee should see or obtain 

. • 

the documents given by the prosecutor to the 

magistrate ehlch aey or will be used in the lnqueet. 

'It will be in hie discration whether he ellowe 

/ P*ge 10 

thee to have a copy or to peruse the document, and it 

will be in his discretion whether It Is to be ellowed. 

in respect of all tha documents or only In respect of 

ecme of thsmf and aa to shen this le to be done, or in 

what circumstances and subject to whet conditions the 

perueel is to take place or tha copies ere to be 

delivered 1 . . 

14) whether e list of witnesses and documents to be 

used in the trial be given to the interested party. 

The rights of interested parties (normolly relotlves 

of the deceased): 

1) The rigiht to nominate legal representation. 

2) The right to nominate e medical practitioner to be 

present et the medical examination (eectlon 3(a)(b)). 

3) To put such questions to witnesses as the 

magietrate may allow (section 11(2). 

4) To hand in affidavlte (section 13(l)) - eno ash: 

that the makers of the effldevits be aubpoenaad to give 

orel evidence. 

Poet-mdrtomo 

THE lnqueet Act leys down the legal framewor* in 

which the post mortem exeminetion le to tmfce piece. 

According to the Act t a meglatrate to whom e death 

la reported may *if he deeme it expedient in the 

Interests of Justice, ceuss (the body) to be 

examined by tha district surgeon or eny other medical 

practitioner who amy, if he demse it necessary for the 

purpose of ascertaining with greater certainty the 

cause of dwwth, meke or causa to be mode en examination 

of any internal organ or any part of any of the 

contente of the body, or of any other eubatance or 

thing'. 

In addition, a private pathologist may be present 

If the Magistrate is satisfied thet such e person 

(usually representing the family of the deceased) haa 

a 'substantial and peculiar interest in the issue of 

tha examination'. 

Even if privets pathologists are present, they 

may not neceesarily be so et the critical post-mortem. 

In the case of Luke •mtwamba, private pathologists 

were only able to ess the body 5 deya after the

peg* 11 

officially performed post-mortem. In the cetie of 

Hell Aggett, the post-mortem was started prior to 

the arrival of the private pathologist. 

The aim of the post-mortem examination la to 

establish precisely the causa of death. The post" 

mortem examination consists of the following 

procedures i 

1) Identification of the body; 

2) Secondary post-mortem changes; 

3) External appearance of the body and condition of 

the llmbe; 

4) Examination of the head and neck and organs; 

5) Examination of the chest and organs; 

6) Examination of the abdomen and organs; 

7) Examination of the spina; 

8) Additional observations; 

9) Specimens. • 

All the observations of the pathologist are entered 

into Form (Health) 1, titled 'Report on a medico 

legal postHsortem examination', which is completed 

under the auspices of the Department of Health. This 

form concludes with an observation as to the cous* 

of death. 

It Is important +o note, however, that the whole 

examination is still subject to the personal 

Interpretation of the examiner. The pathologist is 

In a position to note or overlook certain findings and 

to take or ignore certain specimen*. At the inquwst 

of Jamms Lenkoe, evidence of electric shock treatment 

and traces of copper war* found by a private 

pathologist. The atate pathologists were unlikely 

to have taken such specimens. 

Thus, while the inquest post-mortem has the sir 

of cold, objective, scientific enquiry. It is 

nevertheless open to personal opinion, personal bias, 

end in some cases, polltlcel objectives. Even the 

scientific basis of many of the conclusions are open 

to discussion - the Blko inquest contained hours o f 

discussion over how, exactly, certain Injuries might 

have bean sustained. The pethologlst is in a very 

powerful position of being expected to atate with 

euthorlty what was the cause of death* In many cases, 

pathologists refuse to commit themselves by stating 

• 

a particular event likely to have caused death. In 

other inquests, the testimony of doctors has given 

important insights into the methods of interrogation 

used by security police, end the resultant deaths of 

detainees. 

The evidence presented by government pathologists 

is highly regarded by inquest magistrates. Solomon 

modipane died on 28 February, T9G9. A police 

spokesmen announced thet the detainee had received 

certain injuries when ha had slipped on a bar of 

soap. The district surgeon announced thet he was 

unable to determine the cause of deeth; the magistrate 

used this information to state that it was a 

•natural death* and that no inquest was necessary. 

The pathologist may be unwilling to speculate 

es to how injuries may have been caused. Imam 

Abdullah Hsron died on September 27. 1969, In the 

Maltland police cells. The minister of police told 

the press that ha had died of natural causes, 

heving fallen down stairs- 26 bruises of varying 

agas were identified on the front, side and back 

of his body. The pathologist stated thet the cause 

of death was heart trouble related to injuries 

sustained in the fall. Ha could not or was not 

willing to say how the other injuries had been caused. 

Interestingly, although the magistrate attached no 

blame to any person, the state paid Mrs Heron 

R5 000 In an out-of-court settlement. 

The evidence provided by doctors may also be 

significant in implicating tha security police and 

their interrogation methods. James Lenkoe was 

found hanging in his prison call in Pretoria. The 

prison surgeon found that death was due to hanging. 

The family of Lenkoe lnalstad on another post* 

mortmw being conducted by en independent pathologist. 

At the inquest, counsel for the widow presented medical 

evidence that indicated that Lenkoe had been given 

an electric shock on the day he died. Three 

pathologists testified that there wee a mark on hie 

body thet was consistent with a very recent electric 

burn. The verdict in the Inquest was 'eelf-inflicted 

hanging*. 

In summary, tha Inquest Act allows for post-ewrtem 

examinations to take place. These af* conducted by 

stete pethologiets, except where the magistrate haa 

allowed private pathologists to attend tha 

examination. The post-mortem Itself is subjective 

in tanas of what tissues are examined and what 

specimens taken; the observations tcx> may ba 

contested as to their signiflcanca. Doctors Involved 

In providing evidence et inquests may ba of asslstanca 

to the family or 'prosecution*; somwtimas this is 

intentional. The objectivity of the poet-mortem 

findings is itself e myth. 

Illustrations from pest Inquests 

1. Hussein Haffajeo 

Hsffejee, a 26 year old Durban dentist, died on 2 

August, 1976, which was tha first night of his 

detention. The inquest into his death eas only held 

in 1976. 

Security police testified that Heffejea was 

detained et e specielly erected police block. Police 

had previously entered hie flat, photocopied items 

there, end then left the premises as If undisturbed. 

After being detained, police drova Hsffejee around 

Durban, and according to security police he put up 

a struggle and fought with them a nusber of times^ 

es if trying to escape. Police claimed that these 

tussles ware the causa of bruises found on the 

detainees body, and denied thet they ware the reeult 

of 'excessive interrogation'. Tha chief etata 

pathologist and an International for*nelc export 

both agreed thet the 40-50 bruises on the body were 

not the causa of death. The representative, of the 

public prosecutor accordingly argued that Heffejea 

had killed himself by hanging. 

The public prosecutor applied to lead documentary 

evidence to lndicata a motive for suicide. These 

Involved notee In his handwriting on hoe to woke 

exploelveet manuals 'for organising tarrorism', 

and other books. He even wanted to call e police 

exploalvas expert to testify that bombs found in a 

building were tha same aa thosa described by hoffejea 

in his notes. 

Counsel for the Hsffejee family opposed tha

application, claiming that it •ould turn the inquest 

into a criminal trial of an accused already dead, 

and therefore not in a position to answer allegations. 

The magistrate, haaaver, ruled that the documents 

could be lad as evidence. 

The public prosecutor-than argued that the 

docuaanta proved that Heffejee had committed suicide 

Qecauee he did not sent to face public trial and be 

exposed es a saboteur. 

At the conclusion of the Inquestt the magistrate 

found that no-ona aaa to blame for Haffejaa's death. 

Regarding the injuries on his body, the magistrate 

found that security police aere not responsible. In any 

event, he ruled that the issue was irrelevant 'since 

in tense of the Inquest Act the court eaa not concerned 

aith lesues not connected to the cause of death*. 

2. LungUe Tebalaxe 

Tabalaza, a 21 year old youth, fall to hie death froa 

the fifth floor of the Senlmm Building (security 

. police headquarters) In Port Elizabeth on 10 July* 

1978. Thla aaa the saiie venue ehere Stave 8iko 

sustained his fatal injuries shortly before. 

Tebelaae'a death led to calls for the resignation 

of police Minister Jimmy Krugar - aho announced that 

a aanior police officer had bean appointed to make 

immediate investigations into the clrcuaatancas 

surrounding the death of Tabs la ES. 

Tao seeks later, Krugar announced that three 

eecurlty pollcaaan in Port Ellnbeth aould be 

transferred to another area. One of these aas the 

'C— ending officer of the PC security police, Colonel 

PJ Oooean - prominent in the BiXo inquest. Goosan 

haa recently bean promoted to Brigadier. 

Tahaloza had bean arrested together eith another 

Y7 year old youth. They eere taken from the police 

etatlon in Nee Brighton to the Banlaa Building in 

toan share the eecurlty police have their offices. 

The 17 year old youth aas brought to trial on 

charges of arson and theft el thin 46 hours of 

Tabalaza'a death. Tabalaza aould have bean e co- 

accused in this trial. The youth pleaded guilty on 

all chargee. but the Magistrate found hi* not guilty 

on aoae of the charges .beceuee of insufficient 

1 my., v I.--.-*- --• •. ll JJ-. i'L ' " ^ m ^ m ^mm 

evidence. He aae aantanced to 30 months imprisonment. 

During the course of the inquest, this youth 

aas called aa a vltnesa at the request of the family. 

He said that the eecurlty police had told him that 

he would be detained for 10 yeara If ha did not plead 

guilty. He also said that ne did not want to aake 

! e stataaant in front of a magistrate, but aade one 

beceuse he aas afraid of being beaten up. 

The security pollca claimed that Tabalaza had 

Jumped froa the fifth floor office in a bid to reach 

the roof of a building across the street. Counael for 

the Family said that thie see pure speculation and 

that Tabalaza could have Jumped to escape the police 

or to commit suicide. TebaJexa aas efreid of the 

eecurlty police, and they eare not only morally 

liable for his death, but had bean criminally negligent, 

said counsel. 

Hoeever, the magistrate found that nobody aas to 

blame for his death. He recorded the evidence 

given by the security polio* ea honest and thoroughly 

tasted, ehlle the evidence fllven by the youth aaa 

felee. He rejected hie evidence of threats and 

assaults by policat ahich tna youth had given for 

the first time et the lnQuest. 

3. Ahmed Ttmol 

Timol aas a X year old school teacher aho fell 

from the tenth floor of John Vorster Square, 

Johannesburg, in October 1971. 

An inquest date aas Initially set doan for 

December 1971, but at the start counsel for the family 

applied for access to documents relating to Timol *e 

detention. The magistrate refused this, and counael 

applied to the Supreme Court to eat aside thie refusal. 

The Bupreme Court ordered the magistrete to etudy 

the documents, but maid that it aaa etlll at the 

magietrete'e discretion what to do. After 

studying the docuaanta, the Magistrate allowed them 

ell to be disclosed. 

than the inouaat began at the and of April T972, 

etateaente allegedly eritten by Timol during the 

three days before* hie deeth eer« handed in as axhibite. 

He aas reported to have described hoe ha aaa recruited 

and trained by the South African Communist Party 

in London, 

During the course of the inquest, a visit aas 

made to the room from ahich ha aas alleged to have 

Jumped. Security police aho had bean present and 

involved in the caae at the time, gave evidence 

about hoe Timol Jumped. Tao security police gave 

conflicting accounts, and counsel for the family 

pointed out thet one of them had only handed in a 

ststement to the CIO, aho mere inveetlgatlng the 

case, tao weeks lata. To add to the drama, General 

Buys, head of the CIO and leader of the investigation 

team, aho had agreed that there rare inconsistencies, 

page 12 

had a heart attack ehlle being cross examined. Later, 

he see apparently back in hie office doing light 

work, but aas unfit to return to the witness box. 

The etate gave tag possible raaaons shy Timol 

had jumped: they said that ha had Jumped after a 

Mr X (an informer ehosa name they aould not disclose), 

had walked into the office and announced that they 

had traced 'Quentin and others*. If thia aaa the 

seats parson aa Quant in Jacobeant he aaa later 

acquitted on charges under the Terrorism Act, and 

Tiaul aas not mentioned in that esse. 

I The eacond reason put forward related to 

docuaanta found In Tlmol'e possession, ahich 

instructed memo ere of the Communist Party to commit 

suicide rather than betray the Party. The aagietrate 

accepted that Timol must have been familiar aith thase 

instructions. 

Detailed medical argument aaa led concerning 

datea of bruises that mere found on Timol'e dead 

body. It aaa difficult to ascertain whether the 

bruises aere Inflicted prior to detention, or ehlle 

ha aaa in detention. The magistrate'recommended 

when giving judgement, that detalneeo under tna 

Terrorlem Act should in future be examined by a 

district aurgaon aa aoon aa posaible after their 

detention. This might avoid the necessity for 

long enquiries, and might save the pollca unnecessary 

smb ex ralament. 

There aas also medical debate about injuriss 

that could have bean sustained immediately prior to 

death. hVjeauer, counsel admitted that injuries,

page 13 

unless Inflicted beforw daath. would ba 

indistinguishable fro* thoaa sustained at daath 

( f m falling). 

Counsel asked the aagiatrata to giva * vwrdict 

that ha saw unable to aay whathar tha daath had baan 

brought about by ait act or oaisalon on the part of 

any parson. Tha magistrate's finding was that 

nobody w responsible. Ha aald that Tlaol'* daath 

could heva baan politically aotlvatad bacauaa of his 

allayad adhapanoa to coaaunlat Ideology, and that 

•Mi daath *a* • twrribla loss to tha polica\ alnca 

ha was wary * valuable' for thair invaatigatlona. „ 

Othar laoal procaadinga 

THE general and aoat accaptad procedure aftar • 

daath has occurred in datantion la an lnquast 

hearing. T«o of tha deaths that hava occurrad in 

datantion hava raault in additional court proceedings. 

Tha caaaa of Joseph Hdlull and Hapatla Hohapl ara thaw 

lnatancaa, 

: Jowwph 1M1 

On 19 Ismrch, t976, Joaaph Udluli diad in police 

custody in Durban, 2d hours aftar ha had baan 

I datainad. Mo lnquaat took placa as tha state 

decided to proaacuta d aacurity policawin for 

culpabla hoaiclda, 

Tha AW in London ralaaaad certain photograph* 

; of Hdlull** corpse. Thay showed a aultltuda of 

injuries on his body. Ho had nuaarous abrasions, 

a fractured cartilage, broken ribe and his brain 

i*M conoaatad with haaaur rhagta. This aaa tha cllaata 

in ahich tha trial of tha 4 aacurity policaaan took 

placa* 

: Tha accused wara: 

Captain OF van Zyl 

Uautwnant * Taylor 

I Datactiva Sarpaont ef> eawthanya 

Datactiva Sergeant Z Npobaaa. 

Tha accuaad did not give avidanca. Xnataad 

thay aada atataaants to tha proaacutor. Thair varalon 

of tha evants loading up to Waluli's daath was aa 

follow*: Joaaph udluli aaa arraatad on ie asvoh at * 

about lOhOO. Tha rolloelng aorning, ahila being 

lntatrogatad, ha aoVad toward* tha window in an 

attwapt to coiaait suicide* Ha WW* rastrsin-d , and 

a fierce struggle anaued. Tha incident aas report** 

to Major Coatzaa aho aaa Hdlull and stated that ha em 

satisfied that Udluli had not baan injured. 

Hdlull*s intarrtsjation continuad -lth ocoaalonal 

braaka until about 20h30 tha aaaa day. Tha pollca 

alleged that ha than auddanly got up, staggering 

and coaplslnlng of diulnaa*. Ha fall with hla 

chest or naok onto tha back of a chair. Tha chair 

topplad and Udluli fall against tha door. Shortly 

oftarwda, Hdlull aaa daad. 

In his Judgaaant, Justice Jaaae rwfarrwd to tha 

avidanca of Or van Straatan, tha stata pathologist 

aho carried out tha poet-aortaa on Hdlull*s body. 

Or van Straatan had originally attributed tha causa 

of daath to throttling, but aftar discussing tha 

•attar alth tha chief stata pathologist, Prefaaaor 

Gordon, ha caaa to tha conclusion that Hdlull'a 

daath aaa associated with tha application of force 

to the naok. Tha Judga did not dlsputa this finding, 

and had this to say about ltt "In othar words. . . 

although what ha observed was conaistant alth daath 

through throttling it aaa also consistent aith tha 

application of forca or soaa othar aannar*. 

Justice Jaaaa rafarrad to tha atatawant* whicah 

tha accuaad had aada, in ahich thay aald that Hdlull 

had admitted to having racruitad people for sdlitary 

training. Thay alao sold that ha had ravaalad tha 

naaa of tha taxi drlvar aho had tranaportad tha 

racruita. Tha Judga accaptad tha accuaad'a story 

that thay had uaad no aora 'force than aaa nacasawry' 

to wubdua Hdlull aftar ha had aovad toaarda tha 

ainojoa. Ha said thay "clearly sara not guilty of 

any unlawful conduct at 6.X on tha aorning of tha 

ttth Harch bacauaa thay appliad no greater forca than 

saa lawfully justified in tha cireuaatancaa*, 

Whan tha second incldant occurrad 12 hours later, 

tha 4 accuaad, according to thair wtateaanta, war* 

not in tha rooa. Othar aacurity policaaan, Ifruawlo, 

Ndull, and Itilongo wara thara. Tha Judga said that 

although tha accounta glvan by tha latter .dlffarad 

I in tfatall, thara aaaaad to be oanaral agraaaent that. 

Hdluli got up froa his chair, hald Kis haad in hla 

hand*, coaplalnad of dizziness, and than fall onto a 

chair and than againat a door fraaa. Othar policaaan 

rushad to tha acana and andaavourad to apply artificial 

inspiration. By 2*30 it aaa obvious that Udluli was 

dean • 

If this avidanca of tha police la to ba accaptad 

at its faca valua, than It ia claar that tha 4 

accuaad aaro not rwaponslblw for tha daath 

of Hdluli. Thay wara not prewant whan ha 

diad and had left tha rooa about an hour bafora. 

Tha only incldant in ahich thay had baan involved 

in any violent contact aaa at about 8.30** ouar 

12 houra bafora his daath and according to 

Major Coatzaa ha notioad nothing wrong with 

Hdluli aftar tha incldant, 

tha Judga aald. 

Tha Judga discounted tha argtsaant put forward 

by Ur Brunette for tha state, that tha daath 

occurrad aa a raault of tha Incldant aMoh took placa * 

at 8h30 in tha aorning. Tha doctor** avidanca had 

atatad that daath would hava baan alaoat lnatantanaous 

aftar racalving tha naok injuries. Ha could not 

hava sustalnad thaaa injuries and only diad 12 houra 

later. Furtharaorw, if IWluli had received tha rack 

injuries in tha aorning and died ia*j*diat*ly. tha 

Judga aald, tha court ***• unable to accept* that it 

«as possibla far tha pollca to cover this up until 

that night. 

.Tha 4 aacurity policaaan wara thua found not to 

ba laaponalblw for Hdlull'a daath, although thara aaa 

a possibility that thay had uaad 'lagltiaata forca to 

aubdua hla*. Justice Jaaaa acqulttad thaa of tha 

charga of culpabla hoaiclda. 

Bafora concluding hla Judge****, hoawvar* 

tha Judga had this to say in tha light of tha wida- 

spraad injuriaa on Hdlull"* body and tha conflicting 

avidanca ha had haard: , 

I naad hardly say that tha pr^blaa of how 

Udluli aat hla daath is ona that should ba solved 

and that it ia ona of groat Importance. 

Joaaph Hdlull aas liatad aa a co-conspirator in 

a trial in Pirtaiwaritzburg of 10 wan charge* with 

MC activities. Hr Juaticw Hoswnl, in a section of 

hi* Judgaaant, rwfarrad to Hdlull** daath In datantion. 

He aald that tha injuriaa that cauaad hla daath could

not heve been aalf-inflictmd, nor ciusid eccidentally. 

He said 

•w are satisfied that Mr Mdlult sustained the 

injuries while he was In tha custody of the 

Security Police. There is no evidence of how 

ha suffered tha injuries, or In shot 

circumstances* That is a setter peculiarly in 

the knowledge of the persona In whose custody he 

was at tha time end none of them has given 

evidence. 

The statements mode by both Judges have far- 

reaching Implications in tens of further 

lnvestlegtion into Udlull's death. However, no 

further action hot t>^mn taken by the attorney 

general, end the circumstances of his death hevw 

only left his interrogators that much more suspect 

in the eyes of the world. 

As has been stated above, Inquests ere far from 

adequate means of establishing what actually happens 

when a death has occurred in detention. If a civil 

or criminal case reaches the courts t much more 

evidence is brought to light, both sides lnvestlgeting 

and arguing more deeply the events leading up to the 

death, 

Mspotle wohapl 

An lnquaat into tha death in detention of Uepetla* 

Uohapi (died 15.07.76) found that the cause of death 

was 'force applied to hie neck due to hanging'. His 

death, the magistrate seid, was not brought about by 

any act or omission by any living person. However, 

the magistrate did not issue a formal verdict of 

suicide. 

tapetla Mohapi's widow then sued the Minister of 

Police for damages for loss of support resulting 

from the death of her husband In police cuetody. This 

is the only civil action with regard to a death in 

detention actually fought in a court of law which was 

not kept out of that arena through out-of-court settle 

wants* which has bean the common practice. 

In Uohapi vs Minister of Police, much of the 

argument centred around a suicide note which counsel 

for Hrs Uohapi argued was faked. They brought in 

expert witnesses to testify, one of whom was a Or 

ifcjllus Grant, past president of the Forensic Science 

Staiaty, end medical Legal Society of Great Britain, 

» 

Or Grant showed differences betawen the handwriting 

of the alleged suicide note and other authentic 

examples of Uohapi's handwriting. 

Ooctor Grant had the toilet paper on which the 

alleged suicide note waa written analysed under 

ultra-violet light. The same procedure was adopted 

for other notes which Uohapi had smuggled out on 

toilet paper, while in detention. Or Grant claimed 

that the composition of the paper on which the 

'suicide note* was written was of a different 

composition from thet of Uohapi's clandestine 

letters, ie they did not come from the same roil. 

Evidence was also led as to the change in tone 

from three optimistic letters written from Jail 

and then the improbable suicide note. Mrs Uohapi 

said thet in the letters he had smuggled out, Uohapi 

had expressed optimism about tha future. He advised 

her to obtain a loan In his name to tide her over 

'until I em back in circulation someday*. , In en 

unprecedented move t evidence of an ex detainee, 

who was in exile In Lesotho, was heard. Thenjlwe 

Utintso described in her evidence how Captain 

Hansen of the security police had held her head with 

his thighs and put a towel across her face end pulled 

it tight. He hed then said, 'Now you know how 

Uohapi died 1 (Star, ie.Oi.eo). 

The police led evidence to the affect that the 

suicide note was genuine. Lt Col Fourie said ha 

had examined the suicide note and compared it with 

authentic writings of Uohapi**, and said 'there ware 

no signs to convince (him) thet lt waa not a genuine 

document•. 

A second police handwriting expert, Oet-Sgt 

KFC landman, said he had applied 10 different criteria 

to establish whether the Uohapi note might be a 

forgery. They all proved negative, he said. 

The finding of Justice Smalberger ems that there 

had not been sufficient evidence to suggest that 

Uonapl's death had been caused through assault by 

the police. Neither was there convincing evidence 

to suggest that 'the suicide note was faked. He 

dismissed Urs Uohapl's claim, end ordered her to pay 

all costs tp the Minister of Police. 

W overview of the available findings of inquests 

tf into deaths In detention reveals two issues* firstly, 

the magistrate'e findings as to the cause of death 

follows closely the explanations advanced by security 

police when they announce the death. Secondly, 

no magistrate has ever found any policeman or 

other person responsible for a death that has 

occurred in detention. Further, no magistrate 

has ever recorded mn 'open verdict' in an inquest 

into a death In detention - which would meen that- 

he was not able to make a finding on the basis of 

the available evidence. In all legal proceedings 

dealing with deaths in detention, security police 

have been exonerated mvmry time. 

(•MmtjtLiiiTii) 

DOTT in I#C«»TI0K PILE IIP - UU IT : 

Critical WMlta srwvt4M 

- lam for nta» tart srwarmulfe aMlta- 

•wriMTi C*R plm/ fa 

Pmpl i Knew 

.•ttttty. 

- • tritiem *f 

•hailtJr la Imrtatfm 

Africa. 

• mmraam of IwalUi 

at t autc Hato. 

dfHiAltOA Of 

kMlU nliud • 

turn*;. 

- iMiaM Into tfm mriUtttl Mtvre of 

wnltJk. 

/Vm tt: Critfcil WMlta, X 

! F.O. »ox mi, 1 

I Jofctnrwifejnj, 2000. 

VfcmstHptimi: •t*«0c" for emit fmw itumt.J 

page 14

I 

0-B« 15 

INTRODUCTION 

TO POLITICAL 

ECONOMY, 

part 4 

THE previous three port* Of this series have 

ondentrated almost exclusively on the structure of 

the capitalist aconoay. As explained in part one, 

ths economy am* focused on bocauae it is ther basis 

of socisty in general. This is not to say that 

politics, law, culture, ths stats and ideology ant 

not important. Claarly they an, and some of the 

aoat significant procassas and ralaticna ara found 

In tha non-economic arass of socisty. But as 

Piarra Jalte orgued, 

rajesnklnd** first naad is to Maintain physical 

life* production of tha aaana of subaistanca 

(clothing, food, housing) and tha conditions 

undar ahich thay ara producad ara of isnadiata» 

furidsmsntal and permanent importance....A 

socisty can only bo built upon suoh an economic 

infrastructure as a houaa on its foundations 

(quotsd in SIP 19:24). 

In other sards, the undarstanding of aconoalc 

structuras and falatlonshlpa alloas for tha 

exploration of other aapscts of sociaty. In this 

seneo, tha method usad in tha wrl« on political 

aoonoay involved exploring tha bass of capitalist 

socisty - tha economy - bafora trying to move on 

to other important faaturas of ths social systsn. 

But it is not quits accurate to say that tha 

shola aconoalc structure has baan explored in this 

series* Tha eronomy ltsalf is mede up of a nuatxer 

of interrelated parts* Thaaa involve tha actual 

production of coamditlas, as sail as tha say In ehleh 

coasiodltias ara bought and sold (circulation of goods). 

In looking at tha economy, it aas arguad that tha 

aoat iaportant procassas and relations at work 

involvad tha amy in ahich uoamodltlss sara 

prod-jcad. Tha aconoay as a shola aas tharafora 

not examined, but rathar tha conditions undar ahich 

co— odltloa ara producad. 

( In tha invastigation of production, tso vary 

iaportant sats of rslations vsra uncovered. Thay 

involvad 

1* tha ralatlonohip of tha various classas to tha 

aaana of production; and 

2. tha aay In ahich tha capitalist class attaepts 

to incraaaa tha amount of surplus ahlQh is producad 

by tha sorklng class. 

It eaa arguad that thaaa relatione asra iaportant 

in that thay fonsod an initial basis for understanding 

tha diffarancas and slsdlarltlaa botesan various 

aociatiaa. It aaa found, for example* that tha 

capitalist class as a shola oaned tha noat 

iaportant aaana of production. This banorshlp ia 

a significant baala of poaar. In that it anablas 

ths oanars to dacida ahat is produced, hoa it is 

producad, and hoa any surplua la distributed and 

ralnvaatad. 

Thosa ralatlona shlch sara Identified in tha 

firat thraa parts of tha aarias on political aconoay 

fom a basis for undaratanding ehst classas ara in 

sociaty, and hoa ona ldantiflaa such classas. Tha 

capitalist class Is ldsntiflad in taraa of its 

osnarahlp of tha aaana of production, tha fact that 

its a—bsn do not produca comaodlties, and its 

ability to tsfce ovar or af>propriata tha surplus 

velum and profit ahich saorge from now production. 

Tha aorking class, on tha other hand, is dafinad 

by its separation froa (or non-oanership of) tha 

amens of production, tha fact that lta asafasn Are 

tha dlract producers of surplus value, yat have no 

control ovar how it ia distributed or reinvested. 

It Is tha identification of thaaa relatione 

ahich beglne to explain tha natura of the 

contradiction beteeen the tso major classes of 

capitalist sociaty* This contradiction is ths basia 

of conflict beteeen these classas. In ss such ae tha 

contradiction Is Inherent in the econoalc structure, 

conflict cannot dlsapper slthout e change In the 

basic economic relatione, k 

Put simply, this contrsdiction betaaan tha tao 

largest clsssss In eoclaty Is Indicated in the 

following says: 

the aorking class produces value and surplus value, 

ahlle the capitalist clasa appropriates (takes over) 

the surplus value produced; 

tha capitallet clasa oane the aeens of production, 

ehlle the aorking class is separated froa (does not 

own) the aeons of production; 

it la in tha lntsraeta of capital to incraaaa aurplue 

lebour tiae relative to necessary labour tlae eorksd 

(see tha dlsgraaatii and explanetlona in tha firat 

thraa parts of this earlee for tha difference 

between surplus end necessary labour tlaa); 

It Is in the' interests of labour to Increase 

necessary labour tlaa relative to surplus labour 

tlM. 

These seemingly aba tract notione neve vary real 

end concrete effects in socisty* (It is eorthahile 

rapeetlng here ahat ass pravlouely said about 

abstraction, ss that notion applies to tha aathod 

of political econosy. In pert one of the sariaa. 

It aas arguad that 

Tha sannar of investigating tha general natura 

of a social system involves....abstraction. 

Thia is tha wy in ahich tha aoat iaportant, 

the baaic features of e system ara Identified, 

aval the say in shlch thay ara lifted out of 

(abstracted froa) the less iaportant fseturas 

of thet system. This process is something dona 

in the atnd In en attempt to find out anion 

aspects of a society ere basic to that society - 

and shlch era superficial. The aethod of 

abstraction - of removing fundamental processes 

end etructuras fro» lass iaportant ones so that 

thay can be examined - la tied up elth tha 

atteapt to understand reality, rather then 

accepting that things ara tha aay thay aeea to 

be (IIP 19:Ze)), 

A nuaber of the abstract relatione end processes 

Identified neve concrete effecta In tha real aorld: 

for exajpl*! th * changing ralationahlps between 

necessary and surplus lebour tlae in practice 

involvee struggles bstaaen aorkera and employers ovar 

the length of tha aorking day, overtime, 

mechanleotion, and tha epeed and lnteneity of aork. 

Conflicts over these Issues tend to indicate en 

ettempt by either cepltel or lebour to change tha

divisions of ths working dsy. The rsapsctlvs 

PWWT, vovUnUon and strength of ths tso 

conflicting clsssss will, in asch csss, dsclds how 

e»ch leaus is rasolvad. 

In such ths ssn way, it sss argusd thst ths 

ssttlng of ths vslus of labour power sss sn 

important procsss in soclsty. Conflicts snd 

struggles ovsr this show up in SBQS disputsa, 

ohsnQinQ rslstlons bstsssn lndustrlsl snd rursi 

irNs, snd in s ssriss of othsr wsys. 

Anothsr important sbstrsct rslstlonshlp 

discussad lnvolvsd ths diffsrlng positions of tha 

, vsrious clsssss to ths sssna of production. There 

srs s nusbsr of dlffsrsnt aays in which ths 

Cspltmlist clsss csn osn snd control ths assns of 

production - Involving formal shsrs ownership, 

ststs lnvolvaasnt, aanagsrlsl rsprsssntstivss 

noting as sgsnts for owner*, ste. 

Ths relation of ths votfeing clsss to ths 

sstarlal sssns of production slso chsngss within ths 

capitalist sconosy. And, laportsntly, non- 

capltallat soclstlss (so fsudsl, socialist) Involvs 

vswy dlffsrsnt rslstlons of bath dirsct producsrs 

and non-producsrs to lsndt sschlnsry snd tools. 

This, then, hss bsen ths ssjor sin of ths 

I ssriss on political sconosyt to identify s sst of 

important sbstrsct economic relations, and to sss 

shot thay tall uo about capitalist aocisty In gsnsrsl + 

Thoss rslstlons which exist within production hsvs 

bssn concsntrstsd on. Hossvsr, shlls thsy srs ^mry 

lsportsnt, othsr fsctors hsvs to bs taken into 

sccount to undsrstand sny soclsty. Ths conditions 

undsr vhioh cowsloditiss srs praducsd tolls s lot 

sbout car tain bssic procsssss in cspltsilst soclsty. 

•vt to undsntsnd apaolflo soolstlss, othsr dynsslcs 

which do not rslsts only to ths sconosy slso hsvs 

to bs snslyssd snd understood. 

m 

'ORGANISING 

WOMEN.' : w 

Response 1 

A controvsrsisl fasiniat ones cospsrsd ths connsctioi 

bstwssn narxiwa and faainie* to 'ths asrrlsgs of 

husband snd wifs dsplctsd in English DO—a last 

mer-ia* snd fsslnias srs ons snd thst ons Is 

marxism'. 1 Hartman contlnuss hsr si«Ue, 'either wS 

nssd s hsslthlsr marriage or ws naad s divorca*. Ths 

srtlcls 'Organising woman' (»JIP 21) is sn Important 

contribution towards a sors squsl ststs of affairs, 

but both ths srtlcls snd Hartasn'a sis41s suffsr fros 

s similar dafact: thsy fsll to go bsyond ths 

convsntlonally sccsptsd socisl and political fom. 

Shlls Hartman falls to problssoUss ths Institution 

of.serrlsgs, ths authors of 'Orgsnising Somen 1 foil 

to push bsyond ths convsntlcnsl sitss snd fonts of 

political struggls. 

Ths thrust of ths srtlcls is how to lntsgrata 

sossn into clsss struggls. Ths authors ahow vary 

clssrly thst wording class sossn experience 

exploitation and oppression, both ss women snd ss 

SSSbsrs of ths black marking class. Ths thsorstlcsl 

assumption behind thsir SUM—I sssss to bs thst 

clsaa atructurds dsfins ths forms of ssxusl 

opprssslon to which wossn srs subject. Hossvsr, thsy 

fan to follow through ths political ispliostiona of 

thalr argument. This is essential if fsainiss la to 

bs prlorltissd, and put on ths sgende for political 

action, and not aiaply subsumed undsr class struggle. 

In ths first plaost two themes within fe-inism 

t which hsvs consldsrsbls foros hsvs to bs confrontsd If 

ths prsdcwilnant concsption of fewdnlaa ss s 'ssspon 

2 * 

of lspsrlsllss' or 'bourgsols Indulgsnos' srs to bs 

dispsllsd. A rsdlcsl fsainiss which sssusas thst ths 

ssxusl opprssaion of wossn trsnscsnds class divisions 

sust bat attacked on sll fronts. This psrspsctlvs la 

exemplified in ths aloosn *A sossn nssds s ssn ilka 

s fish nssds a blcycls*. wMls this sight exprwse 

s notion of female autonomy snd lndspsndsncs whloh is 

valusbls in sons contsxts, it la dangerous snd 

dlvislvs In s soclsty llKs or own, whsrs progressiva 

ssn snd wossn hava to units in s corson struggle 

against exploitation snd opprssslon in sll its fonas. 

A liberal or bourgsols fssiniss which sssks 

squsllty with ssn within ths existing order sust slso 

bs attacked. This kind of fsslnlsa is on ths 

aacsndsney In South Africs snd fits in vsry wsll 

with ths 'total strategy' to which capital and ths 

ststs srs cosslttsd. Totsl etratsgy involvss 

utUisino sll ths rssourcss svsilsbls to change 

South Africs in ssys thst ansbla thoss in povsr to 

rewaiin in possr. Xt lnvolvsa giving privileges to 

s sslsct group of people - apsclflcslly aoas groups 

of urtosn blscks - st ths SKpsnss of ths *vaat majority 

of blocks in ths rursl srsss. In ths ssss ssy, 

bourgsols feminism involvss lncrsssing ths prlvllsgss 

of sows groups of Middle clsss sossn st ths axpanss 

of the vast ssjorlty of sossn in South Africs. This 

kind of fssiniss sight involvs change, but not 

progrsas. 

In ths crisis SS Srs presently fscing there is 

no roos for sny slllsnos vlth rsdlcsl or bourgsols 

feminists. Ths euthors of 'Orgsnising Sossn' srs 

clearly ssntlng to distance thsaaalvsa fros both 

positions, but this rsojjirss s sors rigorous 

ststsssnt of ths socialist fssinlst position. Ths 

wsy forward for socialist fsednlata doss not lis in 

ths 'equal snd active psrtlclpstlon of wossn in sll 

orgsniaatlona ' (*XP 21i22). Obviously tha 

authors srs ssnsltlvs to ths *pull* ths organisations 

snd lssuss thsy cits hsvs for black working clsss 

sossn, but in ths present situation more crsstlvs 

and Innovative strategies are demanded. St rat eg lea 

suoh ss organising around ths sitss in which working 

clsss wossn are oppressed hsvs not been prioritised 

by socialist or national 1st aovsnsnts in South 

Africs. Sites auch as tha hsslth osrs systas In 

which woman, both as ths Mjority of producsrs snd 

consumer* of hsslth csrs ssrvloss, ars sxploltsd snd 

P«fts J6

pega 17 

oppressed BOTH by capital and by een. Sites such a* 

tha household in ehieh tM elfe's unpaid labour 

benefits BOTH capital and mm. Looking at altaa of 

oppression such as th« household and tha health car* 

system hes tha potential far mobilising women because 

it involves raising questions about 'the private 

domain', about our most dooply intieete and paraonal 

affairs. These question* en* not noneelly tha subject 

of political struggle. ^ Making these laauaa part 

of politics, feminism he* bagun to break doan tha 

barriara ahlch hava kept 00 aany paopla - especially 

eoeen - out of political struggle. It haa thla 

potantUl bacauaa it la calling for a 'total 

politics*, a polltlca atilch flghta oppression on 

all fronta- Tha notion of tha totality of oppression 

la cantrml to tha amdit theoretical tradition, but 

haa baan lost In racialist politics - In methods of 

organising. It la a tradition on ehicn feminism can 

build. 

To raturn to HartsaVt'e alalia, a divorce la 

needed - not fro* marxism, but froa bourgaola and 

radical faainlsai and tha divlaiva and dlatractlng 

atrataglaa they* hava generated. A 'healthier 

aerrlage* bataaan amrxle* and feminism lnvolvaa 

prioritising foadnist polltlca in a aora craatlva eey. 

•Organising eYjaen* leave* "any Important quaaUona 

unaneeereds 

1. *hat la tha rola of tha ahita middle claaa 

faminiat In our atruggla; a struggle In ahlch aa 

ara both tha oppraaaad and tha oppressors? Joaaph 

haa arguad that it la necaasary for ahita feminists to 

(l) racognlaa thair implication In tha 

partnership (of capital and patriarchy) aa 

banafactors and tools; 

(ii) address tha unique problaaa of black eoeen 

In tha labour force*; and 

(ill) distinguish bataaan tha rola of ahita een 

and black nan in tha partnership of capital 

and patriarchy (Joaaph, 1901:102). 

2. Ihat Is tha rale of tha progressiva een In 

relation to feeinlee? The currant 'politic** of 

adoption' 4 la hardly a strong platform froa ahlch 

alliances could be forge*. One version of this hea 

boen articulated aa follows: 

To tha eittent that feminist daaanda flow froa 

m^ experience of oppression ahlch is specific 

to eoasn, which een can never themselves 

emparlance and to ahich they actively contribute, 

all they can do *e listen, agree and support* 

Thus male socialists can support women's 

struggles for tM see* raaaon that they support 

the struggles of ell oppressed people, and 

faalnlaa is linked to socialise, through the 

general cetegory of oppression. This kind of 

aele solidarity elth faalnlaa aeeas to offer e 

nee version of an old problem facing ahita 

middle dees aala lntellactuela: the fact that 

tha objects of tnelr polltlcel concern have 

alaays been external and other - the poor, the 

black, the colonieed, exploited and physically or 

spiritually crushed in soae Inaccessible 

combination (Politics and Poeer: 1991:3). 

3. la there a case U> be aada for a speclficolly 

black faainlat politics? Soma time ago, Kollontai 

posed the question of ehether a united eoeen's 

aovaaent aas possible in a aoclety based on class 

contradict lone* ee harve to take thle further and 

aak ehat are the possibilities for faalnlaa in a 

v 

society shot through elth racial Inequality and 

antagonises? The eexual inequality beteeen black 

een and somen haa very different historical and 

cultural beginnings tP those beteeen ehltes, and 

clearly calls for dlffsrent atrategiee for change. 

Angela Oavls has ergued that tha inetltutlon of 

elavery pleyed a curloua role in bringing about 

equality aaong black een end eoeen. In South 

Africa, the structure* of apartheid hava created a 

shared senae of oppression aaong blacks, and generated 

ymrf particular foree of sexual inequality. Thla 

eould auggest that tha peculiar dynamics of racial 

oppression have to be confronted and not subsuaad in 

claas anelyele. 

4. Hoe much dialogue 1* there beteeen ahita and 

black soman in South Africa at preeent? joaaph 

seea a prooase of mutual •creation aa the key to 

political action: 

Aa black and shite feminists combine forcts In 

the atruggla against eele aupraascy and ahita 

supremacy, they rust be willing to communicate 

and follow a ror-et consisting of dialogue, 

practise, more dialogue, and acre practise - 

moving slowly and Inexorably toaerds advanced 

levela of underetandlng and reepect for one 

another's dlfferencee. The similarities among 

eoeen era aaalar to understand and ahould be 

used es building blocks toearde understanding 

and respect for racial and claaa dlfferencee. 

The possibility of an alliance beteeen black and 

ahita women c*n only bs realised If enite eoeen 

understend the nature of their oppression 

eithin the context of the oppression of blacks 

[Joaaph, 1961:106). 

Only at that point "ill »• be able to unite in a Lueauii 

struggle agelnet reclel, saxuel end claas inequality. 

But tha different forme and structures demanded in 

thla struggle have to be specified very clearly. 

Tha authors of 'Organising Women* begin their 

article by quoting froa the Women's Charter of the 

Federation of South African Women, l9S4t ahlch etatee, 

'we eoeen have stood and will stand shoulder to 

shoulder (ay aaphesl*) *ith our menfolk In e coaaon 

struggle egalnst poverty, race and claaa 

dlscrtadnatiom,*.*. 'finouloer to shoulder' mas 

a rallying cry among the militant auffragettae of 

the •o-en's Social and Political Union (ISPU) In 

Britain early In this century, thla powerful leaps 

of alliance raise* difficult questions ln the South 

African context. Thla ooaaent hee simply triad to 

focus on aoae of thee. 

Jacklyn Cock (February 196?) 

•sas 

'1. Hertaan, H - 'The unhappy aarrlaga of marxism 

1979 and feeinlam*, ln Capital and Class. 

Number 6, ttuaeor 1999. 

2. da Chungare, 0 - Let mm Speak. Testimony of 

1976 ' DreiitlaTTôaan of t*e Bolivian elnos, 

(Qtage 1, London). 

3. Joaaph, 0 - 'The incompatible eenege a trois: 

1961 aanciaSJ, faalnlaa and reciea 1 In 

L Sargent (ed) WOaen and Revolution 

[Pluto Prase, London J. 

4. Politics and Pcmrny 111. (Routladge and Kegan Paul, 

5. Kollontai, A - Selected Tritings. Allison and 

1977 Bueoyt LondonJ. 

6. Oevie, A * •Refleetiona on the black eoeen *s role 

1971 in Che coeemjnlty of sieves 4 , ln The t 

Blacx Scholar, vol 3 no 4, December 1971.

Response 2 

A few years ago BOM beat-forgotten group put out a 

hunp«r sticker baring the slogan 'Peaceful change 

no*l ' Our response to 'Organising Soman?' (flIP 21) 

MB auch thai aajaa aa our raaponaa to that sticker, 

ayepathy alth the atrong faallnga of tha authora, 

but disquiet at their logic 

Tha conclusion to 'Organising eoeanT* - 

It to only through tha equal and active 

participation of somen in all organisations, 

not, that aowen'e baaic demands will ba met in 

a future daaocratio South Africa 

- fllaa in tha faca of tha authora* oan data and of 

tha politic*! raalltiaa of t*la country. 

Shila appreciating tha 18 montha' raaaarch dona 

by tha voaan's etudy group Into tha form of 

oppraaaion paouliar to black working; class aoaan and 

raoognlalng, aa thay do, tha need for a radical changa 

In sexual ettltudee, ee ballava that thara ara aoaa 

aarloua flan in their erguaante. 

Firstly, aftar stating aaphatically that 

'tha aajortty of aoaan* ara not raady to partlclpata 

In mass politics (an aaaartlon aa would diaputa In 

Ita present form), thay than demand *ao|jal and actlua 

participation in all organisations'. Given that tha 

majority of aoaan are not raady {to quota tha 

authora) to partlclpata in aaia politics, ara thay 

suggesting that x number of aueh 'unready* aoaan 

gat dragged In off tha atraata to fill thalr SOT* 

quota In tha ranka of thaaa 'organiaationa 1 ? 

Or ara tha authora perhaps looking a littlo 

cloaar to hoaa? Ara thay aodaatly auggaatlng that 

thay aVe raady to ahouldar thia haavy burden 

thaeaelvee - being, presumedly, liberated, and thus 

unancuabarad with -eubeervlence, paaalvlty and lack 

of aalf-confidanca*? 

Coaa now, lac's ba raallatic. aomen ara 

oppraaaad becaueo that oppraaaion aarvaa carta in 

interests, not bacauaa thalr male counterparts 

don't lika mixed atoluala. 

• 

No-ona aould augpeet that undar tha praaant 

regime tha working clmi could eoaehow gain control 

of tha means of production. Why than do tha 

authora expect anything dlffarant In tha realms 

of sexual polltlca? 

Aftar pagaa of axaaplaa demonstrating ahy aoaan 

do not partlclpata aojually in 'all organiaationa' 

(ahatavar that aay mean), tha authora blandly demand, 

In thalr laat aantancat that thay ahould. 

Surely thay cannot ba auggaatlng that tha 

structural and Ideological conatralnta of South 

African aociaty ara accidental, and that Barely t»y 

aanting to, thaaa 'organiaationa 1 oan eoaehoe steal a 

march on mocaablqua and implement aaxual liberation 

before economic and political liberation? 

In addition, the authora aeea to ballava that 

the nature of faaala participation in lnduetrlal or 

coaaunlty action la aoeehoe different froa that of 

male participation. The faaala rent protaatora In 

Soaeto aantloned by tha authora did not necessarily 

participate in thet action aa aoaan; nor did thoae 

involved* in the Sea Harveet or Freaatex strikes* involve 

thaaaelvaa bacauaa thay eere aoaan. ThU aould onty 

ba tha case if It could ba ehoen that aoaan only act 

aa aoaan, and never aa part of a broader, non- 

aaxuelly defined coaatunlty. 

Poaan auffar aa auch aa aan froa non-aexuel 

foraa of oppraaaion and exploitation. Ihy than do 

the authora appear to aaa the above aotiona by aoaan 

aa aoaa sort of victory for faalnlat conaclouanaea? 

Thoae aoaan aere reacting aa people affected by 

particular circumstances. For aoman to partlclpata 

in political or Industrial action la nothing new. 

atwmrever people - aula or faaala - have the naceeeery 

opportunltiaa to act against oppraaaion, thay do. 

True, there era ailliona of aoaajn aho do not 

participate in 'mess polities'* There ara also 

ailliona of aan. The point of aeee political 

activity aould appear to be to ajoblllae ae many 

people ae possible over laeuee that affect thaa 

Jointly, not to do a heed-count of tha aexee. 

The structure of our aociaty diotataa a larger 

eada partlclpatipn, and until thet structure la 

s 1 tared, that diaproport Ion will remain, no aatter 

how undesirable* 

Tha article also makes auch of 'organleatione... 

already serving to connect working clasa aoaan*. It 

ahould ba pointed out that not all structures serving 

to connect working class aoaan are, of themselves, 

e Good Thing. Neither, for that Batter, are thoae 

serving to connect working clasa aan, or mash are of 

tha working class generally. One only has to 

consider Inkathe, ahoea strength among working 

claaa aan and aoaan in Natal la indisputable. 

And to take a atructura apparently favoured by 

tha authora! tha Catholic Church aoaan*a groups. 

One aould have to search long and hard to find a 

sexually progreesive coaponent In an organisation 

!*«• 18 

ahlch coidaana absolutely contraception and abortion m 

two major factora In tha liberation of eorklng claaa 

aoaan from a purely domeetlc role - and haa as lta 

ideological basis the inherent euperlorlty of melee. 

To aay nothing of tha sawing clrclea and houeaaivae' 

leagues ahlch appear to find auch favour aa eltaa of 

struggle. 

Yet for aoaa raeeon tha authora aaa auch groups 

aa having progreaeive potential, ehile rejecting 

the National Union of Clothing Wort ere. How does an 

organisation dedicated to the ralnforcaaant of 

aoaan's domes tic role have progreaeive potential, 

ahlla an organlaatlon alth a aambarehip of 20 000- 

plus Indisputably eorting claaa aoaan doaa not? 

Merely because of Us Bwbalo'a-laadarehip? 

It should be pointed out that while tha 

housewives 1 leagues and sawing circles twiddled , * 

thalr thumbs during tha 1976 atay eeaya, in at laaat 

one, ?« of Ms aVubelo'a maatoarahlp answered the 

students* call to etey at hoaa, .. 

And than there U the laaue of asperate eeaan'm 

organiaationa. Or rather, than thara lan*t. Surely 

thia la one of the fundaaantal leauea ahlch needa to • 

ba examined. Yet the authors of 'Qrffanlalng soman?- 

skip over tha laaue aa If all the arguaanta are i 

coaa on knowledge, and only the conclusion (that thay 

are e Good Thing To Have - In moderation), le worth 

putting on paper. 

Finally, ae aould lika to take laaue with tha

I suthors' contention thmt it il oxpadiant to organism 

rw&mI only to drm« the* in to thm main stream of 

political organisation. Why also? Bacauaa thay art 

nicer paapla than man? 

•Wan naad to be organlaad bacauaa thay hava not 

. aa yat ihoultfarad thalr Full share of tha burden of 

struggle against a system ahlch tha authora thamsalvma 

* recognise oppraaa tham mora harahly than It doaa tha 

i 

othar half of tha *oppraaaad masses'. 

Sorely tha quaation which tha aomsii's study 

* oroop ahould hava aslcad ems: any bo •BUM not 

participate 'equally and actively', and ho* to gat 

thaa to do ao. Omawnding that thay do - ehmthar tha 

• daamnd la mmda to man or aoman * la a llttla baalda 

• 

tha point until that quaation haa baan mnaamrad. 

Urtfortunataly, 'Organising Wornon?' did not 

anmemr it. It merely confuaad tha quaation. 

Response 3 

THE artlcla 'Organising toman?' («P 21) la walcoma 

bacauaa thara la a good daal about aoman'a oppraaalon, 

daaa division and organlsablllty In South Africa that 

naada to ba dabatad froa both practical and 

thaoratlcal viewpoints. Tha artlcla providaa a vivid 

plctura of soma aortclng claaa aoman'a axparianca, and 

haa triad to ba raadabla and colloquial* 

Ita central aaafcnass ft earns to aa tO ba tha 

inadaquata dlatinction betaaen oppraaalon and mconomic 

p axploitatlon. • Thla raaulta In tha vagua generalities 

of tha conclusion; no claar anaaar la givan to tha 

quaatlona poaad at tha beginning of tha artlcla. 

Time and again, oppraaalon la rafarrad to aa 

tha apaciflc and concrete axparianca of exploitation* 

By opprmaalon aa ara talking about tha way In 

f ahlch aorfcing people axparianca tha affaota of 

thla amploitmtion In thalr daily llvaa. For 

axampla, loaar amgaa aaan inadaquata food, 

poor housing and Inadaquata education. 

Tha authora aaaa to mean that non-oanarahlp of 

tha mamna of production laada to olaaa exploitation; 

ahlch in turn causas loa aaqaa; ahlch in turn 

raaulta in auffaring and deprivation, ahlch la tha 

aa**) thing aa oppraaalon. Woman auffar daprivatlona 

ovar and abova thoaa of tha morfclng claaa, ahila 

aharlng thoaa aa mall. 

Aa far aa I oan aam, economic claaa mxploitation 

arialng from tha moda of pro-party oanarahlp undar 

capitalism ia ragardad by tha authora aa tha aola 

basis of all forma of oppraaalon in aociaty; and 

individual or group axparianca of that axploitatlon 

la ahat tha authora undaratand by oppraaalon. 

anile tha authora glva mn explanation for claaa 

axploitatlon (non-oanarahlp of tha mamna of production) 

thay noahara glva a raaaon for tha apaciflc and axtra 

penalties auffarad by aoman. Thay daacrlba thasa 

lntaraatlngly and movingly, but aithout any axplanatlon 

aa to any woman aa an Idantlflable group ahould auffar 

tha axtra penalties of oppraaalon. Thay seem ovar* 

anxious not to dapict aoman'a oppraaalon aa arialng 

froa a contradiction aaparata or avan dlatingulahabla 

from claaa oppraaalon; thay avoid any mention of 

patriarchy and tha dabataa around it, or discussion 

of auch iaauaa aa tha technical diviaion of labour. 

Aa a raaulta tha authora ara unabla to conaldar 

any forma of famala oppraaalon othar than aorfclng 

class oppraaalon - in fact* according to thalr 

conceptualisation t only working class eommn oan 

auffar oppraaalon. Thla daaplta tha fact that a 

numbar of tha axamplaa thay put foraard for aorklng 

claaa aoman*a oppraaalon * tha doubla day, aaxual 

abuaa lnalda and outalda aarriaga, being cut off 

from aldar social activity by family atructuraa and 

raatrictiona - ara axparlancad by woman in othar 

clessee. 

Thara is noahara any augpaatlon that tha ability 

to oppraaa ia a function of political poamr, and 

convaraaly that oppraaalon la a consequence of 

political poaarlaasnaaa. Oppraaalon derives from 

political poamr, political poaar doaa not alamys derive 

from aconcaiic poaar. (If political poamr alaaya 

dartvad from aconomlc poamr, state poaar could nmvilr B 

changa handa onca hald by mn economically dominant 

claaa. Burmly any thought about tha split bataman 

political poaar and aconomlc control in tha third 

aorld aould ahom that tha kind of raductlonlam 

that la unabla to aam poamr aourcaa aaparata from 

economic/property ownership la going to go vary far 

aatray). 

Polltloal poamr can ba understood in tha 

brondost sense aa tha ability, by sanction or 

coercion, to protect or advance ona's interests 

aa mn Individual, a group or a claaa. Economic 

and/or atata poaar arm not tha only aourcaa of 

poaar and potantially of oppraaalon in a aociaty i 

aithln many - If not all - social organisations and 

atructuraa thara ia a potential for sanction and 

coarclon aithln tha organiaation, and in ralation to 

othara, according to tha organisation's scope. 

Aa tha authora damonstrata, avan aithln tha working 

claaa thara la dlffarmntlal mccmaa to organisational, 

community, family and othar atructural baaaa of 

authority mnd poaar. 

Tha artlcla describes tha authority of aorfclrvj 

claaa mmn within tha family, and thalr ability to 

oppraaa on that level. Gonamojuancas of thla arm 

fait in community and trada union organisation aa a 

raault of axtrm difficulties axpmrlancmd by aoman 

In participating- in thmm at all, nmvar mind on 

equal terns. 

•omen's oppraaalon * tha doubla day; axtra 

aaarlnmaa and no tlma for activity outalda eor+c and 

tha family; aaxual abuaa; unahmrmd rmaponalbllity 

for children; marginaliaatlon in tha labour force - 

muat spring from aoman'a poamrlmaanmaa In social 

atructuraa, baginnlng alth tha fmally. It 

reproduces itself in othar social aranas, including 

tha labour market, ahlch la many woman's hopm of aoma 

material baaia for ultimata lndapandmnca of family 

authority. 

All thla la obvloualy not a almpla apln-off of 

thalr aconomlc position aa aorfcara: famala * super 

axploitatlon* la mmda possible by thm structures of 

specifically aommn'a oppraaalon. In an exploited 

claaa, thla alll ba mora acuta, bacauaa powarlaasnaaa 

aa woman ia not altlgatad by claaa privilaga and 

thm increased options it brings. 

By oaalng working; clasa aoman aa simply a type

of aurjer*-oppressed group within the working class, 

thvt Is no ultiaate Justification for ecaan - 

wording class or otherwise - to organise separately, 

axcspt insofar as it is a aora practical say for 

organisers to pet at thee. Tha artlcls doas not go 

this far, and rightly classifies such an attitude as 

'expedient'; but having tantatlvaly accaptsd that 

separate woeen*a organisations havo soaa role, it 

doas not explore tha alternatives. 

Tha authors say 

*e faal that to esauee that ssparata soaen*e 

political organisations hava tha capacity by. 

thaasalvas to deal alth all tha issuas faced 

by aoaan la to aaka a nuabar of sarious 

aletafcee. 

Cartalnly: but what are tha Issuas and objectives 

that can, and parhaps aust, be dealt with by 

saparata spawn's organisations. ihet is aesnt by 

tha claia that eoaen'a organisations 'can only ba 

affactlva if thay exist within tha context of tha 

organisation of aoaan, and of aan and aoaan, at 

different lev*l3'(eIP 21:21-??)? *het level*? 

Are tha organlsatlona "of aoaan* saan as social 

bodlas aaallorating tha condition of tha aoaan 

aantionad in tha intervieea, or supplanting tha 

aarvloas provided by atofcvels, or woaan's wings of 

political and labour organisations, or any of thoaa 

depending on a particular group's naana? What is tha 

rola of non aorfcing class aoaan, aaaajl with aora 

options of t lac and participation in thasa issuas? 

Ay lapllcatlon tha articla anaaars its Questions 

as to why aorfcing class aoaan and aoaan's organisations 

hava baan alaost solaly issua-rasponslvw in tha past: 

tha Intarvisws show why thasa aoaan would raact 

defensively to furthar erosions of alraady tanuous 

positions, and raapond to aobilisatlon around issuas 

such as pass laws, rant lncroanas, etc. But thay 

hava not tha tlaa nor tha option to lnvolva thaa 

salvas in on-going long twra organisation. 

This ralsas tha problee* of organisablllty on 

a long tara basis of *tha aost opprassad of tha 

oppressed* - thoaa aho llva on tha bars bonas of 

survival. Soaa alnlaua of tlaa and fraadoa la 

nawdad to partioipata socially and politically. 

The description of participation in stofcvals and 

church groups shows that a tiny option of social 

participation aust ba usad in organisations that 

halp tha aoaan and thair faalllas in tha daily 

battle to survive. Cartalnly such aoaan would 

benefit froa health and child cars pi'OQiuawioa. 

But how far would thay be abla to participate 

on an ongoing basis? 

Prugiajaasj alaed at this category of woaan would 

naad to hava aa a ahort tara goal tha provision of 

options, particularly soaa -ability and soars tlaa, 

which opan tha possibility of a broader social 

lnvolvaaant. fhia aay sail ba resisted by tha heeds 

of aorfcing class faedliee, as wall as eaployers, but 

long tara involvaasnt and participation by substantial 

members of worfcing class aoaan in organisation seeas 

pretty wall laposalbla if this cannot ba done. 

Susan Brown 

TEACHERS 

IN SA 

DCTntPUCTIW 

EDUCATIONAL change is part of the broader subject of 

social change. Social change, as aany students and 

teachers have coae to realise through the 1976 and 

1980 school uprisings, is a highly coaplax and little 

understood ohenoeenon* 

In thia paper the aajor political and social 

page 20 

questions are acknowledged as being of central laport- 

ance in a discussion of teachers' strategies. The 

importance of the devalopaant of a theoretical fraae- 

worfc which guides and relates educational strategies 

to tha broader social change strategies la also seen 

as vital. Teachers in tha aadiua tara will naad to 

link into and coordinate their efforta with other 

bodies on a national scale if the society Is to be 

trensforead. However, in this paper the concern la 

with tha *here and noe'. ahat steps can teachers 

take in the short-tsra? 

POSSIBLE APPWQAOCS: 

Theoretical Dleenslons 

PEOPLE'S actions are believed to be directly related 

to their understandings of their situations. It is 

for this reason that educational lata like Frelre, 

Bowles end Olntis, Gelpl, etc, believe that tha 

teachers' understanding of their situation Is so 

iaportant. Each parson operates froa a theoretical 

frwawwortc. It is, therefore, iaportant that teacher* 

bacoaa aora salf-conscioua in their teaching, of their 

own Ideologies. 

Teachers naad to be clear about tha lapliclt or 

explicit values thay are conveying to pupils. Self- 

awareness or sal f-consc iouansas la an iaportant 

aspect of teachere' personal davalqceint which will 

influence their ability to understand and Manipulate 

thair anvironaant. For exaaple, by analysing the 

classrooa and school situation with a variety of

Q ' analytical tools*( like role theory, class analysis, 

mnd personality theory (when and where appropriate), 

K M of the external forcss end the personal motives 

csn be port clearly understood and sctsd upon. 

Another theoretlcel dimeneion is the need for 

tsschsrs to hsvs s brooder under* tan3I**g of education. 

Ths educational prablss) Is sbovs all • political 

problem and, therefore, aducatlonal stratagias naad 

to start out from an analysis of social and political 

forces, lhat happans in a clessrooe can aithar raflact 

the status quo In ths broadar society, or It can 

analyse th« aoclaty critically and attempt to 

construct alternative reletionships. Tha latter 

approach would laad into an analysis of issues 

Uke poaar relationships, control end authority. 

Practical Olaenslon 

IN order that taachara can -or* toaarda a greater 

eelf-eonecioueneas of their oen actions in the school 

end classroom, and in order to develop e broader 

perapectlve on educational problems, three approaches 

• ill be mentioned briefly, Tha reason for the choice 

of these approaches is releted to the belief that 

taachara in South Africa need to play a critical and 

dynamic role in the schools end coamunlty. 

1. heesarch ceientetioni 

Many writers believe that change in schools eill 

only occur ahan teachers bacoaa asare of the school 

•nil hoe it function*. It la acknowledged by writers 

that acadaalc aducatlonal researchers have got e 

role to play but in tha end aducetionel change 

dapende on the understanding and the actions of 

taachara. Taachara, as was inferred above, therefore 

naad to acquire enelyticel skills and ahat 

could be celled e research orlentetlon. 

Ideally, for a school to develop this Idea 

affectively tha principal and/or leading taachara 

ahould be actively involved. To develop tha Idee of 

e taacher*r• • sercher and to encourage e 'research 1 

climate will be difficult under aost circumstances. 

However, if a teacher or e group of teachers eanta to 

begin to teet tha idea, perhaps a eeall ad hoc 

resaeroh group could be fonaed. This group, by 

drawing on their own resources or external help. 

could decide on approaches to classroom reeeerch 

ahlch, preferably, would lnvolvw atudants as well. 

2. Study of innovatiom 

The study of failed innovations can help to 

develop a deeper underetandlng of aducatlonal and 

social change. For example, in the event of an SBC 

having been created which than fails to attain lta 

goals, a careful analysis of the 'failure* by those 

involved and by others, can reveal the 11*1 te to 

change in a particular situation. This information 

can than be used to guide the implementation of futura 

change strategies. 

In the South African situation, ahere changee have 

occurred at certain times, the need for taachara and 

pupils to become reflexive and to enelyeo whet hea 

happened weens to be e crucial task. Other axaaplea 

Of innovations nay be the more active participation 

of pupils in the cleesroow, change In curricula 

content, or change in teaching stylas. Thaaa could 

possibly provide tha aaterlel from which puplla end 

teachere could constructively ieam. 

3. Supportive action: 

Teachers are in general in a confrontation poeltion 

where the contradictiona Inherent In their roles can 

and do create atresa. In South Africa the teachers* 

poeltion is extreme and teachers' reactions to various 

situations heve ranged from bitterness, anxiety, 

exhaustion, to wxcitament, 'Survival' teaching la a 

common response. Many writers believe that teachers 

require extensive support and thet they also need 

help In order to be able to transcend the eituetion. 

One writer proposes a counselling aodel which 

may be one way of helping teachers transcend their 

circumstances. He believes that trenecending the 

situation aaens that e stete of sufficiently Internal 

ised principles of 'good' practice neede to be achieved. 

Thia could help taachara cope with uncertainty or 

anxiety generated by change. 

In South Africa tha uaa of e Counselling* •oaejl «hlch 

involves Individual, group, or peer counselling mey 

have some relevance. It could be used to help 

teachers locate themselves more accurately in the 

aoclaty. Perhape it could facilitate the development 

of a aelf and aoclal ewerenesa which hea bean mentioned 

ea neceeeary if they are to play a dynamic and 

creative role. In addition it may help identify the 

problems for which action etretaglee naad to be 

developed which could relets to specific training 

needs. The acquisition of counselling akilla amongst 

teachers could havs advantagss both in the claaarooa 

and In tha staffroom. 

Tha three atrstegles, ie the development of the 

•twacner-rwswerther:t the collective analysis of 

innovations, and the engagement in aupportlva action, 

ell link in with the development of theoretical 

undarttandinge. They ere concerned with taachara' 

present socisl reelity and have bean proposed as 

possible starting points for tha analysis and tha 

development of the teacher*! role. There are several 

other strategies which could heve bean put forward. 

However, the main purpose hae bean to try and 

demonstrate that even in a repressive system there 

aay be eoms degree of autonomy for educational action. 

Short, Medlua or Long-Term Strategies 

XT la accepted thet action strategies should be 

related to a broadar conceptual framewortt. It is also 

accepted that the consciousness of the people ehioh 

la developed In the 'transitional atagee 1 should be 

congruent with a long-tern vision of e future soclsty. 

Long-tens strategies will focus upon feoturee 

of an aducetionel eystem which would cherecteriee a 

•hoped for' social and political dispensation. 

However, the likelihood of e coherent, acceptable 

political framewortc emerging ahlch le adopted by the 

majority of people in South Africa, and which can 

provide the basis for teachere* 'hare end now' 

stratagias, seema remote. It la, therefore, proposed 

that in order for teachers to develop their roles 

in a way which both helps them to cope with the 

current situetion, and which conetructively contribute* 

to the long-term transformation of tha society, 

some basic critarle for action naad to be agreed. 

Siitie idaee ere tentatively offered as examplae of 

possible working criteria. 

1. There Is no blueprint for transforming education 

and aoclaty. Ae has bean stressed already.

strategies can only prow out of analysis of local 

conditions, needs and Interests. The teachers* 

position is intimately bound up with the expectations 

of their role-SBt. Therefore, the development of 

strategies needs to take into account the expectations 

and the roles of pupils, parents, col leagues and 

authorities. Teachers can undertake to increase the 

communlcations between oil members of the role-set In 

order to de-escalata the levels of conflict end than 

encourage co-operation. A working criteria could be 

to open up communications between all members of the 

role—sat. 

2. The slat of education for transformation must be 

that of helping pupils, other teachers, parents 

and themselves to understand the material and social 

world around them. As many educationalists believe, 

it Is not the content but the educational process 

which is aost important. The organisation of the 

school and of the clsssrooa should therefore proaote 

critical understanding. Participation in tha 

educational process should be encouraged. Gelpi, the 

current head of UNESCO's Lifelong Education unit, 

believes that self-directed learning by Individuals 

and groups should be promoted as 'it is s danger for 

every repressive force, and it's upon self-direct ion 

that we aust insist*. He goes on, '(r)adlcel change 

in social, aorel, aesthetic and political affairs is 

often the out COM of a process of self directed 

learning in opposition to tha educational message 

imposed f rcai el thout * * 

Several writers who are concerned with education 

al transformation insist that the development of 

critical thinking Is fundamental to the task. This 

means that trying to indoctrinate pupils with an 

alternative Ideology is the worst way of progressing• 

A dialectical educational philosophy needs to farm tiie 

cornerstone for change. Education needs to enhance the 

chances for a genuinely democratic and participatory 

society. Tha second working criteria could therefore 

be a ooaatltSKsnt to the development of e critical and 

dlalectlcel educational philosophy. 

If criteria like the above were accepted as key 

principles in the strategies adoptmd'by teachers. 

perhaps a constructive start could be made to the 

building of a unified community of teachers, where 

"divergant-typ*< thinking is encouraged and teachers 

are able to play an important role In facilitating 

positive educational developments, which both begins 

to meat the present needs and can also contribute to 

the foundations Qr * future, more desirable education 

system. 

CONCLUSION 

THE teacher in this article is treated as one in 

opposition. Therefore strategies which are projected 

need to be concerned with "re-def inition• , relatively 

small-scale, low-cost, and ones which draw primarily 

on teachers' Own resources. 

Shirley "alters 

Note: The author of this article has developed ideas 

that serve as background to the strategies discussed 

in the erticla above, in an U Ed dissertation at the 

University of Manchester. Readers who might be 

interested in this dissertation are asked to 

contact Shirley Baiters through the editors of IP 

(address on the index page of this publication). 

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fctAAJrftWTZIN, 2D17 

ETHNICITY 

AND CLASS 

IN GAZANKULU 

IF there is agreement about anything regarding 

Gazankulu, it is a sense of surprise at the 

bantustan's very existence. Cos Desmond, who 

visited the Northern Transvaal in 1969, wrote that 

the Tswanastan belles the idea of a nation* 

state In that its sections are often hundreds 

of miles apart. But the Vendastan and 

T&ongastan woke the idea of creating a viable 

nation-state even less plausible. 

Vet only three years later. Commissioner- 

General EF Potgieter ems able to tell the Gazankulu 

legislative assembly that 

I very much realise that there was a time when 

you were grouped together with the Bavende on 

the one side and with the Besutho on the other 

and that you eere not a people as you are today 

in this meeting hall. 

The decision to create Gerankuiu as a separate 

political entity for the Tsonga/9*angoen ethnic 

group was almost an afterthought in the South 

African state's grand scheme of 'separate development' 

Ihus, the problem which this article addresses Itself 

to can be stated quite simply: how is it that in 

little over a decade, ethnic consciousness has been 

aroused to the extent thet Gazankulu is nom well on 

the way to bentustan * independence*? 

as an analytical category, ethnicity or 

nationalism has always presented a massive problem 

to materialist writers. In an important article, 

John Saul writes that 'progressive writers on Africa 

generally approach the Issue of "tribalism* as one 

mould approach a minefield - and with good reason'. 

Saul makes the point that It Is useless to slogenisa 

ethnit consciousness away as 'false consciousness** • 

The vary fact that ethnic consciousness has so often 

been mobilised into e powerful political platform 

demands an explanation of the availability of 

t*xje «V

page 2& 

•officiant nuebers of the population to erxept such 

identification. Thus, atilla It la arang to regard 

ethnic conacioueneea a* an independent aetaphyelcel 

'for* 1 , It la politically and intellectually absurd to 

disregard lta existence entirely, anat needs to ba 

dona is to link tha polltlcleatlun of athnlc . 

dlffarancaa to tha procaaa of claaa foraatlon and 

to traat tha changing political and aconoalc 

aignlficanca of ethnicity historically, 

lhan aa apply thla projact to tha caaa of 

Bazankulu, tha eolution to tha problaa of athnlcity 

la eurprielngly streightforeard: politiciaad 

athnlcity - though by no aeons tha naatly peckaged 

product of a cynical conapiracy aaongst tha doainant 

* olaaaaa - la undarlald by aany claar aatarlal 

concarne. It ia therefore tha teak of this artlcla 

to axaapllfy and analyaa thoaa aatarlal forcaa which 

hava maturated tha development of politiciaad 

athnlcity In Gezankulu. 

A Taonoo/Shangaan 'Tribe'? 

ACCORDING to South African govornaont sources, thara 

aara In 1975 aoaa 7de 400 Teonge in tha Northam 

Tranavaal of ahoa only 266 100 actually llvad in 

Gezankulu. Tha Taonga orlglnatad in Uocaabloua, 

balng aim or laaa bataaan tha 21at and 27th dagraaa 

latitude. Thay arrived in tha Northam Tranavaal 

throughout tha 14th cantury In a nueber of aavaa of 

iaadgratlon. Tha flrat aava of laalgration Into tha 

Tranavaal aaa a raault of claahaa with Ngunl 

rafugaa laadara (ilka Qhoanangana), aho flad praaant 

day Natal aa a raault of tha tffecane. A aacond aava 

of Taonga iaadgratlon froa Hocanbiqua occurrad In 

1850-6?, dua to a auccaaalon diaputa bataaan tao of 

ahoahangana*a aona. A third atraaa of rafugaaa 

arrived In tha Tranavaal bataaan 1646 and 1900 aa a 

raault of tha Portugueee destruction of tha Gaza 

kingdom. Tha othar coaponant of Tranavaal Taonga 

arrivad In small groupa aftar baing aaployad aa 

algrant labourara on tha Tranavaal alnee. 

Tha crucial laportanca of tha foregoing auaawry 

ia that tha Taonga In tha Tranavaal aara navar 

| coaprlaad of unlfiad tribaa alth poaarful chiefs. 

Thay aara distributed over a alda geographical 

araa and aara concerned only to find a place to 

live under the protection of whatever chief aould 

give thaa) land. Aa a raault, Taongaa have been 

ecettared throughout tha Tranavaal, living eulnly 

amongst Venda- and Sotho-speafcera. Aa the govarneemt 

ethnologiet, NJ van aaraalo* put it In 1935, 

Tha Taonga In tha Tranavaal ara, eith aoae 

exceptions, not organlaad into tribes at all, 

but represent a larga fonaleee population, the 

aaka-up of ahlch elmoet defies anelyela.... 

tha bulk of thaa live under haadaan of no real 

rank or atandlng or alee fora part, sometimes 

even the greater part, of tha folloeing of 

Sotho and Vande chiefs of high end loa degree. 3 

Tha concept of a Taonga tribe aaa conceived 

largaly aa a raault of the aortt of the anthropologist 

HA Junod in the early 20th cantury. According to 

Patrick Harriee, Junod, trapped in tha 19th century 

European Ideology of the nation-etata, attaapted 

•to creoto clarity ahere clarity did not axlat* by 

classifying the Taonga aa a group* 

Tha araa knoen today aa Gezankulu has eleaya 

bean noticeably devoid of poaarful Shangaen chlefe, 

and unlike tha caaa of the KeaZulu or the Tranaksi, 

thara hee never been a paramount Shangean chief. 

Yet deaplte tha abaanca of any clearly defined 

Taonga or Shengaan nation, the Promotion of Bantu 

Self Governeaint Act of 1969 racognlaad the Taonga/ 

Shengaan aa a separate population group • Thla Act 

aaa folloaad in 1962 eith tha craation of a llaahangana 

tarritorlal authority and the subsequent granting of 

a legislative aaseably in 1971. In t972, tha nee* 

Gazankulu aaa coined, and In 1973 the nee bentuatan 

aaa daclared a aalf-governing tarritory eeelting 

* Independence •. 

It 1* not, hoaever, tha concern of thie 

contribution to explain the declalone of the South 

African stata in lta creetlon of Gazankulu. Aa in 

tha case of the other 8 bantuatana, a conplex matrix 

of Nationalist ideology, tha need to export tfie reeervo 

aray of unemployed, atteepte to fragaant afrlcana * 

politically, etc, all played foraatlve rolaa in the 

craation of tha bantuatana. Bather than diacuaaing 

thla aspect of bentuatan craation, it la our concern 

to explain hoe ethnic nationalise has been aoblliasd 

within Gazankulu aa a neceeeary precondition to the 

aucceasful execution of the hoaxtlend strategy. 

Class and Ethnicity 

IN recent atudiaa of the poet-colonial atata in 

Africa, it hee been coaaonly argued (eith varying 

degreee of sophietlcation) that nationalise) haa been 

the cleaa projact of tha Indigenous petty bourgeolelo 

in lta atteepte to eecure political and economic 

doalnence. Thie la qualified with the proviso that 

no claaa aver consplrea in unlaon to conceive an 

ideological bluaprint for clasa domination. Tha caaa 

of Gazankulu broadly aupporta thla theela. It hea In 

feet bean precisely because tha petty bourgeolala 

believee lte oen ideology that lta ideology haa gained 

auch force. 

David Dieon note* that Gezankulu's formtlon 

haa bean unique beceuae of the fact that a aeparata 

Shengaan entity aaa rmtv envisaged in tha original 

plan to balkaniaa South Africa. It did not groe up 

in tha *claaalc hoaaland aould' 7 - out of pertlaa made 

up of chiefs and their eupportera. Rather, its 

foraatlon aaa mediated through e group of &tangean 

buslnasaaisn, taechera and bureaucrats, under the 

leadership of Professor Hudaon Ntsane/iei of tha 

Unlvaralty of the North, and former moderator of 

the Taonga Presbyterian church. 

Olaon pernaps overetatee tha unlojuanaaa of tha 

foraatlon of Gazankulu. Aa ee shell praeantly aaa, 

the rola of chiefe and hsaoaen aalarlad by the Couth 

African atata haa baan a oruclal factor in Gezankulu'a 

craation, Navarthalaaa, It la to tha rola of tha 

entrepeneurial patty bourgeolala that aa should turn 

to flrat. 

During ay visit to Gazankulu in Oacaabar 1961, I 

apoke to only tao ehopfcaepere at any length, 

Intereetingly. both readily aacrlbed their eaitarial 

advancaasnt to the craation of Gazankulu. Evan aura 

lntereatlngly, both buelnssaaan edeltted that they 

aara tha flrat paople to live in their raepective 

arees. Since both thaaa bualnssaaan aara living in 

areas neely oocupied by raaattled paopla, the

Implication la clnr that they hod received advance 

notice of masa population removals, 

Oia of tha businessman I spoke to llvad in 

Lulekanl. an area Just east of Pholaboree, which seams 

to t>a destined to bacoaa) a alta of M U resettlement 

for Gezankulu citizens. A* a Gezankulu citizen, ha 

had recently moved acrose tha main road froa tha 

raamakoale location ahere ha had owned a tihop and 

butchery. (It seems that namafcgale la to become pert 

of Lebowa, ahlla Lulekanl - ahere Ha now Uvea - 

la to bacoaa part of GaxanKulu. Both settlements are 

therefore deatined to bacoaa bantuatan dormitory towns 

serving Phelaborea}. 

Thla businessmen, (Ur uV)t la a caricature of tha 

patty bourgeois 'on the make'. Hia large corrugated-* 

Iron housa-cum-office la situated In tha aidat of 

shanty-town structures. In contraat to tha general 

atmosphere of heat and squalor, hla office la filled 

alth ostentatious furniture, ornaaants and paintings. 

A Persian-looking rug aas draped over his desk 

and a cablnat to tha rear aas filled alth huge books 

and a sat of encyclopedias. Tha bizarre situetlon aaa 

compounded by hia boabastit self-importance - ha 

Initially rafusad to sea a* because I had not aade an 

appointment with his 'secretary'. 

It would be comforting to believe that Mr hmi 

la unique - unfortunately, ha la not.. He is one of 

e nee generation of petty bourgeois businessmen 

aho are the direct beneflciarlee of bantuatan 

consolidation and population resettlement. It is 

hardly surprising therefor* th*t ar HI Is i hearty 

supporter of the development of Gazankulu. A 

particularly revealing expression of the benefits to 

be gained by businessman aho gain trading licenses by 

virtue of bantuatan consolidation is seen In tha 

following extract from tha Gazankulu legislative 

assembly debates: 8 

Mr N Chauke: Things stildi aorry ma most era 

tha shops of foreigners, wnat permits these 

shops to be situated in our areas?...Thla Is 

disgraceful. Especially non-ehlte shops.... 

me may sympethlee a little alth ehites because 

ee are asking for batter and bigger businesses 

from whites with which they muat come and help 

us But a non-white? He will only use our 

money and go aaay with tha money, we do not 

* 

need e foreign non—white parson to manage our 

businesses. 

The granting of trading licenses to citizena of 

a particular bantuatan is thus a primary reason for 

tha support which tha petty bourgeoisie gives to 

bantuatan consolidation. Traders, however, are 

not tha only beneficiaries within the petty 

bourgeoisie. In 1973 it waa alleged in the Gazankulu 

legislative assembly that soma Shengaans ware 

'buying cars, hoping that the business of removing 

paople would bring them a flubatantlal income*. 

Similarly, owners of tha ubiquitoua Japanese 

bakkles and taxla who ply ttair respective trades 

throughout Gazankulu are beneficiaries of the systaa 

by exploiting tha opportunltlea afforded to tha full- 

On account of their vested interests they too must 

therefore be conaiderad sympathetic to the process 

of ethnic rrmgmantetion. 

It is a prerequisite that inspectors of schools, 

principals, nurses end bureaucrats of tha capital 

Glyanl must all be citizens, of Gazankulu in order to 

hold their Jobs. For thes% members of tha petty 

bourgeoisie the existence of Gazankulu Is of mora than 

mere sentimental significance - it la the basis of 

their power, status and class position. 

Chiefs 

TnOTe la no doubt that chiefs mnd headman have played 

an instrumental role in fostering ethnic consciousness 

amongst their subjects. Tna series of apartheid Acts 

following tha 1951 Bantu Authorities Act involved an 

attempt by the South African state to conserve 

'traditional tribal' structures in a restructured form. 

Specifically, they ware almtd at restoring economic, 

political and social control to chiefs and headmen 

who Had lost these powere aa a consequence of the 

penetration of capitalist relatione. By Investing 

chiefly elements with administrative control, and by 

effectively incorporating them Into tha civil service, 

chiefs end headmen ware dr*en into a class alliance 

with tha proponents of separate development. 

Throughout Gezanfculu I aaa told hoe chiefs and heariann 

were bribed and corrupted by promises and often 

- -•'- 1 •* - A ' " * T * • 

material glfta. In a strategy raminiscant of gifts 

of worthless trinkwts to chlafs during the colonial 

era, one man described to ma how chiefs were given 

'dignity bags' (briefcases) at preliminary meetings 

with tha South African government. 

Significantly, chlafs and headmen now receive 

salariee directly from tha bantuatan government, 

page H 

according to the numbers of subjecta living under them. 

This has bean of crucial importance with respect to 

population removals since chiefs have often encouraged 

such ramovala in tha hope of gaining mora subjects. 

In motivating ^n amount of fl16 600 for payments 

to chiefs and haooaan In 19?2, Professor Ntsanwisi 

told the legislative assembly 

Oia ou manse hat gese tint die sLano baweag oadat 

hy dense hat. One kaptelna an hoof manna la 

ook diasalfde - dmartlla slang eat bmwewg omoat 

hy denes hat. 0ns all dus hi dat hlerdle 

slenge van ons dams w»t he. 

The graphic image of snakes and Intestines 

can hardly be mora apposite alth regard to tha 

payment of chiefs. Thus, It is no surprise that a 

year later Ntsanwisi told tha legislative assembly* 

that 

A chief will now be paid twice; ha shall be peld 

for the wot* ha does at home and also be paid for 

being a member of tha legislative assembly. 

Tha foregoing dlscuasion does not suggeest that 

each and ewry chief and headman has benefitted from 

bantuatan consolidation. In many Instances they have 

bean moved together with th*lr people and against 

their will. Thla has frequently occurred whan, for 

example, a Shengnen chief has bean moved In order tft f 

facilitate tha consolidation of Vanda. But even 

forced remove Is do not neceasarily negate the ethnic 

consciousness of those chiefs removed with their 

people, revealing it as a fraud. Quite tha contrary; 

hostility and resentment against being removed la 

seldom aimed against the distant South African 

government. Since it Is directed against tha ethnic 

group amongst whom the removed people have bean 

living, ethnic consciousness can be. engendered among 

chiefs, headman and their people, irrespective of 

whether they stand to gain or loam by being removed.

gar. 

rgthnicjty: the ordinary people 

THROUGH listening to missionaries, church—n, 

teachers and ordinary people, there la overahelalng 

evidence that Teonga-epeakers hava baan living 

perfectly easily amongst Vandaa and Sothoa for tha 

last 100 years. Throughout tha Northern Tranevaal, 

X aaa repeatedly Informed, Tscopes have intaraerrled 

extensively eith Vandaa and Sothoa and hava lived alda 

by alda with tnaa. In aany araaa tha conatltuency of 

Vanda chlafa aaa predominantly Taonga, and tha convarsa 

appllad too* Those to whom I spoke wvn virtually 

unanimous in declaring that sustained friction 

bataean athnlc groupa la a ralatlvaly racant 

phanoaanon, a dlract consequence of tha implementation 

of tha Bantu Authorities system. 

A Sotho haalth inspector ehoa I met at a cafe 

naar »lluuane told aa that *bafora aaparata develop- 

aent I llvad amongst Taongas and sent to achool aith 

thaw. Horn I would rathar hava a ahite men In ay 

houaa than a Shangean'.- 

Throughout these araas poised between 

coneoUdetion into althar Vanda or Gezankulu, Taonga- 

apaaKara expressed horror at balng 'Vendafied'. 

Friction arupts everywhere. At Ghlluvana naar 

Txanaan tha Oouglaa Salt hoapltal ahlch eas built 

after World War 1 to aarva tha local population aa* 

declared pert of Gazankulu In 1961. In retaliation 

Phatudl of Laboaa ordered tha removal of all Sotho 

ataff froa tha hospital in Aprll/aay 1981, 

Moreover, Sotho patlanta (soma on drips i] vara 

reached by ambulance to a 'Sotho 1 hoapltal some 15cm 

•way. At preaent, tanalona ajaongat Sotho and Taonga 

epeakara at Shiluvane ara close to breaking point - 

all this in en araa ahlch churchman daacrlba aa 

having baan a modal of haraxmloua huaan inter- 

ralationehlp. 

How, than, ara inter-ethnic tanalona stimulated 

aaongat tha ordinary paopla aho atand only to lota 

froa bantuatan consolidation? Tha key to thla 

quaation llaa in the fact ttiet there ia no 

altarnatlva; facad with tha raallty of bantuatan 

consolidation, ordinary paopla ara foread to oparata 

within tha ayataa In ardor to survive. In tha fight 

for survival, gladiators auat hava hotad ona another 

with more intanaity than thay did tha Roman 

aristocracy responsible for placing than in tha 

arana in tha firat placa. Tha aaaa prlnclpla 

undarllaa tha davalopaant of athnic hostility in 

tha Northam Transvaal. 

Tha aatabllahmant of boundariaai bantuatan 

consolidation and population raaovala ara aaong tha 

aaln masons for athnic dlffarancaa asaualng a 

politicised fora. Oiviaiona ara anforcad through tha 

aatabllahaant of aaparata cllnice, schools, labour 

bureaux, poat offlcaa and othar adalnlatratlva 

atructuraa for aacn population group. On a aaln road 

In Gazankulu, tha road suddenly narroaa and la pittad 

because It haa brlafly antarad Vanda territory and la 

tharafora of no algnlficanca for 5ezankulu euthoritiee. 

It becomes Incraaaingly difficult for pensioners 

to racalva their aonthly handouta if thay ara living 

outside of thalr 'nation' * even If they have baan 

living in the same placa all thalr Uvea. 

One of tha greatest reasons for tha eaargence of 

athnlc hostility relates to tha establlahaant of 

slngle^nediua schools. Whan schools ara auddanly 

daclarad 'Vanda' or 'Qhangaan' or 'Sotho 1 . It bacoaaa 

Impossible for children to receive aother*tongue 

Instruction. Faced «ith this problem, cultural 

traditions can only be upheld by removing to onee 

'homeland*. 

Tne relationship bataean the davalopaant of tha 

bantustans and tha acceptance of their existence by 

thalr 'citizens* is a product of a vicious circle. 

The South African state establishes boundaries in 

the name of 'homeland 1 consolidation and those people 

caught outalda their 'hoaeland' euffer victimisation 

and uncertelnty as a result, victimisation with 

regard to schooling, tha awarding of labour contracts, 

pensions, hospital aervlces» etc, together exert 

treaendoue pressure on people to eove* In addition, 

a favourite tactic of tha 'GO' 12 ia to intlaldata tno*o 

threatened eith removal over an amended period of 

tlaa. As a raeult of these threats of removal, those 

in poaaaaelon of relatively greater aatarial nmmn* 

move before the eltamatlvee offered to thaa become 

laaa and leaa attractive. The community la therefore 

split and It is inevitably tha pooreet alaaenta aho 

are finally carted easy and duapad by the M trucks 

or their bantuatan functionaries. Within these 

peraaetere it la therafore virtually lapoaaible not 

to accept homeland 'independence• in aoaa form. Tha 

South African govarnaant seta the situation and the 

nechenlea of ethnic fragaantat1on acquires a dynamic 

of its own. * 

Conclusion 

Tha tragedy of ethnicity in the Northam Transvaal 

le that it la real. At a political level tha 

lapllcetlona ara extremely depressing; tha South 

African atate ahlch ia ultleately responsible for 

the polltlcleetlon of ethnicity through its pushing of 

separate davalopaant. ia seen by soaa aa an honeet 

broker. The greatest amount of antagonism in 

Gaxankulu ia reserved for Vends end Laboaa - 

ehile Koornhof la respectfully approached by 

'deputations 1 . Rev Sydney Ngobet general secretary 

of the Evangelical Presbyterian Church , e*plolne that 

'ethnic feelings have increased ao much since 

separate davalopaant that people apeak of "aa Sotho" 

or "ae Taonga" rethar than "we people" or "aa 

afrlcane". People aho uaad to aay "aa blacks are not 

allowed to go there" no* aay "aa Shangaen aay not go 

there'. 

It ia tharafora at their peril that progressives 

blithely dismiss tha eaargence of ethnicity In the 

Northern Transvaal es 'false consciousness'* Falae 

it is in tha sense that the real source of edeery and 

Oppression - the South African state - becomes 

obscured. But this falae conecloueness le not e aare 

ephemeral ideology ahlch can be ignored. Its basis 

le dletlnctly aatarial; rooted on the one hand In 

tha claas interests of tha new afrlcan petty 

bourgeoisie, and on the othar hand in the atruggle 

for survival faced by the ordinary aaae of exploited 

end ccpressed paopla. 

Saul Ouboa

1 Desmond, C. The DJmoerdad People. Johannesburg, 

2 Cezankulu Legislative Assembly dtottw, volume 1, 

1973:45. 

3 Saul, J. "The dialectic of cUu and tribe', in 

Race and Clitl, XXt 4, 19?g. 

,4 Gazartulu Economic Revise, Benbo, 1976:11. 

5 Van warmelo, MJ- A preliminary survey of tha 

Bantu tribes of 8outh Africa. Department of 

Native Affair* Ethnological publlcetlone, vol 5. 

Pretoria, 1936:40. 

6 Harries, P. 'Tha anthropQlogiet aa historian and 

liberal: HA Junod and th* Tsonge' in Journal of 

Southern African Studies, vol 8 no 1, Octobar 1961. 

7 Olson. D. 'Opposition politics in Vendo and 

Gazankulu*, in Conference on thai Hiatory of 

exposition in Boutham Africa, Development Studies 

Group, Johanneeburg. WST 

6 First Gazankulu Legislative AsfleePly. vol 6, 

Gazankulu Appropriation BUI. p 126. 

9 ibid, p 123. Speech by «i Baloyi (RltHrtpwene). 

10 Gazankulu Legislative **>%mbly- April 1977, 

vol 1. p 1507. Literally translated, 'The 

novas because it ha* intestines'. 

11 Gawfculu Lanlslativa Assembly, fey 1973. vol 5 p 74 

12 '66* t awning Govertv&ent Garage, ara tha initials 

of tha trucks owned by the South African stata 

which affact population rweovals, *06' is often 

used a& a tana of dislike to describe tha stata* 

INFORMATION 

Strikes in the 

Metal Industry 

OVER tha past Lao months, tha East Rand's metal 

lnduatry has ageln become a kay cantra of mortar 

struggle, with 24 wort stoppages/disputes, 

occurring against a backdrop of tha panding annual 

wage talks between tha Staal and Engineering 

Industries Fadaratlon of South Africa (SEIFSA) and 

tha unions in tha industry. IS of ths stoppages have 

involved FOSATU'e registered eetoi and Allied 

Barters' Union (aWPU). Last year, too, saw the 

East Rand metal industry becoming tha focus of Labour 

action with 24 stoppages in eadevnie. Benoni, 

Boksburg and Springs, involving a total of 10 772 

workers. In thle year's disputes 6 000 UAMU aeebars 

hava bean involved and approximately 2 400 vorkars 

at fines without unions. 

In the 13 stoppages involving WAIU, 33)1 eere 

over diamlsssle, 5Ji over wages, 1 strike over a 

night ahift dispute, and 1 strike over the disbanding 

of a liaison coanlttee end recognition of MAW. This 

coaperas with 50)1 of last veer's disputes over 

diaelssala, 25£ over wages, end 29)1 in opposition to 

managerial staff behaving in an arbitrary fashion. 

This analysis will focus mainly on tlAVlTa 

involvement in the recent work stoppages and disputes. 

The nature of the daeenda in tha disputes and lasuas 

related to thaai will be discussed, 

Oamende for the relnstetaaent of dismissed 

sorters were made in 33% of tha disputes, and UWJ 

eaafasrs were successful in two such struggles: at 

Lltaaastar Products in eedevllle, 22 wortara were 

dismissed last yaar in October* Until tha resolution 

of tha issue, tha union helped support the mortars 

who did not seek naw aaployaant, welting rether for 

the outcome of tha issue. Up to January, aanegeeent 

refused to nagotieta with the union despite its 

majority representation amongst the firm's 260 workers. 

UAWU arranged for an Industrial Court hearing at the 

and of January to chellenege the firm's refusel to 

negotiate with a representative union. In the 

meantime, shop stewards in the factory put continual 

pressure on mansgeasnt, stnd workers boycotted 

overtiee. Just before the court hearing was due 

Llteeester eenageeent capltuletad end rehired ell 

22 worters. A recognition agreement with MAVU has 

a Laos t bean coaplatad. 

A second victory over a disaissals issue ess 

eon at Transvaal Malleable Foundries in March, 

workers came out on strike for three days in support 

of two dismissed colleague*. Initially, eanagement 

fired the entire wortforce end aald that It would 

selectively re aaploy sorters, Vorter solidarity on 

the issue aes ao strong that no one re-applied for 

their Jobs and scab labour see not forthcoming, 

hence, aenagawent re-eeployed the entire workforce, 

even the shop etawerds, and the two woWeeTS initially 

dismissed. (A successful strike over dismissals 

occurred at TIF late lest year es well). 

oage 26 

The struggle at Meeker Siddaley Hschinaa over 

the dismissal of two workers was fought unsuccessfully, 

in that sorters were 'selectively re eauloyed* end 

the 30 trade union aeejbers lost their Jobs. However, 

the eedevllle organiser does not rwgert thia as e 

total failure, for he seys that these 30 workers ere 

united end determined to carry on eith the struggle. 

He seys that whether dieniseed or not, the feeling 

of the wortsrs is not affected - they become 

strengthened through their struggles rsther the** 

disillusioned. 

At present e struggle Is continuing at Flaks^r 

(in wedeville) over the ntrenchment of three MAW 

members. 200 worters are out on strike end the 

outcome is not yet known. 

Wage daaends accounted for 53]L of leVJU's disputes 

during the present spate of strikes. At present the 

minimum wage for the metal industry, em determined 

by the June, 1961, wage talks, is R1,13 par hour. 

In all the disputes the demand mas for e R1 per 4 hour 

increase, or for a R2 per hour minimum wage - e 

standard F08ATU target. (This daeand h*s Just been 

successfully negotieted et Colgate-Palmolive where 

FOSATU'e CftlU has Just negotiated e minimum wage of 

Rir95 an hour, and all other other grades will 

receive over R2 par hour. In Now amber the minimum 

wage will be increased to ft2,04 per hour. 

lege increases were demanded at Pressor 8A, 

(eadeville). Lasher Tools (Gareiston), McKlnnon 

Chaiii (oiatermaritzburgjT Chubb. Hubco. ifcXachnle 

Brotherj (wadeville), Hawker Siddaley Transformers 

and Automatic Plating {IsandcJ. The Bedevilla 

organiser relates these demands to the high cost of 

living, snd poor reins In the bentustehs (ahich neve 

eroded the migrant worters' supplementary rural 

Incomes). None of these demands have been met - 

slight increases have been granted: at UcKachnie 

Brothers s 12c per hour Increase eea granted, es 

well ss a 2c par hour attandance bonus rise, end et 

Leuher Tools e 4c per hour increase hag bean granted. 

Host firms have refused to negotiate mages until the 

Industrial Council wage talks between SEIFSA end the 

unions hava been completed. 

Tha wage demands must be seen in the context 

of the system of wage determination in the metal 

lnduatry. The demands ere elso e statwmant about 

hoe workers fsel merrs are to be negotiated - et 

plant level rether then Industrial council level. 

SEIFSA, the tough employer body representing 

some a 500 bosses (FCtt, 05.11.61), meets unions 

in the metal and engineering Industry each year for 

negotiations on the Industrial Council, to determine 

«eges and working conditions for the industry's 

approximately 440 000 worters (ttml, 03.11.61), 

nationwide, unions end employers have an equal number 

of representatives on tha Industrial Council. The 

bosses, sithough competing far eertets, are prepared 

to equalise many factors and Inputs of production,

particularly •egaa, end hence wort from « position of 

unity end strength on the Council. On the other hand. 

the -hoi* spectrum of unions, with widely difVering 

policial and demands, ara expected to ait together 

on the Council, thus awaking for weakneee and division 

(eg In tha prasant wags talks ths Steel, Engineering 

and Allied Sorters' Union has taken a completely 

independent stanca from that of othar unlona in its 

demands). 

Kore significantly, tha barfMiring procass Is 

isolated from tha work place, where workers hava 

tha strength of ttiair organisation, and tha poaar to 

withdraw their labour in order to reinforce demands. 

On tha council, tha participatory natura c4 mortar 

involvement in thair union is diminished* for they 

ara not negotiating «ith thair own employer through 

thair alactad ahop stawards or raprasantatlvas: thay 

COM to play a poaslva role, for thair aandata is not 

(lawjedletely) required by thair union - thay merely 

receive a 'report back*. Thus, tha council systaa 

weakens unions' bargaining power snd encourages 

buraaucracy, and hanca aost sections of tha prograsaiva 

union movement rafuaa to participate on tha industrial 

councils. 

Thus, in tha prasant Industrial Council sag*. 

talks in tha metal and engineering industriaa (ahich 

bagan on 9 Uerch, but hava baan postponed to aid- 

April aftar daadlock was raachad - with unlona 

flatly rejecting a waga offer made by aaployars) 

tha General Workers 1 Union (GHUh tha National 

Automobile and Allied sorters* Union (NAWu) and 

UMVU hava rafusad to partlclpata. Unragistarad 

unions wara invltad to partlclpata informally as 

obsarvara for tha firat time, but only tha Black 

Alllad (tartars' Union (Bflflj) and SEM-J hava accepted, 

TUC8A is of coursa participating - at thair annual 

confaranca In East London in September last yaar, 

delegates declared thair support for tha 'triad and 

trus" council systaa. Tha GVU statad that it had 

rasarvatlons about tha industrial council structure» 

mrtd would not join tha asm caucus as TUCSA affiliates 

bacausa of TUCSA's conslstant hostility to tha 

independent unlona. and its 'appalling* stanca on 

Nail Aggett'e daath. (TUCSA criticlsad protaat 

which roaa froa tha daath in datantlon of Nail 

Aggett. Central secretary Arthur Grace1oar said 

in a etatamant that tha Council 'unhesitatingly 

distancas itaalf * froa wny calls for industrial action 

in connaction with Dr Aggatt'a daath - bacausa TUCSA 

'cannot aubscrlba to atrikss or work stoppagas 

which ara not dlractly related to aanioyar-aaployaa 

ralatlonahipa*)- G*U **Y» that tha Industrial Council 

allows for nagotlatlons not by workers, but by 

'professional bureaucrats*. 

Tha 14 registered unions prasantly on tha Council 

raprasant only a third of metal workers, but ara 

negotiating for tha entire Industry with 45 SEIFSA 

employer associations. 

UAwXI rejects the industrial council systaa) as 

i it atends. Tha VaJeville organiser says that UAtu 

ia not agalnat negotiating for sagaa at a national 

level par aa, but that these talks should be more 

dacentralieed into national bargaining for separata 

categories, such as electrical, rubber, natal 

industries, ate- Bargaining st national level, ha 

said, would be favourable for those sorters who ara 

not 'yet organised, but tha national-level 

bargaining should not eliminate tha right for 

organised wortere to bargain at plant level with 

individual aaployars, as many can afford to pay wall 

above Council-determined minimum*. *tAHU -ill only 

be prepared to negotiate at national level when 

only representative unions are allowed to participate. 

(On 24 March, eVWJ'e national executive was to ejeet 

an Industrial Council eepanate committee to discuss 

why the union was not prepared to sit on tha Council). 

Thle is similar to tha GaTU's stance: tha GaV 

la 'not in principle opposed to multi-plant bargaining 

aa long as it facilitates a procass of direct 

negotiation between elected sorter representatives 

and management? It believet that 'bargaining in tha 

ateal Industrial Council hinders this direct 

participation in tha bargaining procass by virtue of 

the size of the Council and its highly bureaucratic 

etructures'. 

SEIF6A, however, in its Iwjvember (1961) guidelines 

reitereted its support for the council systaa (eaying, 

though, that reforms wara necessary) and its opposition 

to bargaining by Individual efnployers on- aatters 

covered by council agreements. They suggested 

incentives to unions to serve on councils» such 

as advising aaployars to grant these unlona atop 

order facilities, accaaa to workers for recruitment, 

eccaas by union officiala to ahop stawards, end 

access to company notice boards for union 

announcaaants. Graham Bruatred, chairperson of 

Anglo American's Hlghveld Stsel, said: 'Joining a 

council will give tha unions •ore influence than 

before'. The guldelinee did accept though, for the 

first tJjat, a factory floor role for representative 

unions, whether registered or unregietered, in 

consultations over Issues not covered by council 

agreements. This shoes a new ccaeaittaent to 

bargaining with representstl^t unions and an approach 

of persuasion, rather than coercion, in getting the 

9 unions outaide tha council system to Join up. 

Unionists, responding last yaar to these guldelinee, 

said that thay represented • 'shift 4 , but that *the 

real issue is our demand to bargain on wagea and 

wort conditions outside tha council systaa, and 9EIFSA 

has not changed its stance on that*. 

SEIFSA'e stanca is contrasted somewhat by that 

of the country's largest industrial capital grouping, 

Barlow Rand, whose Executive Director of Industrial 

Relatione, Hofeeyr, aaid in December last yeart 

'Employers will have to llva with tha fact that there 

will be parallel negotiations with trada unions st 

both industry level and ehoP floor level*. 

The 'ideal' situation, ha aaid, is for aaployer 

bodies, employee representatives, and registered nonracial 

unlona to aaet at national level, and to hold 

aupplementary negotiations on domestic Issues at 

plant level through worts councils. Hs realised 

this Is impossible as unions rejected the present 

XC system, and ha admitted that ICa could suffer tha 

same fate es works and liaison committees. He aaid 

further: '•» appreciate the problems that can arise 

through parallel negotietione at shop floor and 

industry level, but believe thle is not necessarily 

fatal and is in fact something which South African 

amployera will have to learn to llva with 1 * 

However, StIFSA etreeaas that it will not allow 

unions who agree to sit on tha Council to negotiate 

wages at plant level. Van Collar, SEIF8A chairperaon, 

stressed that thay earn tha boycott of the Council by 

feet-growing unions aa a serious problem 'i"a want 

to negotiate with rapraaentatlva unlona. So aa aant 

thoee unlona who do represent wortere to do so on tha 

Council* (RDM, 05.11.61)* However, thle is clearly 

not likely to happen as recant atrugglas and eucceases 

on tha plant floor considarably weaken SEIFSA'a 

position, SCIF6A la trying to evolve counter 

strategies. For example, thle month, a confidential 

paper was distributed to aaployars on etrlke 

handling in tha wake of the etrlke wave which haa 

gripped the tadavilla-Garnlston area. Companies 

era warned in it that by agreeing to bargain outaide 

the council system, thay ara 'in affect establishing 

an alternative bargaining arrangement to tha Council*. 

It edvlees setting of deadlines for return to wort, 

and in tha event of these being ignored, that tha 

company dismissal all wortere* It also advises 

members not to negotiate with strikers until thay 

have returned to wort. 

stoat responses by wadevllle and Germlston aatal 

companies to the strikes have bean consietent with 

theae guidelines. In aoaa of the un-unionised 

factories these strategies have been successful, 

for example, at Baldwin's Steal and Alumco. where 

all strikers were fired and replaced. At hubco. 

after workers failed to meat the management deadline, 

thay wars regarded as having 'dismissed themselves' 

(nagotiatione between Hubco and avwj ara still 

continuing). At Hpllosec and EMJETS, where nagotietions 

took place after workers returned to wort, tha wage 

demands were not eat. At ftand Scrap Iron, tha 350 

workers who did not return by the deadline, were 

regarded aa fired, to be followed by 'selective 

re-employment'. Thle is a typical mnevsment strategy 

by which those thay regard aa "troublemakers' lose 

thair Jobe (as happened at Hawker Siddoley}. 

Employers charged (ROU, 03.03.82) that tha recant 

unreat was a *co-ordinated campaign 1 by UAau. One 

said, *Thay era trying to influence the negotiations + 

or ara flexing their muaclee'* mWrG denies this: 

'few had nothing to do with It. It la tha aortara aho 

have decided to take action. One day wa might decide 

to call our saabers out, but wa haven*t dona it thle 

tiag* (ROM, 04.03.62)* 

Tha MAWU organiser at aadeville, Hoses esiyekleo. 

explains tha present strength of MAVU by its grassroots 

organisation. Struggles ara articulated by ahop 

stewards, tha central leadership group in tha union, 

and than tha union is called in to negotiate. Although 

UMU was started in 1995, it has only grown in the 

lest year to its present strength of 29 000 signedup 

members, of whom 20 000 are wall organised. In 

the peat, ha said, tha union relied too much on 

organisation by individual officiala. Since than, 

orgeniaation had become the task of tha mortars 

themselves, through shop stewards. The ahop ataward 

council meats regularly for seminars on orgeniaation

and negotiation techniques. Thara ia also intensive 

discussion in tha planning coealttaee at aach 'local' 

on probleaa and dlaputee-, and a raport bade westing to 

tha antira union every three aonthe by tha shop 

stewards council. 

Tha union aleo grew rapidly through tha ealectlon 

of 'target factorlaa' - uaually tha biggest firsa - 

for 1 lntenolva organisation. Through coeaunloation 

bataaan workers in tha toanahipa and hoatala other 

workers from aaaller factorlaa in tha area ware 

attracted to tha union. 

Ueyekleo aaid that 'Hero in *adavilla, no 

union can challenge UW f . (At National Springe in 

Hadevillo, for axaaple, •e-bers of GEA*U left that 

union in favour of UAW), Only ahan WttU haa * 60* 

wemberehip in a factory doaa it approach aanagaaant 

for recognition. Thraa recognition opTaawjents have 

bean concluded with aVWJ in tha paat year, with aore 

In tha pipeline after the current atrike wave. For 

axaaple. at Kroat Brothers In Harriotdale, 1 300 

aorlcers cane out on atrlka demanding tha disbanding 

of tha liaison cow It tee and its replacement by union 

ahop stewards. The liaison coaalttea haa been 

disbanded, and tha company la conducting recognition 

talks -ith MAVU. 

Uayeklao aaid he ama happy with tha outcoao of 

the atrugglee in the Vedevllle area, for there hod 

been «orw euccaaaee than failures. Oaapite the 

fallurae, he aaid, eortcere had learnt to struggle 

together. 

Xn the recent events on the East Rand ffljnaoaaent 

atrategies and the SEIFSA stance repreaant capital'a 

attaapt to lnetltutlonellae lnduatrlal conflict and 

articulate It in an organised, aalf-ragulatlog wanner. 

Tha recant ahop floor atrugglee in the natal industry 

are evidence of worfcere 1 determination to resist this 

atratagy and thua to aeakan capital *e poeition. 

S (torch, 1962) 

Labour Action 

NATIONAL fTOPPABE 

Shortly after tne death In aacurlty pollce4Cuatody 

of Hell Aggett waa announced, the union of which he 

aas Transvaal aacretary (Food .and Canning Horkare' 

Union - aae above) called for a national half-hour 

worfc etoppege to mourn hie death. Alaoet 

laawdiataly, the Majority of the independent union 

groupings supported the call: FOSATU, CJSA, G*U( 

CCAWU3A, BWU, Orange-veal GW, 8AAW, aVOUBA. 

MM. 

The proposed stoppage aas aet for Thursday, 11 

February, free) 11h30 to noon. The unions aafcad 

eaployers to agree to thla daaonetratlon strike - 

end e nuaber of tha largeat aeployer groupe (eg 

FCT. KIF8A) rwcoaaended that no action be t*cen 

againat thoea workars aha Joined the stoppage. 

Only deye before tha propoaad stoppage, police 

eelzed 20 000 etoppege aupport etickera froa a 

Johannesburg printer - theee had been ordered by tha 

7ranavaal Unions 1 Solidarity Cowaittee. Certain 

awployere, for axaaple SAPP11 thraetenad workers with 

dismissal if they Joined the stoppage,- ahlla TUCSA 

ran true to lte long history of acabblng on other 

working, class organisations by distancing Itself 

from tha stoppage. 

Shortly before tha stoppage was due to begin, 

it aas announced that the Australian Council of Trade 

Uniona (ACTU) had lapoaed a week-long ban on South 

African shipping and air travel - thla action aas In 

proteat againat the death of Hall Aggett and the 

continued detention of trade unlonlets in South 

Africa, and followed on a oall for protest aada by 

the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions 

(ICFTU). 

The uniona ware Joined in the work stoppage 

by other organisations - cowaunity groupe, universities 

and Journal leta. 

Promptly at 11h30 on 11 February» tana of 

thouaanda of workers downed tools. Estleatee of tha 

numbers of aorlcers involved in the stoppage ranged 

froa a aanagaaant figure of 30 000 to a union figure 

of 100 000. Host co—mtatora "ave euggested 

that the higher figura is the aora accurst*. 

Tha Joint action by so aany uniona aas an 

indication of their growing unity on aoaa issues. 

Thla waa reflected in the apeach given by the 

GK'e David Lewie at tha union-organised funeral for 

Neil Aggettt 

Hell's death le a great price to pey for the 

unity of the trade union aovpeent. la auat take 

the axaaple ahowad on Thursday ahan they stopped 

work and the exaapIs of thla funeral and eg 

aust start uniting tha trade union aoveaant, 

said Laaia. 

ihile the work stoppage waa ignored by 6AflC~TV, 

other saw it as vary significant. Nunerlcally very 

largo, It involved aa aany workers ae want on etrlke 

during the whole of 1973 - e year in which the Incidents 

of strike* was the highest of the 1970s. Equally 

ae laportant, it was an explicitly political atrlka. 

thlla there have bean aany political etrikea before 

in South Africa - the stay aaay caapalgna of 1976 

for axaaple - thle wortc stoppage involved workera 

taking action on tha factory floor rather than in 

the townships. Soae critiques of tha stay aaay 

tactic have suggested that atay aweys eeperete workers 

froa their aost laportant place of power - the factory 

floor. In tare* of the nuaber of workers involved, 

tha unity shown by trade unions, and the neture of 

tha laeue, the half-hour wot* etoppege of 11 

FEbruary can be seen as an laportant indicator of 

poasible future trends. 

* 

TFUKSVAAl 

Aônâ ^Vêear (Doomfontaln); Mora than WO workera 

staged a brier wortc etoppege on 2 March. They ware 

protesting about the dlaaisaal of a ahop Stewart who 

put forward thwir wage deaands to aanagaaant. They 

raturned to work after they ware proaleed a R2t0Q 

lncraaae on their weekly wagesv and the reinatataaant 

of the shop steward. 

Afrox Gas Equipment (Gemlaton): About 300 worker* at 

Afro* downed toola on 6 March. The atrlka aas In 

support of an increase to 1*8,30 per hour. Host of 

the workers at Afro* do not belong to any unicn, 

although aoaa are "wntoere of tha Steel and Allied 

aortcars Union (KAffU). Four negotiators ware appointed 

by tha work are to talk to amnagaaant on their behalf. 

No further news. 

Allied Publishing (Johannesburg)i (Background on the 

company Is Qlvn In w|Pl?: 1-3; atrlka action at this 

company is covered in aiP16 and «P17i46; CCAtUSA 

objections to the uaw of child labour in the distribution 

of newapapara is covered in 1TP1?I4?) 

In March, 1961, CCAVUBA already expressed slam 

at Allied** advertlseaente requesting Johannesburg's 

northern suburbs children to deliver their newspapers 

(see «PV7:47). In February this year talks began i 

batween (XAwUBA ehot> atawerds and Allied. The 

Ccwewrclal, Catering and Allied aorkare' Union'e 

concern la that the greater uee of child eellere will 

cost workera their Jobs, aanagaaant is responding 

by saying that workers whose Jobs are thraatanad or 

aado rwdundant will be re eaployed elsewhere in the 

coapeny. and ia assuming that there will be no aaas 

firing (PW, J7.02.WJ. 


Aluaco awtal IndustMea (aedevllle)f 40 workers ware 

fired when they struck on 6 Kerch, 1902. They vera 

daaandlng e rer«l**r*-hour increase. ttanegewent aaid 

that they had bean Replaced (Star, 12.03.62). 

Autowatlc Plating (laando): A one day atrlka, 

involving 150 workers occurred et Autowatlc Plating 

- a coapany in the Oorbyl Group. Uanagawent and tha 

Hvtal and Allied Venters Union (FOGATU-affiliated UAwu) 

had talks over aage* but the deaands ware not aet 

(Star, 13.03.62). 

Baldwins Steel (Brakpan): 13 driver* eant on atrike 

at thla flra, daaandlng a wage lncraaae. They wmr% 

diacontantad with the eystea whereby thay were paid 

a ainlaua wage aa wall aa an incentive bonue. They 

agreed to call off the atrlka the following day, after 

talks with aanagaaant. flhen thay failed to return 

to work aanagaaant inforaed than that thay had 

'dlealssed theaeelvwa 1 and atartad hiring rmm ' 

drivers (Star, 12.02.62). 

Chubb Lock and Safe Coapany (eedevUle)! 2*0 aorkere 

at this flra downed toola in support of a R2,00 an 

hour ainlaua wage. The etrlke laatad for two dsya, 

sfter ehic* aanagaaant sacked tha striking workers 

(Star, 06.03.62). 

Clifford Harris (Veresnlging)i For previous strike 

action wmm MP19zS3-g. 

A two day atrike occurred at the coapany. 

'700 aorkere aupportad It. Tha aorkara returned to ais* 

on 9 etarch, after aanagaaant had agraad to eaet aoaa 

of their deaands, except thoea Involving wegae. 

The aortcere had daaendad that thay be peld at 

Wh30 Inetaad of Kh30 on Fridays, In order to be able 

*r"

£o natch 'their transport to gat home on weekends - 

f which the coapany agreed to. Tha company also agreed 

* to review tha cancellation of overtime on sookende. 

Dewmnda involving wagee could only be reviewed in 

J April and Octobar, coapany officials said. Tha 

negotiations took place betas en management and tha 

Oranga-vaal General workere* Union. 

Coca Col* Itorahouas (Florida): Drivers at Coca Cola 

stoppsd work for a few hour*- Thay wanted to discuss 

working conditions, apaclfically tha long hours they 

vara required to won* (Star, 20.02.62). 

Ho further news* 

Colotte-Palaolive (Sokaburg)i For background, sea 

WP 18144-5; 19:34-5; 20:43, A recognition egrssmsnt 

between Colgate-Palmolive and the F06ATU-effilleted 

Chemical lorkara* Industrial Union (CWIU) eae signed 

, In August. 1981 (see VIP 20:43). Vega negotiations 

vent on for moat of February this year. They were the 

first negotiations since the recognition egreemont 

(m result of a 4 month strike). Workers et Colgate- 

Pelmollve will not receive a minimum of R1,95 an 

hour In Hey, to be Increased to a minimum of R2,04 

in November. 

Corobrlk (Bedfordwiew): Abeut 500 workers downed 

tools at Corobrlk on 1 February. Thay sere demanding 

that Corobrlk sign e recognition agreement eith their 

FOSATU-affiliated Glass and Allied Itorkers' Union. 

The union clelmed that management wee demanding 

Industrie! council membership as a prerequisite for 

union recognition, Workers elso clelmed that the 

company ems refusing to recognise the union because it 

was not registered, management seld that it see merely 

reateting its position, adopted in December last year. 

The striking workers eere considered to have 

'discharged themselves'. Imvtegement maid that they 

eould bm re employed selectively if they applied for 

their Job*. 

Diamond Cutting Industry: (For earlier information 

on the diamond cutting industry, see WIP7:3Si 16:44). 

L.J ven dan Bergh (25) sppeorsrt in the magistrate's 

court In llsrch, 1982, for allegedly breaking an 

Industrial council agreement. The agreement states 

that if a diamond cutter leevse hie Job, he must melt 

three monthe before joining another employer within 

tha trade* If he re-enters the trade lnalda three 

months, he is bound to return to his former employer. 

Van dan Bergh pleaded not guilty. He said ha 

mme employed by Jooste Diamond Cutting Works until 

July 24, 1981. Intending to become a carpenter, ha 

left the firm. Before leaving he signed a document 

setting out the conditions (outlined above) under ehich 

he could return to the trade. The following Monday 

he Joined LC Diamond Cutting works. Ha said that he 

was under the impression that the agreement was not 

binding on him because he had resigned from the SA 

Oiaaond Cut tare' Union. 

The magistrate found the agrsmaent to be binding. 

He also found Van den Bergh guilty of breaking It. 

Distillers Corporation (ffadeville): The dismissal of 

three workers et Distillers Corporation resulted in 

about 800 workers downing tools. The workers claimed 

that management had broken en agreement between them 

when the workers eere fired. According to the j 

agreement management was required to cbnault the shop 

stewards whan disputes arose. Workers aeld that 

the three had been victimised for their union activities 

(Sowatan, 24.02.62). 


Dresser SA (wadevllle): Between 300 and 400 workers 

downed tools demanding e rand-en-hour Increase on 

their wages. Workers said that a coapany official had 

not addresssd them when they had initially aaked for 

the Increase. How that thay ware on strike the worker a 

refused to enter into negotiations with management. 

They wanted an ens ear of 'yes' or 'no* to their 

demands. 

After three deys the workers agreed to return to 

work on condition that aanagament had talks with UASJU 

on a recognition and procedural agreement. The terms 

elso included telks with an interim committee of 

workers which would replace the existing works 

committee, end an assurance that tha striking workers 

would not be victimised. 

Dunlop Industrial Products (Benonl)t On 1 February, 

199?, 300 workers demanded higher wages (Boweten, 

02.03.62). 

No further news. * 

EMES (Geraiston): 40 workers demanded pay increases* 

They downed tools for a day amd then returned to work 

although their demmnds had not been mat (Star, 

12.03.82). 

Fensecure (Geraiston): At this firm 30 worksrs went 

on atrlks demanding to be paid a minimum wage of 

R2,00 en hour. Thay elso expressed dissatisfaction 

that their pay slips did not reflect their hourly 

wage, and that their weekly wages ware not consistent, 

ie they were sometimes paid R47,00 and sometimes 

paid R60.00 par week (6owetant 09.03.8?). 

Ho further news. 

Fanner SA (laando)i At this firm about ISO workers 

struck demanding an Increase of R1,00 an hour. Thay 

returned to work efter management said that they would 

not discuss e new increase until after the Industrial 

Council negotiation* next month (ROM, 17.03,62). 

Flak ear (wadevllle) i Workers at this metal company 

downed toole on 18 March, in protest against the 

dismissal of three of their co-workers. A union shop 

steward was sent to negotiate with aanagament, who 

claimed that the workers eere just being laid off 

for e month. The striking workers claimed that the 

dismissed workers had been victimised. 

The following day thw striking workers returned 

to worH, but threatened further action if tne sew* were 

not reinstated. MMU said that it eae attempting 

further negotiations with management on the dispute 

(RDM, 20.03.62). 

No further news, 

fuens Electrical Industries (Alberton): About 600 

worksrs downed tools and demmnded higher wegee. Ihen 

the strike had entered its fourth day the eorkere 

elected representatives to negotiate on their 

behelf, and returned to work (Sowatan* 17.03.82). 

Oreyhound Bus Lines (Krugsredarp): (For background 

on this firm sew wTP17i4flj 20*43). 

Following the etrlke in February, 1961, a 

preliminary recognition agreement was drawn up by 

tha Traneport and Allied Workers* Union (TAWU). 

The compeny signed it In December, 1901 (flOU, 17.f2.Bl). 

Harvey Tiles (Bcksburg): Workere et Harvey Tiles 

claimed that their employers had breeched en agreement 

about night shifts. Management had originally 

stated that night shift mould cease on 9 December, 

and had then Ordered it to ceeee on 4 Dec amber. 

Workers ware locked out when thay arrived for 

their night ehlft on 7 December, mnd told to return 

the following morning. On thmt morning 30 workers 

refused to work the dey shift, end were ell dismissed. 

then the company reopened on 6 January, 1982, efter 

the Christmas break, the dismissed workers were not 

allowed baok. 

Forty of their co-workers want on strike in their 

support. All 70 worksrs sere offered their Jobs 

back but refused end ware ell dismissed. UAHj claims 

that tha compeny has violetad an Industrial Council 

sgreemsnt compelling companies to notify tha Council 

when dismissing worksrs. HAWU is considering charging 

the company for heving locked out lte employees on 

7 Oeceaber (Sowatan, 20.01.82). 


Hawker Slddeley Africa: 150 employees et Hewker 

Slddeley downed tools demanding the reinstatement of 

two of their colleagues and en Increase of R1,00 an 

hour. They returned to work while management held 

talks with IWTU (Sowatan, 04.03.62). 

Henkel (Isendo): A helf-hour work atoppage occurred 

at this firm, takers et the Isanda plant cam* out 

in support of a strike by fellow workers at the Natal 

plant (see below) (RON, 11.03,62). . 

JH Henochsberg (Ooornfontain)t About 140 worker* 

staged a briar work stoppage at thle firm on 6 March. 

The National Union of Clothing workers (NUCW) said 

that ths cause was an Industrial Council agreement 

that was sxplring in June, •orkere were demanding 

pay increases and management granted a A3,00 weakly 

increase efter the stoppage, 

HlghvBld Bua Company : A strlks occurred at this 

company during October, 1961. No further news 

(ROW, 15.10.61). 

Holloaac (Gerraiston): A strike by B0 workers 

occurred on 10 Usrch, 1962. Their wage demands 

were not met, but they returned to work tha following 

day. management said that negotiations with a works 

council were proceeding (Star, 12.03.62).

Hubco metal Industries (lmdevllle): 180 workers want 

on strike on 3 March, demanding an increase of R1,00 

an hour. .They returned to work tha following day after 

aanagvaant had agreed to nagotlata with an elected 

workere' committee. 

I»cor (Varaanlglng): About 200 workers aera dismissed 

after e two eaak pay strike In October, 1981. The 

workers aare mainly employed as shunters. Most of 

thaej aare migrants froej the Trmnakei, the Cleksl; 

KeaZultj and other arwae. Ae they aera no longer Iacor 

eeployeea the secksd workers vera told to vecete their 

rooms et the Iscor hostel. Their dlsalssel would 

elao have meant their removal to the bentuetans 

(Soeetmn, 20.10.81). 

Strikes et Jays, Lovable, and Raw Clothing (all three 

In Johannesburg): Strikes at tha above clothing 

factories have annoyed the TUCSA-affiliated unions to 

ahlch tha workers belong. The strikes in support of 

higher wages, have occurred in the context of a new 

aage agreement to be negotiated by employers, 

the Garment Workers' Union and the National Union of 

Clothing Workers. The agreement la to be negotiated 

in march, end will take effect In Jul/. The unions 

hove Issued e earning that 'workers must not think* 

they can strike and negotiate their omn increase 

over and ebove thm union increase*! They appealad 

to workers not to take this issue Into their own 

hands in the interim (ROM, 24.02.62). 

Also erne strikes et 8A weatherwear, Suki 

Crmeford, RUB Ores*, Adonis Knitwear, Remerque 

tear, JH hwrachsbergp end Patona and Baldwins 

Textiles, in this Issue of VIP, and e forthcoming 

article. 

Johannesburg underwear firm: Over 300 woHcers struck 

et this fine over mage demands. They rejected a 

R1,00 attendance bonus end demmnded a RS,(X) incraasa 

In weekly wages. The workers claim that they were 

ordered to leave If they refused to accept tha 

bonua offer (ROM, 10.02.82). 

No further name. 

Kroat Brothers (hwtrriotdale): A dispute Involving 

union recognition arose et this firm. workers sent 

a petition to their employers celling for the llelson 

ccewtlttee to be disbanded end replaced by a shop 

stewards committee of etAJU. The firm's managing 

director agreed to diabend the llelson committee 

and ask the woikerw to elect e nee one until such 

time ee eVenJ had been formally recognised. He 

added that MA*u shop stewards would only be recognised 

whan tha union gained recognition. 

At this point, 1 300 workers went on etrlke. 

After negotiations with avwu, the company agreed to 

recognise union shop stewards, and to sign a mrlttmn 

recognition egremment with the union. The workers 

then agieed to cell off their 1 day strike 

(Star, 04.02.82). 

Kuaak Dairy (Vest Rand): On Thuadey, 12 March. 90 

workers from this, the only dairy in the area, 

stopped work. The etrlke Involved dissstisfaction 

over deduction from their wages. Abel van Vyk, 

managing director of the delry, eeid that he feared 

that the strike would continue, but he hoped to have 

the workers back et their Jobs on Monday. The 

remainder of the only two reports on this strike 

dealt with practical arrangements for peopls to gat 

milk, including thw involvement of Radio Hlghveld. 

Lasher Tools (Germiston); More then 2O0 employees 

(thw entire workforce) et Lasher Tools went on strike 

on 1 February, 1962. They demanded en increase of 

Hi ,00 an hour. One of the workers told e reporter 

that thev ware being paid R2S,00 a week (Star, 

03.02.82). 


Lovable (see Jays). 

McKachMe Brothers (eadeviHe): Over 1 000 workers 

downed tools on 1 March demanding an Increase of 

R1,00 an hour. The demand was later charged to 

one for a R2,00 aft hour minimum wage. After three 

devs the worksra agreed to return to work, on 

condition thet management negotiates on their 

later demand. 

Kampak Recycling Industrisa (Edenvale): About 75 

workers went on strike in support of a R1,00 an 

hour Increase. The following day the workers had 

returned to work pending talks between management end 

the FOSATU-effllleted Paper, Mood and Allied workers' 

Union leter thet months (Star, 04.02.82). 


Patons and Baldwins Textiles (Rendfontein); A three 

hour work stoppage occurred at this firm on 8 

February. Over 200 workers threatened to go on 

etrlke if money that had bean deducted from their 

wages ems not returned to them. Negotiations 

began between management end the Textile Workers' 

Union. The workers agreed to return to work on 

condition that management suspend ell further 

deductions while negotiations were taking place. 

The explanation thet management gave for the 

deductions was that the computer had meda tax 

deductions that were too low during 1981. A 

spokesperson for the union said that It was trying to 

get a full explanation from management and would 

then decide on possible further ection (Sew*tan, 

09.02.82). 

Power Steel (wadeville): For information of earlier 

strike action aae WP 21:56. 

An undisclosed rx*rt>er of workers damned tools 

in early March, demanding mage increases. Vorker 

representetives and management T * reported to be 

holding talks (Sowetan, 03.03.82). 


• 

Rand Scrap Iron (Germlston): 500 workers downed tools 

at this plant on 10 mwrch, 1982, asking for higher 

wages. The company alleged that striking workers 

had stoned vehlclee attempting to enter the plant. 

About 150 workers returned to work and management 

eeid they would take back most of the rest, sxcept 

for those who had been involved in stone throwing 

(BOM, 11.03.82). 

page 30 

Remarque Wwar (Doornfontein, Johannesburg): On Tuesday, 

2 march, more than 100 workers at this clothing firm 

went on strike, over the dismissal of e shop steward 

who had taken wage dmwande to management, 

The workers went beck to work shortly efter the 

strike began efter being granted a R2,00 weakly 

increase, and having tha shop steward reinstated. 

Ram Clothing (see Jeys). 

RmB Dress flBWEm 1: * brief steppage occurred on 

12 March. Ho further news. 

SA Abbatolr Company (Krugersdorp): Workers downed 

tools at this firm protesting about tha dismissal 

of a unman shop steward. The general secretary of 

the CUBA-affiliated Food, Beverage and Allied 

Workers' Union said thet the firm had previously 

refused to recognise the union because it was not 

registered. He claimed the union had a membership of 

about 200 workers at tha plant (ROM, 02.03.02). 

The following day workers returned to work 

after assurances from management that no further 

workers mould be fired (Star, 03.03.82). 

Sapakoa Tea Plantations (Tzaneen): MP has Juet come 

across a report dating back to late last year, and 

referring to strikes at the Sapakoa Tea Plantations* 

It appears that on Friday, 30 October, 1961, 

400 women frtjm the company's Grenshoek tea plantation 

marched on Tinmen. They eere stopped by pollcs when 

about ten kea, from the town. On Saturday morning 

they ware paid off, but management said that the 

next Monday, 2 November, they were all back at work. 

On Monday, 2 November, 600 workers from the 

Hlddelkop plantation marched on Tzaneen, but were, 

in turn stopoed by police a few kas from Tzaneen. 

They eere said to have been carrying flags, sticks 

and singing while marching in an orderly column. 

DJ Penwill, managing director of the company, eeid 

that they had no mage demands, although an amount 

of a monthly increase of R36,00 had been mentioned 

(Seeld, 03.11.81). 

Ww have no further information on these events. 

• 

SA epatherwmsr (mayfair, Johannesburg): On 9 March, 

1962, workers struck demanding wage increases. 

They returned to eork tha following day efter 

management had offered a R5,Q0 par weak production 

bonus. 

Sharp: A strike at a firm Identified as 'Sharp' by 

workwrs was mentioned in e report (ROM, 04.03.82). 

Sukl iCrawfqrg (Johannesburg): A brief stoppage 

took place on 12 March. 39 workers struck demanding 

wage incraases. They returned to eork after they 

had been promised a R3,00 weakly increase. 

Transvaal mailamble Foundries: 360 workers refused

&C..31 

to work in protest against tha dismissal of two 

colleagues* MX "*re dismissed but later reemploy** 

(Star, 05*03.62). 

Unilever (Boksburg): About 200 writer* et the Lever 

Brothers plant struck for o few hours on 25 February. 

This wee in protest over the dismissal of some of 

their colleagues. The return to work happened In 

tereis of a dispute procedure agreed upon by the 

CU&A-effiliated Food, Beverage and Allied workers* 

Union and Unilever laat rwjvember* 

A Wolff General Engineers (taltltu, Pratorle): At 

this factory 40 coloured painter* and welders resigned. 

They were protesting about the fact that they were to 

be replaced by african workers. One of then said, 

•If blexka take our poaitions they will work for lastpay* 

(Star. 21.01.62). 

aoltube (Cwrmleton): About ?60 workers struck 

demanding the dlsajissal of a white security guard. 

He was dismissed two days later and the atrlkers 

returned to work* 

KATAL 

Beta (trading as KweZulu Shoe Cofrpanv) (Loskop, near 

Cetcourt): this factory is owned Jointly by the 

(Canadian based) Beta company (holding a teo thirds 

share), and the state**. Corporation for Economic 

Development (CEO) (one third share). 

The F08ATU-affiliated National Union of Textile 

Woxkere (MJTw) has been active in organising tha 

workers at the factory. At a union meeting a woman 

worker nad coaplslned of ill-treatment by a supervisor 

at tha firm. She wee subseojuantly dl&misssed and 

another 100 woifeers were told that they would also 

be fired if they attended union meetings. 

On Monday, 22 February, TOO eorkara et the KSC 

want on strike in support of tha dismissed worker* 

workers ears eeid to be earning 1)14 e week. When the 

Industrial Council for the Leather Industry was asked 

to coawont on these wages, they aald that there was 

nothing they could do as tha factory 'was not in 

South Africa*! (Natal Usrcuryt 24,02.62). 

The IC spokeaparaon confirmed that the wages 

paid by the KSC were far below tha minimum laid 

down by tha IC for tha factories in the induetry ' 

('e^n e flinking worker, responsible for cutting out 

the uppers, was paid a minimum of R7dt41 a week, 

ectordlng to tha (IC) agreement"). 

Philip Kotxenberg, ftsnlor llaleon officer 

of the CEO, said that the Corporation "did not interfere 

in eny of the homeland Industries' eat up by tha 

CEO. It was a matter between management end workers. 

Ha aald tha primary objective of the corporation 

wee to provide work in tha rural areas. It 

could not do thia if it had to adhere to tha 

minimum wages laid down for metropolitan areas 

by tha various Industrial councils, 

(Natal mercury. 2a.02.62) 

Obed Zume, general secretary of the NUTV, said 

that the matter had also been taken up with the 

KwaZulu Legislative Assembly and the local chief, 

esklng them to exert pressurs. 

On fednesday, Za February, workers allegedly 

decided to return to work, after an NUTS meeting. 

'Community councillors' (?) had earlier asked ths 

worksrs (at management's request) to return to work. 

The workers refused to listen to this request. 

There is e considerable broek in the coverage of 

this strike that aa have at our disposal, dealing 

with tha next few weeks. 

It was reported on 16 March that 700 workers 

had been fired 'lest Thursday* (la 11 Merer*}. xn 

tha saw report it was said that tha NUTV said 

that management would not speak to them or to the 

KwaZulu 'labour officer*. The union also said that 

there had been no production at the factory since 

the dismissals. 

Howevsr, another report (Echo, supplement to 

the Natal (fitness, 18.03.62) said that ZA Khenyile, 

the KwaZulu 'labour officer' had mat with manmgeaint. 

Evan on the flimsy newe wa have on thia etrlke 

It Is obvious that there are eeverel important 

aspmcts to it: It draws attention to tha nature of 

foreign investment (some of it) in South Africa, 

willing to make the most of the extremely exploitable 

conditions that exist in tha bsntustana; it draws 

attention to links between foreign companies and the 

CEO, under the guise of providing employment 

opportunities; it shows up the llmltetions to the 

Industrial council system whan it comes to setting 

wages; the difficulties of organising workers In 

conditions of poverty end unemployment are present; 

and it raises the interesting aspect of the 

reletlonehlp between the bantustan authorities 

(in this cane the pro-Investment Buthelezl region) 

end (he workers situated etthln their areas - ehat 

was the line that the 'labour officer' took with the 

KSC management, and how did tha chief respond to the 

reouest that he exert pressure on the company? 

Hopefully one of our readers will be able to 

fill ua In on these and many other Questions that 

arise out of thia strike. 

Defy (Jacobs, Ourban): See) IIP21:S2. 

The evening shift on Monday, 1 Februory, refused to 

start work and by tha next day all 1 200 workers 

ware on strike. The issue was, once more, workers* 

contributions to and withdrawal from the pension 

fund administered through tha Induetrlal Council 

for tha steel industry, to which Defy belongs. 

The South African Allied Workers Union (SAMU), 

representing most of the Defy workare, were taic 

to be holding talks with representative* of the 

pension fund.Oefy dlrectora said that tha company 

had applied to tha Industrial Council to withdraw from 

the the Group metal Industries Pension Fund, and to 

establish a private schema. 

SCIFSA, the employer body in tha industi-y, said 

that it was examining the pension lasue * but at the 

monmnt contrlbutiona cannot be withdrawn unite* the 

employee laavea tha induetry, end then only *ft*r six 

montha have expired. This was already e change from 

the previous 'frozen' pension sltuetion (frozen until 

death or retirement] - e condition the earns *is that 

proposed and dropped In tha state's Psntion Bin. As 

for tha six month delay, Sam von Caller (SEIFfiA 

director) said that *ww have asaumad that for tha first 

six months after a worker loaae a Job, ha will be ebie 

to cleim from the uViemployment Insurance Fund' [HOM, 

10.02.62), 

On Thursday, 4 February, after an ultimatum to 

return to eorkt all workers eare fired aa 'tha 

coapeny could no longer tolerate the eorkere* 

continued absence and refusal to work' (R0II, 05.02.82). 

Herbert 8ernabus, notional organiser of tha 

SAAftU, said that a workers' committee had told 

management that they would meat the ultimatum "if 

Omfy could settle the pension issue within tha next 

two weeks' (Natel Mercury, 09.02.62). The workare 

were elso awaiting tha arrival of their lawyer, 

Graham Dyson, from Johannesburg. 

Defy was reported to be taking on workers from 

Monday, 8 February. 8y that day tha atrlka was said 

(by director R Collie) to have cost tha firm ft1,4-n. 

Fired employe** could reapply for their Jobe but 

would lose long-service beneflta. 

No further lnfonestion at present. 

Herkel Chemical manufacturers (Prospecton, Ourban): 

Bee SIP 21:53. 230 workers were fired on 10 March 

after being on atrlka (from reports at hand It is 

not clear for now long) over pension fund refunds, 

wages, and the nee shift system which decreased the 

difference'in wee** paid to shift and day workers, 

Tha FOBATU-affiliated CWIU and mnagemwnt warm 

set to meat on 24 March. Tha International Chemical 

and Energy Federation (Geneva-based, with mora than 

6HP affiliated workers Internationally) said that 

they would support a boycott of Henkel products if 

eorkere mere not reinstated, 75 workers had been 

taken bee*. Among thoee left out eaa CttlU national 

president, Able Cesle (Sunday Tribune, 21.03,62). 

(Information seams to Indicate that tha tftrtke 

started on Monday, 8 March). 

Iscor (Newcastle): Sea *IP 20:4? for coverage of the 

strike at thle plant. The Industrial Council for 

the Iron, Steal, Engineering and Metallurgical 

Industry, could not resolve the dispute batwean Iscor 

and the Black Allied workers' Union (BAKU). Tha 

meeting of tha IC (in October 1961) discus sad tha 

call by tha union for reinstatement with full pay 

of tha 76 fired workers. lecor would only take them 

beck -on merit* (Star, 15.10.B1). • 

McKlnnpn Cftaln (Pietermerltiburg): 90 workers, who 

had downed tools on Monday, 15 February, over 

alleged non-payaant of promised eage increesee 

ware evicted from the company T s premises by police 

that same afternoon. The next day they ware told 

that they had bean dismissed. 

A UAWU organiser had said that managament 

inelsted thet wege decisions be negotiated at 

Industrial council level. Tha union ems considering 

contacting tha USA parent company of VcKlnnon Chain. 

Mgndi Umber mill (Port Ournford, north coaat): 

All 131 workera (120 of them members of the FOBATlHeffiliated 

Paper, flood and Allied workare Union), 

were dismissed on Friday, 5 February, after having gone

cxi atrika the grovioua day. Tho issue aaa ovar panaion 

fund contributions which th« workers demanded to hava 

repaid. Manmflaaent said that they would hava to 

ration to oat the money back. Tha workara refused 

to resign, but also rafuaad to work. 

They aould not accapt their wages. Said PtMU 

organiser, Pat Horn, 'Mondi workers ara emphatically 

oppoaad to belonging to tha panaion schema and thay 

ara deaandlng that thay ba consulted on thla bafora 

final policy daclalona ara aada^Natal Mercury, 

06.02*82). 

Tha aanageewjnt at tha Anglo American 

owned firm, steadfastly rafuaad to daal with tha 

Ptmu, until lata in tha atrika. 

On 15 February, all 131 eorkere -ara tafcan on 

again, alth tha undaratandlng that tha panaion 

scheme aould ba investigated, and aorkara kept 

Informed of prooraaa (Natal Mercury, 16.02.62}. 

Natal African Blind Soclaty (Ualaxl): Aftar having 

baan on atrika for a week, 99 blind aorkara at thia 

cana aork factory aara fired on Thursday, 11 

Fabruary. Thay aara diaaatiafiad with an incraaaa 

in tha boarding rata fro- R1.90 to R2,fl0 a aaak 

(In aomw.casee) (ona-aigth of thalr aalary). Thla 

increase aaa said to ba necessary to cut 'the 

trawandoui lows* at ahlch thalr hoatal aaa aaid 

(by NWS eecretary, Lovall Oraana) to ba running. 

Tha aorkara aara glvan a daadllna of tOhOO 

on Saturday, 13 Fabruary, to leave tha hoatal and 

had not baan fad since tha day bafora thay aara 

fired ('because thay aara no longar employed by 

tha factory*, aald director J nandels). 

H Gerrabue, of tha Blind Allied workers' 

union, aald that aorkara aantad to ba chargad tha 

same rata for lodging, and not a proportional aaount 

of thalr aalarlaa (aald to ranga froa Re,00 to 822,00)* 

then tha aorkara rafuaad to laava thay aara 

chargad alth traapaaalng in tha hoatal, ahlch tha 

aorkara aald thay regarded aa 'thalr home*;* 

Randala aaa la tar persuaded, by KaaZulu authority 

officials to feerj tha aorkara (KaaZulu oana tha 

factory building* run by tha NABS on an agency baala ). 

On Monday, 15 Fabruary, 62 aorkara appaarad in 

tha uWazi magistrates* court, chargad alth 

trespassing. On 1? February, thay aara found 

guilty and thalr sentences (R30,00 or 30 dayo) 

aara suspended on condition that thay laava tha 

praalaaa. CJ Albartyn, for tha dafanca, arrangad a 

stay of ona night at tha hoatal. 

Tha aorkara applied to tha Supreme Court to 

ba alloaad to atay in tha hoatal. Randala aaa 

ordarad to ahoa cauaa (by 5 March) any ha ahould not 

ba pravarrtad froat ejecting tha aorkara. 

No furthar inforaatlon available to ua. 

Progress Industrlas (llamaarsdale): 80 aorkara loat 

thalr Jobs on Friday. 12 March (?), after protesting 

ovaraagaa (Star, 16.03.82). Tha flrad aorkara 

demanded that all of thaa ba ralnatatad. eenapmaent 

rafuaad and another 900 than aant on atrika. Thay 

aara given until Vadnaaday, 1? March, to raturn to 

aork. It aaa than announoad that aanagaaant would 

take on tha 80 aho had baan flrad. 

Tha National union of Taxtlla aorkara aald that 

thay aould talk to managsaint about aorkara* ahort 

pay, and recognition of tha union. 

Richards Bay Minerals (Rlchexda Bay): Saa «P19;a6. 

Following tha atrika in 1981, tha Intamational Metalworkers* 

Fadaratlon (HF) aald that Canadian aorkara 

aara baing asked "to uaa thalr Influence' to win tha 

reinstatement of ASM aorkara (tha IMF aald that a 

Canadian company oanad 31% of tha aharaa in R8**)• 

Matthews Oliphant (now detained), ganaral 

eecretary of tha National Fadaratlon of torkara (NFW), 

whosa afflllata tha National Iron, Steel, Metal and 

Alllad Workers* union was aald to hava baan involved 

In tha dispute, aaid that a handling boycott of 

staal exported by W might ba requested. Ha aaid that 

life 'had baan aada "hall" for workers since tha 

stoppage' (KM, W.02.62). 

T and C Organic (Mandinl): Morkers on two shifts at 

thla factory want on atrika on Friday, 6 February, 

protesting at tha diawiisaal of two shop stewards 

tha previous day ( Cltlzen,06.02.82). 

No further information. 

Tongeat Milling (Eatcourt)t An incomplete report 

said that tSO aorkara had baan flrad on Thursday, 

11 March (?), after demanding tha dlaaiaaal of a foreman 

(Star, 18.03.62). Tha Sweat, Food and Alllad 

workers 1 Union aaa aald to ba Involved in recognition 

talks at the factory* Workers eeie calling for full 

reinstatement, while manug—nt ware aald to be • 

planning 'selective 1 re employment. 

No furthar naaa available to ua. 

Tumall Ltd (Jacobs): About 400 aorkara downed toola 

during tha aaak ending Friday, 12 March over union 

recognition demands ('Echo', euppleaejnt to tha Natal 

witness, 18.03.62). 

From another report (Natal Mercury, 16.03.82) it 

appears that tha aorkara had downed toola on wwoneeday, 

K) March. aWvjgeaant aaid that moat of tha aorkara 

had raturned by tha Friday. 

Vlckers Lenning (isithaba): On 16 November, 1961, 

265 workers (almost tha entire workforce) aara 

diaalasad following a strike, and deaanda to ba paid 

while on strike. 

The aorkara* action at thla 'growth point* 

factory In KaaZulu, aaa aald to hava started on 

12 Noveaber, over 'grievance procedure*. Management 

aaid that 'eoma' workara aould ba rehired (Natal 

UwTCUTy, 18.11.61). 

No furthar information available to ua. 

Zlnkwexl Caravan Park (north coaat): (See tIP21:66). 

Tha trespass trial of 43 workers continued in February* 

21 of tha aorkara ware found guilty, cautioned aod 

discharged. 

WYSTETW CAPE 

Ley!and (Cope Town): Saw W1P20:49 for previous 

coverage and references. Lata In 1961 tha Layland 

company aada an offer of R1(m) par hour as Its minimum 

page 3? 

wage rate for tha 2 000 workers employed at ita two 

Cape Town plante. Thla aaa rejected by the F08ATUaffiliated 

National Automobile and Allied aorkara* 

Union (NAAWJ), aho aakad for A1,80 an hour ainlmua. 

Early in Fabruary the company asked the state to 

appoint a conciliation board to mediate in tha dispute 

between it and tha NAAVU. Failure to settle after 

this step could have led to a legal lock-out by * 

Layland of tha aorkara employed by tha company. 

NAAVU members had aald that thay would accapt 

R1.96, if new negotiations aara held In June (after 

alx months). Layland wanted the rata to stand for " 

12 montha. 

On 12 march it was announced that tha diapute aaa 

settled. From preas reports it appears that NAAJIU 

won their demand for aage negotiations in June, and 

accepted the R1»76 and hour ainlmua rata froa January 

to thla data. 

EASTERN CAPE 

VolkswagenTuitenhoge): On Friday, 5 Fabruary, two • 

workers were fired, for 'disciplinary reasons'. On 

Tuesday 200 workara vent on strike end ahut down several 

production llnee. Thay returned to work on thw same 

day while NAAMU shop stewards and officials continued 

negotiations with managamant. 

No furthar neve available to ue. 

Saw WIP20:49 for previoue coverage. Alao MIP21:60. 

Wilson-ftowntree (East London): Saa «P2l:o6-8; 

WIP20:50. 

The British Distributive and Allied Mockers' 

Union (OAWU) and tha Transport and General Workers* 

Union (TGwXJ) demanded In aloXJanuary that KleOfr- 

Rowntrea recognise tha South African Alllad starkera* 

Union (SAAtu) and reinstate the dismissed workara, 

otherwise action would be taken against tha LK-ba&ed 

parent company, Aoantrae-4leck 1 ntosh. 

Later that month people marched through tha 

streets of York, demanding reinstatement of the fired 

workwra. York la tha International haadouartara of 

Ro wo tree Mackintosh, flown tree Mackintosh shop 

stewerde proposed, in February, that the matter of 

the fata of tha South African workara ba raised 

within tha British Trade Union Congraaa. 

MINING 

Veal fleefs gold mine (Orkney): Miner George Nortje 

was stabbed to death after an underground argument 

on 26 January. No furthar Information available, other 

than that a man was to hava appaarad in tha local 

magistrate's court tha next day in connection with 

tha incident* 

Buffelefontaln Mine (Stllfontain): Miner Leonard 

Johanna* Woeat was stabbed to death on 12 Fabruary 

by an afrlcan miner after an argument while on duty. 

No further Information other than thet a mlner 

me* to hava appaarad in tha 8tllfontoin magistrate's 

court on Monday, 15 February. 

Ermelo coal mine (Ermelo): On 17 March 900 african 

Miners 'rioted* for three houra, demanding that tha 

last Saturday of every month ba free to allow thaa) to

[fmgn 33 

mturn to th«lr homes In the bantuetens. It appears 

Chat they were willing to work in time to make this 

possible. 

Conflicting statements by officials of the 

o«n»ra of tha mine, Gwncor, described demege as 

'minimal' end as ( tha worst I hava 9mmn % (Star, 

18.03.02). 

Tha situation wee atill tansa tha n**t morning 

and tha trouble was expected to spread to otner mine* 

at aome atage. Horkere agreed to raturn to vork while 

tha matter was being discussed with tha white unions. 

Thasa unions coma into tha picture because thay had 

agreed to an 11-day fortnight, on tha way to establishing 

a five-day working week (chair ultimata demand). 

Tha african miners' demends would, therefore, mean that 

not all white miners would have a regular 11-day 

fortnight. 

Arrie Paulus, generel secretary of the Uineworfcera' 

Union, said that he hod refused the request for the 

and of the month frm Saturday - 'the only change 

his union would favour would be a five-day weak*. 

Negotiations between Gencor and white (!) unions 

were aaid to be continuing. 

TRADE UHIOTS AMD uMONISTS 

Tha Ciskei authorities are taking a long hard look at 

the South African Allied workers Union (SAAtfU) after 

the lateat trial of strength between the two bodies. 

A mammoth court cese which lad to the conviction 

of 35 SAAmU members under tha Riotous Assemblies Act 

waa only the lest of severel clashes betwaen the tract* 

union and the 'government' it so atrongly rejects. 

Held in the Zwelitsha magistrate's court, the 

case was completed some three months after it opened, 

whan 35 'ciakelent* were charged under one of several 

eecurlty lews retained whan the bantuaten opted for 

South Africa's version of 'Independence'. Forty-two 

SAAiU members were originajly charged with inciting 

public violence at a bus terminus In Udantsane 

during September last year (see *IP20:S0). They were 

ell erreated after getting off a bua tmklng them home 

froa a SAAWU meeting held at the height of the 

•11son Rowntree dispute. 

They elao allegedly sang Inflammatory songs 

calling for the head of the Ciakai Central Intelligence 

Service (the CCIS), Uejor General Charles Sebe, to be 

killed. 

During the trial CCIS members told how the bus 

arrived at the terminus with people singing loudly, 

while other atuck clenched fleta out of tha windows. 

Some passengers were allegedly elnging 'Charles Saba 

will die' and said that thay would -always follow 

Gqweta', « reference to SAAWU preaident Thozemlle 

Gqwete. 

At the end of the state'e came SAAPJPJ's advocate, 

M Brassey, celled for ell 42 to be discharged, eeylng 

thet the prosecutor had felled to prove who the 

principal perpetretors were and what their cowman cause 

was. 

The magistrate. J Kotie, turned down the 

application, saying that he could not reject ell the 

fttata evidence. 

Of the original 4?f 36 were found guilty on the 

•eln -Jrirpe of incitement end sentenced to pay P10G 

fines. They were elso sentenced to nine months 

Imprisonment each, suspended conditionally for five 

years. 

five were found not guilty end discharged eftar 

claiming they wwrw 'innocent bystanders', A warrant 

of arrest was issued for m sixth accused, Nuku Koliai, 

who felled to eppeer on the day of Judgement, 

The 42nd accused did not live to see the end of 

the trail. He was stabbed to death over the Christmas 

period in a brawl. 

After sentence was p»sed Sebe warned that the 

Clekel was considering banning SAAVU. 

'X have seld on various occasions they (SAWJ) 

do not atand for any trade union*, he told the Oelly 

Dispatch newspaper. 'Today we have brought them to 

court and got a conviction. X em glad we have proven 

our case to the »rld. 

•ww have b—n accused, particularly mm, of 

harassing SAA*U members. U is now in the hands of 

the government whether to ben SAAVU.* 

The Ciskelan threat ccjnws et the end of e long, 

sometimes vicious war between the two bodies. 

Just over two years BQO the Ciskei authorities 

fired the first shots in tha war when it refused to 

give 8ANPAJ officee in the Mdantsa/iw shopping complex 

- Sebe cleimed trade union* were redundant in the 

Ciskei because tha 'government of Ciskei looks Into 

the problems of wvery worker*. 

Since then approximately 300 SAAMu membere have 

been detelned, either by the South African security 

police or the CCIS. 

Thozemlle Oqwete himself has been detained 

five tinw without being convicted of en offence, and 

wee also picked up during tha Zwelitsha trial. After 

being accused by CCIS officers of 'waking petrel 

bombs end pamphlets 1 , he ems released. 

Lest year 6Qweta*s home was mysteriously set 

elight end two close relatives - his mother and an 

uncle - died in the fire, allegedly because somebody 

had wirwd bcth entrances closed (see «P21:61-3). 

At their funerel Gamete's girlfriend, Oeliswe 

Roxiso, was shot deed when shots were fired et a 

crowd of mourners. 

Recently Thoiemlle Gq%eta was detained for 66 

days by the South African security police. He wee 

released *for heelth reesone* efter being admitted 

to a psychiatric ward. 

- Eastern Cape correspondent. 

The deeth In detention of mall Aggett hee domineted 

the labour scene both locally and Internationally. 

It la quite remarkable how the atete and its media/ 

propaganda arm, the 9A8C, has toned down its coveregw 

of the Polish situetlon now thet the local repression 

of the working class and its leaders hee hed such 

internetlonel coverege. 

Hell Aggett was not the first, end will probebly 

not be the lest. Trade unionists who ere known to 

have died in detention: 

Looksmert Ngudle September 1963 

Celeb mwyeklso 1969 

Luke wwzwembe 1976 

Lawrence Ndzenge January iffTfi 

Elijah LOM 1977 

Neil Aggett February 1982 

The offices of the Black Allied worker* Union 

(BAeU) in Nmwceetle were raided by security police en 

Tuesday, 19 Jenuery, 1961. Documents end some 

correspondence waa removed, 

A preyer meeting that was to be held by the 

Uwdle fforkers 1 Association of South Africa (sVASA) 

was cancelled when the security police intimidated the 

prleat in whose church It was to have teken place. 

Cers of MMASA members who were already et the venue 

were searched {Star, 15.02.62). 

The South African Allied Vorkers* Union (SAAVU) 

has come in for more than lte shere of the lntlmldetion 

and harassment of the security policw, both In the 

Ciskei bentustan (see above) and the national security 

police. During the first week of February the offices 

of the union in Eest London were raided three times in 

tec deys. The officlels present were told thet they 

had no right to be In South Africa as they were 

foreigners from the Ciekei. The need of the security 

police in East London, Colonel *P >M> der mwrwe, said 

thet the officee had Hot been 'raided' but thet they 

hod been 'visited 1 , and that some documentation had 

been removed. The union was using a disused church 

hell a* offices, heving been evicted from their offices 

in the city. 

Two officials had been taken away by thw security 

police for questioning. They were releesed two hours 

later. 

It is feared by trade unlonista thet enother tool 

could be added to the Array of security mmesures thet 

can already be, and is being used agalnat them. This 

is the recommendation by the Reels Commission thet 

'lntlmldetion' be declered a crime (this would prohibit 

anybody 'from compelling or inducing another person 

from doing any act or forcing, another to adopt or 

abandon e certain viewpoint')* Anyone found guilty of 

this 'crime' would be lleole to a R20 000 fine or 

ten yeers imprisonment* or both. Picketing la et 

present being 'dlecourmged' through the eppllcetlon 

of the Riotous Assemblies Act. 

The case in which 40 workers who hed been involved 

in the strike et Rely Precision Casting are suing the 

Minister of Police for R1 500 each, continued during 

January and Februery. The workera allege thet they 

were beaten up by the police. Thia cese will be 

written up later. See 1IP21:59 for references 

to previous coverege of the strike et the fire). 

The Minister of Police eeld in reply to e queetion in 

perliement thet e totel of 21 trade unlonista hed been 

detelned in South Africe since the beginning of 1961. 

Ten of these people, according to the Minister, had 

benn released without cherge and the othmra were in 

detention under the Terrorism Act (RDM, 26.02.8?).

Trade union related people known to b 

at 15.03,8? (central stete): 

Gate of detention *jwwe 

24.09.81 Alan Fine 

23-11.81 

27.11.B1 

OB-12-81 

11.1Z.81 

? .12.81 

13.03.82 

• In detention as 

•onty Nersoo 

wfeshlnlni 

Klklna 

Mflou 

Rita Ndzange 

Maria Favls 

Liz Fiord 

Sisa Njlkelt 

Eric Hntonga 

H Teho 

BMW 

eatthews Oliphant Gen~Sac, eFl 

unlon/cfojenlsatipn 

Ass Sec Itt««ter!;rand 

Liquor and Catering Trade 

ex-ohb municipal Employees' 

Gan-Sact CCAwYJSA 

Gen-Gee, SAJWJ 

Proa, GMU 

Org-Sac; GMU 

Editor, SHB 

Assoclatad alth IAS 

V-Pres, SAMU 

Branch Chelr, SAA*U 

Trade union related people released fraa detention; 

03,06 81 -1S.02.82) Ouslie wmkhende Uw*ir, MAC-USA 

wmxwell eadlingozi Official. UACWUSA 

Zandlie ejuza Official, HAOtUSA 

wVolisi Oldlzw 0rgt WC8UGA 

26.06 81 

Sipho Pitymna Org, UftCWSA G GaUSA 

27.11. 01 03.03-82) Thozmaile Gome the Pras, SAA*U 

29.01 

0?,G3 

-12.02-8?) 

09.03.8?) 

Ifiaac Ngcotoo 

wary Ntaefce 

wu ;;v*:> 

Gen-Sec, GA*U 

05.03-82) Solly Pholoto BMU 

Elliot Tshebangu GAM 

13.03.82 15-03.82) Four unnamed trade. unionists detained 

•1th wntLhew* Oliphant Qf the NrV 

(a TA - Twrroriaa Act; GLA - General Lm Attfndeant Act 

• • Data In brackets la the data of release] 

STOP PfCSS 

OT the detainees mentioned above. Alan Vine appeared 

In court on Frlomry, 26 earch, charged under the 

Tmrroriae tet together eith Barbara Hoga/i and 

Oniric *ir' J "* 

On the same day, Liz Floyd of the IAS 

released fraa detention, and unconfirmed 

•pail that Itonty Pwsreoo has bean transferred 

to section 12(b) of the Internal Security Act. 

STATISTICS AMD PWJUATIOaB 

A Centre for Black Advancement haa been formed eith 

the intention of 'helping mwrmgwmnnta throughout the 

country to sat up grievance procedures and also build 

up linea of coeeBjnlcatlon with workers fco minimise 

the poaalblllty of strikes (Citizen, 2D.01.62). 

Orlas Beater, Industrial psychologist at Potchafstrooe 

university, bellevea that ttie spate of strikes in 

South Arrlca ere the 'birth pangs of a nee Industrial 

order' rather than anything to eorry eftwjut. Hi arguem 

fraa the point of viae that conflict la functional to 

roclety, in that it stimulates change I Owe Id, 03.02.82) 

( * 

According to the Oepextamrit of there 

strike* during 

strike* am 

1981 then during 

), involving 

Section 

8 

6 

6 

6 

6 

6 

6 

6 

6 

6 

6 

22 

6 

6 

f> 

6 

6 

6 

22 

22 

22 

1k 

TA 

TA 

TA 

TA 

TA 

TA 

TA 

TA 

TA 

TA 

GLA 

TA 

TA 

TA 

TA 

TA 

TA 

GLA 

GLA 

Q_A 

22 O.A 

9a 802 workers, all black (mi, 05.02.82). These 

strikes cost 226 550 shifts. These official figures 

do, of course, only reflect strikes reported to the 

Department of manpower. 

After the annual plenary session of the Catholic 

Bishops* Conference, seating in Pretoria early In 

February, the church Issued a statement that it eould 

'throe the morel eaight of the church' behind the 

struggle of eorfcers In South Africa. This statement 

folloeed emny references made to the parallels eith 

the Polish sltustlon. Archbishop Hurley said that 

the majority of the members of the church, mho mere 

blacfct mould support the statement. * 

The Old mutual's pensions manmger sold that it 

ems lack of undmrstanding of the pension issue that 

led to the strikes around this issue during 1961 

(Transveler, 12-02.61). 

Courts 

TEFPnOTlSM ACT TRIALS 

Oscar epwthe (?l)( Lawrence Lerotholl ( 18] . morgan 

makubaie (19), Aaron Tshangama (28), Peter Kubs (IB), 

Alton Sabums (18), Fuaanlklle Bool (16), Vuylslla 

Kzaze (19), Johannes Nhlapo (?0), Jeffrey Beeroemn (20] 

Vuylslla Oiba (2l), Richard Aaapondo (20)t aalile 

mnzothana (21) and 5 youths. 

Charge: The stete alleges that beteeen August 6 and 

August 12, 1980, the accused Incited people to damage 

motor vehicles by throwing stones and petrol bombs, 

and setting alight the vehicles. The accused are 

charged eith assaulting 6 people, teo of shorn 

subsequently died. Other charges relets to the 

barrLcedlng of Kllpfonteln Road by placing stones, 

tree stumps and tyres in the street; earthing in 

singing groups armed with sticks, stones end other 

weapons; ordering the closure of block schools; 

end congregstlng in various churches to encourage 

people to participate in 'terroristic* ectlvltlea. 

For previous details, see sip 20:36-40, end 

•IP 21:42-43. 

then court re-opened on 9 February, Justice 

•llllamson ruled that In respect of statements made 

by teo of the accused to magistrates - both of ehich 

•ere confessions - the onus eas on the state to prove 

that they eere freely and voluntarily made, eithout 

the imposition of pressure or undue influence. 

The statements of three other accused eere 

ruled by the Judge to be admissions, and the accused 

had to bear the anus of disproving that they eere 

voluntarily made. 

Since court re-opened In 1982, the state has 

called some 20 witnesses In connection eith the trialelthin-e-trial 

relating to teo of the confessions. 

State witnesses have denied assaulting the accus 

and promising to release them from detention if 

they Made statements. The accused allege assaults, 

threats and promises of release on asking statements - 

Esaentlellv, this issue revolved around the 

credibility of the stete eitneasms and the accused 

es to the eoMsslbllity of the ate tea in ta. 

During the course of the trial, the health ef 

the first accused, Oscar w*pethe, has been cause 

for much concern. tfpetha, eho is 72 and suffers 

from diabetes, has been hospitalised a number of 

times during the trial. Ha has been In custody 

since August 13, I960, and the state has 

consistently refused him bail. Host recently, 

ha eas hospitalised elth chronic diabetes, and 

underwent mn operation for an enlarged prostate 

gland- 

In another development, security police 

raided the offices of the Cape Town Students* 

Representative Council In February* seizing 

hundreds of posters portraying mpetne. 

The trlel t which has now run for wall over 

100 court bays, continues In the Cape Town Supreme 

Court, 

34

paga 36 - _ ' 

Fane Qeorge dibhole, Jebolard Vilfrad fctocofao, and 

Till Alocla Khenwane, 

Chorgo: The eccuaed feca teo counts under the 

Terrorise Act, and accaaad nuaber 1 (Slthole) 

faces a furthar t5 counts under tha Internal 

Security Act, reletlng to the breaking of hla 

bannlnQ order. 

Tha etate allege* that tha accused Foraed an 

organisation knoan aa tha African Youth Congress 

(AVC)f alth tha intention of furthering the elm 

of the banned African National Congress. They are 

alleged to have Incited others to leave tha country 

for allltary training, and assisting thea to Leave 

via the organisation of transport. 

The accused are also charged alth obtaining 

inforaatlon regarding security arrsnguaonts at the 

Caltav Oil Terminal In Durban, and to hava obtained . 

explosives. 

The accused, aho first appeared in court In 

Durban on 5 January, 198?, eere rnaanded In custody 

until February 23. than tha trial began In the Durban 

Regional Court, bhey ell pleaded not guilty to all 

charges. 

Bheflfca Hgobese told tha court of a aaating of 

tha AYC ahich elected ax Hobben Island prisoner 

Phillip Vatheas as president. At this aaating, 

bathees said he aould arita to Oliver Taabo asking 

for financial assistance, Mthanyane said that a reply 

swld indicate that *ea aould be having recognition 

froa tha ANC and aould knoa that the AYC is one 

alth the «cv Tha aaating, according to tha 

eltneaa, also decided to sand eaaaagei to Mandela 

and Glsulu on Bobber. Inland via a lawyer aho aould 

be visiting the*. 

The state than applied for tha cross exaalnatlon 

of Mgobeae to be held In c as ere, as he had received 

threatening telephone calls earning hie not to 

continue testifying In tha trial. This application 

aas turned dosn by the presiding aaglstrate, aho 

ruled that tha eltneaa aas already exposed, and 

closing the court at this stage aould do nothing to 

protect hla. 

After tha aaglstrate had heard tha evidence 

of e psychiatrist, ttheijans aas ordered to be placed 

under observation at tha aaritrburg Prlaon Hoapltal. 

Or E veljee eaa called by the defence to give 

evidence on Hthenjane'a eental state, eftar 

Itthanjana claiaad that he eaa having difficulty 

following the court procaadlnga. 

Or Valjoe told the court that Khenjane had 

soaa disorder in his thinking process. He shoeed 

signs of depression end eaa experiencirî 

hallucinations. ha see elao suffering froa loss of 

eelght and had lost his appetite. 

Prior to his appearance In court as Bn accused, 

tfthanjene had bean detained e nuaber of tiaes by 

security police. Since 1976, he has spent eany 

lengthy periods in detention. In addition, he served 

en 18 Booth Jell sentence for refusing to testify 

against co-SSRC a asp or, Paul Langs, in a Terrorise 

Act trial. 

The hearing ees adjourned until parch 1967, 

Khoteo Sydney Saethlolo (25) and aery baa » he the 

Loete (23). 

Chaxoje: The state alleged that Saethlolo, a forear 

prenldant of the noe-benned SERC, helped fora tha 

South African Youth Revolutionary Council ( SAYRCO) 

ehlle in exile. ha eaa chalnaan of the Nlgerlanbased 

Council, a allltary group foread by otudants 

aho left the country eftar the 1776 riots, and eho 

did not Join either the ANC or PAC. 

According to tha charge sheet, SAYRCO elea to 

incite blacks to over-throe the governeent by 

violence, and in achieving this, to recruit people 

for allltary training. Tha state also alleges that 

SAYfCO ease contact eith certain organisations elthln 

South Africa in an attaapt to furtttmr its also. 

Aaong the acts detailed in count 1, it eaa 

alleged that tha accused conspired alth other aaabers 

of SAYfCO to ettaapt to destroy laa and order 

In South Africa through violence. It eaa also claiaad 

that GAYfCO paaphleta aara distributed at a aaating In 

Soaato on 16 June, 19B1; that during June 19B1, one 

of tha accused brought teo people froa Boteeana into 

contact with Thabo Noabenl, national organiser of 

AZAPO; that Saethlolo Joined AZAMYU and introduced 

the national chelraen mvS president of the organlsstlon 

to people in Soaato; that Loete arranged a aaating 

beteaen various AZAPQ and AZAffYU aaapera, and BAfflCO; 

that aha airshed a aaating beteaen Saethlolo end 

Thaal atonal, naaa editor of tha Soaetan naaeoapar; 

that aha arranged accoaaodation for eeabers of 

SAYfCO eho entered South Africa; and that she had 

requested three people to apply for passports, ehlch 

she took and kapt for use by aoafjari of SAYfCO. 

The second count alleged that Baathlolo and 

Loate had incited 5 persona froa Soaato to undergo 

allltary training outside South Africa. They both 

pleaded not guilty to ell the charges agalnat thee. 

At tha start of the trial, in tha Vender*!jlperfc 

Regional Court, on February 8, tha court heard 

security police eltnessea describe the arrest of 

tha teo accused. Captain EG Clapton described a raid 

on a houaa in Orlando aaat shore SAYRCO docuaants aara 

sailed. Alao found in this house ass a forged 

Botseana passport and talagraas to Botsaana. 

A young girl aho aay not be neasd and for ahoa 

the aaglstrate cleared tha court, rafused to ||ive 

evidence. She said aha aould rather go to Jell 

then taatlfy against her colleagues. 

Another eltneaa, aho aay also" not be naaed, 

told tha court of a trip to Gaborone eada by 

hieeelf and a group of church eeabers. Ha said he 

ees introduced by the previous eltne&a to three 

youthe, teo of ahoa he reaeabere as 'Teboho* and 

*Paul*. Teboho had told hla that SAYRCO aould 

liberate blacks through violence and that 6TJ0 - 

1 000 aaaaara had coaaltted thaasalvaa to the 

organ 1 set ion - 

The altnasa said that the folloalng day he had 

eat Seethlolo, eho told hla that tha organisation 

considered ltaalf to be a third force and did not 

align ltaalf alth either tha AfC or PAC. 

Saethlolo elao aefced hla if ha could get eapa 

of Soap to. SAYRCO aaabera hod offered tha aitnaaa 

and his colleagues booklets about tret organisation 

and about tha Uvea at oVejhneu and aao for 

dlatrlbutlon in Soaato. They adapted tha 

booklets, but carried out none of tha Instruction 

7 eltraaaaa refused to give evidence for tha 

state: they aara 

Fraedoa Mazlbuko (20), 

Theal batesl (38), 

Carter Seleke (24), 

Thabo Mdabenl (25), 

Alex Selent (27), 

Sloho Soaacale (281. and 

Elsie aathlbedl (??). 

They aara all sentenced to teree of laprlsonaant 

ranging froa 9-16 aontha. 

Verdict: Both eccuaed guilty on both counts. 

Sentence: Saethlolo - 10 years on count 1, 5 yeare on 

count 2t to run concurrently, ia 10 yaara iaprlsonaent. 

Loate - 5 yaara on each count, to run concurrently, 

le S yaara iaprlsonaent, 

(vanderbljlperk Regional Court, 11.03.6?). 

Shortly after sentence, Saethlolo aas ra-oatalned 

under aactlon 6 of the Tarrorlaa Act by aecurlty 

police, 

tllliaa eabone Ouaa (31), Oualsena Blrette aanln>ai 

(31), Bayi Keye (S), and Luyanda aayeklso (»). 

Charge: In thie, tha first Clsfcei Tarrorlaa Act 

trial alnca the territory attained -lndapandenca* 

last Opceaber, tha eccuaed era alleged to hava bean 

•aefauiu of tha banned African National Congraaa. 

During June 1900 to Auguet 19B1 they era alleged to 

have been actively angagad in tha oparetlonal 

activities of tha ANC, thus identifying theaaalvas 

alth its revolutionary alaa. 

They ere elso ellagad to have recruited people 

to undergo allltary training, and to have po«aaaad 

banned- literature. Tha trial opened in the £eellteha 

Cipraei Court on 22 February ehen tha 4 accuaed 

appeared briefly before tha Clakel Cnlef Justice, 

Judge de Sat end teo assessors, aovocataa B Pohl and 

F Hal . 

The case aas adjournal for 4 daye to alloe the 

oldeat accused, ar Keye, to be eaaalned by a doctor 

"to Inquire Into hie aental and physical condition', 

ar Keye claiaad ha had been assaulted in detention. 

•hen tha trial laopened on 26 February, Clakel*a 

attorney general aT Jurgana announcad that Kmym had 

been sent to Cape Toan'e Groote Schuur hoapltal for 

tests, and aald that Keye had e previous history of 

achirophranlc paychotlc reaction. 

According to a partite! report froa Groote 

Schuur * aubaitted ehen Keye reappeared on « aaroh - 

no evidence of current paychoals aaa found. 

Hcaever, a hospital payohologlst said that Keye 

appeared aoderataly depressed end analoue* Tha 

Groote Schuur report eald Keye had denied any 

serious accidents or head Injuries, but ahan anked 

ehether ha hod been hit or kicked on tha head ehile 

in detention he replied: *Yee, they did everything to 

me' (js, hulls net ellea gaooan by ay). Tha 

psychologist's laport laqnoatert that Keye should 

not be kept in solitary canf lnaasnt. 

In another aatflcal report, subaitted inaapandently 

by a Or ID huaklaaonf it aas stated 'This patient

alleged onnnl assaults and ther- Is no doubt he 

had « ecMzophrenlc-llke illness with auditory 

heilucinations mhen admitted to hospital*. Or 

Huafcleson Hid In his report that Keye had told Ma 

h* aaa essmultmd during hit tmo months of 

lnterregetion, to try and make hie talk about a 

certain meeting ha had attended* Keye also told 

tha doctor that ha had been hit alth flats and kicked 

on tha haad durlnQ Interrogation. The f^xt thing ha 

raaaabarvd aaa being sent to Komanl Hospital in • 

CeJainatoan ahara ha aas kept for tao months. Ha 

said that after being baatan his nose aas sore end 

he could not aaa out of his left eye. 

-Tha trial reopened on 15 -arch »lth ttr Jurgens 

contesting the allegatlona of esaault and asking 

several emmndment* to the indictment, tith er Keys 

hart in court, the defence coaplalnad that another 

of tha accused, ar Uayeklso, had been taken froa 

prison to give a henderltlng aaaple elthout his 

leeyers being consulted. Jurgens conceded that the 

police had ande *en error of Judgement' but said they 

had not tried to force evidence out of ar aavaklso. 

In the state** evidence a South African security 

policeman* aerrent Officer ED Flsdon delated he end 

his colleagues had dug up banned literature - one 

leaflet eea ellegedly entitled 'Mandela says 

unite* - In the beck gardens of teo houses in 

ebentaane. 

The proaecutlon called a lecturer In political 

science et nand Afrlkaana University, ID da Vrles, 

te > Br v * * hlatory of revcplutloaery groups In 

South Africa'. De Vrles said that tha east 

Important movements sere trie ANC, SACP, SACTU 

era) MC. Hs pointed out that the JVC ees opposed 

to 'homelands' and did not recognise Clakel's 

Indaaartdanoe. Oe Vrles also clelmmd that the 

conetltutlon of the South African Allied workers' 

Uhlon (*$MW> correspondejf, «Hh eaall ajteeptlons, 

to that of SACTU. 

The trial continues. 

Robert Martin Adam (26) end Jinnd la mthmmbu (23). 

Charge: The eccueed era alleged to heve conspired 

elth trie African National Congress to obtain 

information regarding the transmission system and 

other aspects of tha SABC TV toear in Brixton. 

During July iMit it eea alleged thet they visited 

the toear and obtained information about it, 

including the taking of photographs. 

Adam is alleged to heve dreen up e report 

for tret ANC entitled 'Report on the reconnaissance 

of the SABC-TV system in Auckland Park 1 , mhieh eas 

placed In a dead letter box together elth certeln 

photographs. These eere collected by en A*C courier. 

The accused are also Jointly charged elth 

attempting to recruit a person for the ANC, end 

poaeeaslon of ANC literature. 

Adam has admitted in court that he If an 

ANC member, end that he prepared the report on 

ttwj SABC toeer for the ANC. Homever, ha claims 

that the intention aas not to sabotage the toear, 

but to rlamaga machinery and the building next to the 

toeer. eHhmmuu hme admitted taking photographa 

of trie Brixton toear, but clalmm that these eere 

done for the purposes of writing an article for 

e magazine on ehlch he Is eaployed. 

Irthembu has contested the admissibility of 

a statement he made after his arrest, claiming 

that it ehouid not be accepted as evidence against 

hie by the court. 

The triel continues In the Johannesburg 

Supreme Court before the Judge President of the 

Province, Judge Boshoff • 

INTERNAL gCUMTY ACT TRIALS 

Elaine dohaeaatf (20), Leslie Lax (23), kUchael 

O'Oonoven (21), Benjamin Greyllng (20). 

Charge: The accused aere charged eith distributing 

and producing posters ehlch cslebreted the 60th 

anniversary of the founding of the South Afridhn 

Communist Party (SACP). 

The stete celled fiend Afrikaans University lecturer 

ID de Vrles to give expert evidence on 

'revolutionary tactics*. Ha clalaad that a 

poster sheen to hie last year carried the eords 

'eorkers unite' ehlch he said eas extracted from 

Hsrx*s Communist manifesto. The poster, he said, 

could be seen ae a eey of publicising an unlaeful 

organisation. 

Ban Greyllng told the court of hie eel-treetieant 

by police after his detention. Ha claimed thet after 

three security police arrested hie, his hands mere 

tied behind hie back, and he eas throttled, 

* Throughout the day until midnight he eas bound fund 

and foot end forced to stand for 14 hours of 

questioning at John Vorater Souare. He ems forced 

to remove all his clothes and a bunch of keys eas 

pushed against his private parte. 

ehen ha reported having been assaulted to a 

doctor, the r*oort «*s referred beck to his 

Interrogator*. 

unexpectedly, in the middle of proceedings, 

the eccused changed their plea to guilty. It appears 

thet the presiding magistrate eas due to go on leave, 

and thia eould have extended court proceedings for 

some time, ehlle the accused remained In custody. 

Couneel for the defence then aaked for eholly 

suspended sentences to be imposed: the accused had 

already been in Jail for some time, end ell eere 

keen to resume their unlveraities studies if given 

the opportunity. 

Verdict: Guilty 

Sentence: 360 days Imprisonment, of ehlch 3S0 days 

mere conditionally suspended for 5 years. 

(Johannesburg Regional Court, 10.03.62). 

Of Interest eas the state's policy regarding 

ball in this case, end the previous Official Secrets 

Act triel ehlch Greyllng eas involved in. In the 

first trial, tha stete opposed bell strongly, and 

security police indicated that if ball eas granted. 

Greyllng eould be radetalned. Ha eas subsequently 

acquitted. 

In tha aacond trial, the attorney general 

prohibited bell by means of a onrtlflcate. The 

accused mee thus held In prison aa eeeltl'ng triel 

prisoners throughout the triel. They eere then 

sentenced to only 10 days imprisonment. 

peg* 

tthmmmt **» Omar (25). 

Charge: Photocopying end distributing en AJC pamphlet. 

The accused claimed thet he had received the pamphlet 

froa an unknown person, end read it. It contained e 

message from Oliver Tambo on the 69th anniversary of 

the ANC'a foundation. Ha gave tha pamphlet to a 

friend, making her to make copies ss he intended 

taking them to a political science class ehlch aaa 

part of his journalise course. 

Verdict; Guilty. 

Sentence: 12 months imprisonment, suspended for 

5 years* 

(Durban Regional Court, 22.0t.83). 

APPEAL PROCEEDINGS 

Guy perger and Devendira Pllley. 

The original charges against Berger end Pllley 

related to the provision of information on trade 

unions to SACTU, membership and furthering the aims 

of the ANC, and the possession and distribution of 

unlaeful literature. 

Effective sentence in Berger's esse eas a years* 

Pillay receiving 2 years. 

They appealed against sentence, and mere 

successful, in that Plllay*s sentence eas reduced to 

one year* Berger's to teo. 

(Grahaaatoen Supreme Court, eerch 1962). 

Nclmbithl Johnson Lublsl (29), Petrua Vashego (20), 

and hmphtali Uenane (24). 

(For trial details, see VIP 14:39-4!; VIP 15:40-41; 

MP 16:3-5). 

The eppellents eere found guilty of high treason 

in November I960, end sentenced to death. The major 

act for ehlch they received the death aentence Involved 

their participation in an AJC attack on the Soekmekaer 

police station in January 1960. 

On appeal. they argued that tha death sentence 

•as Inappropriate beceuee they had deliberately 

refrained froa killing those inside the police 

stetlon et the time of the attack. Various other 

factors such as their ages, the social disruption of 

their lives et the tie* they Joined the AFC 

(involving the June 1976 events end efter), and 

the disparity beteeen their sentences and other 

accused i eere put forward by the eppellents. 

Judgement has bean reserved in this important 

appeal. 

Wilfred efereane (20). 

mermane mas tried and convicted In BophutheTseana 

in terns of South Africa's Terrorism Act, The 

trial Judge, in summing up, said that ehlle the 

Terrariee Act aaa passed in South Africa, it still 

applied In BophuthaTemana after "independence* 

because it had not been repealed, tsjraane eas 

sentenced to 15 years imprisonment* 

Tha appeal, heard In South Africa's Apellete 

Division in Bloamfontein - ehlch has Juriadictlon 

over the) 'lndapmnoent'bantustans - eas on tha grounds 

that the Terroriem Act mee in conflict with the 

conetltutlon of BophutheTseane. This constitution 

has a bill of rights attached, ehlch couneel for tha

peg* T/ 

appellant c la lea overrule* the Terrorise) tat. 

The appael, being haard by a full banc* of 11 

Judges, la proceeding. 

PHIS0H5 ACT TRIALS 

ettchmel Jenfcin {31), Pram Naidoa (33) and 

Enlrlah Femebhei (44). 

The accused, having bean detained for soee tlae 

under section 6 of the Terrorise) Act, aara charged 

alth harbouring a political prisoner aho escaped from 

Pretoria Central prison In 1979. Staphen Lee ascapad 

mitt Alexander eouebarls and Tlaotny Jvnkln, 

brother of one of tha accused, and all 3 subsequently 

esnaged to laava South Africa. 

Jar* In has bean relaasad on bail of R5G0, ehlla 

feiidoo and Nanebhel are In custody. 

Dyson. 

Attorney Gi anise Oyson la charged alth attempting 

to enuoBla a letter erlten by a prisoner out of tha 

Fort Prison, Johannesburg. Tha prlaonar Involved 

ess allegedly Elaine Mohaeaid, recently convicted 

in tares of tha intaraal Security Act (see above)*

pegs 1 

The article which follows was originally presented 

as e seminar paper in tha Paper taant of Political 

Science «t tha University of Oar £m Saloon on 

Friday, 26 November, 1960. The paper, delivered 

by Dan O'Meera - than of the History Department at 

tha University - was titled '"Muldergata". the 

politics of Afrikaner nationalise end the crisis of 

the capitalist state In South Africa'. The paper 

is due to be published elsewhere, in s substantially 

revised form, at a later date. 

The 'Muldergate' article has been included In 

this MP because of its importance in the 

analysis end understanding of tha recent break 

assy of the Treurnicht group from the National Party 

Not only does O'Maara provide essential background 

to the latest crisis in both party end government„ 

he also provides a aathodology for interpreting 

ehat is happening in the National Party as an 

Indicator of a generalised crisis of the capitalist 

state in South Africa. 

The contemporary importance of this Is that 

it enables one to identify the various class 

interests et work, not only within party and 

governaent, but within the capitalist ruling class 

aa a whole- The identification of theee interests 

allows for en assessment of the content of the 

'reform* Initiative which the alliance of tha 

PM Botha led military group end monopoly capital 

is attaaptlng to implement - and ehlch has bean 

rejected by tha Trwumicht led alliance* 

The editors of f^P only received permission 

to publish the 'Muldergate* article shortly before 

going to print. As such. It has not been edited 

for typing consistenQy in tares of 

the use of capital letters, underlining and other 

eatters of presentetion. Apologies ere offered to 

both the author and to VIP readers for this. 

•MULDERGATE' 

AND THE 

POLITICS OF 

AFRIKANER 

NATIONALISM 

ThTOUGHOUT 1976 and much of 1979, the ruling 

Nationalist Party (NP) In South Africa, led by 

Prima Minister BJ Vorster, was shaken by en ongoing 

aeries of political and financial scandals. The 

opposition Engiiah-language press immediately oubbed 

the effalr 'Muldergate*f after its leading scapegoat, 

Or Connie Mulder - then Minister of Information and 

Plural Relations and Development, leader of the 

Transvaal Nationalist Party, and Vorster's clear heir 

apparent. WlQely trumpeted press end Judicial 

revelations about fhe misappropriation of funds and 

other abuses elthln Mulder's Department of Information 

began to siauaaj tha tone of e moral cruaada against 

political corruption. In September 1976 Vorster 

dramatically announced his resignation on 'health' 

grounds from the premiership and as national leader 

of the NP. He was promptly elevated to the purely 

ceremonial post of State rVesldent. vorster** 

resignation m%& closely followed by that of his 

longtime political crony and arguably the second 

most powerful polltlcel figure In South Africa, 

General Handrlk van den Bergh, head of the notorious 

Bureau of State Security (BOSS)* In e bitterly fought 

election within the NP caucus to select Vorster's 

successor as national leader of tha NP, and hence the 

Prima Minister, Connie Mulder was narrowly defeated 

by the Minister of Defence and leader of tha Cape 

Nationalist Party, PW Botha. Tha nee Prime Minister 

plsdged himself to run a 'clean' povernmmnt, and In 

rapid succession Mulder was driven out of the Cabinet , 

the leadership of the Transvaal Nationalist Party* 

Parliament, and eventuelly tha NP itself. Ha now 

heads en extreaa right-wing opposition group. 

Muldergate attracted a greet dwal of moralising 

coeaejntary and etrtdent demands for the government's 

resignation In the bourgeois press. It has bean 

almost universally interpreted es e symbol of We 

corruption of Afrikaner rationalism, reinforcing the 

wldmly held view that tha root causa of social conflict 

In South Africa lies almost exclusively within tha 

apartheid policies of a monolithicelly conceived 

'Afrikaner* ethnic group. This supposed 'ruling 

ethnic group* is than presumed to use the etate to 

pursue tha narrow (and egjeln mcnolithicaOly conceived) 

interests of the Afrikaner volk. 1 Mora often then not, 

this kind of analysis continues further to poeo a 

fundamental contradiction between Afrikaner nationalism 

and 'its* apartheid policies on the one hand, and the 

supposedly ratlonel, inherently colour-blind 

Imperatives of capitalism on the other - e 

contradiction In which the latter are fettered and 

distorted by the former, 2 

This conventional conception of Afrikaner 

nationalism rests upon a number of mutually re 

inforcing logical and analytical errors ehlch 

togathar result in logical circularity and political 

confusion. Firstly, and aoat fundamentally, the 

highly disparate and dlfferentieted Afrikaans* 

speaking ahlta population of South Africa is 

unpi-oblematlcally charactarieed as a monolithic 

•ethnic group', with a presumably inherent organic 

unity and a set of common interests overriding all 

dlfferances. This is taken as self-evident, thereby 

neatly and uncritically reproducing the basic tenet 

of Afrikaner nationalist Ideology. Once this first 

untenable assumption is made, a seriea of others 

then follow naturally. The shifting and contradictory 

base of support for a political party (the NP) la 

simply collapsed Into this 'ethnic* category. Given 

that the NP has been the ruling party since 1908, 

this Illegitimate confletlon of perty and ethnic group 

then loads to the argument that Afrikaners monopolise 

polltlcel power in South Africa and hence comprise a

'ruling •tunic group'» or eo*etia*s 'a political class'. 

All this too is taken as self-evident. 

In this say, tha vary dlffarant social categories 

of coavaon language, ethnic group, class, political 

party* government and stata ara glibly collapsad Into 

aach other, and usad Interchangeably. Hara tha 

dlatlnctlon bataaan tha vastly dlffarant areas, levaIs 

and typas of social action and organisation to anion 

thasa dlffarant catagorlas rafsr is sieply obliterated* 

This conflation closes a naat logical clrcla, in ehlch 

tha atata is raducad to an Afrikanar entity, and 

concalyad as a simple instrument In tha hands of this 

alleged ruling athnic group. Thasa numerous arrors 

and confusions apart, ahat gats concaalad in thla 

concaptlon of tha atata Is precisely its character as 

a capitalist stata. And thus tha political problaas 

of South Africa ara raducad to tha problem of 'the 

Afrikaner*. 81nca 'they* ara hald solaly responsible 

for tha situation of aocial confrontation In South 

Africa, on 'the*' alona llaa tha onua to changa. 

In tha eords of a racant bookt 

Tha graat problem for South Africa...la 

assantlally a problem for tha Afrikaners slnca 

thay hold tha poamr In avarything that matters. 

Thua tha raal political questions in South Africa - 

thoaa of tha capitalist stata, and the social relations 

on ohjch it raats - ara naatly mvoidad and displaced, 

ao legitimising bourgeois politlca. 

An analysis of muldergata as a crials for both 

government and ruling party must nacasaarlly break 

alth thasa myriad confusions to confront tha problem 

of tha capitalist atata In South Africa. In racant 

yaars a growing body of South African litaratura has 

ralsad this question. Hoeaver, as Volga's racant 

revle-s of this litaratura has demonstrated, all tha 

varioua tandanclaa hava remained trappad althin an 

instrumentalist concaptlon. Hara, tha state ia in 

affact analysed aa an lnatltution external to class 

struggle, available for uaa as an undiffarantlatad 

instrument in tha hands of a political party 

raprasantlng spaciflc and puraly economic Interests, 

Thla litaratura haa fallad to grasp tha charactar of 

tha stata as a diffarantlatad and contradictory 

unit/t ltsalf conatltutad througn, and a sits of, „ 

class atruggla. 

Such a concaptlon of tha stata aa a aita of class 

struggls furthar poses tha problem of tha relationship 

bataaan classas dafined at tha laval of relations of 

production, and tha concrata ldaologlcal and 

organisational fonts through which class struggls is 

fought out. As hara concaivad, classas dafinad at 

tha laval of ralatlons of production exist in class 

struggls in and through multiple fonts of concrata 

organisation. Thus, in any conjunctura, tha unity 

of this or that class as a social force cannot simply 

be rsad off fro* tha ralatlons of production, but 

needs to ba constructed via tha ensemble of concrata 

organisational and ldaologlcal forms in and through 

which that claaa axiats. In thaaa tarsia than, an 

analysla of tha atata concaivad as a alta of class 

atruggla lnvolvaa, intar alia, a focus on praclsaly 

tha contradictions and conflicts althin and bataaan 

tha varioua institutions and apparatuses of tha state. 

This papar rapraaants a flrat attempt to bagln 

such an analysis. It focuses mainly on but ona aspact 

of tha stata - tha signlflcanca of tha currant crisis 

in Afrikanar nationalism for tha stata as a ahola. 

This la takan as a uaaful antry point into tha much 

aora Caspian quastlons of class struggls and tha atata 

as a ahola. Thua the analysla prasantad hara la 

nacasaarlly partial and tentative, leaving unraaolvad 

nutrous thaoratical and saiplrlcal problema* Thaaa 

ara hopafully to ba confrontad in futura rasaarch. 

Tha lluldargata itibrogllo aaa tha culmination of 

a long-aiaaiaring crisis in both tha Nationalist Party 

and tha HP government, than plunging both party and 

government still daapar into crisis* Yat it rapraaants 

much mora than tha simple lntamal crisis of Afrikaner 

nationalissi as it is usually daplctad. I would argue 

that It aaa but an aspact of, and a product of a crisis 

for tha capitalist stata as a ahola in South Africa. 

Ita 'resolution' llkasriaa rapraaants an attaaptad 

resolution of tha wider crisis of tha South African 

atata. 

If this if in fact tha caaa, to assess tha 

signlflcanca of Wuldergate for tha stata as a ahola, 

it ia necessary to answer thrsa intarralatad quastlons: 

Ihat aara tha broad features of thla crisis of tha 

capitalist stata in South Africa? «hat mas tha 

q»q« 

signlflcanca of tha particular for* that it assumed in 

tanas of tha contradictions and conflicts althin tha 

Nationoliat Party and govarnmant? And ahat la tha 

signlflcanca of its for* of resolution for tha — 

contradictions and conflicts althin tha stata? 

Tha Crisis of tha 1970a 

THE crisis confronting tha South African stata and 

ruling class in tha arid* 1970a aaa complex and eultl- 

lavallad - an ensemble of simultaneous and mutually 

dwtemining economic, political and ldaologlcal crials, 

producing significant shifts In tha balanca and 

alignment of class forces, A graat daal of furthar 

rasaarch la nacasaary to arrive at an adequate analysis 

of this ganarallsad criaia. Hara Is examined vith vary 

dlffarant oepheees but three of its elements: firstly, 

aspects of tha growing crisis of capital accumulation 

In tha 1970a: tacondly, tha rapid Intensification of 

tha class struggls during this decade; and thirdly, 

in thaaa contexta, tha aorfelnga of Afrikanar 

nationalist politics. Tha alsi la to attempt to 

understand hos tha flrat tao elements both structured 

and articulated alth the internal dynamic of 

Afrikaner nationalist politlca to produce a political 

crisis in its particular for* of muldergata. Thla 

• ill provide a basis for a tantatlva aeasisment of 

tha signlfloanca of tha changes occurring in tha 

sake of lluldargata. 

Ourlng tha 1960a tha South African economy had 

expanded mora rapidly than that of any other capitalist 

country except Japan, averaging an annual growth rata 

of GOP of bataaan 6 and S parcant. A number of 

features of this boo* should ba noted, aa hera aara 

established tha condltiona for this crisis of tha 

1970s. Flratly* the brutal aupprasalon of tha 

national liberation movement by 1963 created the 

requisite condltiona for rapid capitalist growth* 

Particularly significant hare ass tha eamshing of 

tha econoalc organe of tha stocking class. Thus, 

bataaan 1964 and 1969, leas than 2 000 africen eorfcars 

par annus) aant on atrlka. Secondly, tha moat notable

page 3 

Koranic aspect of this boom was that It lad to e 

dramatic concentration «nd centrelieation of capital 

on the basis of cv*r more capital inteneive production, 

leading to significant shifts in relatione within the 

capitalist class. Prior to the 1960s, South African 

industry was characterised by a sharp economic 

distinction and political antagonist between local 

undertakings and foreign capital. "•> & 00 * 9 f ^ha 

i9€Oa produced the rapid intervenetratIon of capitals 

and the consolidation of the dominance of diversified 

monopolies within the economy generally, and in all 

the major sectors of capitalist production. This 

process was effect^ on the basis of a_ massive influx 

of foreign capital, in a country where the return on 

capital was amongst the highest in the world. By 

1970. total foreign investment was estimated at 

R5 81&-milllon, and a total of R3 559-million foreign 

investment capital flowed into South Africa in the 

period 196S - 19?o\ 6 

Consequent on this Increasing dominance of 

capital-intensive production, these years further saw 

significant changes in the organisation of the 

proletariat within production, accelerating the process 

of the simultaneous attraction and extrusion of workers 

from production. The introduction of Increasingly 

sophisticated technology into the production process 

on an ever expanding scale, leads to a relative 

reduction in the number of workers needed to operate 

it. moreover, it simultaneously Introduces a new 

industrial division of labour between semi-skilled 

operatives on the one hand, and technical/supervisory 

labour on the other, replacing the old unskilled/ 

skilled division of labour. Thus, during this period, 

whilst large numbers of sami-skilled operatives were 

being drawn into production, even lerger numbers of 

unskilled african migrant workers lost their Jobs as 

they became 'redundant 1 . Throughout the 'boom', 

african unemployment stood at over 1 million. The 

Influx control measures and pass laws of the apartheid 

system operated to expel the unemployed from the 

cities end dump and barricade them In the festering 

rural slums of bantustano. This process marked a 

decisive shift aw«y from the reliance on cheep, 

unakillad migrant labour so long charactar 1 Stic of 

South African industry, towards the consolidation of 

a stable, ssml-ekllled workforce. 

Similarly during this period, large numbers of 

skilled (white) workers eere also rendered relatival/ 

superfluous to capital Intensive production, as their 

skills were superceded by the need for technical/ 

supervisory labour. Yet in apartheid South Africe. 

the Jobs of white workers were protected. The rigid 

industrial colour bar reserved all supervisory, 

technical and professional work for whites. Thus in 

this changing organisation of the labour process, few 

shite workers lost their Jobs, but were either 

retrained and/or converted into supervisors of efrican 

workers. However, this process of reclassifying white 

workers was unable to fill the growing need for 

technical labour. The boom period was thus also 

characterised by a severe and growing shortage of 

labour in technical, professional and semi- 

professional grades of work - a shortage estimate*. 

at some 47 000 workers In 1969. 

In these years the monopoly element of the 

capitalist class did demand measures which would mase 

restriction on trie mobility, employment and training 

of african workers, to permit its acquisition of a 

stable supoly of semi-skilled operatives end to retrain 

african workers for technical labour. However, the 

over-all conditions of expansion and high profitability 

edtlgated the adverse effects of such labour 

shortages flncJ thus did not lead to an all out assault 

by capital on the existing rigid racial division of 

labcxir. During this period, the economy was further 

'cushioned' against such labour shortages hy the 

continuing large influx of foreign investment capital. 

Thua, while the boom conditions persisted, the 

maintenance of the rigid racial division of labour in 

industry did not seriously threaten the interests of 

the capitaliat class. 

As the 1970s unfolded, the great boom of the 

sixties gave way to a deepening recession. By 1976 

the country was facing the worst economic crisis in 

its history and an actual decline of GOP of 0,29)1 in 

1977-76. 9 By the mid* 1970s, confronted both with an 

international recession and growing industrial, 

political and economic instability within South Africa 

itself and the region as a whole, the very large doses 

of foreign capital which had sustained the growth 

of the 1960s began to dry up. South African Reserve 

Bank statistics show a reduction in the inflow of 

long-term foreign investment from R1 561-mllllon in 

1975-76 to Ra52-mlllion in 1975-77. If this 

redaction is coupled with the actual net outflow 

of short-term capital from the private sector, the 

year 1976-77 saw a total capital outflow of some 

R12l-mllllan. Similarly, the recession dramatically 

increased the growing structural unemployment of 

african workers. In 1976, before the recession had 

reached its full height, it was estimated that 

african unemployment stood at 2,3 million workers* 

moreover, simply to stabilise unemployment at this 

huge number it was calculated that the economy would 

have to grow at 6,7% per annum. Ironically, in 

the face of this acuta unemployment of african 

workers, the shortages of technical workers in 

the economy accelerated* By 1977, government figures 

show vacancies Tor 99 000 workers in the professional, 

semi •'professional and technical grade*. The pages 

of authoritative economic Journals were filled with 

reports of bankruptcies, and the r.t it* was forced to 

abandon or defer major infrastructwal Investment 

programmes in steel, petro-chee)ical»f transport and 

other sectors. 

The above specification of som% of the Indices 

of the crisis of accumulation cannot substitute for 

lte actual analysis. A detailed analysis would have 

to grapple particularly with the differential 

barriers to accumulation for veriou* capitals, and 

the differential impact of the crisis on various 

capitals. Thle analysis remains to be done. Thus, 

the assessment of the effects of thl* crisis of capital 

accumulation remains necessarily incomplete. However, 

one general point can be made. Thia *as far more 

than a cyclical recession normal to capitalist 

economies, but represented in effect a profound 

structural crisis for South Africmn capitalism. 

The rapid growth of the South African economy

in the 1960s extended the process of eecondary 

industrialisation baaad on import substitution, which 

had begun in earnest in tha 1920s. Tha impressive 

flQuras indicating, tha growth of sacondary industry 

in South Africa 1920-90 tand to concaal tha fact that 

thass industriaa were concentrated vary heevily in 

tha wage goods sector, producing artlclat of 

consumption. Tha procass of Industrialisation behind 

protactlva tariffs did not laad to tha davalopaant of 

a significant capital goods ssctor. As tha ragular and 

growing balancs of payments daflclts throughout tba 

1960s lndloatadt Industry in South Africa raaainad 

vary haavily dependent on tha importetion of capital 

equipment froa tha developed capitalist economies. 

Thasa imparts were financad through tha axport of 

primary commodities - agricultural products and 

minerals, but particularly gold. Thus, in a wary 

fundaaantal sense, tha limits of capital accumulation 

in South Africa remain sat by tha primary axport 

sactors - la agriculture and minerals t aith gold baing 

by far tha aost important. 

Tha economic crises of tha mid-1970s revealed 

vary claarly that, undvr tha prevailing political 

and social conditions within tha country, tha 

South African aconomy mas raachlng tha limits of 

industrial expansion based on Import substitution. 

By 1977, facad mith little apparent prospect of an 

early or rapid lncraasa in tha price of goldt 

virtually all South African aconomlsts mere agreed 

that furthar industrial axpanslon mould hava to ba 

basad on tha development of a strong capital goods 

ssctor, and a shift In tha emphasis of exports 

tomsrds industrial rathar than primary products. 

Tha aconomlc crisis of tha mid-1970s thus 

presented both differential barriers for accumulation 

for particular capitals, and mora fundamentally, for 

capital as a ehols In South Africa. Tha resolution 

of this crisis spomared to damand a complex restructur 

ing of capital in all aactore of tha economy, a 

restructuring ehich mould render labour more 

productive, Thle Implied the nmed for an even more 

capital intenelve basis to South African industry. 

now linked to the need to rsep the owneflts of 

M 

economies of scale. Thue the racaeelon posed very. 

eterkly vthe urgent need for change In a number of 

the conditions of accumulation of capital in South 

Africa. ( In broadest terms, the entire eat of 

conditions under which labour ems utilised within tha 

economy on the one hand, and the structure of the 

market on the other hand, warm poaed aa urgent 

political problems for the capitalist cless as a whole. 

Here, however, tha differential impact of tha 

recession on various capitals becomes Important. The 

forms of resolution of these problems and tha 

policies desired by various capitals differed 

substantially. This is an Brea requiring much 

f^rtf^r investigation. 

Before analysing the unprecedented proliferation 

of politicking-on these issues by the entire complex 

gamut of bourgeois organisations, tha other side of 

this economic crisis needs to be mentioned. The 

process of cepltallet eecumuletion of the mid-1970s 

took piece In the context of, and was indeed largely 

a product of, a rapid intensification of the cless 

struggle. The decede saw a growing militancy on 

the part of an increasingly organised efrican working 

class. It began with a massive strike of contract 

workere in Nemible. Prom 1972 onwards. South African 

industry was rocked by wave upon wave of strlkea by 

african workers demanding higher wages and tha right 

to organise. These strikes began at the tall end 

of tha great boom or the 1960s, and in many mays 

heralded the onset of the recession of the 1970s. 

These struggles are well known end neod not ba 

documented here. The mining Industry too was shaken 

by bitter disputes, stoppages end strikes between 

1973 and 1976, These were liirgely suppressed with 

violence - In one instance in Carletonville In 1ff73, 

11 etriking miners were shot oy police summoned by 

the Anglo--Amarican Corporation. During the Soweto 

uprisings, two massive general strikes in August 

and September 1976 virtually paralysed South African 

Industry, 

These working cless struggles apart, political 

stability was further shattered by other mass 

struggles against apartheid. Tha regime was rocked 

• 

by maaeive uprlelnge in 1976, by the collepse of 

Portuguese colonlellam and particularly the 

humllletlng defeat of tha South African army In 

Angola. Significantly, beginning in 1976 a slowly 

escalating guerilla war inside South Africa waa waged 

1 by the militants of tha armed wing of the banned 

African National Congress, Umkhonto We Sizwe. As 

PW Botha claimed on assuming office, the state did 

indeed seem to be confronted with e 'total onslaught*. 

Certainly amongst South African businessmen there wee 

an almoat panle-etricken recognition that these 

struggles went beyond mere demands for the and to 

reclal discrimination. In the words of one worried 

cepltallet, 'there is e general tendency for young 

africans to be enti-free enterprise.* 

Again, tha above simple cetalogue of some of tha 

events of this intensifying class struggle of the 

1970s Is no substitute for its analysis. Uuch furthar 

research is needed in this area. 8ut one general 

conclusion Is clear. By 1977-78 both tha economic 

and political conditions which had underlain end given 

rise to the unprecedented boom of 1961-71 had been 

decisively shattered. •hilet the economic end 

political crises of tha 1970a are not immediately 

reduceable to each other, they both raised, in 

differing ways, as tha central issue of polltlcel 

struggle, the question of the requisite state 

policies to ensure renewed capitalist growth and 

stability. Moreover, they did so in ways which 

began to shake loose the existing political 

alignments within South Africa, leading to Intensified 

political conflict and significant political 

reorganisation of varioua class forces. 

The Pressure for Reform 

.IT is necessary to note that by 1996 a significant 

change had occurred in the alignment of the economic 

organisation of the capitalist claas. With the 

important exception of organised agriculture, by 1978 

ell the economic organisations of the cepltallet 

claae were united in agreement over the need for 

significant reforms in economic and political 

policy. Even given the differential Impact of tha 

page 4

page 5 

recession, tnern was broad agreement over the nature 

of tots* desired reforms* The Most significant of 

these can ba broadly specified. Firstly, aith raganl 

to aconomlc policy, there was wide agreement on tha 

naad to ease substantially legislative raatrictions 

on tha mobility of african labour (influx control, 

pass lava, tha labour bureaux system), to permit i 

its mora profitable utilisation. This aas 

accompanied alth a general damand that raatrictions 

on the training and employment of skilled african 

labour ba likewise aboilahad or rafor mad, to parmlt 

tha reorganisation of production on tha basis of 

highar productivity. Thasa two vary basic issues 

further ralsad tha naad for s negotiated reorganisation 

of tha labour procasa in many branchas of capitalist 

production. Again, all employers' organisation* vara 

united on the naad for some kind of state recognition 

end control of organisations of collective bargaining 

for african workers* In 197S, the various employers* 

organisations in South Africa formed an umbrella body 

to press these views on government. The evidence of 

tha various employers* organisations to tha government 

Commissions of Enquiry on Manpower Utilisation 

(Rlekert Commission) and Labour Legislation (Vlehahn 

Commission) is strikingly similar on these issues. 

There aas likewise unanimity between all the 

organisations of the capitalist class on the urgent 

need for e drastic reduction in state ownership and 

control In the economy. 

The particular emphasis given to economic policy 

by all the various employers' organisations iamediately 

posed tha question of the necessary reforms to ensure 

the political stability so vital to further economic 

growth. Here were raised questions of both foreign 

and domestic policy. Tha flight of foreign capital, 

the intensifying wars of national liberation in 

Namlble and Zimbabwe, and the increasingly desperate 

need for export markets for South African industrial 

commodities, highlighted very clearly the relationship 

between International acceptability, regional 

stability and renewed prosperity. Once again, all 

the various employers* organisation* put strong 

pressure on the government to Introduce reforms 

which would emee the international leoletion of the 

country, renew th« flow of foreign investment, 

(Marwntee Western support in Namibia and Zimbabwe, and, 

if possible, open the African continental market to 

South*African goods. 

But tha most overriding concern was tha need to 

secure Immediate domestic stability. Hare particular 

emphasis was placed on tha position of a newly 

discovered creature, 'the Urban African'. In mid- 

1976, in the aftermath of Soweto, e whole host of 

business-funded and cross-cutting organisations 

sprang up to 'deal' with the problem. The most 

Important of these was tha Urban Foundation, 

jointly established, and massively financed, by 

many of the major corporations in South Africa* 

Numerous proposals warm made for 'Improving' the 

lot of the urban african* that was essentially 

being proposed here was the removal of those 

apartheid restrictions which unnecessarily inflamed 

workers, and more particularly, lead to collective 

action between african workers and the african patty 

bourgeoisie. Thus the most widely trumpeted and 

major scheme of the Urban Foundation was an attempt 

to initiate a system of private home ownership for 

the very few Africans able to afford housing. In 

reality, thes* various organisations envisaged 

isolating various groups of efricans from each other, 

attending to their specific needs separately, hopefully 

to polarise them politically. Thus a slight 

amelioration in the living conditions of those 

africans who possessed the right under section 10 

of the Urban Areas Act to remain in the cities 

would effectively separate them permanently from 

tha vast reserve army of the unemployed barricaded 

in the rural slums of the bantustans by tha influx 

control system. But more particularly, the sudden 

obsession of all these organisations with the (again 

newly discovered) 'black middle cless', and the need 

to develop it very rapidly, was premised on the need 

to drive a wedge between black workers and the petty 

I bourgeoisie. Certain sections of the capitalist claas 

I had long been arguing for this course. By 1978 It had 

I become the universal litany of all employers and other 

bourgeois organisations. 

Once again, much further research le required 

before an adequate analysla of tharaectlons of the 

capitalist class to these aconomlc and political 

crises can be made. However, 5 preliminary general 

points can be stressed. Firstly, the combination of ( 

economic and political crisis gave rise to a atrong 

demand for urgent reform from virtually all sections 

of tha organised capitalist class. It earn a rapid 

proliferation of business-funded organisations and 

pressure groups to push for reform. In other words, 

through the various cross cutting organisations 

through which it exists as a class, tha bourgeoisie 

engaged in a desperate flurry of open politicking 

on a previously unheard of scale. 

Secondly, this flurry of bourgeois politics was 

in no sense confined to the party and parliamentary 

level. For reasons which thaajselves require detailed 

analysis, parliamentary politics are a relatively 

insignificant form of political struggle In South 

Africa. Rather, what took place aas intense 

politicking on the one hand within and between the 

various (and proliferating) organisations of the 

capitalist class - ranging from directly economic 

interest grouos to church organisations, women's 

group*, etc - and within and between the various 

state apparatuses and such bourgeois organisations on 

the other hand. 

Thirdly, any consideration of this explosion of 

bourgeois politics must come to terms with the 

increasingly open and direct political role of tha 

military. Particularly under the new Chief of 

Staff, General amgrws Helen, the military ems now 

openly canvassing for state policies which ware 

'militarily defensible'. This is examined In greater 

detail below, but here it is Important to note that 

this now openly political role of the military 

brought it into increasing conflict with other 

elements In the state apparatus, particularly the 

security services. 

Fourthly, during these crises, long existing 

political alignments and alliances both within the 

bourgeoisie end between sections of the bourgeoisie

and othar claaa forces, began to crumble and shift. 

Of apaolal significance aaa the position of various 

large Afrikaner undertakings, both at Individual 

companies, and organised collectively through tha 

Afrikaanse Hsndeleinstltuut (Afrikaner Commerciel 

Institute). This points to tha need for datallad 

research on tha development of Afrikaner undertakings 

over tha pravious IS years. But it can ba notad that 

tha now strongly-expressed demand by Afrikanar 

buainaas for raform in tha raatrlctiona on tha 

aobllityt employment, training and organisation of 

african labour, togathar with a vahaaant attack on 

atata lntarfaranca in the aconoay and a vigorous 

caapalgn for *tha davalopaant of tha black middle 

dees', was shaking loos* a long-standing political 

allianca batwaan Afrikanar buainaas on tha ona hand, 

and cartain strata of white workers and tha patty 

bourgeoisla on tha other. 

This laada fifthly to tha point at tha heart of 

. this paper. Tha exploeion of politicking over tha 

appropriate economic end political responses to 

these crises, whan taken together with this shift 

in traditional political alliances, began to raise in 

vary atark form another problem a the political 

capacity of tha Nationalist Party government to 

implement tha necessary reforms* This Is not to pose 

the hackneyed and discredited view of a contradiction 

between the requirements of a rational capitalism on 

the one hand, end tha irrational 'ethnic' concema of 

the Nationalist Party on tha othar, in which the 

latter dominates end distort* tha former. Indeed, 

elsewhere I have argued that tha election of the hP 

government in t943 represented e form of solution to 

an earlier political crisis of the capitalist state, 

and that its apartheid policies facilitated rapid 

capital accumulation in all branches of capitalist 

production. Thus, at no stage during Its rule up 

to the 1970s had the capitalist class seriously 

challenged the notionalist government, precleely 

because tha role of capital Itself wes not challenged* 

But the coterminous collapse of capitalist prosperity 

and the intensification of class struggles in the 

early 1970a began to pose the political Question of 

the role of the W> as the governing party in the 

capitalist State. 

This is tha context of Uuldergatef Tha general 

economic and political crlawe want hand in hand with and 

helped to shape a growing crisis within both tha NP 

government, and tha party itself outside of government. 

Put another way, Uuldwrgate reproeented in condeneed 

form the complex articulation of three separate 

political crises: 

a) tha crisis both for individual capitals and the 

capltellet claae aa a whole in tha economic and 

political conditions of accumulation; 

b) for tha Natlonallat Party as the governing party 

in tha capitalist state; and 

c} for the Natlonallat Party cutalde of government 

M an Afrikaner natlonallat party built on a 

particular eat of political alliances. 

It la crucial to realise that though inextricably 

interconnectedt these three different levels of the 

crisis of the South African atata in 1978 refer to 

very different alignments of sets of organisational 

and Ideological class forcee. Thua, the political 

crlele confronting the NP government aa the ruling 

party in the capitalist state, was not the same as, 

and cannot ba reduced to, tha political crisis 

confronting the NP as a political party representing 

a particular alignment of clews forcee within the 

social formation. Existing accounts of both 

muldergate and the development of Afrikaner nationalist 

19 

politico have glibly collapsed thess levels. To 

understand Uuldargate as a crisis for tha capitalist 

state aa a wholea it Is necessary to grasp these 

verloue crises both in their aeparateness and 

articulation. 

The Struggle Inalde the Nationalist Party 

THE Nationalist Party has been In power in South 

Africa since 1906. It is conventionally seen as a 

monolithic omaniaetlon rapreaanting 'the Afrikaner* 

in South African politics. Such a static, 

undifferentiated .view of the NP la profoundly 

misleading. As I have shown elsewhere tha NP camm 

into office in 1948 as tha political organisation of 

a ehlftlng, highly differentiated end contradictory 

cleas alliance. Far from being a monolithic force, 

the NP has always been wracked by vigorous, oftwn 

bitter and sometimes violent conflicts between the 

various forces comprising its social basis. To the 

vary limited extent that these conflicts have avwn 

bean recognised in the literature, they have been 

univereally depicted In purely ideological termet 

often overlaid with a regional 1st emphasis. Thua, 

tha so-called 'moderate* nationalists of 'the South' 

Pmge G 

(la the Cepe province) are supposed to be at loggerheads 

with the hardlinare of 'the North' (tha Provinces of 

ths Transvaal and the Orange Free State). This la 

usually taken es given. Now clearly there are deep 

ideological and regional differancaa in the character 

of Afrikaner nationallme. Yet these are hardly their 

own explanations. They must needs ba understood in 

terms of the significantly different social bases of 

the various provlnciel NPs, and tha forms in and 

through which these class differences have bean 

Institutionalised in nationalist politics. 

Tha NP la no single 'national' party, but rather 

a loose federation of 4 autonomous provincial parties, 

wmch with its own distinct social basis, party 

organisation, membership, constitution, leadership, 

press, and political and ideological etyle. The NP 

qua party has a 'national' existence only through 4 

institutions: the National Leader elected by the 

Parliamentary caucus; a 'Federal Council* 

representing each provincial party, and which meets 

but rarely; the 'Federal Congreas', which meets even 

more rarely; and the Parliamentary caucus in which sit 

tha Nationalist ammmmTt of Parliament from all 4 

provinces. Tha cabinet makes up a fifth National Party 

institution, but le simultaneously engaged at a vary 

different level of politlca, and subject to a much 

wider sat of pressures and struggles. 

Each of these 'national• institutions of tha party 

ia a site of widely differing etrugglea and represente 

widely varying Interests* Tha much-neglected structure 

of tha NP la vital to an understanding of its 

operation, as tha real locus of power within the 

party oye party. Ilea in the Provincial party

7 

onjanlaationt, rather than tha national institution*, 

within tha Provincial partlaa, tha Provincial leaders 

of tan hava graatar lnfluanca than tha National Laadar 

(aho is usually alao a laadar of ona of tha Provincial + 

partita - this coaprises hia raal poaar baaa within 

tha party). within tha party qua party (aa distinct 

froa tha cabinet) tha Provincial leader* wield aa audi 

poaar aa tha National Laadar hlaaalf. Tha Provincial 

partlaa hava alaaya vary Jaaloualy guarded their 

particular lntaraata, prerogatives and idantltiaa 

both froa aach othar, and froa tha 'National* 

institutions of tha party. 

Thua, tha 'raglonallat' or *provlnclaliat' 

strugglaa ahlch hava alaaya plagued Afrikaner - 

nationalist politic*, raat at ona laval on thaaa 

4 distinct party atrvcturaa. Hoaavar, »ia 

raglonaliaa and tha oftan aida policy and ideological 

dlffaranca* bataaan tha political partlaa ara a*plainad 

by tha fact that aach party has a distinct claaa baaia: 

aach la tha inatitutionollaatlon of a distinct fora. 

of claaa alllanca ahlch diffara in important raapacta 

froa that of lta fadaral partners. Thua, aa 

aaparataly organlaad, aaparataly financad and 

aaparataly lad political lnatltutiona alth differential 

aoclal baaaat tha 4 provincial Natlonaliat Partlaa 

hava acqulrad distinct lnatltutlonal practices, 

ldaoloolcal atylaaand lntaraata. Far fro* baing 

aonolithic organisations, thay hava changad 

aignifioantly during tha parlod of tha »'a rula. 

IhUat it la ooaposad of a federation of 4 

provincial partlaa, tha HP la In fact alaoat totally 

doalnatad by tha tao largaat of thaaa, tha Transvaal 

and Capa Nationalist Partlaa. Tha-ft* of*tha Oranga 

Fraa State haa tandad to folloa that of tha Tranavaal 

(although thara raaaln significant dlffarancaa), 

and tha NP of Natal la ao aaak aa to bo almost 

inaignifleant. Thua, for tha aafca of brevity, in 

tha analysis of tha growing crisis in tha Natlonaliat 

Party during tha 1970a, I ahall concantrata 

predominant!/ on tha tan largar provincial partlaa. 

Vary achaaatlcaUy, in tha Tranavaal in t948 

tha NP aanagad for tha first ti-e In ita history to 

organiaa politically a claaa allianca of tha (alaoat 

axdualvaly Afrllraani apaafciimj) capitalist faraars of 

tha Provlnca; apaciflc strata of ahita workers 

in tha adnlng, conatruotlon, ataal and transport 

lnduatriaat' tha larga AfrUcaana apaateing patty 

bourgeoisie in tha state apparatus and tha profaaalona; 

and finally, aaarglng out of thla latter group, a 

aaall claaa of aspirant coaswrclal and financial 

capitalists organlaad in tha ftaddlnpôaadbaaaging 

(literally, tha '-ova-ant for tha act of rascue). 

Thla lattar group aara haavily dapandant on tha ra- 

invaatad aurpluaaa of agricultura and tha savings of 

Afrlkaana apaatears of all claaaaa. Indaad, long 

bafora tha NP aaa abla to organlsa thaaa diaparata 

clasa foraaa into a political alllanca, through tha 

various organisations of tha RaddingsdaadbasaginQ, 

tha patty bourgaoiala had organlaad thaa into a fora 

of aoonoaic allianca. 

Elaaahara I hava analyaad in datall tha condition* 

giving rlaa to, and tha apaciflc fora of, thla 

allianca. 21 Hara It should be straaaad, hoaavar, that 

alongslda tha NP, Transvaal Natlonaliat politics aaa 

doalnatad by a aacrat aociaty knoan aa tha Afrikanar 

Broedsrbond. Tha Afrikaner Qroadarfaond aaa affaotlvaly 

tha institution through ahlch tha apaciflc lntaraata 

of tha Afrikaner patty bourgsoieis cams to ba 

lndapandantly organlaad and artlculatad. Tha 

Broadarbond aasuaad a aalf-conacioua rola aa tha 

vanguard of Afrikaner nationalism. Through It tha 

Afrikaner patty bourgeoisie axarclaad ideological 

dominance ovar tha Tranavaal NP and othar organs of 

Afrikaner nationalism in tha province (and ths 

Oranga Fraa State). Thua, in both tha vldar . 

Afrlkanar natlonaliat aovaaant in tha Tranavaal, and 

tha NP In particular, an idaology of tha Afrikaner 

yolk aaa artlculatad ahlch atraaaad a particular fora 

of •snti-iaperlalisa' and tha lntaraata of tha 

(ahita) 'aaall eavV against tha large (and 

predominantly English apaateing) eonopcJies ahlch 

doalnatad tha accraty. 

Tha situation in tha Capa differed aaricadly. 

Hara tha NP had long rastad on an aconoaic and 

political alllanca bataaan tha aaalthlar capitalist 

far-era, particularly of tha eastern Capa, on tha 

ona hsjnd, and a aaall group of financial capltaliata 

in tha oanlaai (and later Raeorandt) to-canie* Off ttta 

othar. Tha aoving spirits in Sanle-n had if* feet 

doalnatad tha Capa *F right frxm its inception in 

1913. Thua tha Capa party aaa far aora opanly 

capitalist in oriantatlon and sympathies than that 

of tha Tiwiavaal. Ita lntarpratatlon of ahat 

constitutes tha *Afrlkanar volk' and 'iU 1 lntaraata 

like.ua varied considerably, laying far graatar 

aaphaaia on tha condltiona to aacura stable capitalist 

profit, ttoat significantly, tha Afrlkanar Biuadeibond 

aaa not a particularly iaportant forca in Capa' 

natlonaliat polltlca. Indaad, tha Broadartond aaa 

of tan characterised aa tha aajor oooooiticnal forca 

to tha 'Capa finance power* - ahlch bacaaa tha 

Tranavaal an%ar phraaa for tha Cape party. 

This la not tha place for a detailed analyala 

of tha regioneiisa In tha NP after 1906. Tap points 

hoaavar ahould ba noted. Firstly, during tha 1980a, 

tha previous Capa doainanca ovar tha NP as a ahola 

began to give aay to tha now aora powerful forces 

of tha Tranavaal- IMa ia raflactad in tha success 

of tha tao Tranavaal candidate* (JG Strfjdoa and hF 

Varaoard) ovar tha Capa candidates (H Havanga and 

C Oongaa) In tha leadership elections of 1964 and 

1956. Thla groaing Tranavaal doalnanca raflacU 

tha incraaaing isolation of 'Capa financa poaar* 

• 

froa tha forcaa aafcing up tha Tranavaal la*. 

Secondlyt during tha 1960a a crucial shift began 

to take place in tha econoaic alllances underpinning 

tha Capa fcff\ Tha accumulation atratagy of tha 

natlonaliat economic -eovawwjnt (tha namaJlTyjadaeaâsaBtng) 

during tha 19at)a rested on tha centralisation into 

Afrikaner financial unoajrtafelnga of surplus aoney- 

capital erassulatad in agrloultura, and lta 

conversion hara Into productive capital. Hoaavar, 

tha aavlnga of Afrllcanar workers and tha patty 

bourgeoisie aara alao an iaportant oacondary source 

of finance. Hoaavar, tha rata and pattern of 

accuaulatlon in tha varioua aconoaic undertakings 

established by tha Rat« 1 noadaadbaaapina aaa unavan. 

Aa by far tha largaat and aoat powerful Afrlkanar 

financial ttsapany, Sanlaa had inspired tha economic

movement (In collaboration with the Broederbond), 

dominated its various organisations, and was the 

prime economic beneficiary of the alliance. Largely 

as a result of HP policy after 1946, the growth of 

Senlem aftar 1946 wee nothing short of remarkable. 

By i960 the funds uodar its control had been 

increased by over 1 500)1. The real eignificance 

of thie growth lies in the fact that by 1960, long 

before any other Afrikaner financial undertaking 

(with the possible exception of the Rembrandt 

Corporation) eas in a similar position, Senlem's 

total aconoailc dependence on an alliance elth 

farmers and workers as the eejor source of its capital 

had been broken. Freed from the need for an economic 

alliance elth agriculture. Senlaa began to pursue 

Independent (and previously unthinkable) economic and 

political policies. After 1960, it moved into ever 

closer cooperation eith the Anglo-American Corporation 

in a number of undertakings, culminating in a Joint 

take over of the General etining and Finance Corporation 

- thua gaining the first ever entry of an Afrikaner 

company into the 'mammy territory' of mining finance. 

This cooperation eith the arch epltoee of 

'Hoggenheimer' aroused bitter condemnation of Sanlam 

within Afrikaner nationalist ranks. ZS 

The differentiel development of Afrikaner 

finance after 1905 la yet another area requiring 

much further research. Yet the basic point is 

clear. By 1960 the process of capital accumulation 

was rapidly loosening the economic alliance between 

Cepe finence capital and agriculture. This vital 

shift in the alignment of forces organised by the 

Cape NP, had algnificant effects for the politics of 

the Cape party. Sanlem retained its overwhelming 

dominance of the Cepe nP, which began to engage in 

increasingly open conflict with the other provincial 

parties on precisely the basic questions of the 

constitution of the Afrikaner volk and the nature of 

ff ita B interests. * In the period 1960-66, the Cepe 

NP eas regarded in nationalist circlee ee 'the 

mm 

opposition party'. This conflict then raged In 

all the organisations of Afrikaner nationalism, 

from business groupings^ the Broederbond (itself used 

;as a counter force to the Cepe party), churches, 

Parliament and cabinet. 

Here the vital question of the relationship 

between party, government and state must be posed. 

The yeers immediately before the W> came to power had 

seen an intense end open politic!eatIon of the state 

bureaucrecy in South Africa. Political struggles 

within the capitalist class, and between it and ' 

specific strata of the petty bourgaolsle and whita 

workers were fought out so vehemently within the 

civil service that policy Initiatives of the then- 

ruling united Party were effectively paralysed. 

The Afrikaner Broederbond MS particularly ective in 

this process, commonly referred to as the nationalist 

'white-anting• of the government. 27 Immediately on 

assuming office in 1MB, as Q matter of priority, the 

NP government began a systematic purge of the senior 

ranks of the civil eervice end Installed pro- 

Nationelist eleaante. These purges were carried out 

by individual Ministers, and Involved a protracted 

process of struggla within the state apperatuaee. In 

the process, particular government ministries became 

powerful political bases for e number of politicians. 

This should be seen neither in purely subjective nor 

instrumentalist terms. Rather, it implies thet 

through the struggle to transform the state apparatus* 

the state apparatus Itself become a site of ongoing 

conflict between the cless forces organised in the 

NP. Specific ministries were identified with 

specific •regionalist' political lines, end the 

regionalist struggles were fought out pertielly 

between particular state Institutions. 

This led to significant anomalies. Under the 

Premiership of Or OF Halan, I9a8-5d, a disjuncture 

developed between the relative regionalist etrengths 

in the perty on the one hand, and the government on 

the other. By virtue of the results of the 1948 

and 1953 election results, the Transvaal party had 

finally emerged as the most powerful of the 

provlnciel NPs. Yet, as simultaneously Prime Minister 

and leader of the. Cape HP, leslan uastf his prerogatlvea 

of appointment in en ettempt to shore up Cape 

dominance in .the government, His first Cab3.net 

1 * page G 

contained but two Transvaal appointments.in 

relatively insignificant portfolios, whilst 7 

Cape attnlatara (in a Cabinet of 12) virtually 

monopolised the Important poets. Thus, under Malan, 

particularly powerful Ministries became associated 

with the 'Cape line* (especially Finance and 

Transport) whilst the Transvaal struggle against 

the Cape 'moderation 11 was waged largely from the 

base of Strljdom and Verwoerd in the Uinistrlss 

of Lends end Netive Affaire. 

Thuefar it has been argued that the e 

separate NPs rest on different social bases and 

hence have institutionalised significantly varied 

politics. An lmportent feature of Nationalist 

politics lies In the ongoing struggle between these 

various class forces, a struggle institutloneUsed 

within the verlous parties, and taking the fora of 

often bitter 'regionalist 1 conflict between them. 

This conflict ie largely expressed in ideological 

terms aa deep differences over what constitutes 

the Afrikaner volk end 'Ite* intereete. It la waged 

not only through the ftP itself, but the numerous 

organisations which collectivly comprise organised 

Afrikaner nationalism. 

At a second level, this struggla is over whet 

types of policies should be pursued by the NP as the 

governing party. The fact that the NP was also the 

governing perty gave e particular character to the 

ways in which these conflicts are fought out within 

the state apparatus. I do not aant to be misunderetood 

here. This is not to reduce the state as a site of 

class struggle to a simple conflict between the 

various tendencies in Afrikaner nationalism. 

These nmmtt to be situated in their erticulatlon with 

the wider class struggles end contradictions within 

and between the state apparatuses. But here I am 

particularly concerned eith the question of how the 

effects of the contradictions within Afrikaner 

nationalise themselves helped structure the particular 

form of the criais of the South African atate in the 

mid - late 1970a. Thus, as conflict between organised 

class forces ovsr state pollcyt these Afrikaner 

nationalist politics teke piece at three levele

within t>e st«t« apparatus: the Parliamentary 

caucus; the cabinet; and within and between the 

various state apparatuses. 

Acute conflicts and struggle* within Afrikaner 

nationalist ranks were a constant feature of South 

African politics after 1W8 (and indeed before). 

But these were not static struggles. Their content 

and forms shifted with the changes in the social 

bases of the various provincial NPs* most significant 

here was the changing relationship between Caps 

finance and agriculture, which began to shift the 

Cepe NP into an even more openly oppositional role 

within the party. In the immediate aftermath of 

the Sherpevllle crlets of I960, particularly whilst 

Dr Verwoerd was recovering from %n assassination 

attempt, end the forces of the traditional 

nationalist alliance were temporarily leederless, 

the struggle within the NP was very finely balanced. 

However, once Verwoerd returned to political life, 

he succeeded in mobilising against the Cepe financial 

intereats, all the other elaes forces in the NP. This 

wes echieved pertly by epproprieting for the right the 

mantle of true Afrikaner nationalism, with 

Verwoerd es Its lnfellible leader. For the 

remainder of hie Premiership, he M 9 

keeping the Cape politically iaolated. 

successful in 

Verwoerd was able to maintain this alliance 

against Cape finance by centrelleing power in both 

party and government into hie rolee as National 

Leader or the NP and Prime Minister respectively. 

.This was unprecedented in the hiatory of the NP. Thus, 

the Cape was doubly Isolated - within the party as a 

whole, and in the state apparatus Itself. Verwoert's 

period as Prime Minister saw a narked diminution in 

the powers of both individual Ministers and the 

Cabinet itself, with the Prime Minister taking 

final responsibility for all crucial decisions, and 

often announcing these to Cabinet without coneultation. 

Likewise, the NP caucua had its political independence 

severely curtailed, and was simply not informed of a 

number of crucial political decisions (such as the 

vitally important 1959 Promotion of Bantu Self- 

Government Bill) before they were laid before 

Perliement. Verwoerd was able to operate Ilka this 

because of his personal political power base within 

the Afrikaner Browdertond. During his Premiership, 

the AS Executive Council in many senses displaced 

• 

the Cabinet as a policy making body. And given thet 

the Cepe had no influence within the Broederbond, it 

was the ldeel institution through which to mobilise 

all class forcea in the nationalist alliance egalnst 

the Cepe* 

Yet the contradictions and conflicta within 

organised Afrikaner netionaliea were in no senee 

brought to en end under Verwoerd's authoriterlan 

leadership, they were aimply displaced. If an iron 

discipline of the mejority eas mainteined in the 

party to keep the Cape in line, these struggles 

spilled over into bitter conflict in ail the other 

orgenisetions of Afrikaner netlonelism, from church 

and cultural groups to buslneas organisations, etc. 

Here the Sanlam group managed to maintain its control 

over the very influential Afrlkaanse Handel sins tltuut 

(AHI) ae a major pletfora from which to challanga 

the dominant line In the party. Despite e bitter 

struggle for power et the 196fl AHI congress, Sanlam 

could not be dislodged, and it was predominantly 

through the AHI that the Cape line was articulated. 

8y 1965, it was openly acknowledged thet Afrikaner 

nationalism had Its 'verllote' ('enlightened*) and 

'verkrempt* (•reactionary*) wings. The main base of 

the verllgtea ley in the Cape party, with elenly 

gathering support for ite position amongst certain 

business groups In the Transvaal. The so-called 

verkrempte wing was' led by Verwoerd. The main 

differencee ware over labour policy and relations 

with English capitalists* The Cape groups favoured 

much looser restrictions on the mobility and training 

of afrlcan labour and close co-operation with 

English buslneae. But these were in many respects 

the fundamental questions around which Afrikaner 

netlonelism es a claaa alliance hinged - these 

issues touched directly the Intereats of all the 

verious class forces organised under Afrikaner 

nationalism), tt eae precisely the accumulation of 

capital by the Cepe financiers and their new 

independence from the economic support of Afrikaner 

fanners, petty bourgeoleie and sorters, which led to 

this change in Sanlam's position on the crucial 

issues of influx control, skilled labour, finance 

policy, etc. Thus, what the verllgtea eere in feet 

advocating wes e new Interpretation of the interests, 

of the Afrikaner volk, one which concentrated 

particularly on the needs of the rapidly growing 

group of powerful Afrikaner capitalist* led by Swnlem. 

The assassination of Or Verwoen) in September 

1966 brought these contredictlons out into the open, 

Into a vicioua fight within the NP itself. In these ^ 

atrugglea, the personal political poaition of the 

new NP leader, John Voreter, became vitally Important, 

in that it was a significant factor in the form taken 

by these struggles. 

From the viewpoint of all 'normal* political 

considerations. 8J Voreter should never have been 

elected leeder of the NP and Prime Minister. Almost 

everything in hie political past told against him. 

During the 19eOs he had b—n e leader of the bitterly 

enti-NP and Nexl-orlented Oasewa Branding. In the 

1948 election Voreter had attacked the NP aa anti 

democratic whan It opposed his candidacy for the W»*s 

election partner, the Afrikaner Party. Defying perty 

discipline, Voreter fought tne election ae en 

independent, ioeing by two votee, thereby denying 

en otherwise eefe eeat to the Natlonmliet coalition. 

He hed only Joined the NP in 1951 and been elected 

to Parliament in 1933. He hed nm^r developed a 

strong personal political beam within the Tranavaal 

perty. In 1966 he ranked a lowly thirteenth in 

Cabinet seniority, end as Minister of Police, had 

been the man ultimately responsible for ttie Prime 

Minister's safety when Verwoerd waa killed. The only 

other candidate for the leadership eea the moat eenior 

member of the cabinet. Transport Minister Ben ScJvjemmn, 

deputy leader of the Treneveal Party before the death 

of Verwoerd. But Bchoaman's political paet told 

against him too. He waa one of the diminishing band 

of so-called oud-ameIters, le Natlonmliata who in 

the 19Xe had split the Nationalist Party to join 

the United Party. He hed come back to the fold In

1939, but aoaa aaabars of the Nationalist right wing 

hid long •WDTltt, and regarded the smelters as far 

•ori objectionable than tha aaaaara of tha Ojjw 

Brandwag. 

Given that thera was no clear and obvious 

auccaaaor to varaoard, whose total dominance of both 

party and govarnaant had thoroughly precluded tha 

— f — of a nuatoar two in both, and In tha light 

of tha axtraaa factionallaa within tha party, 

Voratar'a vary politioal aaaxnaas stood in hla favour. 

Ha waa not firmly identified with any faction of tha 

part/, and enjoyed wide respect for hia ruthless 

perfccaance aa Htniatarof Juatica. Voratar eventually 

eaarpad aa tha unchallenged candidata because ha 

anjoyad tha total backing of two apparantly 

contradictory alnga of tha party - tha axtraaa right 

lad by Or A Hartzog, and tha Capa party. Togathar 

thay coaprlaad a Majority of Nationalist aPa, 

parsuadlng Schoaaan to withdraw baf ora tha issue 

oaiaa to a vote* Tha support of tha axtraaa varkamptaa 

for Voratar can ba aaally axplalnad. Hla maabarahlp 

of tha pro-Mazi Osaewe Brand wag when couplad with tha 

hardllnar reputation aamad aa Minister of Juatica , 

ewwaad to aart hia out aa a cowaiittad partlaan of 

tha right. Tha Capa vota ia axplalnad by tha fact 

that, in tha abaanca of a cradibla Capa candidata. 

voratar's aarriaga to tha daughtar of ona of tha 

foundara of tha Capa HP and Sanlaa - PA Helen - aede 

hla tha aoat accaptabla candidata. It aaa through 

thia connactlon that Voratar had in fact baan ao 

Quickly rehabilitated In tha V after 19d8. His 

appointaant to tha Cablnat by Verwoard In 1968. but 

5 yaara aftar ontaring Parllaaint, aaa widely 

lntarpratad in Nationalist clrclaa aa ona of tha 

aopa VarwoenJ offarad to tha Capa NP, still bittar 

aftar tha dafaat of lta candidata in tha 1958 

laadarahip election* 

This detail is crucial to an understanding of 

tha nature of Vorstar'a laadarahip in both party 

and govarnaant. Ha laaadlataly raallsad that ha 

could not doainata either in tha style of Verwoard. 

In tha party, ha thua triad to stand abova all 

factions, and bring Ma togathar by tha praatlps 

of hia office. To do so, ha took a stap unprecedented. 

In Nationalist politics, ona which aaa to transfer* 

tha ralationahlp between party and govarnaant» 

Under tha noraal procadura of tha NP, aa tha chosan 

National Laadar of tha party in succession to 

Varaoard, ha would naturally havs llkaalsa succeeded 

varaoard aa Transvaal laadar of tha nP. Evary 

national laadar of tha NV alnca ita Incaptlon had < 

baan alaultanaoualy tha laadar of tha Party in hia 

hoaa Province. Thia coaprlaad tha final political 

basa of tha National Laadar. But Voratar had not 

rlsan to national laadarahip through tha aatabllahad 

path of promotion In his provincial party. Ha had 

not anjoyad tha support of tha ovsrshalalng 

majority of Tranavaal af>s in tha pariod in which it 

aaaaad aa if an alaction between hla and Schoaaan 

would ba nacasaary to aalact tha national laadar. 

Ha had no natural political basa in tha Transvaal 

party, while tha Provincial laadarahip aaa hia to 

claia by right, ha auat hava raaliaad that not only 

would ha anjoy at bast tha grudging support of tha 

party organisation in tha province, but glvan that 

tha factionallaa of tha HP was at its worst in tha 

Transvaal, ha would gat sucfcad Into thoaa atrugglaa 

in a way which could rapidly loaa hla hla support 

in othar provinces. Thus rathar than take thasa 

risks for llttla ratum Voratar announcad ha would 

not accapt tha Transvaal laadarahip. and offarad it 

to hla aatonishad and gratlflad opponent, Ben 

Schoaaan - thereby placing Schoaaan and his faction 

daap in Vorstar'a political dabt, and axplicltly 

alavating hia own placa in tha W* to that abova 

tha various factions. 

Thia dapartura was to ba of vital algnificanca 

in tha factional struggle in tha NP. Vith tha 

National Laadar of tha party thua affaetivaly 

without a local institutions! powar base In tha 

party, it meant that tha aachinary of govarnaant 

would coma to play an lncraaaingly iaportant rola 

in thaaa factional atrugglaa* Oaaplta hla dallbarata 

attaapt to elevate hlaaalf abova thaaa atrugglaa, 

Voratar could not raaain neutral aa tha hP want into 

lta aost sarlous lntarnal splits slnca tha 1940s. 

Indeed for tha firat thrae yaara of hie'Praaiership 

ha waa attacked froa a nuabar of aides as baing a 

weak laadar, Siaply to protact hia own position, 

he aaa forcad, witnin tha party, to raly on various 

factional groups, in tha aarly yaara of his 

laadarahip, 1966-9, whan the axtraaa right attaaptad 

to drlva tha verllgtaa out of tha ranka of Afrikaner 

natlonallaa (but andad up baing drlvan out of tha 

party thaaaalvaa) Voratar was forcad to raly vary 

haavlly on tha Capa Party for support. But Voratar 

dapandad for political support avan aora haavily on 

tha Special Branch of tha South African Police. Aa 

Hinietar of Juatica, ha had built tha Security Police 

into a vary powarful force In South African polltica. 

Tha SB waa used against Voratar'a natlonaliat 

opponenta as affaetivaly aa ha had uaad it to break 

tha national liberation aovaaent in tha aarly 60s. 

Thus, ona of tha aoat algnlfleant features of South 

African polltica In tha 1960a waa tha aaaalva 

build-up in tha diractly political rola of tha 

Sacurity Police under Voratar. Eventually in 1969, 

p»g« 10 

ha craatad a naw, apaclal aacurlty aarvlca, raaponslbla 

only to the Priaa Minister, tha notorious BOSS. 

Hencaforth 6086 aaa Voratar'a atrongaat and aost 

effective paraonal political basa. But this 

development aaant that tha apparatuses of tha state 

ware now uaad by tha Priaa Hiniatar to intervene 

diractly in internal natlonaliat polltica. 

There ia a further iaportant dlaanaion here* 

Tha varfcraapta/verllgta conflict waa asaantially 

a atruggla batwaan thoaa who wlahad to praaarva 

tha claaa allianca of 1948 as an alliance doainated 

by tha interests of farmer* and tha patty bourgaolala 

against those who raaliaad that In 20 years tha social 

basa of Afrikaner natlonallaa had shifted profoundly, 

and wantad to transfora tha ideology and polltica to 

suit tha changing class composition of tha volk. Tha 

varllgte phanomenon was a response to tha aaarganca 

particularly In tha 1960s of a class of aggraasiva, 

self-confident Afrikaner capitalists, whoaa intaraata 

now want beyond thoaa of tha narrow claaa allianca 

out of which thay had aaargad. By tha lata ttCQe, 

the varliyte element *as no longer confined to tha

Cap*, but aae emarglng u * strong element In the 

Transvaal *• ••11. And Just •* he* occurred In the 

Cap* a dwcsda earlier, its economic dependence on an 

• UUnc> of all classes of Wrikaane apeafrere had 

now baan bnfcen. Moa tha Transvaal bualnseeaen 

ware alio beginlng to puraua indapandant econoalc 

end political policiee. 

In lta struggles against tha verllgte wing of 

tha party, tha vatkiaaplss attempted to uaa thalr 

traditional political organisation, tha Afrikaner 

Broodertond, aoalnat ahat thay labelled tha 'flnanca 

poaar of tha South'. Indeed, a strong aova was mounted 

to portray tha factional etrtsjgle u a alapla conflict 

between tha Afrike n#r Broedertwnd aa tha guardian and 

soul of traditional Afrikaner values on tha ona hand, 

•nd tha nouveeu rich* "money capltallata' of tha 

8outh on tha othar hand, Hara again tha Indapandant 

• 

rola of Voratar ems vital. By 1967 It was clear that 

ha au not going to aupport tha vaHcraapta effort, 

and ha began to ba attacked aa yet anothar lackey of 

tha Gape. Given that Vormtar aaa still vary dependant 

on tha Cape party at thla etaga, there aaa aoaa truth 

in thla charge. However, Voratar aust have reallead 

that If tha Afrikaner feoedertkond aera ueed egminet 

hia, he would be totally laolatad politically. Thua 

aa National Leader of the HP he deaandad total 

loyalty from tha AS, and particularly its arch- 

vartcrewpta chairman, Dr PJ Meyer. Uoraovar, ha 

further aada aura that ^mty large numbers of eecurlty 

policemen aera admitted to tha AB, and hia supporter* 

ware thua able to outvote the extreme right in all 

laportant instances. 30 Tha affect of thla aaa to 

destroy finally tha political independence of tha 

Broedwrbond, reducing It for the first tlea) In lta 

history largely to a platform for tha leader of the hP. 

Thie accoapUahadt Voratar then required of tha 

veifcraapta Hayar that ha purge froa tha Broederbond 

and party ell the othar verkraaptae aho aould not 

too the line. He used tha right to destroy the right. 

voratar f s deliberately chosen and carefully 

cultivated Bonapertist position within tha UP aa 

above tha factions, likawiae had vital consequences 

for political struggles both within the government 

and etate epperatueee. Given hie own ralatlva 

eaefcneae aithin the Cabinet, Voratar discarded 

Verwoard'a authoritarian style of leadership 

through total doainatlon of each attnlster, and 

adopted a 'chairman of the board 1 approach. Full 

policy-making reeponsiblllty aas again given back 

to Ministers aithin their oen departments, and tha 

Prlsa Minister ass knoan not to intervene in any 

Minister's running of hie dapartnant. Thle had the 

conaequence that individual alnlstriea vara again 

rapidly transformed into powerful political fiafdoas 

by Individual Ministers. Tha factlonaliat atruggle 

aithin tha HP aas again openly eoged aithin, but 

aora particularly, between various govarnaent 

ainlatriae. 

Certain alnlatrles rapidly bacsae identified elth 

certain 'lines' aithin the party, and interdepartaeiital 

tussles aara openly discussed in ths press. Thus, eg, 

the powerful rivalry betaean the Department of Foreign 

Affaire as a aaat of the varllgtes, and tha Gmpartaent 

of Inforaatlon headed by tha varfcrempte Connie 

Mulder, aae legendary. Lass publloslly known, 

though ultimately equally laportant, aas tha 

growing conflict between tha allltary and security 

apparatuses. Through the Dapartaant of Defence 

(preelded over by tha leader of tha Cape «\ P* 

Botha) tha allltary began to ploy an increasingly 

open role in South African politics, arguing for 

miitarily defensible policies. Tha reforae desired 

by the allltary leadership in aeny aays coincided 

with thoae being argued for by Sanlaa, and tha military 

aae known to ba growing increasingly restive at the 

paralyele which hP factlonallea foletad on the 

govarnaent. Indeed, in 1966, at tha height of tha 

struggls in tha NP; allltary clrclee aara 

reputedly buzzing with talk of a nee political party 

to be haadad by PW Botha. Tha eecurlty forces on tha 

other hand ears reputed to see South Africa's politi 

cal probleaa largely in teras of conspiracies by 

agitators, and downplayed any need for rafora. Tha. 

conflict between the teo reached breaking point over 

the South African Intervention in Angola' in t97fl. 

According to top Parliamentary sources, ths allltary 

opposed the Intervention, arguing that its liksly 

results did not coapeneate for tha political damage it 

aould do to to the govarnaent*a 'detente* policies, 

whilst ths Bureau of State Security aaa convinced that 

strong support in Africa could ba gelned for a South 

African defeat of the MPLA. PV Botha aas reported to 

have bean particularly aablttered by tha decision to 

riek a Halted intervention. 31 Aa it happened, BOSS 

aae Voratar'a oen political base within the govarnaent 

and after the humiliation of Angola, the increasingly 

open conflict between the ailitary and B06B often 

pitted Voratar agalnat Pf Botha. 

lhllet tha eccnoay was booaing, and tha country 

enjoyed relative political atabillty, Voratar aaa able 

to maintain hie Bonapertist role within the party 

and govarnaent with soaa success* Particularly after 

tha extreme verkraaptae ware driven out of tha NP in 

1969, hie personal political prastigs and influence 

were anoraoua. Following the auccesses of the NP 

egelnet the right in the 1970 election, he ess able to 

abandon his previously heavy political reliance on 

the Cape Party and aaauaa in reality tha role he 

had cast for hlaself as ths force uniting in his person 

all factions aithin the NP. Hoasvsr, with the rapid 

escalation of econoalc and political crisis in tha 

mld-1970e, thla Bonapartlet role became Increasingly 

difficult to auatain. The verligte wing began to 

push for far-reaching policy reforms, particularly with 

respect to labour and state control of the economy, 

•hich vigorously re-opened the factlonaliat atrugglaa 

In tha W. Particularly after the Angola debacle, 

Venter's own peraonal position became increasingly 

identified with the right-wing of tha NP, now lead by 

tha new Transvaal leader and Miniater of Information, 

Or Connie Mulder. Tha right aara demanding a 

emintananoa of tight influx control aaasuraa. 

restrictions on the employment of akilled african 

labour, no fone of recognition of african trade unions 

and continued etate control of the infrastructural 

sectors of the economy. Thle right alng position still 

rested on an alliance of capitalist farmers, white 

workers and eectione of tha Afrikaner petty bourgaolele, 

particularly those employed by tha etate.

An Important caveat needs to be wdi him. The 

argument that the contradict ions within and between 

the class forces organised by the NP qua part/ were 

transposed Into the Cabinet and especially Into the 

atata apparatuses themselves must not ba misunderstood. 

This is not to imply that these were the only, or 

•van the major struggles and contradictions within 

and between the state apparatus. The state has been 

defined ae % site of class struggle. The specifically 

Afrikaner nationalist struglles sere but part of, 

and indeed structured by end structuring of, alder 

class struggles,Thus a comprehensive analysis of 

the state would have to account for the Complex 

interaction between these various contradictory class 

forces and class struggles within the state. 

The point of this long analysis of the faction 

alism within the National Party and government is to 

situete Muldergate within the wider capitalist 

crisis. By late 1977, in the disastrous political 

aftermath of the defeat in Angola, the Soamto uprisings, 

the deeth of Steve Biko end the panicky banning of IB 

afrlcen politlcel and other organisations, confronted 

with increasingly organised and militant working class 

and mass resistance to Apartheid - a resistance now 

taking an openly anti-capitalist form - under severe 

international pressure from the Vast to introduce 

cosmetic changes, and faced with a massive outflow of 

foreign capital, huge unemployment and tha worst 

recession in South Africa's history, both the 

Nationalist government and Party themselves were 

decisively split over precisely the political 

questions posed by these multiple crises. 

The minutiae of these conflicts within both party 

and government could be elaborated if necessary. Hoe- 

aver, the point to note is thet in this period of 

intense crisis, the party end government were both 

effectively paralysed by their oen internal divisions. 

It must be emphasised as forcefully_a_s_is possible, 

that this mas no simple personality struggle, or 

purely ideological difference, but much_mjore profoundly 

a crisis of the class alliance on which Afrikaner 

nationalism had rested nationally and in tha various 

provinces since 19d8. 

To oversimplify for the sake of exposition, the 

'conservative 1 faction now grouped undar Uulder, and 

enjoying the strong tacit support of Vorster, were 

committed to retaining the alliance of farmers, 

businessmen, workers and petty bourgeoisie intact. 

To do so meant resisting moves to reform labour end 

industrial policy, end anything more than minimal 

concession* to the black middle class. Out it was 

equally clear that vmry few Afrikaner businessmen 

supported this policy with any enthusiasm. Rather, 

from within the Afrikaner business community, and 

amongst tha leading Afrikaner intellectuals there was 

now strong support for tha 'reformists* nf the party. 

This reflected the substantial development of 

Afrikaner business particularly in the Transvaal 

during the 1960s.^ 

Thus, Sanlom and the Cape Party were no longer 

Isolated (as they hod been in the early 1960s) from 

powerful forces in the other provincial parties. 

The Transvaal party was now itself decisively 

divided along fairly explicit class lines between 

conservatives and reformists. The Transvaal leader, 

Or Connie Mulder, was the great hope of the conservative 

sing. But within the Transvmel Party there nom existed 

a powerful reformist opposition, grouped under two 

very influential Ministers * the Minister of nines 

and Planning, 0r p Koornhof, and tha Minister of 

Foreign Affairs, nr Botha. To Transvaal businessman 

Mulder was an anathema. One leading Afrikaner 

industrialist described him to me as e dpef - 'a fort*. 

By 1977 -a virtual politlcel impasse had been 

reached in party, cabinet end atata. Mot only was 

Vorster's Qonepertlem increasingly untenable within 

the party, but inside the Cabinet his practice of 

giving individual Hinletare their head made it ^mry 

difficult for him to recentrelise control in his own 

hands* He was thus unable to intervene decisively to 

give a particularly conservative or reformist 

direction to this government, but was reduced to the 

increasingly sterile role of trying simply to keep all 

factions together. 

After Angola end pmrticulerly Soweto, virtually 

all commentators were agreed thet on all the burning 

Issues of economic end political policy, behind the 

overt fece of hardline control, the government was 

virtually rudderless. Torn in many different B 

directions^ it spoke with many different voices. The 

political paralysis of the Vorster government when 

faced with severe end worsening economic and political 

crises, finally catalysed significant shifts in the 

alignment of political forces in the state. Tea 

groups are crucial hare - the military and the moat 

powerful of South Africa's capitalists. An alliance 

between these two forces rapidly took shape. 

whatever the fears of Afrikaner Intellectuals of 

a coup d'etat, senior military officers began to 

Intervene directly in these politlcel struggles over 

state polity, advocating significant reforms. In 19OT, 

through the Minister of Defence, Pi Botha, the military 

proclaimed ita programme of a 'total strategy' to meet 

the crises confronting the stete. Its fundamental aim 

according to the official military Journal, was 'a 

guarantee for the system) of trwm enterprise 1 . 

This could only be achieved on tha besls of a "coapre- 

hensive plan to utilise ell the means svailable to e 

state according to en integrated pattern*. Total 

strategy hald that 'the resolution bf a conflict In . 

the times in ehich we now live demands Interdependent 

and coordinated action in ell fields - military, 

psychological, economic, ideological, cultural etc 

... Ve are today involved in a war .*. the striving 

for specific elms ... must be coordinated aith all 

the means available to the state** 

bjut this 'coordinated action* should not be 

understood as simple defence of a static status quo. 

- political and economic reforms ware essential to 

ensure the defence of the state. In tha worde of the 

CJilef of Staffr 

The lesson is clear. The South African 

Defence force is reedy to beat off any attack 

•.. but ee muet take into account the aspirations 

of our different population groups, ee must « 

gain and keep their trust. 

In effect then, the Total Strategy Doctrine argued that 

'blacks* had to be given e stake in the capitalist 

system, whareby they would begin receiving the 

'beneflte' of that system, their 'quality of Ufe< 

would have to be Improved, thus supposedly giving

I * blacks' • commitment to tha defence of capitallaa In 

South Africa against *tha eterxiet throat'- But this 

aaa only possible through tha cloaaat cooparation 

bataaan tha atata and 'tha prlvata aactor' - la 

monopoly capital. Thua tha Total Strategy Oootrina 

> began to create tha basis for an a*plici* alliance 

bataaan tha military and monopoly capital. In lata 

1977 tha national aanapaaant and 

\ Oayalopaant Foundation convanad a aaating of kay 

•business leaders', aanlor military officers, and 

Papartaant of Labour offlclala, to 'enable aach group 

to understand tha othara' naada*. Chaired Jointly 

by tha Chairman of a leading bank and a senior 

! Oanaralr tha aaating aaa hald In caaara, undar tha 

cloak of tha Official Secrete Act. 36 

[ At praclalay thla stage of now direct allltary 

• intervention in political struggles althln tha atata, 

laadlng buainaaaaan alao bicaai dlractly and stridently 

lnvolvad In a Caapalgn for reform. Tha chairman of 

! Senlam published a awlngaing attack on tha government'a 

economic policies, characterising thea aa 'A Fraaaay 

to DPaaMdaa) , > 

Tha influential Financial tail 

arguad that In tha face of govarnaent paralyaia, 

organlaad and co-ordinated *Bualnaaa Powar' aaa 

j aaaantial to aava 'South Africa* (la capitallaa) 

\ froa tha nuaaroua crlaaa confronting it, Uoraover, 

: in thla parlod ahan behind tha patant immobility of 

tha government important ahlfta ware taking place In 

j tha traditional political allgrwwanta of tha capitalist 

class, tha bourgaola oppoaltlon partiaa aara under 

going a process of dramatic ra-allgnaant. After yaars 

of political atarlUty. tha official oppoaltlon 

United Party finally oollapaad into a merger with 

tha adniacula Daaocratic Party to fora tha Haw 

Republic Party. Large matera of United Party aPa 

rafuaad to Join thla NAP and eventually allied 

thawaalvaa with tha Progressiva Rafara Party which 

had already takan on board aailaa froa tha Unitad 

Party. Tha PAP changed its naaai yat again to tha 

Progressive Federal Party, and aigniflcantly aatarad 

tfoan lta libaral progra—a to aaita it aara acoaptabla 

to a eide range of bourgeois interests. 

Zn October 1977, Voreter callad an early 

General El so t ion out of ahloh tha W> eaargad alth an 

avan teors aassive Parti aaantary majority and a 

aubatantlally aldanad baaa of political aupport. 

Campaigning aa tha only party capable of dealing with 

tha multiple crises facing South Africa, tha aP for 

tha firat time aon support froa tao furthar aodal 

forces - larga nuabara of EngUah-apaaking patty 

bourgaola ehitaa, and significant sectors of business 

which had pravloualy aupportad tha now defunct 

Unitad Party. Ironically hoaavar, far froa> producing 

bold political Initiatives, thla freer, electoral 

aupport simply intanaifiad tha political inartla of 

both Nationalist Party and Government by multiplying 

tha centrifugal forcaa pulling it In different 

dlractlona. Tha contradictiona and conflicts within 

tha party and govsmment vara coapoundad , and bacaaa 

a alta of avar aora intanaifiad political struggles, 

Inartla combined with lncraaaingly vicious and cynical 

repression aaaaad tha only oantrlpatal forcaa In tha 

NP. 36 

Tha victory and consolidation of tha reformist tendency 

THE auldergate circus burat into tha open in thla 

context of paralyaia of both party and povamaant - a 

context which produced a staggering prollfaratlon of 

extra-party, cross-cutting organisations and agitation, 

largaly by business interests, Huldargata began aa a 

aariaa of proas rwvwlwtlons about tha misuse of funds 

in Mulder's Department of Information. Juicy detail 

followad Juicy details to ravaal a vast aall-financad 

and aacrat attaapt by tha Information Department to 

aatabllah both inaida tha country and internationally 

an apparently independent ccwamjnl cat ions network which 

would publlah 'objective' pro-govarnaant material, 

Parllaaant had no control ovar, or powar to revise tha 

uaa of thaaa funds. One of tha major projacta 

lnvolvad tha aacrat channallng of R7**dllion In 

atata funda to aatabllah an 'independent', pro-NP 

Engllah-languapa nawapapar - Tha Cltlian -* in 

oppoaltlon to tha libaral Band Dally wall, 

Tha revelations unleashed a massive outcry within 

ahita politics. Epithets about tha destruction of 

daaocracy and tha fraadoa of tha press, alnlatarlal 

corruption ate, abounded, Tha datalla are not 

significant here, but tha import of thla scandal la. 

At ona level , tha intense moral outrage ovar auldargata* 

avan in tha pro-NP Afrikaans newspapers, aaaaa 

absurd. Full bourgeois daaocracy has never axlatad 

in South Africa, so it could hardly have bswn said to 

hava baan daatroyad. Tha last vaatlpaa of tha Fraadoa 

of tha Press had baan aboil ahed In tha aarly 1960s, 

far woraa examples of collective and individual 

alnlatarlal corruption had occurred (such aa tha 

Agiiutti affair in tha lata 60a) with virtually no 

political consequences. Abuaaa uf poear by tha ruling 

party had occurred on a auch aora massive scale, to 

be easily dismissed - and defended by aoaa of tha 

nawspapara now howling 'corruption' - aa balng 

•in tha national lntaraat*. Indaad Mulder had 

dafandad tha operations of hia Oapartaant in thaaa 

pravloualy halloaad taraa. So why did thla particular 

brouhaha aasuai auch aonuaantal proportions? 

Tha anawar auat ba aought in tha aany-lavallad 

character of tha crisis confronting tha South African 

atata and ruling class, crlaaa In tha face of which 

tha govarnaant. appeared politically paralyaad. 

Thla paralyaia did not grow out of any lack of 

political all! on tha part of individual politicians, 

but ataaaad froa tha balanca of claaa forcaa within 

tha NPt tha natlonallat government and tha atata 

apparatuses. Thus, ahan tha report of tha Auditor* 

General ravaalad tha first lrragulariUaa in tha 

accounta in tha Oapartaant of Information, tha 

pro-reform forcaa aara presented with an ideal 

opportunity to attaapt tha political dlacradltatlon 

of tha aajor politician of tha right, tha Unlatar of 

Inforaation Or Connla Mulder. Tha Uuldajgata 

incident la significant not for tha degree of 

political corruption involved, but in tha way in 

which it aaa used aa a oatalyat to effect a raallgnaant 

of political forcaa. 

Most significant rsrs la the wanner In ahlch tha . 

leaks about Oapartaant Of Information practices 

aara aada, and tha aay In which thaaa leaks aara than 

turned into the raw material of a political vendetta 

against tha right wing of tha NP, Huldar in particular,

end Vorster by implication. Although it is impossible 

to be sura on this, it la widely taken aa established 

fact by Afrikaner intellectuals with close links to 

the Cabinet that the first leaks to the press eera 

provided by unitary Intelligence. The Minister of 

Defence and Cape NP leader, PV Botha, eould probably 

not neve been personally Involved in these leeks, 

but eaa known to be angry with the loss of RW a 

of the approved Defence Budget, now transferred to 

the Information Department secret fund. Once the 

initial leaks had been made, they were relentlessly 

pursued by the Englletwlanguage newspapers of the 

Argus and South African Associated Newspapers 

groups. Owned ' Jointly by the Anglo-American 

Corporation and the largest banks, these press groups 

mere clearly hounding Mulder as but part of the wider 

campaign to effect vital reforms necessary for the 

restoration of capitalist growth* But even more 

significantly, after some hesitation, the enti- 

Hulder compaign was taken up in the Afrikaans press, 

and particularly in the newspapers of the official 

Cape hP press group, Ojg Nanionale Pers. In the 

Transvaal too, Nationalist newspapers began to 

pursue the matter, though the official Transvaal 

NP organ, Ola Transvaler. did everything possible to 

protect Mulder and claimed he was not involved in the 

ebuses * bleming it all on the Secretary of 

Inforaetlon. Or Eachel Rhoodie. This involvement of 

the officlel Nationalist party press in a campaign 

agelnst a government Minister (and by implication 

against Vorster himself) was unprecedented. It 

Indicated Just how deep were the divisions within 

party end government, end the lengths to which the 

reformers were prepared to go to discredit the right. 

Further evidence of this lias in the belief of the 

ebove-amntioned Afrikaner intellectual aources that 

once the affair began to unravel cruclel dlscloaures 

to the press were made by the wives of (unspecified) 

Ceblnet ministers. The 'English press* had long been 

depicted es the greatest enemy of Afrikaner nationalism. 

Horn it became the crucial medium in which a decisive 

confrontation between factions in the hP was fought 

put! 

Just as the effalr seemed to be building up to a 

crescendo, Vorster dramatically announced his 

resignation on 'health' grounda. He wes followed 

soon afterwards by the head of BOBS, General Hendrlk 

van den Bergh. In retrospect, Vorster's resignation 

and that of Van den Bergh seem to have bean prompted 

by two interrelated factors. Firstly, mm was later 

revealed, both were deeply involved in the schemes 

elaborated by the Department of Information. Ware 

this to coma out whilat Vorster was still Prime 

Minister, the political demoge would have been 

lmmenaa. Vorster aust have realised îet In such a 

case he could not rely on support from the mhole NP. 

If he were elevated to the State Presidency however, 

even his opponents in the NP would be forced to 

protect his peraonel position. But secondly, 

again it seem* clear that Vorster was attempting to 

pre-empt the complete reformist diacredltetion of 

the right wing of the party with which he eaa now 

Identified* If he rmslgnad early, before the full 

detaila of the scandal broke, there was a strong 

chance thet Mulder mould be eble to succeed hie, thus 

forcing the reformists Into en ettaok on the party 

through the position of ite leader, rather than on an 

Individual minister. Vorater's preference for 

Huider was open* In the run up to the leadership 

election, BOBS leaked (distorted) Information 

favourable to lajlder to the press - but it was 

published only in the Tranavaal W organ. Die 

Transvaler. 

Vorster**, ploy very nearly succeeded. Hed 

Huider been able to maintain discipline in his 

Transvaal NP ha eould 1 have been assured of the 

Premiership by virtue of the Transvaal majority in 

the caucus. Out by 1976, so deep were tha class 

conflicts within the NP, particularly within the 

Transvaal, that Mulder wee unable to control the 

party he led. Defying all party precedent, protocol 

and discipline, another Tranavaal Minister, AF (Pik) 

Bothet put himself forward as a candidate for tha 

National Leadership of the Party* This split tha 

Trenevaal vote* ensuring (es eas later admitted to 

have been the aim} the defeet of Mulder mod the 

election to the Notional Leadership of the Cape 

page 14 

leader end Minister of Defence, P» Botha (no relation). 

This drawing off of tha Transvaal reformist vote 

from Mulder was shown to have been decisive when, 

in tha election for e new Tranavaal leader 

consequent on Mulder's enforced resignation from that 

post soon afterwards t tha conservative candidate, 

Or Andrlea Treurnlcht, trounced tha reformist 

Minister, SP Botha (again no relation). 

Thus the long campaign of press revelations and 

judicial enquiry fatally weakened tha conservative 

wing at a crucial moment of the struggle for dominance 

both within tha NP and the government. The defeat of 

Mulder marked a significant shift in the balance of 

claaa forces orgenlsed by the NP gua party under the 

banner of Afrikaner nationalism. By now Afrikaner 

business hed effectively established itaalf as tha 

dominant force In the allience. Through Bothe It 

announced ite Intention to abandon some of the 

hallowed policies of thle alliance, policies 

which before brought support from white workers 

and certain strata of the petty bourgmolaie. 

But it cannot be too strongly emphasised that this 

eas no simple struggle Internal to Afrikaner 

nationalism. Afrikaner capital erne eble to 

establlah its political dominance within the NP 

over the other forces in the nationaliat alliance 

only because of broader political support outside 

of the- NP from other bourgeois organisations and 

institutions, and the ermy itself. On its oen, 

the reformist wing of the NP would not neve been 

able to defeet tha conservatives and achieve the 

almost total diacreditatlon of tha right eing. To 

do so, it eaa forced to rely on, and indeed play a 

relatively minor role in, e breeder campaign by 

various bourgeois political groups (but partlculerly 

the prase) egeinst ths right wing of the Nationalist 

Party. Thue, tha defeat of Mulder not only marked 

a decisive shift in the belence of forcea within the 

Nationalist Party end government, et enother level of 

politics it represented e now open allience against 

elements of the NP on the pert of elmoat all 

crgsnlsetlone of the capitalist class.

mo* 1ft 

But to rutin tor a moment with the discredited 

and defeated forces of the NP right. The tern HP- 

right does not refer to e monolithic group all with 

the M M interests. It too represented a political 

alliance between specific class force*. Over- 

scheamtically thaaa can be Idantlflad aa cartaln 

capitalist fansere (particularly thoa* who had not 

made tha tranaitlon to tha highly machaniaad, capiUl 

inteneive form of production which bscMS increasingly 

conion in South African capitalist agriculture in 

tha 1960a) t tha lower atrata of whit* workers 

(particularly in mining, transport, ataal and various 

atata lnduatriaa), and apacific aactlona of tha 

Afrikaans apeaklng patty bourgeoisie. Again to put 

it in crudaly reductionist tana, for Men of thaaa 

claaa forces, tha Apartheid policlaa of tha atata had 

producad definite aconoaic and social advantages, ' 

and raaminad nacaaaary to preserve and dafand their 

existing position in society. Farmers naadad a 

rigid eyatae of influx control, paaa laws ate to 

keep african labour on the feme, white workers 

bitterly oppoaad schemes to ratraln african worker* 

for cwpitei-lntwnaive lnduatriaa. corractly 

seeing in thla a capitalist ploy to aacura chaapar 

tachnlcal labour. Similarly both groups vara 

bittarly oppoaad to any recognition of african 

trada unlona. And for tha lovar lavala of tha 

Afrikaner petty bourgeoisie, particularly thoaa 

aaployad in tha atata bureaucracy, any talk of reform, 

and aapaclally tha now-familiar thaaa of concessions 

to tha 'block nlddla claaa' M«*ed to hold out tha 

proapact of aavara aconoaic and aocial competition 

and thraatan their carafully carvad out and haavlly 

protactad nicha of aconcaiic and aocial privilege. 

Thua thaaa group* aara unitad In thair iaplacabla 

opposition to tha rafora propoaala being truapatad 

by Sanlaa and othar Urge Afrlkanar undertaking*. 

Yet, thair interests vara not identical, and thair 

conceptions of necessary atata policy cannot ba 

seen aa identical- Thla ia iaportant to baar in mine 

whan usaaalno tha poaalbla political futura of tha 

Afrlkanar nationalist right. 

In tha factional is: struggle althin tha nP, this 

coalition of forcaa on tha * right• had alaaiya 

selected as ita ohoden terrain of etruggle, and aa 

tha best mean* to dafand it* intareata, ita claim 

to constitute tha authantlc voice of tha 'Afrikaner 

volk', and tha embodiment or tha intaraata of thla 

volk. Wth tha significant exception of tha -oat 

reactionary of tha ahlta trada unlona, within tha 

HP tha right had deliberately limited tha range of 

ita political atruoglw to purely "Afrikaner' 

organiaationa. Aftar Muldergete, with Afrlkanar 

bualnaaa alllad alth othar capitalist forcaa against 

tha right wing in tha NP, tha right wing bloc no* 

found thla old atratagy to ba a political trap. It 

aaa confined to tha narroa terrain of Afrikaner 

politics, and had really lost control of aoet of tha 

significant Afrlkanar organiaationa outalda of tha 

Party. Thue, the only wmy it could continue with 

tha fectlonallet etruggle under tha mantle of genuine 

Afrikaner nationalise, aaa to begin to attack the NP 

itself. Within the party it had bean daciaively 

defeated and could no* only conduct a holding operation 

against rafora. A* will ba aeon below, thia holding 

operation or brake, still rwaaina an iaportant aspect 

of South African politics however. 

One last point naeda to be aada with regard to 

the defeat of the right wing within the NP. The 

different claaa forcaa comprising the right wing 

alliance began eloely to fragment, aost aignificantly, 

the extreme right wing unlone began to act politically 

independently of the NP in an attaapt to force Botha 

back Into tha traditional alliance. The Nine Workers' 

Union la the most iaportant of th*M. In 1979 it 

forced e direct confrontation with the reformists in 

party and govamwajnt by coming out on atrika againet 

(a government approved) rwcrganisation of Job claeel- 

fioatlona on the mines - a reorganisation which would 

permit employer* to utilise african labour in skilled 

Jabs previously restricted to ahlta workers. In e 

siwiler dispute in tha aicK 1960s, the government had 

immediately backed down anq supported the white miner*. 

Now thla atrika was daciaively dofMted and strikers 

dleelaead with the ectlve approval of tha nationalist 

Party governMnt. 

The Botha Raolaa and tha Form Pf the South African fltate 

ANY asaeswaent of the iaplicetlona of tha alactlon of 

PI Botha as PriM Minister for the crises confronting 

the South African state auat begin by rebutting 

teat of tha widespread myths about hie position 

within the NP. Immediately after succeeding Vorster 

Bothe was almost univeraally depicted in the press 

as a 'hawk* and a nationalist hardliner. Aa tha 

longtime Minister of Defence, Bothe is clearly 

prepared for the most vigorous action to dafand tha 

existing atata against tha liberation movement. If 

necasaary ha would be quick to approve foreign 

military Intervention. Thus, aa the politician who 

for well over e decade hod been responsible for the 

South African Military apparatue, and who dearly 

got on vary Mil with the military high co-wand (Botha's 

political nickname in NP circles la 'Plat mmpen 1 - 

Pete emapons), end thua can be relied upon to reflect 

the military's thinking to some extent, Botha My be 

called a allltarlat. But thia tern misrepresent* 

both the military's current role in South African 

politics, and Botha's own long-held political poaltion 

elthln the faitionaliat spectrum. Aa argued above, 

for wound military reasons, tha military high cue*and 

ia one of the Mat iaportant pro-reform forces in tha 

South African atata. Thia neatly coincides with 

Bothe'* own personal position. Perhapa aore than any 

othar politician in the W>, Bothe concentrates in hie 

own political person, the dominant tendency of the 

Cape party. He is e political creature of the Cape 

party adenine. In the lata 1930s Bothe eaa the first 

full-tiM political organiser hired by the Cape NP. 

Hia rise to political prominence has occurred through 

the organisation of the party - en organisation which 

he helped mould, and which he know* better than 

anyone else. Thia means that for hia entire political 

life, Bothe hea been very cloae to the forces which 

dominate the Cape party, ia tha financial interests, 

particularly around Benleei, which founded the Cape 

NP end elaaya dominated it. There la no othar way 

to political prominence in the Cepe. Thua, Botha 

concentratee in his own politicel pareon tha intereats

of thit Cape party organisation and the political 

outlook of Cape finance, as soil as those of the 

military high cownd. Since 1960 at least, within 

the context of Nationalist Politics, thet has produced 

a strongly reformist orientation. Botha's twin 

political roles ee Minister* of Defence end leader 

of the Cape party, thus both coepelled hie Into a 

reformist political position - which hes elways been 

hidden to those who mistake the bluster of political 

exchange for its content. The 'total strategy' is 

the enbodieent of this reformism, and likewise 

concentrates the intereste of Sanlam end the military 

in the defence of 'free enterprise 1 . 

Thus, es already noteci, Botha's election marks 

a clear victory in the W* tnd the government for large 

capitalist interests in the Hstlonellst ellience, and 

in particular, Sanlam. Thi» has been politically 

acknowledged by the Chaliwwjn of Sanlee, who in a 

remarkably frenk interview with the infumntiel 

Financial wall, adeitted that in the lest years of 

Vorster's leadership he had despaired of any movement 

out of the governeent; thet his seneetlonel published 

etteck of the economic policies of vorster's govern 

ment (entitled The Assault on Private Enterprise) was 

Intended to stir things up end produce e sheke-up 

within the party; and thet he could not be more 

delighted with the direction taken by Bothe es it 

corresponded exactly with whet he hed long been arguing 

for- 

mhile in certeln importent respects - particu 

larly bentustan policy and state security - the Bothe 

regime appears, thus far at least, to be the direct 

inheritor end guardians of the policies of the previous 

regime, in at leest five areas of economic end political 

policy, Botha hes gone e long may towards lmpleeentlng 

the changes long fought for by the NP reformists, and 

Senlem In particular. Firstly, all restrictions on 

Investment by white cepitellsts in the efricen town 

ships in the urben erees hwve now been lifted. 

Sanlee has embarked on e major campaign to establish 

a chain of •Hypermarkets' In areas like Soweto, 

in so-called 'Joint participation* ventures with efricen 

buslneseean. Secondly, efwj auch more importantly, 

erislng out of the Rlekert and Viehehn reports on 

Manpower Utilisation and Labour Legislation respect 

ively, legislative restrictions on the mobility, 

utilisation and training of african labour have been 

substantially eased, while this in no say undermines 

the basic props of Apartheid as a system of labour 

41 

legislation. it does go e long way to meeting the 

dmeands of big business for a flexible labour policy 

which will facilitate the reorganisation of production 

along more capital Intensive lines. Thirdly, end 

complementary to this, the governeant has ennounced 

measures for the recognition of efricen trade unions 

in e eay which brings them under much tighter state 

42 

control than was previously the case. This hes gone 

hand in hand, fourthly) with e government committment 

in rhetoric et leeet to eeae the minor pinpricks 

on the african 'aiddle class*, forming the beginnings 

of e recognition of the need for a political strategy 

which differentletes between and divides this middle 

class from black workers, and further distinguishes 

between the 'rights' of urban african workers and 

those forced to live in th* rural slums of the 

43 

bantustans. And fifthly, the Bothe regime is 

pledged to a gradual reduction in the state control 

of key productive sectors of the economy, opening them 

up for private Investment. 

Simultaneously, the regime hea taken a number of 

steps Intended on the one hand to ensure its continued 

support outside of perty and government, end on the 

other hand to set up *etate lnetltutional end 

organisational structures which will serve to 

consolidate the reforejlet position against the right 

wing of the W. 

Firstly* Botha has gone out of his eay to project 

his government as the governeant of e broad ellience 

of ell sections of capital, and in this eay to diminish 

still further the traditional English-Afrikaner 

political division amongst buslneeammn - divisions 

which long ego lost any economic meaning. This mas 

beet symbolised in the convening in November 1979 of 

e much-publicised meeting of the Cabinet end 230 

leading South African businessmen - the ruling^cless 

lncarnete It might be said. The purpose of this 

1 ' muu ' ' J '••• ' "" 

peg* 16 

meeting was to work out eay* of Implementing the 'total 

strategy' egalnst the 'Marxist threat' to private 

enterprise and 'civilised stenderds' In South Africa. 

Though the proceedings remain secret, the meeting did 

produce a number of vitally importent permanent 

standing committees composed of members of government 

and businessman, with the avowed function of overseeing 

and co-ordinating the re-orgenlsatlon of the 

odminls tret ion of the state, 44 

Secondly, within the NF>t Botha has noe decreed 

in his cepecity as National Leeder of the Party that 

in future, the annual provincial HP congresses will 

no longer neve the power to question government policy, 

but may only discuss matter* of 'principle 1 . By 

so redefining the relationship between perty and 

government, Botha is clearly seeking to limit ttie 

ability of the NP right to organise egalnst his 

policies within the party, end to force them to fight 

rather with the government, where they cen be euch 

more easily contelned- This tactic very nearly 

forced en open split In the party in early I960 on* 

the issue of efrlcan participation in a traditionally 

'white' sporting event - the so-called 'Craven week*. 

Thirdly. Bothe's polltlcel ettack on the right 

has not been confined to the level of the party only, 

but the implementation of the *totel etretegy* has 

produced vitally important chenQes within the. government 

and state es well. As Prima minister he has acted 

decisively In en attempt to forestall the struggle In 

the government and state apparatuses developing into 

an effective ettack on reformist policies. In effect 

he has attempted to drive NP factionalism out of these 

Institutions, or to contain it so as to render minimal 

the political demags to his programme. A number of 

steps are significant here. The major portfolios in 

the Ceblnet have been largely reserved for hie own 

supporters. Bothe has clearly abandoned eny idee 

of balancing the NP factions within the Ceblnet a la 

Voreter. Thua, although Treumlcht la the elected 

leader of by far the largest individual provincial NP, 

end In terms of party protocol ranks but second after 

the National Leeder, Botha et first kept Ma out of 

the Cebinet (by refusing to promote him to full

ministerial rank), and when finally forced to take 

Tnumicht Into hit Cabinet, eisigned him the 

inaultingiy minor portfolio of Public fcrtto. and 

Tourism. Tho recent CoUnot rwahufflw SWAT TrwurnichVs 

further demotion to Minister of statistics. Moreover 

in m further move to undermine tho Trmnwveel Liidir's 

• 

position in hia own provincial Pwrty, Botha has* given 

an important Cabinet post to tho son who defeated 

Trwurnicht and replaced Mm oa Chairman of the 

Afrikaner Broadtrtjond - Or. G. Vlljosn, tha praaant 

•Administrator' of Namibia. VI1 Joan la aloo a 

Trmnsualar and Ma known pro-reform sympathies will 

oct as a strong counterbalance to Traurnlcht in 

both Trmneveml party and government, Likewioa, 1A 

tha recent Cabinet ramhufflw o n^mwjwr of TrwurnichVs 

supporters ewrm kicked upeteirw Into tha newly formed, 

and puroly wdvlwory 'PTwaldents*'Council', This nova 

provoked an angry reaponea by former Minister 8. nMisn- 

hataar at tha moat racont Trmneveml bp congrmsa ahan 

ho warned that 'The Tronavaal* would oust *Tha Crnea' 

aa tha dominant forca in tha hP. 

But far aora than this Juggling of individual 

politicians of tho riptit, has baan tha structural 

changaa introduced Into tho stato apparatus. Utdar 

Botha tha Coblnat and 8Uta buraaucrooy hava baan 

aaaapingly ra orpaniaad so as to concantrata poaar 

In tha hands of tha Prime atlnietwr. In affsct, tha 

Cabinat hao boon virtually aboliahad aa a responsible, 

dKielon-eeeting politic*! institution. It now Sftldaa 

•mats as a body, and loads but a largely fonssl 

mxlatencm. much of Its former functions hava boan 

taken over by a eyatern of six, broad 'Cabinet 

CowwAttmea'. 45 Each of theme is needed by tha Prim 

Minister or his nominee, and their activities era co- 

ordinatad by tha secretariat of tha Prim*) Minister's 

Oapartaant. Horn affectively tha executive bodlae of 

gouwrrassnt, tha Cabinat committees ore Goaprlsad 

of those Uinlstars shoaa individual portfolios In any 

say bear on the'concarne of the Committee, together 

•lth an unspecified and flexible number of appointees 

of tha PrlM Minister - eho do not hava to be drean 

froa Parliament. 

This step is highly significant for a nueber of 

reason*. Firstly, it hao transformed tha rslationahip 

eataeen tha Legislature and EffOOutlvo aithln tha State. 

Thaaa Cabinet Commltteaa »n* raaponolble neither 

to Parliament nor avan tha r^lisamntary caucus of tha 

HP. Aether they aro eneaarmbU only to, ond appointed 

solely by, tha Prime Minister, Thus tha antlro 

principle of Cabinet raaporetlbUity hem bmsn lifted 

into tho Of flea of tha Head Of Government, dramatically 

lncraaaing hie poaar. Secondly, tha long established 

role of the NP cabinet as an Important arena of 

struggle betseen the ropraatfntatlvaa of the various 

faction* in tha »> has baan virtually twnsinatmd. 

Since it haa effectively bawn aboliehad as a single 

body, tha Cabinat can no lofsjsr provide a boss of 

political struggle agsinat the dominant tendency in 

tha government. Ajein, this represents an enormous 

concentration of poear in tne hands of the Head of 

Govemeent via A via bis Oan party, and a decisive 

•esJcsnlng of many of tho traditionally iaportent 

institutional baaoa of political atrugglo. 

Tha aatoblishaant of ths Cebinwt Comaitteee 

thirdly marks tha introduction of e new constellation 

of closs forces into a dlrwct role in the government* 

under the former system of cabinet g^vartveant, tha 

E»mcutlvm mas draan wxcluaivwly free Nationalist 

Party Maabars of both Houama of Parliament* undwr 

thie system, tha balance of cUss forces within ths 

HP was to soma extant reflected in tha oompoaition 

of tha cabinet. Tha internal politics of'tha party 

obliged tha Prima Minister to psy duo regard to ths 

relativa strongths of the various factions in tha 

Party when drawing up tha Cabinet. Sut tha nam 

Cabinat Committee aystom hat effectively trwnefoxwwjd 

tha relationship bwtwwwn party and government. Nov 

membership of tho executive (tha Cabinet Committees) 

la raatrictad nalthar to members of the NP nor member• 

of Parliament. Through thews commlttaee Botha has 

introduced directly into key roles in government a 

number of prominent (non-Natlonaliet) buelnasspen 

end senior military officwrs. Thua, if Botha's 

election confirmed a shift in tha balance of class 

forces within the NP, thie bourgaoie domination 

of tha party haa been consolidated in government by 

directly dreeing into the povetnewjnt wider elements 

of the bourgeois clamS. Likewise, In this climate 

of -total war* mo Botha has tmrmad it( ths 

reorganisation of tha flovwrnmmnt and atmtm apparatuses 

ham for tha first time given tha military a vitally 

important institutionalised role with the executive. 

Over mnd mbovw the central role playwd by tha 

military within the ayatam of OSbinat committees. 

senior officer* new osoupy key positiona in tha 

revamped State Security Council. This Council hao 

samipad as perhaps thm moat influmnUal deciaioo- 

tafclng political institution In the country and is 

tha main forum for formulating mnd planning thW 

implementation of the much-trumpeted total Strategy, 

Further****, military mdviaora ait on tha 15 

Interdepartmental comaitteee covering mil major 

sap acts of poverneant and whoso rwc nmamiidat ions arm 

co-ordinated through tha state Security Council. 

Military man aro likwwisa to bo found on moat of thm 

public conadsaions sot up by the Botha regi-*e. this 

now institutlonallst central political role aasigned 

to tha mUltwry extends oven to tha local level 

through tha Joint Planning Cmntrms whloh havw been eat 

up In tha 9 military regions into which thm country 

Is divided. Finally this military praasnoo in tha 

central political and admlnlatrmtlvm apparatuses of 

tha state has boon furthor confirmed by tha racont 

appointment of tho Hmad of tho Defence Fores - 

magnus Helen * aa HinlatOr of Defence, taking ovar the 

portfolio from Botha Uflaalf. 

Thuo» without undergoing the formal process of 

a coup d'etat, the vaatigiml rewvjlne of"Perilammntai y 

goverraeant in South Africa hava baan almost totally 

abolished, mnd boisrowoiw pontics havw boon militarised 

to a vary considerable extant. Botha'e own pwrwonal 

political aupport within tha military Is a critically 

Important dlmmnalon of these changes. Until vary 

rwewntly ha rwtminad thm portfolio of Defence, giving 

himaalf a personal political base outside the NP 

which ie unequalled and unchallenged by any other 

Notionalist politician. Thus if Vorstar triad to 

lead from above tha factions of hie party, Botha le 

trying to load by going boyond mnd outside hie oan

^ — :—: __. 

* party, In «n ettenpt to defsat the opposition to his 

l 

pollcli* .Uhln the MP. 

Finally, it should M noted that the** sweeping 

change* In the for* of the state over the post two 

mrt, have baan ecccaiaenisd by a paraxial * 

raorgeytlsstlon of the state bureaucracy, Tha mater 

of Oepsftawnts has been reduced fn» 40 to 22, snd 

tha Public Sarvlca Cosed aalon ha* been chs^gad eith 

tha task or producing 'a aaasller, but aora affaotlva 

and battar paid' public tavlw. Significantly, tho 

Prlae Itlniatar has appointed *prlvata sector laadora* 

to ovaraoa thla eork of tho Conalaalon, This aova 

sea explained aa representing but ono atop In *a 

policy of cooperation bstaesn Govarnaant end tho 

private sector, inciting selected ecadealc*'/ 7 - 

If It la ie*ssbsrsrt that atata saployese have long 

constituted a vital basis of support for tha HP, and 

In particular for tha M> riant, tho significance of 

; thaoo changes bee pass cloarar. In effect, .tha Leader 

I of tho HP to relying upon loading non-natlonallat 

party buslnassaan representing four of th% biggest 

eonopollee . in tha country, to oversea tha reduction 

in earning and •• organ! sotlon of a crucial alta of 

eoplo,aont for (particularly) tha Afrtksano opaafclng 

patty bourgoolaio. Thara could bo llttlo aora 

eloquant evidence of tha shift in the balance Of daao 

farcaa In the NP, 

at tha outoat that tha capitalist atata 

not stand outside tha class atruggla aa a alapla, 

atatlo ml undlffarantlatad lnatruaant to be laid 

hold of by thlo or thto data, and than used to 

\ conaolldata tha interests of mat claaa. Rather, as 

itaalF a contradictory unity* tho capitalist atata la 

I constituted through, snd la ltaalf a slta of, olasa 

struggle. This papar haa attempted to ex**ine slsasnts 

of tha claaa atruggla vlthln tha atata. If tha 

analyalo haa baan W sldad and lnooaplater in that 

*t haa foousaad prlaarlly on tha significance of 

Afrikaner nstionallet politics, it does S*aa that tha 

culainatlon of thaoa struggles in tha election of 

Botha aa National Leader of tha W and Pris* Itlniatar 

eaeasaaessaaaea-sswaaaa——eaweeeawwa •^•wawwwawa 

haa heralded important chengee In tha for* of the 

South Afrlcen stete - chengea based on the 

InetitutlonallaeUon of a nea political allgnaent 

of claaa forces in which tha bourgeoisie attaapta 

to secure tha conditions for rapid-capita list expansion 

through'the noticeable centralisation of poser In the 

hands of a single individual end the militarisation 

of politics generally. 

The central political question arising cut of 

these develop—nts le slsply thlai shst, if any, ara 

tha leplicatlons end significance of these changes in 

tha fan of the capitalist atate for tha national 

liberation struggls in South Africa? At one level 

the eraser le clear. These such heralded 'reforms*, 

tha sudden concern -ith 'the Quality of life 1 of 

South Africa'* black population, tha recognition of 

efrloan trade unions, tha conceaslone to tha blade 

•lddle claaa etc. In no say herald tha collopoo of 

Apsrthaid end tha snd to national oppression in South 

Africa. Aa a syataa of brutal end violent 

exploitation which control*, directs, channels. 

allocates labour on behalf Of all capitalist* and ki 

South African sorters divided and opcraaiad and thalr 

labour poser cheep, little In Apartheid is changing. 

For all of Botha f s clela that hie govarnaant sill not 

tolsrata 'hurtful or insulting' legislation ageinat 

anybody, for all of Minister Koorntof"s barefaced 

statement to Aasrlcan capitalists that -Apartheid 

as you kno* it is dying** after tha 

proposed refonaa, tha fundasamtal props of Apartheid 

as a syataa of labour exploitation rsealn even aora 

* firmly In place. Ihe raglaa haa no plana to give 

aiactca the vota, or to abolish tha paea lass end influx 

control, population registration, group eraes or my 

other of the legislative prope of Apartheid la*our 

exploitation. Undar the 'nee dispensation' of the 

total strategy, African sorters aill go on ouaualng 

at tha peas offices and labour bureau, esaetlng In 

the alnes by day and cooped up In conpountf* at night. 

The millions of jobless will continue to rot In the 

esmtuatana, dented all political rlghta, stripped 

of their citizenship in tha land of thalr foe*father*f 

tha subjects of play-play •states' recognised by 

I ~ in H*-m^^***-—+m-M*-*»*m\ ail • i " 

nobody but tha capitalists sho night need their labour 

occasionally. So, at thia level, little or nothing 

has changed. All that haa happened Is that the stata 

has bean further aUlterlaad, tha apparatuaaa of 

oppression ara now even stronger, aora centralised and 

eleldod with intent to crash but even tha slightest 

hint of opposition. 

But at another level, the changes in the fora of 

the South Afrlcen etate analysed in thia paper do neve 

great significance for the neture and direction of the 

national liberation struggle. The consolidation of 

tha Botha regis* has finally atrlppad off tha * 

'Afrikaner* **ek anion since 1946 hid tha capitalist 

character of tha South African stata frea ao aeny of 

the ojporajnta of Apartheid. Total strategy Is a 

strategy to save *frae anton-rlee* froa "the Marxist 

threat* in Southern Africa. Tha raglaa eafcas no 

bones about this. It presents ltaalf quite openly snd 

proudly aa a regis* of tha aoat powerful sectors of 

tho capltaliat class, in alliance alth and resting 

on, the ewtieasly powerful South African are*/* Ho 

lonqir can even the aoat blind apologist for 

capital lea argus that Apsrthaid euat be bla-ed on 

Afrikaners and not capital la*. Bo longer can 'the 

Boars* be held to be the anaay. Indeed thla 'Boer* 

state ie noa turning on other •Boers' In tha neae 

of profit, private property end stability. Thus. 

tha changes In the for* of stata in South Africa 

clarified the real relation* on which this stata 

Tha present crisis of tha capitalist stata in &A 

hlngss on the Question of hoe to eertntaln tha continued 

untroubled snd prof 1 table rule of capital. That 

doss not Ua in the handa of Botha alone, or 

in tha hands of tha solitary. It reeta finally 

with tha sorting naoaoe. And aa the intensifying 

class struggle in South Africa testifies, tha aaaoeo 

ara becoalng increasingly aaare of their poaar. Thla 

U tha real and lneoluble crlala of tha capltaliat 

etate In South Africa. 

^°' > f c M " 

IT

Pflgp 19 

10. 

11. 

12. 

13. 

«. 

«. 

16. 

19, 

Posing for ltMlf the question 'can South Africa 

Survive without destroying Itself V the most 

recent and influential wflwmwm:lc treaties on 

Afrikaner nationalism arguee that to answer this 

question, it la nacaaaary to focue solely on the 

'ruling Afrikaner ethnic group 1 . H. Adam A 

H. Gillomee, Ethnic Power Mobilised. New Haven, 

1979. 

The classic statw-wnt of this position is 

fl, Horwiti, The Political Economy of South Africa 

(London 1967^7" 

Again the clearest statement of these Multiple 

errore and confusion la Ada* & Glllowee op.clt. 

J, de St, Jorre, A House OUldod, New York, 1977, 

p3. 

H. wolpe. Towards an Anal 

African State*. mdmeo 

thw South 

D* Hobert Houghton, The South African Economy, 

Oxford, 1967, p160. 

Analysed by Marx in Capital, Vol. 1, Ch 25. 

The Economic Development Progrseae ... 1965-70, 

Survey of Race Relations In South Africa. 1973, 

Johannesburg, 1979, pl36. 

Quoted in R. Devles, 'Capital Restructuring and 

the Modification of the Reclel Oivialon of Labour', 

Jnl of Southwm African Studies. 5t 2, 1979. 

Charles Simklne, 'Employment, unemployment end 

Growth in South Africa 1961-1979'. Seldnj 

working Paper No 4. 

Oevlea op. dt. 

This la the subject of a Special Survey on 

Exports, Financial wall. 19.8.1977. 

Quoted In Financial wail. 11,2.1977- 

eg the speech by the Managing Director of 

General Mining, -The Ideological Orientation of 

Afrikaner Business 1 aiawo 1975. 

This la clear from the book by the Chairmen of 

Sanlamt A.D. wasswneer, Assault on Privwte 

Enterprise, Cape Town, 1977. 

16. D 0 f Claws Capital and Ideology * n _ tn> 

t of Afrikaner nationalism, D.Phil, 

University, 1979, Ch 12,7,13. 

19. 

20. 

21. 

22. 

23. 

24. 

25. 

26. 

27. 

26. 

29. 

30. 

31. 

32. 

33. 

34. 

35. 

36. 

37, 

39. 

Again moat notably Adwa & Giliomee op.clt. 

O'Moara loc.cit. 

Ibid. 

Ibid. Ch 3. 

Ibid. 

Sanlmm Annual Report 1961. 

See eg The South African Observer. X, 6, March 

1966. 

See H. Serfonteln, Die Verkrempte Aanslag, Cape 

Town, 1770. 

Sea eg the Report by the Head of Military 

Intelligence, 'The Afrikaner Broederbond' 

(n.d. - but from internal abidance, August 

1944), Thw Hofmeyr PwjM 

t.cit., Ch 12. 

Documented in B. Schoemen, Voratar sc 100 Dae, 

Cape Town 1974. 

Ibid, & Serfonteln op.cit. 

Interview with a Front 8ench MP Msy 1976. 

The teraa verkraepte and verllgte heve now 

been replaced by conservative and reformist 

respectively, 

Paratus, July, 1979, p36. 

Defence White Paper, 1977, p5. 

Gen Magnus mslmn, Rend Pally Mall. 13.6.1979. 

See the Important article by Glenn Moss, 'Total 

Strategy', fork in Proqresa. Ho 11, Feb I960. 

PD Vsssanear, Aasault on Private Enterprise^ 

The Freeway to Communism, Cape Town, 1977. 

Two atatemente by the then Minister of Police* 

J. Kruger, seemecf to eum this up. After Soweto 

he declared that the police had uewd live 

ammunition rether than rubber bullets as a method 

of crowd control* because Africans had to be 'made 

tame to thw gun'. Similarly when the newe first 

broke of thw death of Stave Biko In detention 

Kruger dwclarwd that it 'left hie cold', end lied 

to the Natal NP Congress that Biko had died aa 

the result of a hungwr strike. The congress 

then congratulated the Minister 'on extwnding. to 

Biko thw democratic right to starve hlmewlf to 

death'. 

This ia in fact what occurred. Bothe instructed 

the investigating Judge not to divulge thw degree 

of Vorater'e complicity, but hie orders were 

Ignored and Voretwr was then forced to resign 

from thw State Presidency In disgrace in June 

1979. 

40, Financial Vail 

41, See SACTU 

1«0, 

ndum to I960 IL0 Conference, June 

42. Sea the speech by the Minister of Manpower to 

thw 0FS congress of the hP, Quoted in The Star, 

8.9.1979. 

43. This la particularly clear in the Government white 

Paper on the Report of the Commission of Enquiry 

into Manpower Legislation (the Riekert Commission). 

A Cabinet Committee, which lncludea w numbwr of 

leading businessmen has been set up to study the 

position of 'the urban African 1 * 

44. 

45, 

« . 

Survey of feet Halations In South Africa, 1979, 

pp3-6. 

Omaiing with Stete Security, Finance, Economical 

Internal Affaire, welfare end Legislation and 

Parliamentary Affelra. 

Magnus Melan la the son of the former Chairmen 

of the largest Afrlkeena Bank, Volkakas. His 

father ewe for many years one of the leading 

•embers of the Broederbondr a Member of Parliament 

and prominent verlcrampte. Gen. malen'e personal 

and political biography thus makes him the ideal 

person to bridge the government, army and 

capitalist class. 

47. Survey of Race Relations In South Africa. 1979, 

pp6f t AJO-»I. 

46. Barlow Rand, SA Brwwerias, Old Mutual and General 

Mining.

m - DISA

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