m - DISA

• The Johanneaburg-fce&ad Detainees' Porants Support
Committee (OPSC) responded to the Rabie proposals on
detention in tha following way: they argued that
there vara thraa main faaturaa of tha currant
datantlon system, namely
tha total discretion of tha Minister and tha
Security Polica from tha moment of detention,
tha lack of lndapandent monitoring of thalr
arbitrary axarclaa of power, and tha
vulnerability and depandanca of detainees on
thalr interrogators.
Tha OPSC want on to say that they saw 'nothing in
tha (Rabie) recommendations ehlch indicates any
change in these respects - indeed, we suspect that
these features are being entrenched' (SUr, 04.02.62}.
Tha OPSC became even mora aware of the 'closed*
nature of tha system a few days after responding to
Rable's report • whan Nell Aggett was found dead in
his detention call. Before his death, a number of
relatives suspected that certain detainees were
being mal-treated during interrogation - through
sleep deprivation, prolonged periods of enforced
standing under interrogation, and in some cases,
other assaults and torture, what could parents
and raletlvee do about their suspicions?
Some we-faers of the committee felt that en
application should be wade to tha Suprejee Court,
restraining security police from assaulting or
bringing undue pressure to bear on detainers.
But the OPSC faced a major problem in this regard.
How could they convince a court that they had good
reason to believe their reletives were being mal­
treated? Often, the basis of tha allegations
involved a whispered word, a smuggled message -
sometimes passed on at second or third hand.
No court could order an independent investigation
of the condition of a detainee: a Judge is not even
permitted to call the detainee to give evidence, or
empower an independent lawyer or doctor to consult
with the detainee.
Even if it" ess possible to obtain a court order
preventing aal-traatment of a detainee, how could
this be monitored? would the detainee be told of the
court decision, and who could ensure that it would
be obeyed by all who had access to the detainee?
Only thoee within the closed system are in a position
to do that.
There was another reason why no reletlve brought
en urgent application to the Supreme Court - even
after Mrs Helen Suzman made known the allegation
that Neil Aggett hed been essaulted before he was
found dead In hie call. If an interdict was applied
for - even If it was granted - how could the OPSC
be sure that tha detainee mentioned would not be
victimised In some way? Possibly by tha withdrawal
of reading material or food parcels (where those are
permitted); or even the possibility of assaults or
other pressures.
The discussion on this problem involved very
difficult decisions for relatives of detainees.
Neil Aggett was dead - and according to one detainee,
had been beaten before his death; a number of others
were in hospital. How could other detainees be
protected?
In the event, no court application was brought -
partially because of the difficulty in proving
allegations of ma1-treatment- But one thing was
made vmry clear: the so-called safe-guards for
detainees currently in force are of almost no use
at all. And the Rabie proposals do nothing more
than perpetuete e closed, self-contained end self-
regulating system of detention for the purposes of
lnterrogetion•
As already mentioned, the Rabie report does
not look at the question of solitary confinement as
a way of extracting information from detainees.
Neither does the Commission deal with other
interrogation techniques: what of sleep deprivation,
or prolonged standing in one spot? How does the
Commission feel about these methods? They remain
silent - and egaln fall to offer any new protection
to those detained under a system which has caused
the death of at least 50 people - and severely
affected the mental and physical health of hundreds,
if not thousands, of others.
•
In this regard, it la worth mentioning the role
of the attorney-general's office in tha detention
system. Often those held in detention far the
longest periods involve detainmes which the office of
the attorney^general has designated potential state
witnesses in political trials. This does not mean
that the person held has agreed to testify - or even
that he/she will be called as a witness. It is
sufficient that the attorney-general feels that tha
potential witness might be intimidated, or might,
abscond, or that it is in the 'interests of the
administration of Justice'; the parson can then be
held In conditions ehlch are effectively the same
as those applying to section 6 of the Terrorism Act,
for s period of up to 6 monthe.
In practice, those held by the ettorney-general
as potential state witnesses have previously been
section 6 detainees. Their transfer to section 12
page 4
of the Internal Security Act Is largely administrative:
In the recent cases of Journalists Themi Unzwal and
Zwelakhe Slsulu, they were detained by security polica
in mid-1961. Early in 1962 they were transferred to
section 12(b) of the Internal Security Act. Until
amswai's appearance in court, and Slsulu's release in
February 1982. they received no visits from family,
friends, lndapandent doctors or lawyers. For them,
12(b) must have been much tha seme as section 6 -
and it was tha office of the attorney-generel which
was responsible for their detention under 12(b) and
for the conditions of detention.
Tha Rabie proposals retain provisions for tha
detention of potential state witnesses. This is not
surprising, given the general approach of the
Commission. But it is worth emphasising that
detention provisions ore not only administered by
security police, and that the offices of tha
respective ettornays-generel are integrally
involved in the lengthy detention of people under
conditions similer to those existing under section 6
of the Terrorism Act.
Over the past 0 months, a considerable amount of
energy has been expended in focusing on the issue
of detention and security detainees. Large-scale
police raids, followed by the detention of trede
unionists, community workers and students initially