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within t>e st«t« apparatus: the Parliamentary caucus; the cabinet; and within and between the various state apparatuses. Acute conflicts and struggle* within Afrikaner nationalist ranks were a constant feature of South African politics after 1W8 (and indeed before). But these were not static struggles. Their content and forms shifted with the changes in the social bases of the various provincial NPs* most significant here was the changing relationship between Caps finance and agriculture, which began to shift the Cepe NP into an even more openly oppositional role within the party. In the immediate aftermath of the Sherpevllle crlets of I960, particularly whilst Dr Verwoerd was recovering from %n assassination attempt, end the forces of the traditional nationalist alliance were temporarily leederless, the struggle within the NP was very finely balanced. However, once Verwoerd returned to political life, he succeeded in mobilising against the Cepe financial intereats, all the other elaes forces in the NP. This wes echieved pertly by epproprieting for the right the mantle of true Afrikaner nationalism, with Verwoerd es Its lnfellible leader. For the remainder of hie Premiership, he M 9 keeping the Cape politically iaolated. successful in Verwoerd was able to maintain this alliance against Cape finance by centrelleing power in both party and government into hie rolee as National Leader or the NP and Prime Minister respectively. .This was unprecedented in the hiatory of the NP. Thus, the Cape was doubly Isolated - within the party as a whole, and in the state apparatus Itself. Verwoert's period as Prime Minister saw a narked diminution in the powers of both individual Ministers and the Cabinet itself, with the Prime Minister taking final responsibility for all crucial decisions, and often announcing these to Cabinet without coneultation. Likewise, the NP caucua had its political independence severely curtailed, and was simply not informed of a number of crucial political decisions (such as the vitally important 1959 Promotion of Bantu Self- Government Bill) before they were laid before Perliement. Verwoerd was able to operate Ilka this because of his personal political power base within the Afrikaner Browdertond. During his Premiership, the AS Executive Council in many senses displaced • the Cabinet as a policy making body. And given thet the Cepe had no influence within the Broederbond, it was the ldeel institution through which to mobilise all class forcea in the nationalist alliance egalnst the Cepe* Yet the contradictions and conflicta within organised Afrikaner netionaliea were in no senee brought to en end under Verwoerd's authoriterlan leadership, they were aimply displaced. If an iron discipline of the mejority eas mainteined in the party to keep the Cape in line, these struggles spilled over into bitter conflict in ail the other orgenisetions of Afrikaner netlonelism, from church and cultural groups to buslneas organisations, etc. Here the Sanlam group managed to maintain its control over the very influential Afrlkaanse Handel sins tltuut (AHI) ae a major pletfora from which to challanga the dominant line In the party. Despite e bitter struggle for power et the 196fl AHI congress, Sanlam could not be dislodged, and it was predominantly through the AHI that the Cape line was articulated. 8y 1965, it was openly acknowledged thet Afrikaner nationalism had Its 'verllote' ('enlightened*) and 'verkrempt* (•reactionary*) wings. The main base of the verllgtea ley in the Cape party, with elenly gathering support for ite position amongst certain business groups In the Transvaal. The so-called verkrempte wing was' led by Verwoerd. The main differencee ware over labour policy and relations with English capitalists* The Cape groups favoured much looser restrictions on the mobility and training of afrlcan labour and close co-operation with English buslneae. But these were in many respects the fundamental questions around which Afrikaner netlonelism es a claaa alliance hinged - these issues touched directly the Intereats of all the verious class forces organised under Afrikaner nationalism), tt eae precisely the accumulation of capital by the Cepe financiers and their new independence from the economic support of Afrikaner fanners, petty bourgeoleie and sorters, which led to this change in Sanlam's position on the crucial issues of influx control, skilled labour, finance policy, etc. Thus, what the verllgtea eere in feet advocating wes e new Interpretation of the interests, of the Afrikaner volk, one which concentrated particularly on the needs of the rapidly growing group of powerful Afrikaner capitalist* led by Swnlem. The assassination of Or Verwoen) in September 1966 brought these contredictlons out into the open, Into a vicioua fight within the NP itself. In these ^ atrugglea, the personal political poaition of the new NP leader, John Voreter, became vitally Important, in that it was a significant factor in the form taken by these struggles. From the viewpoint of all 'normal* political considerations. 8J Voreter should never have been elected leeder of the NP and Prime Minister. Almost everything in hie political past told against him. During the 19eOs he had b—n e leader of the bitterly enti-NP and Nexl-orlented Oasewa Branding. In the 1948 election Voreter had attacked the NP aa anti democratic whan It opposed his candidacy for the W»*s election partner, the Afrikaner Party. Defying perty discipline, Voreter fought tne election ae en independent, ioeing by two votee, thereby denying en otherwise eefe eeat to the Natlonmliet coalition. He hed only Joined the NP in 1951 and been elected to Parliament in 1933. He hed nm^r developed a strong personal political beam within the Tranavaal perty. In 1966 he ranked a lowly thirteenth in Cabinet seniority, end as Minister of Police, had been the man ultimately responsible for ttie Prime Minister's safety when Verwoerd waa killed. The only other candidate for the leadership eea the moat eenior member of the cabinet. Transport Minister Ben ScJvjemmn, deputy leader of the Treneveal Party before the death of Verwoerd. But Bchoaman's political paet told against him too. He waa one of the diminishing band of so-called oud-ameIters, le Natlonmliata who in the 19Xe had split the Nationalist Party to join the United Party. He hed come back to the fold In
1939, but aoaa aaabars of the Nationalist right wing hid long •WDTltt, and regarded the smelters as far •ori objectionable than tha aaaaara of tha Ojjw Brandwag. Given that thera was no clear and obvious auccaaaor to varaoard, whose total dominance of both party and govarnaant had thoroughly precluded tha — f — of a nuatoar two in both, and In tha light of tha axtraaa factionallaa within tha party, Voratar'a vary politioal aaaxnaas stood in hla favour. Ha waa not firmly identified with any faction of tha part/, and enjoyed wide respect for hia ruthless perfccaance aa Htniatarof Juatica. Voratar eventually eaarpad aa tha unchallenged candidata because ha anjoyad tha total backing of two apparantly contradictory alnga of tha party - tha axtraaa right lad by Or A Hartzog, and tha Capa party. Togathar thay coaprlaad a Majority of Nationalist aPa, parsuadlng Schoaaan to withdraw baf ora tha issue oaiaa to a vote* Tha support of tha axtraaa varkamptaa for Voratar can ba aaally axplalnad. Hla maabarahlp of tha pro-Mazi Osaewe Brand wag when couplad with tha hardllnar reputation aamad aa Minister of Juatica , ewwaad to aart hia out aa a cowaiittad partlaan of tha right. Tha Capa vota ia axplalnad by tha fact that, in tha abaanca of a cradibla Capa candidata. voratar's aarriaga to tha daughtar of ona of tha foundara of tha Capa HP and Sanlaa - PA Helen - aede hla tha aoat accaptabla candidata. It aaa through thia connactlon that Voratar had in fact baan ao Quickly rehabilitated In tha V after 19d8. His appointaant to tha Cablnat by Verwoard In 1968. but 5 yaara aftar ontaring Parllaaint, aaa widely lntarpratad in Nationalist clrclaa aa ona of tha aopa VarwoenJ offarad to tha Capa NP, still bittar aftar tha dafaat of lta candidata in tha 1958 laadarahip election* This detail is crucial to an understanding of tha nature of Vorstar'a laadarahip in both party and govarnaant. Ha laaadlataly raallsad that ha could not doainata either in tha style of Verwoard. In tha party, ha thua triad to stand abova all factions, and bring Ma togathar by tha praatlps of hia office. To do so, ha took a stap unprecedented. In Nationalist politics, ona which aaa to transfer* tha ralationahlp between party and govarnaant» Under tha noraal procadura of tha NP, aa tha chosan National Laadar of tha party in succession to Varaoard, ha would naturally havs llkaalsa succeeded varaoard aa Transvaal laadar of tha nP. Evary national laadar of tha NV alnca ita Incaptlon had < baan alaultanaoualy tha laadar of tha Party in hia hoaa Province. Thia coaprlaad tha final political basa of tha National Laadar. But Voratar had not rlsan to national laadarahip through tha aatabllahad path of promotion In his provincial party. Ha had not anjoyad tha support of tha ovsrshalalng majority of Tranavaal af>s in tha pariod in which it aaaaad aa if an alaction between hla and Schoaaan would ba nacasaary to aalact tha national laadar. Ha had no natural political basa in tha Transvaal party, while tha Provincial laadarahip aaa hia to claia by right, ha auat hava raaliaad that not only would ha anjoy at bast tha grudging support of tha party organisation in tha province, but glvan that tha factionallaa of tha HP was at its worst in tha Transvaal, ha would gat sucfcad Into thoaa atrugglaa in a way which could rapidly loaa hla hla support in othar provinces. Thus rathar than take thasa risks for llttla ratum Voratar announcad ha would not accapt tha Transvaal laadarahip. and offarad it to hla aatonishad and gratlflad opponent, Ben Schoaaan - thereby placing Schoaaan and his faction daap in Vorstar'a political dabt, and axplicltly alavating hia own placa in tha W* to that abova tha various factions. Thia dapartura was to ba of vital algnificanca in tha factional struggle in tha NP. Vith tha National Laadar of tha party thua affaetivaly without a local institutions! powar base In tha party, it meant that tha aachinary of govarnaant would coma to play an lncraaaingly iaportant rola in thaaa factional atrugglaa* Oaaplta hla dallbarata attaapt to elevate hlaaalf abova thaaa atrugglaa, Voratar could not raaain neutral aa tha hP want into lta aost sarlous lntarnal splits slnca tha 1940s. Indeed for tha firat thrae yaara of hie'Praaiership ha waa attacked froa a nuabar of aides as baing a weak laadar, Siaply to protact hia own position, he aaa forcad, witnin tha party, to raly on various factional groups, in tha aarly yaara of his laadarahip, 1966-9, whan the axtraaa right attaaptad to drlva tha verllgtaa out of tha ranka of Afrikaner natlonallaa (but andad up baing drlvan out of tha party thaaaalvaa) Voratar was forcad to raly vary haavlly on tha Capa Party for support. But Voratar dapandad for political support avan aora haavily on tha Special Branch of tha South African Police. Aa Hinietar of Juatica, ha had built tha Security Police into a vary powarful force In South African polltica. Tha SB waa used against Voratar'a natlonaliat opponenta as affaetivaly aa ha had uaad it to break tha national liberation aovaaent in tha aarly 60s. Thus, ona of tha aoat algnlfleant features of South African polltica In tha 1960a waa tha aaaalva build-up in tha diractly political rola of tha Sacurity Police under Voratar. Eventually in 1969, p»g« 10 ha craatad a naw, apaclal aacurlty aarvlca, raaponslbla only to the Priaa Minister, tha notorious BOSS. Hencaforth 6086 aaa Voratar'a atrongaat and aost effective paraonal political basa. But this development aaant that tha apparatuses of tha state ware now uaad by tha Priaa Hiniatar to intervene diractly in internal natlonaliat polltica. There ia a further iaportant dlaanaion here* Tha varfcraapta/verllgta conflict waa asaantially a atruggla batwaan thoaa who wlahad to praaarva tha claaa allianca of 1948 as an alliance doainated by tha interests of farmer* and tha patty bourgaolala against those who raaliaad that In 20 years tha social basa of Afrikaner natlonallaa had shifted profoundly, and wantad to transfora tha ideology and polltica to suit tha changing class composition of tha volk. Tha varllgte phanomenon was a response to tha aaarganca particularly In tha 1960s of a class of aggraasiva, self-confident Afrikaner capitalists, whoaa intaraata now want beyond thoaa of tha narrow claaa allianca out of which thay had aaargad. By tha lata ttCQe, the varliyte element *as no longer confined to tha
Page 1 and 2: nr mm 1982 !'V V \ 1 i • » * s
Page 3 and 4: » DETENTIONS: Rabie Reports JUBT t
Page 5 and 6: dominate In South Africa. In these
Page 7 and 8: Ma+i-lightwd soee of the IMUN invol
Page 9 and 10: Baper* (LK8), beceuoe of *ta anti-u
Page 11 and 12: [DETENTIONS: Investigating Inquests
Page 13 and 14: peg* 11 officially performed post-m
Page 15 and 16: page 13 unless Inflicted beforw daa
Page 17 and 18: I 0-B« 15 INTRODUCTION TO POLITICA
Page 19 and 20: pega 17 oppressed BOTH by capital a
Page 21 and 22: I suthors' contention thmt it il ox
Page 23 and 24: Q ' analytical tools*( like role th
Page 25 and 26: page 2& •officiant nuebers of the
Page 27 and 28: gar. rgthnicjty: the ordinary peopl
Page 29 and 30: particularly •egaa, end hence wor
Page 31 and 32: £o natch 'their transport to gat h
Page 33 and 34: &C..31 to work in protest against t
Page 35 and 36: [fmgn 33 mturn to th«lr homes In t
Page 37 and 38: paga 36 - _ ' Fane Qeorge dibhole,
Page 39 and 40: peg* T/ appellant c la lea overrule
Page 41 and 42: 'ruling •tunic group'» or eo*eti
Page 43 and 44: in the 1960s extended the process o
Page 45 and 46: and othar claaa forces, began to cr
Page 47: movement (In collaboration with the
Page 51 and 52: An Important caveat needs to be wdi
Page 53 and 54: end Vorster by implication. Althoug
Page 55 and 56: of thit Cape party organisation and
Page 57 and 58: ^ — :—: __. * party, In «n ett

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