m - DISA

of thit Cape party organisation and the political
outlook of Cape finance, as soil as those of the
military high cownd. Since 1960 at least, within
the context of Nationalist Politics, thet has produced
a strongly reformist orientation. Botha's twin
political roles ee Minister* of Defence end leader
of the Cape party, thus both coepelled hie Into a
reformist political position - which hes elways been
hidden to those who mistake the bluster of political
exchange for its content. The 'total strategy' is
the enbodieent of this reformism, and likewise
concentrates the intereste of Sanlam end the military
in the defence of 'free enterprise 1 .
Thus, es already noteci, Botha's election marks
a clear victory in the W* tnd the government for large
capitalist interests in the Hstlonellst ellience, and
in particular, Sanlam. Thi» has been politically
acknowledged by the Chaliwwjn of Sanlee, who in a
remarkably frenk interview with the infumntiel
Financial wall, adeitted that in the lest years of
Vorster's leadership he had despaired of any movement
out of the governeent; thet his seneetlonel published
etteck of the economic policies of vorster's govern­
ment (entitled The Assault on Private Enterprise) was
Intended to stir things up end produce e sheke-up
within the party; and thet he could not be more
delighted with the direction taken by Bothe es it
corresponded exactly with whet he hed long been arguing
for-
mhile in certeln importent respects - particu­
larly bentustan policy and state security - the Bothe
regime appears, thus far at least, to be the direct
inheritor end guardians of the policies of the previous
regime, in at leest five areas of economic end political
policy, Botha hes gone e long may towards lmpleeentlng
the changes long fought for by the NP reformists, and
Senlem In particular. Firstly, all restrictions on
Investment by white cepitellsts in the efricen town­
ships in the urben erees hwve now been lifted.
Sanlee has embarked on e major campaign to establish
a chain of •Hypermarkets' In areas like Soweto,
in so-called 'Joint participation* ventures with efricen
buslneseean. Secondly, efwj auch more importantly,
erislng out of the Rlekert and Viehehn reports on
Manpower Utilisation and Labour Legislation respect­
ively, legislative restrictions on the mobility,
utilisation and training of african labour have been
substantially eased, while this in no say undermines
the basic props of Apartheid as a system of labour
41
legislation. it does go e long way to meeting the
dmeands of big business for a flexible labour policy
which will facilitate the reorganisation of production
along more capital Intensive lines. Thirdly, end
complementary to this, the governeant has ennounced
measures for the recognition of efricen trade unions
in e eay which brings them under much tighter state
42
control than was previously the case. This hes gone
hand in hand, fourthly) with e government committment
in rhetoric et leeet to eeae the minor pinpricks
on the african 'aiddle class*, forming the beginnings
of e recognition of the need for a political strategy
which differentletes between and divides this middle
class from black workers, and further distinguishes
between the 'rights' of urban african workers and
those forced to live in th* rural slums of the
43
bantustans. And fifthly, the Bothe regime is
pledged to a gradual reduction in the state control
of key productive sectors of the economy, opening them
up for private Investment.
Simultaneously, the regime hea taken a number of
steps Intended on the one hand to ensure its continued
support outside of perty and government, end on the
other hand to set up *etate lnetltutional end
organisational structures which will serve to
consolidate the reforejlet position against the right
wing of the W.
Firstly* Botha has gone out of his eay to project
his government as the governeant of e broad ellience
of ell sections of capital, and in this eay to diminish
still further the traditional English-Afrikaner
political division amongst buslneeammn - divisions
which long ego lost any economic meaning. This mas
beet symbolised in the convening in November 1979 of
e much-publicised meeting of the Cabinet end 230
leading South African businessmen - the ruling^cless
lncarnete It might be said. The purpose of this
1 ' muu ' ' J '••• ' ""
peg* 16
meeting was to work out eay* of Implementing the 'total
strategy' egalnst the 'Marxist threat' to private
enterprise and 'civilised stenderds' In South Africa.
Though the proceedings remain secret, the meeting did
produce a number of vitally importent permanent
standing committees composed of members of government
and businessman, with the avowed function of overseeing
and co-ordinating the re-orgenlsatlon of the
odminls tret ion of the state, 44
Secondly, within the NF>t Botha has noe decreed
in his cepecity as National Leeder of the Party that
in future, the annual provincial HP congresses will
no longer neve the power to question government policy,
but may only discuss matter* of 'principle 1 . By
so redefining the relationship between perty and
government, Botha is clearly seeking to limit ttie
ability of the NP right to organise egalnst his
policies within the party, end to force them to fight
rather with the government, where they cen be euch
more easily contelned- This tactic very nearly
forced en open split In the party in early I960 on*
the issue of efrlcan participation in a traditionally
'white' sporting event - the so-called 'Craven week*.
Thirdly. Bothe's polltlcel ettack on the right
has not been confined to the level of the party only,
but the implementation of the *totel etretegy* has
produced vitally important chenQes within the. government
and state es well. As Prima minister he has acted
decisively In en attempt to forestall the struggle In
the government and state apparatuses developing into
an effective ettack on reformist policies. In effect
he has attempted to drive NP factionalism out of these
Institutions, or to contain it so as to render minimal
the political demags to his programme. A number of
steps are significant here. The major portfolios in
the Ceblnet have been largely reserved for hie own
supporters. Bothe has clearly abandoned eny idee
of balancing the NP factions within the Ceblnet a la
Voreter. Thua, although Treumlcht la the elected
leader of by far the largest individual provincial NP,
end In terms of party protocol ranks but second after
the National Leeder, Botha et first kept Ma out of
the Cebinet (by refusing to promote him to full