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1982<br />
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Repressive state<br />
apparatus<br />
46 died in detention<br />
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INDEX<br />
DCTENTIONB; Awbia raports Pwjpj 1<br />
(A)FOW<br />
DETENTIONS: investigating lnquaata<br />
WTBODUCTION TO POLITICAL ECOOfT<br />
- part 4 NO* 19<br />
'ORGANISING ttlEN'i rasponas 1 pags 16<br />
rmponw 2 paga IB<br />
raaponaaS -P«a» 19<br />
TEADCftS IN SOUTH AFRICA...' 0*3* 20<br />
ETHNICITY AND CLA88 IN GAZAhKbUJ Paga 22<br />
iNFonuncN<br />
\atrlkas in ths watal industry paga 26<br />
labour action paga 20<br />
courts i paoa 34<br />
SUPPLEMENT: 'sbldargata' and tha politic*<br />
of Afrikanar natlanaUa**<br />
ADDRESS<br />
EuITQRI*, ADDRESS!<br />
PO Box 93174<br />
2143 Yaovilla<br />
SOUTH AFRICA.<br />
aCRK IN PR0GFES6 22 - April 1962<br />
by Kavln Huaphrsy<br />
Tha natura of Fork In Prograas, which la to<br />
Slaulata dabata and praaant controvarslal viawa<br />
a aida rang* of subjects, ansuras that tha<br />
opinions axpraswad do not nacsssarily reflect the<br />
viBnta Of tha sdltorial cgilactiva.<br />
ThU laaua of Vortc In Prograss adltad and publlahsd<br />
by an atfltorlal oollaotlva of 40 Joriasan strsat,<br />
2001 bTMPrfontain, and printad by aachad, 94 siaaonds<br />
straatt 2001 Johannesburg.<br />
RATES<br />
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Croup distributions (par copy) R 1,00<br />
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coapliaantary capias can ba arrangad on<br />
rwquaat.<br />
SECOND O.ASS AIRMAIL RATES<br />
^STERN_ELBOPE and BRITAIN<br />
Individuals: R20,00<br />
Organisations: R25,00<br />
U3A and CANADA<br />
Individuals: R2S,00<br />
Organisations: R35,00<br />
SURF ACE MAIL WES OUTSIDE SOUTHERN AFRICA<br />
Individuals: R ?t50<br />
Organisations:*. R12,60<br />
Important: If pay**** is aado in non-Rand<br />
currancy, plsasa add bank and conversion<br />
charges.<br />
Plaaaa spacify tha adltlon ahlch you wish<br />
your subscription to bagin with. ^ \ JT^^M<br />
Chsoua B and Postal Ordara to<br />
to *ff* IN PRQSBEg.<br />
4 ^ - I J<br />
,:-: I<br />
J i^ arr -*<br />
•y<br />
• • $<br />
EDITORIAL<br />
Thsra aara t*o particularly plaaaing raaturaa<br />
about thia IMua of aork In Progress i in tha<br />
firat place, aany aora ptopis aara involvad in<br />
writing and producing tha publication than haa<br />
previously Man tha cesa* Thia la a develccmnt that<br />
will hopefully continue, as It alloaa for a "ore<br />
divarsa sat 0f interests to praaant Information and<br />
views.<br />
Sscondl/i tha thraa raaponaas to tha IIP 21<br />
article* 'Organising wcwen? 1 follow a pattarn ahich<br />
la encouraging: ahort responses to particular<br />
aspacts of notarial praaantad ara a uaaful aay of<br />
proaotlng dabata on tha issues praaantad In «P.<br />
Thaaa sorts of raaponaaa allow thosa who ara not<br />
ksan to writ* langthy srtlclss to oontrlbuta to<br />
debates, and anaura that MP raaalna a fott* for<br />
dlffarant and conflicting intarpratatlons of<br />
social reality and aaya of undarstandlng it*<br />
Tha fact that ao aany aora contributors vara<br />
Involvad in this adltlon aaant that tha aditora had<br />
too such aatarial. Alraady paga specs haa bmun<br />
lncrastsd frda tnls lsaua with tha Introduction of a<br />
largar layout grid, and tha prasantatlon of all<br />
inforwation fsaturaa in a aora conpraaaad foraat.<br />
Daspita this, cartain contributions could not ba run<br />
bvcausa of lack of spaca: wa apologias to tha<br />
contributors affected, and to raadsrs for thia,<br />
and guarente* thair appaaranca in tha naxt wTP><br />
Tha sdicorlal collactlva alee to doubla<br />
distribution of WIP in tha couraa of tha naxt yaar*<br />
This will by no aeana ba easy, givan that KP la not<br />
coaaanlally diatributad. Rsadars ara accordingly<br />
aafcad for sudQastions on how to raaoh a largar<br />
audlanca both through tha aadlua of individual<br />
subscription*, and group distribution scHaaaa.<br />
Idoas for expansion would ba aoat walcoaa.<br />
•
»<br />
DETENTIONS:<br />
Rabie Reports<br />
JUBT two days after the flaport of the Rabie Commission<br />
into Security Laglelation ems weds public, trade<br />
unionist Neil Aggett died ehile In security police<br />
ouetody. The Rebie Commissioners put fprewrd certain<br />
propoeale 'with a view to the protection of detainees" x<br />
if this additional 'protection had already been in<br />
fares, could the outcoee of Nell Aggstt'e prolonged<br />
incarceration and interrogation have been different?<br />
Evan the briefest glance at the nable proposals<br />
regarding detention lndlcotes that the Commission<br />
report offers almost no change to the systam of<br />
detention as it currently exists. The section of<br />
( the report dealing elth detention of paopla for<br />
purposes of interrogation offers little comfort for<br />
ttiqae ooncarned elth the conditions under ahich<br />
detainaea are held and questioned. Nor, it eust be"<br />
stated, would the table propoeale have of farad any<br />
additional protection for thota detainees who nave<br />
recently found thaaaelvaa-in the sards of<br />
/Johannesburg's General Hoepltal* For the<br />
racoaaandationa flowing fro- the Coaalsalon report do<br />
little ear* then regulariee and give legislative<br />
legitimacy to the detention ayetaa as it already<br />
* This can be shown by coaparing the Rabie<br />
propoeale with the detention systea as it 9<br />
currently exists* In this regard, see the table<br />
on> this page.<br />
If the heble propoeala had bean in force in<br />
November last year, when Nell Aggett eaa detained<br />
for purposes of interrogation, hoe would his<br />
detention conditions have been alterad? m<br />
m Ha aould have bean visited by a aagistrate every<br />
teo weeks - ahich muet have happened st any rats;<br />
a Hs could have bean examined by a district surgeon -<br />
RABIE PROPOSALS<br />
Visits to dstalneee by a<br />
two week's<br />
tiatrate every<br />
Visits to tfatalneea by a district surgeon"<br />
%y%ry two<br />
Tne setting to of an inspectorate of<br />
detainees, ampowsred to visit detainees<br />
and to sake writtan representations to<br />
the Minister<br />
Police be empowered<br />
to allow people not connected with<br />
Interrogation to see detainees<br />
A 30-day limit be placed on detention<br />
unless the Minuter, on the advice of the<br />
Commissioner of Police, authorises<br />
further attention<br />
After 0 months of detention, a review ~~<br />
board appointed by the Minister must<br />
examine the caea. The board than raporte<br />
to the fctinioter, who may or may not accept<br />
their recommendations as to the release<br />
or continued detention of the detains*<br />
Preventive detention propoaod, together<br />
with a review board to examine auch cases<br />
Potential state witnesses in security<br />
trials may be detained at the discretion<br />
of the attorney general<br />
Any policeman of or above the rank of<br />
warrant officer may detain a person for up<br />
to 46 hours as a preventive measure; a<br />
magistrate may extend this period for<br />
another 12 days on request of the police.<br />
This detention is not for interrogation,<br />
nor does it appaar that the detaining<br />
policeman muet beliave that a crime has<br />
or is likely to be, committed<br />
?ras«v*i ; a*'>::ii' : j<br />
visits to detainee* by a magletrate every<br />
two weeks (section 0(7) of Terra-lam Act<br />
Visits ahare necessary to detainees by s<br />
district surgeon (paction 8 of the police<br />
-rant for detention)<br />
While there is no legislation regarding thlst<br />
much an inspectorate was est up by thenpolice<br />
minister Krugsr after the death of<br />
Steve Biko in 1977<br />
6oth the Consniealoner of Police and the head<br />
oT security police ampowered to grant access<br />
to detainees in to*"** of section 2 of the<br />
police warrant for detention<br />
Section 6(1 J of the Terroriaw Act Allows for"<br />
Indefinite detention- However* ones a month<br />
police are required to lnfona the Minister<br />
why aach detainee ahould continue to be held<br />
(•action 0(2))<br />
nWlaw proceecfinge unoWtaRan by a board<br />
appointed by9 and responsible to the<br />
Minister exist in respect of preventive<br />
detention (section 10 of the Internal<br />
Security. Act.<br />
In terms of aeotlort 6*3) of the Terrorism<br />
Act, a detainee may *t any time mafca<br />
written representatlone to the Minister as<br />
to why he/she should be released. The<br />
Minister may. at eYW time, order the release<br />
of A detainee (flection 6><br />
Section TO of the internal security Act<br />
provides for preventive detention, together<br />
with a review board to examine auch detentions<br />
Potential state witnesses in security trials<br />
may be detained at the discretion of the<br />
attorney general<br />
Section, 10 of the Internal Security Act<br />
provides for preventive detention.<br />
Section 22 of the « « General Laws<br />
Amenowent Act provides for detention for<br />
interrogation purposes for MP to 14 days.<br />
Any policeman may, if he believes that a<br />
a crime haa bean, or is likely to be<br />
committed, may arn#sf a auapect, and hold<br />
the arrested person for 40 hours before<br />
bringing them to court or releasing them
which is p-plicltly provided for in the detention<br />
•arrant currently used by security police;<br />
B He would neve been visited by the Inspector of<br />
detainees - which presumably did happen;<br />
e The Commissioner of Police could have allowed e<br />
friend or family member to visit hie for a short<br />
period, under police supervision - and this did<br />
occur during December 1961;<br />
e After 30 deys in detention, the police mould have<br />
had to explein to the Minister why Nell could not<br />
be released. They eight neve said that he had not<br />
answered all questions to their satisfaction; or<br />
that other detainees had Implicated him in some<br />
offense; or Just that they had not yet finished<br />
interrogating him. Prasummbly this did happen et<br />
the end of Omcember. and again at the end of January,<br />
as ssctlon 6(2) of the Terrorism Act makes provision<br />
for these procedures. The Minister did not order<br />
Weil Aagett'3 release then. One doubte that the<br />
Rabie proposals, If Implemented, would have made any<br />
difference;<br />
a Of course, if Hell had lived through 6 months of<br />
detention, the Rebio Commissioners would have wanted<br />
e review board appointed by the Minister to exemine<br />
his came. This board would not have been obliged to<br />
hear evidence from Hell - or even to have seen him.<br />
If the board rsccwmmnded hell's release, the Minister<br />
could have ignored this recommendation,<br />
a If Hell - or any other detainee - lived through<br />
ell of this, and waa charged, the attorney generel<br />
could refuse to ellow bail. This la currently the<br />
case, and is also a Ruble Commission proposal. If,<br />
like most detainees, Neil hed not been charged, the<br />
Rabie proposals would have ellowed his continued<br />
detention as a potential state witness, or as a<br />
'danger to state security*. This, too, can happen to<br />
any detainee In terns of already existing security<br />
legislation.<br />
In the light of the above, there seeme little<br />
room for doubt as to hoe auch difference the Rafale<br />
proposals would have made to Heil Aggett's life -<br />
or death, HOT does there seem eny reason to<br />
believe that the proposed edded 'protection* for *<br />
detelneea would neve prevented Thozemlle Gqwetha or<br />
Sam Kiklne from finding themselves under security<br />
police guard in the psychiatric wards of a hospital.<br />
The Rabie Commission accepted that detention for<br />
the. purposes of interrogation by security police was<br />
a necessary part of security legislation. In ttyeir<br />
summary of flndlnga, the commissioners argued that<br />
information obtained froa persona In detention<br />
is the most Important and, to a large extent, the<br />
only weapon of the Police for enticipetlng and<br />
preventing terroristic end other subversive<br />
activities, and also that information obtained<br />
in this eay may in appropriate cases be used as<br />
evidence in the triel of persona charged....<br />
The Ccmmisalon finds that It is essential to<br />
retain this measure (para 14.5)<br />
In its own terms, the commissioners are correct: in<br />
the summary of their terms of reference, they write<br />
that<br />
To be able to Judge realistically < lf the question<br />
(sic) of the necessity, edequocy, fairness end<br />
efficiency of leglsletlon relating to the<br />
protection of lntemel security, regard should<br />
• ••.be hed in the first instance to society as<br />
It la at present end as it is likely to be in<br />
the forsooable future (perm 14.2).<br />
The Report then goes on to state thet there can<br />
be no doubt as to the need for security legislation -<br />
Including detention provisions - given the nature<br />
of society as it currently is, and is likely to be<br />
in the near future. This le particularly so in<br />
the light of<br />
the terrorism and sabotage committed In the<br />
Republic during the past fee years, the<br />
likelihood thet these activities will continue<br />
to increase In the fnreeeaUls future, the fact<br />
that these ectivities are planned and Committed<br />
by the supporters of organisations whose elm<br />
la to over throe by violence the existing order<br />
in the Republic, the fact that in their<br />
ectivities to echleve this aim thaee orgenlsatlona<br />
receive the support and assistence of communist<br />
countries, and the feet that these ectivities<br />
are carried on from territories bordering the<br />
Republic -, end the Commission believes thet<br />
the measures it recowatends are necessitated<br />
by ths exigencies of the situation in which the<br />
Republic finds itself (para 14.2).<br />
what the Commission declines to consider is<br />
the sort of society South Africa is, end why it<br />
needs the protection of security leglsletlon and<br />
detention In order to survive in Its current form.<br />
Indeed, the Commission explicitly exj^udes this from<br />
the terms of Its investigation end report.<br />
Put In its briefest and simplest form. South<br />
Africa Is a society in which the eajority of the<br />
inhabitants are governed without even the sembfonce<br />
of their consent and participation. The Rabie report<br />
acknowledges thet there is a view* which claims that<br />
the 'non-white sectors of the populetion' heve no*<br />
part in governing the country, end thet this is the<br />
reason for resistance which led to the adoption of<br />
security lews. The Commission admits that msny people<br />
have concluded that there is no hope for peaceful<br />
change In South Africa, and that violence is the<br />
only outlet for frustrated political end economic<br />
aspirations. But this ths Commission sees es being<br />
part of the political arena, while ite mandate<br />
involves a Jurldico-legel viewing of security lawa<br />
in the light of present end likely future events.<br />
Of course, it would be facile to suggest thet<br />
in ell societies which are governed without the<br />
active consent end participation of the majority,<br />
repressive security leglsletlon exists in the form *<br />
proposed by Rabie. Those societies which regard<br />
themselves as capitalist democracies Include both<br />
repressive end ideological aechanlame to ensure the<br />
passive consent of the awfcjorlty of people. There is<br />
ruling class and stete repression in, for example.<br />
North Aaerlca end western Europe - but in those areas<br />
the majority of inhabitants have some limited control<br />
over parts of their lives via trade unions, political<br />
parties, the right to vote in elections from city<br />
level upwards, etc. In e South African context,<br />
even these limited institutions for controlling<br />
conflict between rulers end ruled are largely<br />
absent. *<br />
As such, the Rabie Gomel sal oners are correct ehen<br />
they claim that detention end other security<br />
legialation is necessary to maintain society in its<br />
present form. The real issue, then, is whether<br />
society should be emintained as It is, and If not.<br />
In what directions it should be altered. But these<br />
questions are pieced beyond the scope of Rable's<br />
investigation, which llalts Itself to quostione of<br />
how best to protect those interests which currently<br />
P«0* 2
dominate In South Africa.<br />
In these terms, the recommendations of the<br />
Rsbls commissioners are largely understandable.<br />
For society con only be maintained in ite current<br />
fom through the us» of ever-increasing repression<br />
end control. Commissions of Inquiry such as those<br />
heeded by wlehmhn end Riaftert dealt with sspects of<br />
control of Motions of the working class; the Rabie<br />
report dials with ths other aids of a funds—ntally<br />
undemocratic society , namely rapreeelon.<br />
Having said this, hoaavar, a littla more could<br />
hava bssn expected of tha fteble Commission - at lsast<br />
as far as tha protection of detainees is concamad.<br />
within their terms of reference, tha commissioners<br />
ara bound to justify and legitimate datsntion for<br />
tha purposes of interrogation: as tha rsport argues.<br />
this is probably tha most important way in which tha<br />
pellca gather information. But tha coaalsalonars<br />
could still hava looked at tha possibility of<br />
protecting dstalnees from security police bent on<br />
obtaining lnforeatlon. John Ougerd, director of<br />
tha University of Wlteatarsrond's Centre for Applied<br />
Legal Studies, hea looked et this question in regard<br />
to the conduct of British police in northern Ireland.<br />
He point* out that in 1978, the European Court of<br />
Huasn Rights condeaned various fores of interrogations<br />
used by the British es 'inhuman end degrading<br />
treetsant', in violation of the European Convention<br />
on Husan nights. Partially in response to this,<br />
British authorities atteapted to counter allegations<br />
of aantal tortur* of dete'inees: a detainee may not be<br />
held for sore than 5 days for purposes of<br />
lnterroget ion.<br />
Moreover in teres of the 1979 Bennett Coesittee<br />
Report into Police Interrogation Procedures in<br />
Northern Ireland, ehich today guides police<br />
conduct, detainees are allowed vleits from<br />
their leeyersefter 48 hours, interrogations<br />
era to be aonitored by closed-circuit TV,<br />
police "interviews should not lest longer<br />
then the interval between noioal seal times,<br />
or extend over eaal breaks, or continue after<br />
aldnlght except for urgent operational reasons'.<br />
(John Ougard, writing in the Sunday Tlese,<br />
07.02.8ZJ.<br />
f Surely it would not heve been too such to<br />
bxpect a Commission heeded by an Appeal Court<br />
Judge to exealne the effects of prolonged solitary<br />
confinement. For even If detslnees are not tortured<br />
or eaaaulted In a direct physical earner, aeny<br />
claim that detention in solitary conditions la a<br />
form of torture. The recent ceeee of Sea Kikins<br />
and Thoznmile Gqesthe - both admitted to psychiatric<br />
wards ss s result of prolonged detention - occurred<br />
efter Rabie had completed hie report. So did the<br />
adeisslon for observation of awaiting trial prlsonara<br />
Mthenjene end Keye, both of whoa had been in detention<br />
for long periods before appearing In court. But if .<br />
the Rabie Coasissloners had wanted to look at the<br />
effects of detention, they could heve studied a<br />
trial which took piece in tha Eastern Cape Supreme<br />
Court during 1976. The first state witnsss in thtsw<br />
proceedings wes Vuyo Bsleni of Port Elizabeth, who<br />
told the court thet while in detention he hed tried<br />
to cut his wrists end area with e razor blede. The<br />
witness then stood down, end ess adaltted to the<br />
Fort Englend Hental Hospital for observetlon. A<br />
few days later, tha eedlcal superintendent of that<br />
hospital reported thet Vuyo Beleni had gone Into e<br />
pyechotic state, ripped off hie clothes, snd now<br />
needed peychletrio treatment.<br />
Ouboequently, the ouperintendent of the Tower<br />
•ante! hospital testified that ha had 'certified* .<br />
Beleni, whoa ha classified as a hysteric, not<br />
fully rasponslbls for his actions. The aadlcel<br />
superintendent explained that in detention, effinitios<br />
built up beteeen detainees and their captors: the<br />
fact that Vuyo Bsleni was unwilling to give evidenoe<br />
•gainst his friends, but waa required end expected to<br />
do eo by police.and the court, could heve led to his<br />
breekdawn.<br />
There ere other esses of eental disintegration<br />
which can bs laid at tha door of the systsa of<br />
detention and interrogation: Vuyo Bslenl*s ie given<br />
es one example which should heve alerted tha Rabie<br />
Commissioners to the dangers of the system es it<br />
exists. Given that tha Terrorism Act explicitly<br />
authorises detention in solitary conditions, the<br />
Reble commissioners could have proposed thet this<br />
not bs permitted becauss of its dengerous effects<br />
on the aantal health of detelnses. Without even<br />
alleging thet physical torture Is s component of<br />
'interrogation techniques, it can be suggested that<br />
those people found by inquests to have committed<br />
suicide in detention were driven to this by e<br />
combination of solitsry confinement end Intense<br />
interrogation. fteble*e report does nothing to alter<br />
this ss the usual manner of extracting information<br />
from detainees by security police.<br />
Regarding the regular end persistent sllsgetions<br />
of physical torture and assault es e method of d<br />
intarrogating detainees, Rabie does nothing to deel<br />
with the oft-expressed belief thet thie doee indeed<br />
happen. It ie vary difficult to prove - In e legal<br />
sense - that detainees era torturwd and aesaulted.<br />
The whole system of detention is e closed, self-*<br />
perpetuating one, with no group of people<br />
Independent of tha state having the right of access<br />
to detainees. In e few cases - especially where<br />
detainees heve died - clear indications of easeult or<br />
torture have emerged. But in general, the veil of<br />
secrecy which Is one feature of tha detention system<br />
has prevented Independent scrutiny of Interrogation<br />
techniques.<br />
Tekw, for example, tha Inspectorate of detelnees<br />
which then-police minister Kruger met up af tar the<br />
death of Steve Biko - end which tha Rabie report<br />
pute forward ea a *nae* proposal to protect detelnees.<br />
The inspectorate is responsible only to the Minister -<br />
end reports to hie on a confidential basis. In one<br />
recant case, e detainee complained to Transvaal<br />
Inspector teuton that he had bean tortured while<br />
under interrogation. In the subsequent trial, tha<br />
detelnee * now charged - subpoenaed Houton to<br />
produce the documents in which the complaint had<br />
been recorded, wbuton refused to produce the<br />
documents, claiming that eectlon 6(6) of the<br />
Terrorism Act Justified the withholding of tha<br />
documents from the defence teem. Huch the same<br />
happened in regard to statements wade to<br />
magistrates by detainees alleging aeaaulta. fteble'e<br />
proposals do not alter the cloead, eelf monitoring<br />
nature of the detention system.
• The Johanneaburg-fce&ad Detainees' Porants Support<br />
Committee (OPSC) responded to the Rabie proposals on<br />
detention in tha following way: they argued that<br />
there vara thraa main faaturaa of tha currant<br />
datantlon system, namely<br />
tha total discretion of tha Minister and tha<br />
Security Polica from tha moment of detention,<br />
tha lack of lndapandent monitoring of thalr<br />
arbitrary axarclaa of power, and tha<br />
vulnerability and depandanca of detainees on<br />
thalr interrogators.<br />
Tha OPSC want on to say that they saw 'nothing in<br />
tha (Rabie) recommendations ehlch indicates any<br />
change in these respects - indeed, we suspect that<br />
these features are being entrenched' (SUr, 04.02.62}.<br />
Tha OPSC became even mora aware of the 'closed*<br />
nature of tha system a few days after responding to<br />
Rable's report • whan Nell Aggett was found dead in<br />
his detention call. Before his death, a number of<br />
relatives suspected that certain detainees were<br />
being mal-treated during interrogation - through<br />
sleep deprivation, prolonged periods of enforced<br />
standing under interrogation, and in some cases,<br />
other assaults and torture, what could parents<br />
and raletlvee do about their suspicions?<br />
Some we-faers of the committee felt that en<br />
application should be wade to tha Suprejee Court,<br />
restraining security police from assaulting or<br />
bringing undue pressure to bear on detainers.<br />
But the OPSC faced a major problem in this regard.<br />
How could they convince a court that they had good<br />
reason to believe their reletives were being mal<br />
treated? Often, the basis of tha allegations<br />
involved a whispered word, a smuggled message -<br />
sometimes passed on at second or third hand.<br />
No court could order an independent investigation<br />
of the condition of a detainee: a Judge is not even<br />
permitted to call the detainee to give evidence, or<br />
empower an independent lawyer or doctor to consult<br />
with the detainee.<br />
Even if it" ess possible to obtain a court order<br />
preventing aal-traatment of a detainee, how could<br />
this be monitored? would the detainee be told of the<br />
court decision, and who could ensure that it would<br />
be obeyed by all who had access to the detainee?<br />
Only thoee within the closed system are in a position<br />
to do that.<br />
There was another reason why no reletlve brought<br />
en urgent application to the Supreme Court - even<br />
after Mrs Helen Suzman made known the allegation<br />
that Neil Aggett hed been essaulted before he was<br />
found dead In hie call. If an interdict was applied<br />
for - even If it was granted - how could the OPSC<br />
be sure that tha detainee mentioned would not be<br />
victimised In some way? Possibly by tha withdrawal<br />
of reading material or food parcels (where those are<br />
permitted); or even the possibility of assaults or<br />
other pressures.<br />
The discussion on this problem involved very<br />
difficult decisions for relatives of detainees.<br />
Neil Aggett was dead - and according to one detainee,<br />
had been beaten before his death; a number of others<br />
were in hospital. How could other detainees be<br />
protected?<br />
In the event, no court application was brought -<br />
partially because of the difficulty in proving<br />
allegations of ma1-treatment- But one thing was<br />
made vmry clear: the so-called safe-guards for<br />
detainees currently in force are of almost no use<br />
at all. And the Rabie proposals do nothing more<br />
than perpetuete e closed, self-contained end self-<br />
regulating system of detention for the purposes of<br />
lnterrogetion•<br />
As already mentioned, the Rabie report does<br />
not look at the question of solitary confinement as<br />
a way of extracting information from detainees.<br />
Neither does the Commission deal with other<br />
interrogation techniques: what of sleep deprivation,<br />
or prolonged standing in one spot? How does the<br />
Commission feel about these methods? They remain<br />
silent - and egaln fall to offer any new protection<br />
to those detained under a system which has caused<br />
the death of at least 50 people - and severely<br />
affected the mental and physical health of hundreds,<br />
if not thousands, of others.<br />
•<br />
In this regard, it la worth mentioning the role<br />
of the attorney-general's office in tha detention<br />
system. Often those held in detention far the<br />
longest periods involve detainmes which the office of<br />
the attorney^general has designated potential state<br />
witnesses in political trials. This does not mean<br />
that the person held has agreed to testify - or even<br />
that he/she will be called as a witness. It is<br />
sufficient that the attorney-general feels that tha<br />
potential witness might be intimidated, or might,<br />
abscond, or that it is in the 'interests of the<br />
administration of Justice'; the parson can then be<br />
held In conditions ehlch are effectively the same<br />
as those applying to section 6 of the Terrorism Act,<br />
for s period of up to 6 monthe.<br />
In practice, those held by the ettorney-general<br />
as potential state witnesses have previously been<br />
section 6 detainees. Their transfer to section 12<br />
page 4<br />
of the Internal Security Act Is largely administrative:<br />
In the recent cases of Journalists Themi Unzwal and<br />
Zwelakhe Slsulu, they were detained by security polica<br />
in mid-1961. Early in 1962 they were transferred to<br />
section 12(b) of the Internal Security Act. Until<br />
amswai's appearance in court, and Slsulu's release in<br />
February 1982. they received no visits from family,<br />
friends, lndapandent doctors or lawyers. For them,<br />
12(b) must have been much tha seme as section 6 -<br />
and it was tha office of the attorney-generel which<br />
was responsible for their detention under 12(b) and<br />
for the conditions of detention.<br />
Tha Rabie proposals retain provisions for tha<br />
detention of potential state witnesses. This is not<br />
surprising, given the general approach of the<br />
Commission. But it is worth emphasising that<br />
detention provisions ore not only administered by<br />
security police, and that the offices of tha<br />
respective ettornays-generel are integrally<br />
involved in the lengthy detention of people under<br />
conditions similer to those existing under section 6<br />
of the Terrorism Act.<br />
Over the past 0 months, a considerable amount of<br />
energy has been expended in focusing on the issue<br />
of detention and security detainees. Large-scale<br />
police raids, followed by the detention of trede<br />
unionists, community workers and students initially
Ma+i-lightwd soee of the IMUN involved; further<br />
attentions, the death in security police custody of<br />
Neil Agoett, the hospitallMtlan of e nuaber of<br />
MCtiort 6 detainewe and the report of the Beble<br />
Coeertsslan itself continued to focus attention on<br />
the systssi of interrogation and detention. In tha<br />
aejor urban arees-detainee support group* vara tat upt<br />
aeetlnge held, publicatiora produced.<br />
But ifv aa haa baan argued above, the atata naads<br />
security legislation to Maintain society in its currant<br />
fom, it auat ba aaKad any opposition groups hava<br />
given so wuch attantion to this particular Issue,<br />
After all, tha systaa of detention is Just ona eore<br />
aspact of an undaaocratio ruling group attempting to<br />
•iinUin its poser, thile tha call aay hava baan<br />
for tha unconditional ralaaaa of all datainaaa<br />
and tha abolition of dstantion-ralatad legislation,<br />
fee hava aarloualy baliavad that govamaant aould taka .<br />
nota of such a doasnd. It tharafora bacoass<br />
i»port«nt to look at ahat aort of issue datsntlon Is -<br />
and ehy it has racantly oosaaandsd so auch attantion.<br />
| Ona obvloua anaaar to this question ralataa to<br />
stteepts at protacting thosa who ara currently in<br />
detention, and thoea who may ba hald In tha future.<br />
Ear liar, it aas argued that in ruling class terms,<br />
Rsbla was correct to rare— nd tha aaintananca of a<br />
syatsn of interrogative datantion if South Africa was<br />
to ba rsproducad as an undaaocratlc, non-participatory<br />
society. But it aas also arguad that ona could hava<br />
expected tha Ooaaleoton to put forward proposals<br />
ahlch provldad for tha protactlon of detainees froa<br />
solitary conflnaaant, sleep deprivation, phyaical<br />
assault and osntal torture. Glvan that such ssfs-<br />
guards hardly exist in tha currant situation, a focua<br />
on tha ahola datsntlon syataa aarvas tha function of<br />
Monitoring ahat occurs in datantion, and bringing<br />
prassura to baar regarding datantion conditiona. Thia<br />
aay, in cartain casaa, ba of protactlva valua to<br />
thosa undargoing Interrogation,<br />
In this contact, attsapta to organisa profasaional<br />
bodias and groupa -ith a direct concern in tha aystaa<br />
of intarragatlon and datantion * lawyers* aadical<br />
practitionars, paychologiata and paychiatriata *<br />
aay ba ona aay of trying to protect detainees froa<br />
tha affaota of tha systaa. *-<br />
7 A sacond raason for focusing attantion on »<br />
detentions Involves tha aay in ahlch that iasus oasts<br />
light on othar aspects of tha social aystaa. OVar tha<br />
past faa yasrs, it haa becoew* fashlonsbla for cartain<br />
privileged raprassntativas of tha ruling claaaaa to<br />
argue that tha South ATrlcan stata is bant on a<br />
reformist progrs—•. All that is holding govamaant<br />
back from iaplaaantlng a aida ranga of reforms, thay<br />
argue, la tha right aing natura of cartain National<br />
Party alaaanta, sactiona of tha civil asrvioa, ate.<br />
rwnat tha datsntlon issua doaa is to ahoa that tha<br />
I so-callsd rafora progra—« of tha *varlig' wing of<br />
1 govamaant lnvolvaa a high dagraa of coarclon,<br />
frapraasion and control. Elections to tha South African<br />
Indian Council go hand in hand -ith tha datantion of<br />
entl-BAXC activists; thosa unionists aha opposa<br />
tha 'nee deal' on labour relations, and she assist<br />
lnstaad in tha building of strong, democratic unlona,<br />
ara detained. Qpsn oppoaltion political activity,<br />
if it lnvolvaa aasa participation, sasas to load to<br />
tha calls. Tha ahola ayataa of datantion<br />
demonstrates that currant atata initiatlvaa mmy<br />
involva changs - but not nacaaaarily in tha direction<br />
in shlch tha aajority of South Africana went. Thosa<br />
oho ara involved in organising and facilitating aasa<br />
opposition to government** pollclss — ba thay tha<br />
progresses of PV Boths's ganarala, Plat Koornhof *s<br />
bureaucrats or Fania Botha's Dapartaant of laanpowor<br />
Utilisation - face tha dsngsr of atata rapraaaion in<br />
ona of ita forms.<br />
But having said this. It auat ba notad that<br />
detention In ltaalf is a Halted lsaua. Rejection of<br />
'datantion-aithout-trial*, of datantion in conditions<br />
of solitary conflnaaant, of interrogation tachniquaa<br />
ahlch involva coarclon and astipulation of aind and<br />
body • this is a platforai shlch a broad apectrua of<br />
organised intaraata, froa raprasantativaa of<br />
' enlightened * capital through to tha left, can<br />
support. But precisely bacausa auch a broad and<br />
potentially conflicting sat of Interests can support<br />
tha issua, ita content, limits and paraemtera nwed<br />
to ba assaasad vary carefully.<br />
•ith thia in aind, a nuabar of points can ba<br />
raiaad in tha hopa that consideration of thaa will .<br />
ba conatructiva for those involved in tha datantion<br />
lsaua.<br />
1. It needs to ba asked ahlch groups and individuals<br />
ara bast placad to facilitate tha Mobilisation and<br />
organisation of those profsssions ahlch hava en<br />
intaraat in tha lssusa and conditiona of datantion,<br />
(Thia la ona of tha activities ehicn can potentially<br />
provide soas protactlon for datainaaa, in tarsal of<br />
aonltoring conditiona, prasauring for safsguards, ate).<br />
Of ita natura, thia la a limited activity: tha<br />
Majority of thosa involved In tha profassiona ara<br />
likely to occupy lntsrasdiata positions on tha<br />
political spactrvj*. Aa such, it U unlllcaly that<br />
profasaional bodias can go aach bayond attaapts to<br />
laprova conditiona aithln tha aystaa of datantion.<br />
In thasa taraa, it should ba esfced ahathar thosa<br />
on tha political laft ara bast suited for engaging<br />
•ith tha profassiona ovsr tha issua of detention,<br />
or whathar this is better undartafcan by individuals<br />
within tha profassiona sho ara kaan to consolidate<br />
progrsaalva viewpoints in thair sphsrs of activity.<br />
Thar* aay ba an argument that attaapts by tha<br />
political laft to intarvana with profasaional<br />
groups on an explicitly left-wing basis ara counter-<br />
productive, and Unit tha role strlch such professional<br />
groups can play vis-a-vis tha datantion issue.<br />
2. Much of tha activity around detentions haa involved<br />
a protest coaponant - public eoetlngs, picket<br />
protests, petitione, letter writing* religious<br />
services. It can ba arguad that this is a lag it lasts<br />
and iaportant terrain of activity for cartain groupa -<br />
especially aooarate lntarasts which hava retained or<br />
developed a concern end conscience about tha direction<br />
in shlch South African society la sjoving. Thle, for<br />
sMeapls, hee been en area of activity for the<br />
Johannesburg Oetainaee* Parents Support Cowaittee,<br />
shlch has been both active end successful in its<br />
chosen sphere of politics.<br />
But it dose need to be asked whathar thasa ara<br />
tta aorta of activities or issues shlch tha left
^ -f : - r/ - 1 '- • • • ' " T • .'<br />
should be expending time, tn*rgy end resources on * 1<br />
especially ehan they an already balng undertaken by<br />
other groups.<br />
3. If organised laft wing lntsrsets are going to<br />
undertake certain detention-related activities'In<br />
allianca with othar groups closer to tha cantra<br />
(ag Ubaral oroupa)t tha terms, oatura and function<br />
of thla allianca need to be worked out and apaclflad<br />
In aach case* For example ^ sane have saan a purpose<br />
In trying to inject a graater left-wing contant<br />
Into tha actlvltlaa of pradcftlnantly white, llbaral<br />
groups* ehsthar this should ba tha function of an<br />
allianca cvar a limited issue like datantion needs<br />
to ba aesasead in tarns of productivity and effect.<br />
Thla la not to suggest that thara la no placa<br />
for co-operation bataaan llbaral groups and thosa<br />
further laft, Thla la especially so ragerting<br />
.mutual information inputs, ideas and support In<br />
times of crisis. But It does naad to ba asked<br />
ehether organlsad groups to tha laft of cantra are<br />
bast occupiad in liberal, protest and/or 'preesura-<br />
group 1 politics ovar tha Isaua of datantlons ehan<br />
th|i la already balng undartakan by 'centra* groups.<br />
An assessment of thasa quastlona can possibly<br />
serve to develop both tha atratagy and tactics of<br />
thosa eho saa themselves as part of democratic<br />
opposition in South Africa. *<br />
••<br />
i<br />
,i -<br />
SL-J/feC<br />
' ^ ^ •-<br />
.<br />
i *<br />
* r< ., v- V- fr. . *: -• ? .*. ;% -,.: : , . - •;- • -•' \<br />
NEIL Aggett, Transvaal secretary of tha African Food<br />
and Canning Workers* Union, -au by no aaana tha first<br />
trade union leader to ba detained in tarns of South<br />
Africa's security legislation. Neither was ha tha<br />
first trada unionist to dla In tha custody of aacurlty<br />
police. Before him, unionists Ilka Lookemart<br />
Ngudla (1963), Caleb meyaklmo (1969), Luke Uazeembe<br />
(1976), Lawrenca Ndzange (1976) and Elijah Lou (197?),<br />
dlad ahlla balng held for tha purposss of<br />
interrogation by aacurlty police.<br />
Stata action against trada union officials aaa<br />
not uncoaaon befora 1960: for example', a number of<br />
paopla aaaoclatad with tha African Mine WonXara'<br />
Union aara chargad as a result of tha aasaiva 1946<br />
ains workers 1 strike. But in 1990 tha naa National<br />
Party governmsnt anactad the Suppression of Communism<br />
Act. Tha provisions af that Act ware used in an'<br />
attempt to destroy, or at least weaken. Independent<br />
militant trada unionism*. Of thosa uniona affected<br />
by government's use of this, and other, anti-<br />
working class legislation, tha Food and Canning<br />
•orkere* Union (FCTU) and African Food and Canning<br />
•orkara' Union (A-FCau), warrant special consideration.<br />
For ovar tha dacades, FOau anrJ A-FCW hava andurad<br />
aava aftar wave of stata action against thair<br />
officlala. Nail Aggatt's datantion, and<br />
aubaaquant daath ahlla in security police custody,<br />
la tha latest In a long Una of actions which hava<br />
affected tha organisation of workers In tha food<br />
and canning industry.<br />
•hy hava FCeu and A-FCau attracted so much<br />
atata action? .that kind of unions ara thay that ao<br />
many of thair offlciala hava baan bannad, datalnad,<br />
banished, triad, foread Into exile? Ihat followa<br />
Is a short summary of soaa of thair hiatory, in an<br />
attaapt to contaxtuallaa-atata action* against<br />
indepandant trade uniona, and to aituata tha daath.<br />
in di etantion of tha Tjwjnev*al aacretary of tha<br />
A-FCIPJ.<br />
"•*-".».: .-• kM<br />
iit|i|'i I.V i . i/i'l . .if'li<br />
.1 Tha Food end Canning ftrk.ro' Unlgn eas<br />
established in tha Western Cap« during 1941. having<br />
bean organised byj**y Alexander, • trade union and<br />
political figure of note in .ox^ing claas struggles<br />
until forcad into exile by a sariaa of banning and<br />
house arrest order*, ahan workers met to<br />
establish the union's Paorl branch, thay wara unable<br />
to obtain a hall In which t
Baper* (LK8), beceuoe of *ta anti-union ecUvitiee<br />
auoh as tha sdthdreeal of atop order facilities and<br />
the victimisation of union leaders. Tha outcoas of<br />
tha conauear boycott raelnde ona of tha acre recent<br />
dispute at Fettl's and Mania, share a boycott of<br />
products vat launched In support of tha workers 1<br />
Oasasnde, In 1909, as in the latter emm, tha FCwu<br />
son recognition fro" aanagasint, and antarad into mn<br />
agrooaant ow wages snd working conditions.<br />
FCSU and A-FCWJ aara involvad in a large nueber<br />
of activities underteksn by tha Congress Alliance<br />
(anion Involvad tha African National Congress,<br />
Congress of Oaaocrata, tha South African Indian<br />
Congress, Colourad Paoplaa" Congrass, and tha<br />
9outh African Congress of Trada Unions]* Tha unions<br />
playad a asjor rola in tha formation of tha South<br />
African Congrass of Trada Uniona (SACTU), ahich aaa<br />
tha trada union wing of tha Congraas Allianca, and<br />
aelntalnod effiliation to SAcru until such tlaa as<br />
state repression foread SACTU into exile.<br />
Tha diaput* at UOB, refar red to* above, intagrally<br />
Involvad tha FCfU'e relationship to tha Congrass<br />
Allianca through Its affiliation to SACTU, Tha<br />
coneuaer boycott or U03 producta was led by<br />
Congraasp snd raproaantaUvas of tha Allianca sore<br />
involvad In negotiations alth UCB during tha course<br />
of tha dispute.<br />
•hen the Bantu Education Act eas passed, FCSU<br />
supported the AHC's call for a boycott of bantu<br />
education schools. The union eleo psrtidpated<br />
in activities related to the Congress of the<br />
People. Miefcin of the FCWU aanagaaant conlttee<br />
attended an August 1954 conference to plan the<br />
Kliptoen congress, end union aaabire eat up groups<br />
to discuss ahat the Congress of the People eaa about,<br />
FCSU and A-FGW eere involved in SACTU'* 1957<br />
£1 e dey campaign, end union ewasbers esre prominent<br />
in aoee of the stay-et-*oas oella of the period.<br />
For eneple, a 3-day stay-eeay e i celled in May<br />
1961, oppoaing the declaretion of South Afrioa as<br />
a napubllc. The cell received slssd and petohy<br />
aupport, but on the Rand, Tflt of food end cennlng<br />
workers stdyed away froe wort for the whole 3-day<br />
period-<br />
But it eould be e eistaks to see the union es<br />
e 'paper organlaatlon 1 , involved in national politics<br />
to the detriesnt of factory floor organisation. Froe<br />
its formation in 1941, FC*U grew in strength, faming<br />
branches over the western and eastern Cape, and up<br />
the eest coast, A separate union ese foraid in<br />
Johannesburg end Durben, end in 1903 thla<br />
aMlgaaatad vlth FCVu to fore e netlonelly-beeed<br />
union.<br />
At SACTU'a inaugural conference, held in March<br />
195S. FCWU ees the largeet union repreeented $<br />
(9 000 •ewfcsrs), with A-TOW bslng the third<br />
largest (3 600 eaebsrs). By 1*2, FOV had 8 052<br />
*a**ers, ahile A-fCtu hed groan to include 9 565<br />
neebare. Indeed, the unions saaaad to be<br />
strengthened by their affiliation to SACTu, and in<br />
turn eere e beck-bone of SACTU ectlvltlea. One<br />
union offlciel explained this in the following way:<br />
Zt la not enough Juet to be effilleted. In<br />
every toan share our Union la in existence we<br />
auat help SACTU to organise the unorganleed<br />
workers and build SACTU into e powerful<br />
all-in national trade union centre.<br />
Oeaplte the forael existence of teo separate<br />
unions, a high dsgres of non-recial sorting clssa<br />
unity has bean displayed by union aeabart over aeny<br />
years. One exaaple of this involved the 1997 striks<br />
St BpwkhewVwse Food Products, in Cspe Toan. Initially,<br />
coloured workers froa tha FCWU sent on strike, but<br />
ahsn A-FCWU •aetjari arrived et the factory gatee,<br />
they Joined the striks. 27 african eortere were<br />
charged as a reault, and et the trlel one explained:<br />
I didn't have anything to gain for ayself. The<br />
reason I didn't go to sort was thst I wanted to .<br />
support ay Coloured brother workers who eere on<br />
strike.<br />
During the course of this striks, the *<br />
congraas organlsatlona (AW, 8AXP0, COD and SACTU) sent<br />
e Joint delegation to see Spekhenhaa asnsgeesnt ebout<br />
re-opening negotiations with the striking eortare.<br />
The 19SS InduetrUl ConcilUtion Aasnosjsnt Act<br />
ettacksd the Internal scope end regulation of<br />
registered unions: no further 'mixed* unions eould<br />
be registered, already existing 'aixed' unions sere<br />
to be compelled to separate into unl-raclal branches,<br />
and racially lntegratad congreeses snd shop-floor<br />
esMtlnga were prohibited. Tha aajorlty of SACTU<br />
affiliates* being unregistered unions, eere not<br />
effected by this Act, but soaa of the best organised<br />
snd strongest unione eare registered. Ona of these<br />
eas the FCWU.<br />
Initially, SACTU atteapted to fox* a united front<br />
of trade union groupe to oppoae the legislation, but<br />
TUCGA end the other co-ordinating bodies prefsrred<br />
to oppoae SACTU rather than the goverrasent in poser.<br />
A two-year debate over the issue of rag 1st ration<br />
took piece In SACTU: the optlone posed involved the<br />
formation of unl-racial uniona; dividing unione into<br />
racial branches; or de-regicterlng in defiance of<br />
the lew. Oscar Ifciethe, who until his detention in<br />
I960 wee still organising for A-FUU, aaa one of those<br />
aho ergued for de-registration et the tlae.<br />
Finally, FCJU reluctontly decided to comply with<br />
tha nee Act: while expressing total opposition to<br />
It, the union felt that until there eas greetar unity<br />
in the trade union eovaeent it eould rejasln registered.<br />
Given the growing strength and influence of<br />
m u end A-fcwu, It eas inevitable that action eould<br />
be taken against the unione. 8oae etteapte to awaken<br />
thee involved edsdnistrativs action. For exaaple, in<br />
195? tha lege Board claiaed that FCVU wee<br />
'unrepresentative' end could therefore not partlcipete<br />
in the Board's investigation of the induetry. Thie<br />
was despite the fact that FC*J had -era than SI*<br />
of eorkere in the industry unionised.<br />
In 1958 ths «ege Board actually lapoeed cuts for<br />
certeln cetegoriee of eorkere in the food snd canning<br />
Industry, evwj only the union's strength end relation-<br />
snip to ths Congress Alliance prevented these sage<br />
cute froe being lapleswsntad. At ebout the asm tlae,<br />
the Induetry wae daclered •essential' by govsrnaant,<br />
evening that there eas a total prohibition on all<br />
strike activity,<br />
llth tha passing of tha 1900 Suppression of<br />
Cosvjunlaa Act, government began rawoving trade union<br />
offlciala fro- their union position*. In 1963 the
original organiser of the Fomj, general secretary<br />
Ray Alexander, was banned. Bhe ees replaced by<br />
Dacky Lan who was In turn banned frow gatherings in<br />
1954, and prohibited fraa all trada union activity<br />
in 1956.<br />
Ourlno this period, union president Frank<br />
Uarquard ees banned in '.954, aa vara Sua Coa of<br />
tha unlon'a Port Elizabeth branch, and Sarah<br />
Ventsel, aacratary of tha Borceeter branch,<br />
than tha unlon'a first general eecretaryf Ray<br />
Alexander, wee ordarad by government to resign froe<br />
tha union* sorters etruok in protaat throughout tha<br />
Caps. . Moot of thase protaat strike* took* place in<br />
the eastern Cape, but there sere work stoppagae in<br />
Port Ellaabeth and East London as sell, 100 afrloen<br />
aoaen edgrente struck in Eaet London, and coepoeed<br />
tha follosino tribute to their banned general<br />
secretary!<br />
By encouraging African workere to organles, you<br />
have brought new hope and dignity to thouaands<br />
of workere. Sobeya Bibona (as -ill seat again).<br />
In 1999 Elizabeth flafaklng, preeident of the<br />
A-FCKJ aee benlahad from har hoae in Pearl to a fare<br />
in a remote, eead-deewrt area, 80 miles free tha<br />
nearest large town. Taking only the youngest of<br />
her 11 children, aho slipped out of South Africa<br />
into exile. Frances Beard, eecretary of tha FCSU'e<br />
Port Elisabeth branch, eaa detained by security police<br />
in 1962, and bemad in January 1963, Held In<br />
aolltary confinement for a year, ahe ems finally<br />
convicted in teres of the Buppreeelon of Coeaunlae<br />
Act, and eentenced to 5 years lapriaoneent. On her<br />
release, ahe sea banished to the Northern Traneveel,<br />
a thousand alias froa her hoae.<br />
The list of officleie removed froa FC*U and<br />
A-FCWU la very long, eafcel Balfour, Traneveel<br />
general secretary of the A-FOFJ aes benned in 1962,<br />
and oonfinad to a aaell house in fioodepoort; Liz<br />
Abrahaae, aho acted ae FOPJ ganerel aacratary after<br />
the banning of Ray Alexander and Beaky Len, ees<br />
hereelf restricted in 196*. And Mery Hoodley, who<br />
hed organleed worker* on tha East Rand into FCBU in<br />
the 1900a, see held under 90-day detention in 1963.<br />
Barred free trade union eork in 1963, ahe regained<br />
banned for all but 3 days of the next VJ yetre, dying<br />
a restricted person in October 1979.<br />
Thoea arrested in the Treason Trial Included<br />
A Hshlengu of tha A-FCSU. 6 Oaaone and Frances<br />
Beard of FCBU'e Port Elizabeth branch, than tha<br />
atete of emergency eee declared in 1960, end the<br />
MC end PAC banned, Beard, tasbel Belfour and Oscar<br />
UpethA were detained. Subsequently, Lily Oladrlcha,<br />
aacratary of the FCBU benefit fund in Port Elizabeth,<br />
Inevitably, state action had ita effects on<br />
the unions, and gradually FCJBJ retreated to ita<br />
Veetern Cape base, share only a fee brenchee remained<br />
active. But the davelopaent of nee Independent<br />
trade union grouping* in the 1970a gave FCeU a nee<br />
lapetua, and by 1979 tha union eaa atrong enough<br />
to take on the eenageaont of Fettle* and Mania in<br />
• protracted strike - and eventually ein recognition.<br />
It ees during thla atrika that a conaueor boycott<br />
of F • M products eaa launched in support of tha<br />
eorkere* daaends - a tactic pravlouely used by tha<br />
union in an earlier period. In the 1960s workers<br />
free the union sere involved in tha boycott of<br />
potatoes in the Transvaal, and oranges In tha<br />
eeetem Cape,<br />
The F • m atrika served to underline the F0BU*e<br />
policy of non-reoUl eorker solidarityj both afrlcen<br />
and coloured workers eere Involved in the atrika<br />
activity, and norweclel eupport groups were aet up<br />
around the country to undertake tha boycott of<br />
f • I products.<br />
Union aeebers have been Involved In militant<br />
atrlke activity in e number of inatancee over the<br />
paet fee years - at Baa Harvest in Baldhana Bay<br />
(sea *1P 11:26-27), and at Krcariviar Apple Co-op<br />
(eee JJP 13:23-55}, for exajaple. firanchee have bean<br />
eat up or reactivated in Uohenneeburg and East<br />
London - the latter having bean involved in the<br />
oppoaition to Ciskaien 'lnOependenee*, ahich obvlouoly<br />
affects a majority of union aeabara. Indeed, a number<br />
of FCBU unionist* were detained by Clakel authorities<br />
in 1B80 end 1BS1, ehlla £e*t London branch, aacratary<br />
BonlaUe Noruehe aee held by South Afrlcen eeourlty<br />
police for 7 aonthe before being celled ee a witnaee<br />
in a political trial, then he refused to testify,<br />
he ees eentenced to one yee^e lagrlsoneent.<br />
Ho account of etata action agminet leaders of<br />
FCIU and A-FCiU le complete without aentlon of<br />
Oscar up nth*: involved in A-FCBU for over 3 dacedaa<br />
(intarruptad by banning orders and leprlsoneent),<br />
he Is currently standing trial In Cape Toan eith 17<br />
others. Detained in August 19B0 In tha context of<br />
the Cape Town bus boycott, the etate refuaaa even<br />
to allow thla ?1-yeer old veteran of trede unionlae<br />
ball, despite falling health and vary little evidence<br />
implicating hie in hie trial. In eany ways* Hpetha's<br />
Involvement In trade union, community and political<br />
atrugglaa eyaMliees the hlatory of FCBU and A-FCwu -<br />
Including tha eysteaetlc atteoke aede by the state<br />
on these unions.<br />
This Is the context in ehlch Hail Aggett'a<br />
deeth should be viewed. Ae aacratary of tha Transvaal<br />
branch of A-FCW, he ees Integrally Involved In the<br />
resurgence of eorker orgenleatlon. His death robe<br />
A-FCBU in particular, and the Independent union<br />
eoviaint in general, of a valued and important<br />
member. But the union has outlived the nuearoua<br />
previous attacks on its officials. As a recant<br />
press report noted,<br />
On general policy lesuae the unions 1<br />
etence reaelne within an eatabUehad<br />
tradition. There is e bedrock belief in<br />
industrial unionlae, non-reclellae and rank<br />
and file control (Star. 1fi.01.B3).<br />
It io these featuree which ahould enable<br />
FCfU end^A-FCsnj to aurvive the death of an<br />
organlaar, as well as any future actions ehlch the<br />
stete la planning against the independent trade<br />
union movement*
[DETENTIONS:<br />
Investigating<br />
Inquests<br />
IN response to Neil Agpatt's death In detention, and<br />
the approach of the inquest into the circumstances<br />
of his death, it is important to focus attention on<br />
the procedures followed in inquests- This article<br />
looks at some features of the inquest with regard to<br />
political detainees. It includes concrete examples<br />
illustrating tha role of police, the presiding<br />
magistrate, and state pathologists. Other legal<br />
proceedings resulting from deaths in detention are<br />
also considered.<br />
The Inquest Act, Wo 5ft^of 1950<br />
IT ia essential to understand the purpose and alma of<br />
an Inquest in order to realise that the limitations<br />
contained in the various provisions of the Inquest,<br />
Act lay inquest proceedings open to such abuse as to<br />
prevent tha achievement of those aims.<br />
An Inquest Is not a criminal trial in ahlch<br />
people are found guilty and than sentenced. An<br />
inquest is a hearing Consisting of<br />
1) e magistrate;<br />
2) a public prosecutor;<br />
3) a parson representing those aith an interest in the<br />
outcome of the inquest (hereafter referred to MM a<br />
lawyer); and<br />
4) any witnesses that are necessary to assist the<br />
court in the search for tha truth.<br />
The function of both the public prosecutor and the<br />
lawyer is to present the magistrate with the facts<br />
surrounding tha death of tha deceased* The magistrate<br />
than has to arrive at a decision as to the<br />
circumstances of the deceased's death, and whether it<br />
aas caused by any act or omission on the part of<br />
anyone. It oust be stressed that the role of tha<br />
public prosecutor is only to lead the evidence,<br />
and not to attempt to exonerate or apportion blame;<br />
it is certainly not the public prosecutor's role to<br />
put the beliefs and past actions of the deceased on<br />
trial,
examine the moker of the iUt#Mnt in order to<br />
ascertain the truth of the ellegatlons contained in<br />
the statement. Hwvir, the magistrate may decide<br />
to call th« parson who made tha statement to giva<br />
evidence - but than tha magistrate haa tha discration<br />
to determine which quaationa tha lawyer ahould be<br />
alloaad to ask.<br />
After all tha avldanca (such aa it is ) has baan<br />
hesrd* tha Magistrate 'shall racord a finding,...<br />
a) aa to tha identity of tha deceased person;<br />
b) aa to the cause or likely cause of death;<br />
0) as to the dete of death}<br />
d) aa to whether tha death eas brought about by any<br />
act or omission Involving or amounting to an<br />
offence on the part of any person*.<br />
Zf the amglstrate is unable to record any finding,<br />
then he/she must record that fact. No reasons need be<br />
given by the.magietrete for coning to any of tha<br />
findings.<br />
If the moglfttrete states<br />
1) that the court is unable to record e finding, or<br />
2) that tha death eas brought about by an act or<br />
omission involving or amounting to an offence on<br />
the part of any person, or<br />
3) if requested to by the attorney general,<br />
then the magistrate must give the file of the inquest<br />
to the attorney general who may then, in hie<br />
discretion, reopen the InQuost.<br />
There mrm certain offences that the Inqueat Act<br />
does set out, the Boat important being that "any<br />
person who prejudices, influences or anticipates the<br />
proceedings or findings of an inqueat....shall be<br />
guilty of an offence 1 . Sentence is a maximum of<br />
R900, or 6 months, or both. Thie offence eas<br />
Introduced In 1979, not long after the conclusion<br />
of the Biko inquest.<br />
Bearing in elnd tha fact that tha public<br />
prosecutor and the aaglatrate ere public eervants in<br />
the pay of the state, and the extent of the discretion<br />
thet ie given to the megletrete, It le clear that<br />
the Inojjest Act is vulnerable to ebuae. The<br />
magistrate can, with the uee of the discretionary<br />
powers, direct end channel the events in the<br />
inquest to the extent of almost excluding the party<br />
representing the relatives of the deceased*<br />
An effective summary of the Act is to compare the<br />
embit of the magistrate'a discretion with the rights<br />
of representstiveeof the deceased.<br />
The following fall elthln the magistrate's discretion:<br />
1) Vhether a medical examination should be held or<br />
not (eectlon 3(2)).<br />
2) thether the deceased's body should be disinterred .<br />
or not (section 3(d)).<br />
3) Who should be present at the poet mortem besldee<br />
tha district surgeon and police.<br />
4) Tha date of the Inqueat - 'reasonable notice.*.to<br />
be given to the spouse or relative, provided the<br />
spouse or relative is available 9^S the giving of such<br />
notice eill not, in the opinion of the magistrate,<br />
unduly delay the inquest 1 (section ?).<br />
5) which witnesses should be celled to give evidence.<br />
6) which assessors should alt with the Magistrate to<br />
decide on the findings: must alao get Ministerial<br />
sanction for this (section 9(0).<br />
?) which persons should be excluded froe the place<br />
of the lnqueet - '....the mmgietrate holding the<br />
lnqueet mey In hia discretion exclude froe the place<br />
where tha lnqueet le held eny person whose presence<br />
thereat is, in his opinion not necessary or desirable'<br />
(section 10).<br />
a) wnich questions way be put by Interested partlee<br />
to the witnessee - 'Representatives of interested<br />
parties aay only put such questions as the magistrate<br />
aay allow* (section 11(2)).<br />
9) whether and when the inquest should be ertjournod<br />
(eectlon 12(1»,<br />
10) which documents should be eoMesible In proof of<br />
the facts stated therein (section 13(1)).<br />
11) Ihether the person making the above-mentioned<br />
affidavit shell be celled to give evidence<br />
(section 13(2)).<br />
12) Whether evidence Should be taken on commission<br />
or not (section 15).<br />
13) whether Interested pertlee should see or obtain<br />
. •<br />
the documents given by the prosecutor to the<br />
magistrate ehlch aey or will be used in the lnqueet.<br />
'It will be in hie discration whether he ellowe<br />
/ P*ge 10<br />
thee to have a copy or to peruse the document, and it<br />
will be in his discretion whether It Is to be ellowed.<br />
in respect of all tha documents or only In respect of<br />
ecme of thsmf and aa to shen this le to be done, or in<br />
what circumstances and subject to whet conditions the<br />
perueel is to take place or tha copies ere to be<br />
delivered 1 . .<br />
14) whether e list of witnesses and documents to be<br />
used in the trial be given to the interested party.<br />
The rights of interested parties (normolly relotlves<br />
of the deceased):<br />
1) The rigiht to nominate legal representation.<br />
2) The right to nominate e medical practitioner to be<br />
present et the medical examination (eectlon 3(a)(b)).<br />
3) To put such questions to witnesses as the<br />
magietrate may allow (section 11(2).<br />
4) To hand in affidavlte (section 13(l)) - eno ash:<br />
that the makers of the effldevits be aubpoenaad to give<br />
orel evidence.<br />
Poet-mdrtomo<br />
THE lnqueet Act leys down the legal framewor* in<br />
which the post mortem exeminetion le to tmfce piece.<br />
According to the Act t a meglatrate to whom e death<br />
la reported may *if he deeme it expedient in the<br />
Interests of Justice, ceuss (the body) to be<br />
examined by tha district surgeon or eny other medical<br />
practitioner who amy, if he demse it necessary for the<br />
purpose of ascertaining with greater certainty the<br />
cause of dwwth, meke or causa to be mode en examination<br />
of any internal organ or any part of any of the<br />
contente of the body, or of any other eubatance or<br />
thing'.<br />
In addition, a private pathologist may be present<br />
If the Magistrate is satisfied thet such e person<br />
(usually representing the family of the deceased) haa<br />
a 'substantial and peculiar interest in the issue of<br />
tha examination'.<br />
Even if privets pathologists are present, they<br />
may not neceesarily be so et the critical post-mortem.<br />
In the case of Luke •mtwamba, private pathologists<br />
were only able to ess the body 5 deya after the
peg* 11<br />
officially performed post-mortem. In the cetie of<br />
Hell Aggett, the post-mortem was started prior to<br />
the arrival of the private pathologist.<br />
The aim of the post-mortem examination la to<br />
establish precisely the causa of death. The post"<br />
mortem examination consists of the following<br />
procedures i<br />
1) Identification of the body;<br />
2) Secondary post-mortem changes;<br />
3) External appearance of the body and condition of<br />
the llmbe;<br />
4) Examination of the head and neck and organs;<br />
5) Examination of the chest and organs;<br />
6) Examination of the abdomen and organs;<br />
7) Examination of the spina;<br />
8) Additional observations;<br />
9) Specimens. •<br />
All the observations of the pathologist are entered<br />
into Form (Health) 1, titled 'Report on a medico<br />
legal postHsortem examination', which is completed<br />
under the auspices of the Department of Health. This<br />
form concludes with an observation as to the cous*<br />
of death.<br />
It Is important +o note, however, that the whole<br />
examination is still subject to the personal<br />
Interpretation of the examiner. The pathologist is<br />
In a position to note or overlook certain findings and<br />
to take or ignore certain specimen*. At the inquwst<br />
of Jamms Lenkoe, evidence of electric shock treatment<br />
and traces of copper war* found by a private<br />
pathologist. The atate pathologists were unlikely<br />
to have taken such specimens.<br />
Thus, while the inquest post-mortem has the sir<br />
of cold, objective, scientific enquiry. It is<br />
nevertheless open to personal opinion, personal bias,<br />
end in some cases, polltlcel objectives. Even the<br />
scientific basis of many of the conclusions are open<br />
to discussion - the Blko inquest contained hours o f<br />
discussion over how, exactly, certain Injuries might<br />
have bean sustained. The pethologlst is in a very<br />
powerful position of being expected to atate with<br />
euthorlty what was the cause of death* In many cases,<br />
pathologists refuse to commit themselves by stating<br />
•<br />
a particular event likely to have caused death. In<br />
other inquests, the testimony of doctors has given<br />
important insights into the methods of interrogation<br />
used by security police, end the resultant deaths of<br />
detainees.<br />
The evidence presented by government pathologists<br />
is highly regarded by inquest magistrates. Solomon<br />
modipane died on 28 February, T9G9. A police<br />
spokesmen announced thet the detainee had received<br />
certain injuries when ha had slipped on a bar of<br />
soap. The district surgeon announced thet he was<br />
unable to determine the cause of deeth; the magistrate<br />
used this information to state that it was a<br />
•natural death* and that no inquest was necessary.<br />
The pathologist may be unwilling to speculate<br />
es to how injuries may have been caused. Imam<br />
Abdullah Hsron died on September 27. 1969, In the<br />
Maltland police cells. The minister of police told<br />
the press that ha had died of natural causes,<br />
heving fallen down stairs- 26 bruises of varying<br />
agas were identified on the front, side and back<br />
of his body. The pathologist stated thet the cause<br />
of death was heart trouble related to injuries<br />
sustained in the fall. Ha could not or was not<br />
willing to say how the other injuries had been caused.<br />
Interestingly, although the magistrate attached no<br />
blame to any person, the state paid Mrs Heron<br />
R5 000 In an out-of-court settlement.<br />
The evidence provided by doctors may also be<br />
significant in implicating tha security police and<br />
their interrogation methods. James Lenkoe was<br />
found hanging in his prison call in Pretoria. The<br />
prison surgeon found that death was due to hanging.<br />
The family of Lenkoe lnalstad on another post*<br />
mortmw being conducted by en independent pathologist.<br />
At the inquest, counsel for the widow presented medical<br />
evidence that indicated that Lenkoe had been given<br />
an electric shock on the day he died. Three<br />
pathologists testified that there wee a mark on hie<br />
body thet was consistent with a very recent electric<br />
burn. The verdict in the Inquest was 'eelf-inflicted<br />
hanging*.<br />
In summary, tha Inquest Act allows for post-ewrtem<br />
examinations to take place. These af* conducted by<br />
stete pethologiets, except where the magistrate haa<br />
allowed private pathologists to attend tha<br />
examination. The post-mortem Itself is subjective<br />
in tanas of what tissues are examined and what<br />
specimens taken; the observations tcx> may ba<br />
contested as to their signiflcanca. Doctors Involved<br />
In providing evidence et inquests may ba of asslstanca<br />
to the family or 'prosecution*; somwtimas this is<br />
intentional. The objectivity of the poet-mortem<br />
findings is itself e myth.<br />
Illustrations from pest Inquests<br />
1. Hussein Haffajeo<br />
Hsffejee, a 26 year old Durban dentist, died on 2<br />
August, 1976, which was tha first night of his<br />
detention. The inquest into his death eas only held<br />
in 1976.<br />
Security police testified that Heffejea was<br />
detained et e specielly erected police block. Police<br />
had previously entered hie flat, photocopied items<br />
there, end then left the premises as If undisturbed.<br />
After being detained, police drova Hsffejee around<br />
Durban, and according to security police he put up<br />
a struggle and fought with them a nusber of times^<br />
es if trying to escape. Police claimed that these<br />
tussles ware the causa of bruises found on the<br />
detainees body, and denied thet they ware the reeult<br />
of 'excessive interrogation'. Tha chief etata<br />
pathologist and an International for*nelc export<br />
both agreed thet the 40-50 bruises on the body were<br />
not the causa of death. The representative, of the<br />
public prosecutor accordingly argued that Heffejea<br />
had killed himself by hanging.<br />
The public prosecutor applied to lead documentary<br />
evidence to lndicata a motive for suicide. These<br />
Involved notee In his handwriting on hoe to woke<br />
exploelveet manuals 'for organising tarrorism',<br />
and other books. He even wanted to call e police<br />
exploalvas expert to testify that bombs found in a<br />
building were tha same aa thosa described by hoffejea<br />
in his notes.<br />
Counsel for the Hsffejee family opposed tha
application, claiming that it •ould turn the inquest<br />
into a criminal trial of an accused already dead,<br />
and therefore not in a position to answer allegations.<br />
The magistrate, haaaver, ruled that the documents<br />
could be lad as evidence.<br />
The public prosecutor-than argued that the<br />
docuaanta proved that Heffejee had committed suicide<br />
Qecauee he did not sent to face public trial and be<br />
exposed es a saboteur.<br />
At the conclusion of the Inquestt the magistrate<br />
found that no-ona aaa to blame for Haffejaa's death.<br />
Regarding the injuries on his body, the magistrate<br />
found that security police aere not responsible. In any<br />
event, he ruled that the issue was irrelevant 'since<br />
in tense of the Inquest Act the court eaa not concerned<br />
aith lesues not connected to the cause of death*.<br />
2. LungUe Tebalaxe<br />
Tabalaza, a 21 year old youth, fall to hie death froa<br />
the fifth floor of the Senlmm Building (security<br />
. police headquarters) In Port Elizabeth on 10 July*<br />
1978. Thla aaa the saiie venue ehere Stave 8iko<br />
sustained his fatal injuries shortly before.<br />
Tebelaae'a death led to calls for the resignation<br />
of police Minister Jimmy Krugar - aho announced that<br />
a aanior police officer had bean appointed to make<br />
immediate investigations into the clrcuaatancas<br />
surrounding the death of Tabs la ES.<br />
Tao seeks later, Krugar announced that three<br />
eecurlty pollcaaan in Port Ellnbeth aould be<br />
transferred to another area. One of these aas the<br />
'C— ending officer of the PC security police, Colonel<br />
PJ Oooean - prominent in the BiXo inquest. Goosan<br />
haa recently bean promoted to Brigadier.<br />
Tahaloza had bean arrested together eith another<br />
Y7 year old youth. They eere taken from the police<br />
etatlon in Nee Brighton to the Banlaa Building in<br />
toan share the eecurlty police have their offices.<br />
The 17 year old youth aas brought to trial on<br />
charges of arson and theft el thin 46 hours of<br />
Tabalaza'a death. Tabalaza aould have bean e co-<br />
accused in this trial. The youth pleaded guilty on<br />
all chargee. but the Magistrate found hi* not guilty<br />
on aoae of the charges .beceuee of insufficient<br />
1 my., v I.--.-*- --• •. ll JJ-. i'L ' " ^ m ^ m ^mm<br />
evidence. He aae aantanced to 30 months imprisonment.<br />
During the course of the inquest, this youth<br />
aas called aa a vltnesa at the request of the family.<br />
He said that the eecurlty police had told him that<br />
he would be detained for 10 yeara If ha did not plead<br />
guilty. He also said that ne did not want to aake<br />
! e stataaant in front of a magistrate, but aade one<br />
beceuse he aas afraid of being beaten up.<br />
The security pollca claimed that Tabalaza had<br />
Jumped froa the fifth floor office in a bid to reach<br />
the roof of a building across the street. Counael for<br />
the Family said that thie see pure speculation and<br />
that Tabalaza could have Jumped to escape the police<br />
or to commit suicide. TebaJexa aas efreid of the<br />
eecurlty police, and they eare not only morally<br />
liable for his death, but had bean criminally negligent,<br />
said counsel.<br />
Hoeever, the magistrate found that nobody aas to<br />
blame for his death. He recorded the evidence<br />
given by the security polio* ea honest and thoroughly<br />
tasted, ehlle the evidence fllven by the youth aaa<br />
felee. He rejected hie evidence of threats and<br />
assaults by policat ahich tna youth had given for<br />
the first time et the lnQuest.<br />
3. Ahmed Ttmol<br />
Timol aas a X year old school teacher aho fell<br />
from the tenth floor of John Vorster Square,<br />
Johannesburg, in October 1971.<br />
An inquest date aas Initially set doan for<br />
December 1971, but at the start counsel for the family<br />
applied for access to documents relating to Timol *e<br />
detention. The magistrate refused this, and counael<br />
applied to the Supreme Court to eat aside thie refusal.<br />
The Bupreme Court ordered the magistrete to etudy<br />
the documents, but maid that it aaa etlll at the<br />
magietrete'e discretion what to do. After<br />
studying the docuaanta, the Magistrate allowed them<br />
ell to be disclosed.<br />
than the inouaat began at the and of April T972,<br />
etateaente allegedly eritten by Timol during the<br />
three days before* hie deeth eer« handed in as axhibite.<br />
He aas reported to have described hoe ha aaa recruited<br />
and trained by the South African Communist Party<br />
in London,<br />
During the course of the inquest, a visit aas<br />
made to the room from ahich ha aas alleged to have<br />
Jumped. Security police aho had bean present and<br />
involved in the caae at the time, gave evidence<br />
about hoe Timol Jumped. Tao security police gave<br />
conflicting accounts, and counsel for the family<br />
pointed out thet one of them had only handed in a<br />
ststement to the CIO, aho mere inveetlgatlng the<br />
case, tao weeks lata. To add to the drama, General<br />
Buys, head of the CIO and leader of the investigation<br />
team, aho had agreed that there rare inconsistencies,<br />
page 12<br />
had a heart attack ehlle being cross examined. Later,<br />
he see apparently back in hie office doing light<br />
work, but aas unfit to return to the witness box.<br />
The etate gave tag possible raaaons shy Timol<br />
had jumped: they said that ha had Jumped after a<br />
Mr X (an informer ehosa name they aould not disclose),<br />
had walked into the office and announced that they<br />
had traced 'Quentin and others*. If thia aaa the<br />
seats parson aa Quant in Jacobeant he aaa later<br />
acquitted on charges under the Terrorism Act, and<br />
Tiaul aas not mentioned in that esse.<br />
I The eacond reason put forward related to<br />
docuaanta found In Tlmol'e possession, ahich<br />
instructed memo ere of the Communist Party to commit<br />
suicide rather than betray the Party. The aagietrate<br />
accepted that Timol must have been familiar aith thase<br />
instructions.<br />
Detailed medical argument aaa led concerning<br />
datea of bruises that mere found on Timol'e dead<br />
body. It aaa difficult to ascertain whether the<br />
bruises aere Inflicted prior to detention, or ehlle<br />
ha aaa in detention. The magistrate'recommended<br />
when giving judgement, that detalneeo under tna<br />
Terrorlem Act should in future be examined by a<br />
district aurgaon aa aoon aa posaible after their<br />
detention. This might avoid the necessity for<br />
long enquiries, and might save the pollca unnecessary<br />
smb ex ralament.<br />
There aas also medical debate about injuriss<br />
that could have bean sustained immediately prior to<br />
death. hVjeauer, counsel admitted that injuries,
page 13<br />
unless Inflicted beforw daath. would ba<br />
indistinguishable fro* thoaa sustained at daath<br />
( f m falling).<br />
Counsel asked the aagiatrata to giva * vwrdict<br />
that ha saw unable to aay whathar tha daath had baan<br />
brought about by ait act or oaisalon on the part of<br />
any parson. Tha magistrate's finding was that<br />
nobody w responsible. Ha aald that Tlaol'* daath<br />
could heva baan politically aotlvatad bacauaa of his<br />
allayad adhapanoa to coaaunlat Ideology, and that<br />
•Mi daath *a* • twrribla loss to tha polica\ alnca<br />
ha was wary * valuable' for thair invaatigatlona. „<br />
Othar laoal procaadinga<br />
THE general and aoat accaptad procedure aftar •<br />
daath has occurred in datantion la an lnquast<br />
hearing. T«o of tha deaths that hava occurrad in<br />
datantion hava raault in additional court proceedings.<br />
Tha caaaa of Joseph Hdlull and Hapatla Hohapl ara thaw<br />
lnatancaa,<br />
: Jowwph 1M1<br />
On 19 Ismrch, t976, Joaaph Udluli diad in police<br />
custody in Durban, 2d hours aftar ha had baan<br />
I datainad. Mo lnquaat took placa as tha state<br />
decided to proaacuta d aacurity policawin for<br />
culpabla hoaiclda,<br />
Tha AW in London ralaaaad certain photograph*<br />
; of Hdlull** corpse. Thay showed a aultltuda of<br />
injuries on his body. Ho had nuaarous abrasions,<br />
a fractured cartilage, broken ribe and his brain<br />
i*M conoaatad with haaaur rhagta. This aaa tha cllaata<br />
in ahich tha trial of tha 4 aacurity policaaan took<br />
placa*<br />
: Tha accused wara:<br />
Captain OF van Zyl<br />
Uautwnant * Taylor<br />
I Datactiva Sarpaont ef> eawthanya<br />
Datactiva Sergeant Z Npobaaa.<br />
Tha accuaad did not give avidanca. Xnataad<br />
thay aada atataaants to tha proaacutor. Thair varalon<br />
of tha evants loading up to Waluli's daath was aa<br />
follow*: Joaaph udluli aaa arraatad on ie asvoh at *<br />
about lOhOO. Tha rolloelng aorning, ahila being<br />
lntatrogatad, ha aoVad toward* tha window in an<br />
attwapt to coiaait suicide* Ha WW* rastrsin-d , and<br />
a fierce struggle anaued. Tha incident aas report**<br />
to Major Coatzaa aho aaa Hdlull and stated that ha em<br />
satisfied that Udluli had not baan injured.<br />
Hdlull*s intarrtsjation continuad -lth ocoaalonal<br />
braaka until about 20h30 tha aaaa day. Tha pollca<br />
alleged that ha than auddanly got up, staggering<br />
and coaplslnlng of diulnaa*. Ha fall with hla<br />
chest or naok onto tha back of a chair. Tha chair<br />
topplad and Udluli fall against tha door. Shortly<br />
oftarwda, Hdlull aaa daad.<br />
In his Judgaaant, Justice Jaaae rwfarrwd to tha<br />
avidanca of Or van Straatan, tha stata pathologist<br />
aho carried out tha poet-aortaa on Hdlull*s body.<br />
Or van Straatan had originally attributed tha causa<br />
of daath to throttling, but aftar discussing tha<br />
•attar alth tha chief stata pathologist, Prefaaaor<br />
Gordon, ha caaa to tha conclusion that Hdlull'a<br />
daath aaa associated with tha application of force<br />
to the naok. Tha Judga did not dlsputa this finding,<br />
and had this to say about ltt "In othar words. . .<br />
although what ha observed was conaistant alth daath<br />
through throttling it aaa also consistent aith tha<br />
application of forca or soaa othar aannar*.<br />
Justice Jaaaa rafarrad to tha atatawant* whicah<br />
tha accuaad had aada, in ahich thay aald that Hdlull<br />
had admitted to having racruitad people for sdlitary<br />
training. Thay alao sold that ha had ravaalad tha<br />
naaa of tha taxi drlvar aho had tranaportad tha<br />
racruita. Tha Judga accaptad tha accuaad'a story<br />
that thay had uaad no aora 'force than aaa nacasawry'<br />
to wubdua Hdlull aftar ha had aovad toaarda tha<br />
ainojoa. Ha said thay "clearly sara not guilty of<br />
any unlawful conduct at 6.X on tha aorning of tha<br />
ttth Harch bacauaa thay appliad no greater forca than<br />
saa lawfully justified in tha cireuaatancaa*,<br />
Whan tha second incldant occurrad 12 hours later,<br />
tha 4 accuaad, according to thair wtateaanta, war*<br />
not in tha rooa. Othar aacurity policaaan, Ifruawlo,<br />
Ndull, and Itilongo wara thara. Tha Judga said that<br />
although tha accounta glvan by tha latter .dlffarad<br />
I in tfatall, thara aaaaad to be oanaral agraaaent that.<br />
Hdluli got up froa his chair, hald Kis haad in hla<br />
hand*, coaplalnad of dizziness, and than fall onto a<br />
chair and than againat a door fraaa. Othar policaaan<br />
rushad to tha acana and andaavourad to apply artificial<br />
inspiration. By 2*30 it aaa obvious that Udluli was<br />
dean •<br />
If this avidanca of tha police la to ba accaptad<br />
at its faca valua, than It ia claar that tha 4<br />
accuaad aaro not rwaponslblw for tha daath<br />
of Hdluli. Thay wara not prewant whan ha<br />
diad and had left tha rooa about an hour bafora.<br />
Tha only incldant in ahich thay had baan involved<br />
in any violent contact aaa at about 8.30** ouar<br />
12 houra bafora his daath and according to<br />
Major Coatzaa ha notioad nothing wrong with<br />
Hdluli aftar tha incldant,<br />
tha Judga aald.<br />
Tha Judga discounted tha argtsaant put forward<br />
by Ur Brunette for tha state, that tha daath<br />
occurrad aa a raault of tha Incldant aMoh took placa *<br />
at 8h30 in tha aorning. Tha doctor** avidanca had<br />
atatad that daath would hava baan alaoat lnatantanaous<br />
aftar racalving tha naok injuries. Ha could not<br />
hava sustalnad thaaa injuries and only diad 12 houra<br />
later. Furtharaorw, if IWluli had received tha rack<br />
injuries in tha aorning and died ia*j*diat*ly. tha<br />
Judga aald, tha court ***• unable to accept* that it<br />
«as possibla far tha pollca to cover this up until<br />
that night.<br />
.Tha 4 aacurity policaaan wara thua found not to<br />
ba laaponalblw for Hdlull'a daath, although thara aaa<br />
a possibility that thay had uaad 'lagltiaata forca to<br />
aubdua hla*. Justice Jaaaa acqulttad thaa of tha<br />
charga of culpabla hoaiclda.<br />
Bafora concluding hla Judge****, hoawvar*<br />
tha Judga had this to say in tha light of tha wida-<br />
spraad injuriaa on Hdlull"* body and tha conflicting<br />
avidanca ha had haard: ,<br />
I naad hardly say that tha pr^blaa of how<br />
Udluli aat hla daath is ona that should ba solved<br />
and that it ia ona of groat Importance.<br />
Joaaph Hdlull aas liatad aa a co-conspirator in<br />
a trial in Pirtaiwaritzburg of 10 wan charge* with<br />
MC activities. Hr Juaticw Hoswnl, in a section of<br />
hi* Judgaaant, rwfarrad to Hdlull** daath In datantion.<br />
He aald that tha injuriaa that cauaad hla daath could
not heve been aalf-inflictmd, nor ciusid eccidentally.<br />
He said<br />
•w are satisfied that Mr Mdlult sustained the<br />
injuries while he was In tha custody of the<br />
Security Police. There is no evidence of how<br />
ha suffered tha injuries, or In shot<br />
circumstances* That is a setter peculiarly in<br />
the knowledge of the persona In whose custody he<br />
was at tha time end none of them has given<br />
evidence.<br />
The statements mode by both Judges have far-<br />
reaching Implications in tens of further<br />
lnvestlegtion into Udlull's death. However, no<br />
further action hot t>^mn taken by the attorney<br />
general, end the circumstances of his death hevw<br />
only left his interrogators that much more suspect<br />
in the eyes of the world.<br />
As has been stated above, Inquests ere far from<br />
adequate means of establishing what actually happens<br />
when a death has occurred in detention. If a civil<br />
or criminal case reaches the courts t much more<br />
evidence is brought to light, both sides lnvestlgeting<br />
and arguing more deeply the events leading up to the<br />
death,<br />
Mspotle wohapl<br />
An lnquaat into tha death in detention of Uepetla*<br />
Uohapi (died 15.07.76) found that the cause of death<br />
was 'force applied to hie neck due to hanging'. His<br />
death, the magistrate seid, was not brought about by<br />
any act or omission by any living person. However,<br />
the magistrate did not issue a formal verdict of<br />
suicide.<br />
tapetla Mohapi's widow then sued the Minister of<br />
Police for damages for loss of support resulting<br />
from the death of her husband In police cuetody. This<br />
is the only civil action with regard to a death in<br />
detention actually fought in a court of law which was<br />
not kept out of that arena through out-of-court settle<br />
wants* which has bean the common practice.<br />
In Uohapi vs Minister of Police, much of the<br />
argument centred around a suicide note which counsel<br />
for Hrs Uohapi argued was faked. They brought in<br />
expert witnesses to testify, one of whom was a Or<br />
ifcjllus Grant, past president of the Forensic Science<br />
Staiaty, end medical Legal Society of Great Britain,<br />
»<br />
Or Grant showed differences betawen the handwriting<br />
of the alleged suicide note and other authentic<br />
examples of Uohapi's handwriting.<br />
Ooctor Grant had the toilet paper on which the<br />
alleged suicide note waa written analysed under<br />
ultra-violet light. The same procedure was adopted<br />
for other notes which Uohapi had smuggled out on<br />
toilet paper, while in detention. Or Grant claimed<br />
that the composition of the paper on which the<br />
'suicide note* was written was of a different<br />
composition from thet of Uohapi's clandestine<br />
letters, ie they did not come from the same roil.<br />
Evidence was also led as to the change in tone<br />
from three optimistic letters written from Jail<br />
and then the improbable suicide note. Mrs Uohapi<br />
said thet in the letters he had smuggled out, Uohapi<br />
had expressed optimism about tha future. He advised<br />
her to obtain a loan In his name to tide her over<br />
'until I em back in circulation someday*. , In en<br />
unprecedented move t evidence of an ex detainee,<br />
who was in exile In Lesotho, was heard. Thenjlwe<br />
Utintso described in her evidence how Captain<br />
Hansen of the security police had held her head with<br />
his thighs and put a towel across her face end pulled<br />
it tight. He hed then said, 'Now you know how<br />
Uohapi died 1 (Star, ie.Oi.eo).<br />
The police led evidence to the affect that the<br />
suicide note was genuine. Lt Col Fourie said ha<br />
had examined the suicide note and compared it with<br />
authentic writings of Uohapi**, and said 'there ware<br />
no signs to convince (him) thet lt waa not a genuine<br />
document•.<br />
A second police handwriting expert, Oet-Sgt<br />
KFC landman, said he had applied 10 different criteria<br />
to establish whether the Uohapi note might be a<br />
forgery. They all proved negative, he said.<br />
The finding of Justice Smalberger ems that there<br />
had not been sufficient evidence to suggest that<br />
Uonapl's death had been caused through assault by<br />
the police. Neither was there convincing evidence<br />
to suggest that 'the suicide note was faked. He<br />
dismissed Urs Uohapl's claim, end ordered her to pay<br />
all costs tp the Minister of Police.<br />
W overview of the available findings of inquests<br />
tf into deaths In detention reveals two issues* firstly,<br />
the magistrate'e findings as to the cause of death<br />
follows closely the explanations advanced by security<br />
police when they announce the death. Secondly,<br />
no magistrate has ever found any policeman or<br />
other person responsible for a death that has<br />
occurred in detention. Further, no magistrate<br />
has ever recorded mn 'open verdict' in an inquest<br />
into a death In detention - which would meen that-<br />
he was not able to make a finding on the basis of<br />
the available evidence. In all legal proceedings<br />
dealing with deaths in detention, security police<br />
have been exonerated mvmry time.<br />
(•MmtjtLiiiTii)<br />
DOTT in I#C«»TI0K PILE IIP - UU IT :<br />
Critical WMlta srwvt4M<br />
- lam for nta» tart srwarmulfe aMlta-<br />
•wriMTi C*R plm/ fa<br />
Pmpl i Knew<br />
.•ttttty.<br />
- • tritiem *f<br />
•hailtJr la Imrtatfm<br />
Africa.<br />
• mmraam of IwalUi<br />
at t autc Hato.<br />
dfHiAltOA Of<br />
kMlU nliud •<br />
turn*;.<br />
- iMiaM Into tfm mriUtttl Mtvre of<br />
wnltJk.<br />
/Vm tt: Critfcil WMlta, X<br />
! F.O. »ox mi, 1<br />
I Jofctnrwifejnj, 2000.<br />
VfcmstHptimi: •t*«0c" for emit fmw itumt.J<br />
page 14
I<br />
0-B« 15<br />
INTRODUCTION<br />
TO POLITICAL<br />
ECONOMY,<br />
part 4<br />
THE previous three port* Of this series have<br />
ondentrated almost exclusively on the structure of<br />
the capitalist aconoay. As explained in part one,<br />
ths economy am* focused on bocauae it is ther basis<br />
of socisty in general. This is not to say that<br />
politics, law, culture, ths stats and ideology ant<br />
not important. Claarly they an, and some of the<br />
aoat significant procassas and ralaticna ara found<br />
In tha non-economic arass of socisty. But as<br />
Piarra Jalte orgued,<br />
rajesnklnd** first naad is to Maintain physical<br />
life* production of tha aaana of subaistanca<br />
(clothing, food, housing) and tha conditions<br />
undar ahich thay ara producad ara of isnadiata»<br />
furidsmsntal and permanent importance....A<br />
socisty can only bo built upon suoh an economic<br />
infrastructure as a houaa on its foundations<br />
(quotsd in SIP 19:24).<br />
In other sards, the undarstanding of aconoalc<br />
structuras and falatlonshlpa alloas for tha<br />
exploration of other aapscts of sociaty. In this<br />
seneo, tha method usad in tha wrl« on political<br />
aoonoay involved exploring tha bass of capitalist<br />
socisty - tha economy - bafora trying to move on<br />
to other important faaturas of ths social systsn.<br />
But it is not quits accurate to say that tha<br />
shola aconoalc structure has baan explored in this<br />
series* Tha eronomy ltsalf is mede up of a nuatxer<br />
of interrelated parts* Thaaa involve tha actual<br />
production of coamditlas, as sail as tha say In ehleh<br />
coasiodltias ara bought and sold (circulation of goods).<br />
In looking at tha economy, it aas arguad that tha<br />
aoat iaportant procassas and relations at work<br />
involvad tha amy in ahich uoamodltlss sara<br />
prod-jcad. Tha aconoay as a shola aas tharafora<br />
not examined, but rathar tha conditions undar ahich<br />
co— odltloa ara producad.<br />
( In tha invastigation of production, tso vary<br />
iaportant sats of rslations vsra uncovered. Thay<br />
involvad<br />
1* tha ralatlonohip of tha various classas to tha<br />
aaana of production; and<br />
2. tha aay In ahich tha capitalist class attaepts<br />
to incraaaa tha amount of surplus ahlQh is producad<br />
by tha sorklng class.<br />
It eaa arguad that thaaa relatione asra iaportant<br />
in that thay fonsod an initial basis for understanding<br />
tha diffarancas and slsdlarltlaa botesan various<br />
aociatiaa. It aaa found, for example* that tha<br />
capitalist class as a shola oaned tha noat<br />
iaportant aaana of production. This banorshlp ia<br />
a significant baala of poaar. In that it anablas<br />
ths oanars to dacida ahat is produced, hoa it is<br />
producad, and hoa any surplua la distributed and<br />
ralnvaatad.<br />
Thosa ralatlona shlch sara Identified in tha<br />
firat thraa parts of tha aarias on political aconoay<br />
fom a basis for undaratanding ehst classas ara in<br />
sociaty, and hoa ona ldantiflaa such classas. Tha<br />
capitalist class Is ldsntiflad in taraa of its<br />
osnarahlp of tha aaana of production, tha fact that<br />
its a—bsn do not produca comaodlties, and its<br />
ability to tsfce ovar or af>propriata tha surplus<br />
velum and profit ahich saorge from now production.<br />
Tha aorking class, on tha other hand, is dafinad<br />
by its separation froa (or non-oanership of) tha<br />
amens of production, tha fact that lta asafasn Are<br />
tha dlract producers of surplus value, yat have no<br />
control ovar how it ia distributed or reinvested.<br />
It Is tha identification of thaaa relatione<br />
ahich beglne to explain tha natura of the<br />
contradiction beteeen the tso major classes of<br />
capitalist sociaty* This contradiction is ths basia<br />
of conflict beteeen these classas. In ss such ae tha<br />
contradiction Is Inherent in the econoalc structure,<br />
conflict cannot dlsapper slthout e change In the<br />
basic economic relatione, k<br />
Put simply, this contrsdiction betaaan tha tao<br />
largest clsssss In eoclaty Is Indicated in the<br />
following says:<br />
the aorking class produces value and surplus value,<br />
ahlle the capitalist clasa appropriates (takes over)<br />
the surplus value produced;<br />
tha capitallet clasa oane the aeens of production,<br />
ehlle the aorking class is separated froa (does not<br />
own) the aeons of production;<br />
it la in tha lntsraeta of capital to incraaaa aurplue<br />
lebour tiae relative to necessary labour tlae eorksd<br />
(see tha dlsgraaatii and explanetlona in tha firat<br />
thraa parts of this earlee for tha difference<br />
between surplus end necessary labour tlaa);<br />
It Is in the' interests of labour to Increase<br />
necessary labour tlaa relative to surplus labour<br />
tlM.<br />
These seemingly aba tract notione neve vary real<br />
end concrete effects in socisty* (It is eorthahile<br />
rapeetlng here ahat ass pravlouely said about<br />
abstraction, ss that notion applies to tha aathod<br />
of political econosy. In pert one of the sariaa.<br />
It aas arguad that<br />
Tha sannar of investigating tha general natura<br />
of a social system involves....abstraction.<br />
Thia is tha wy in ahich tha aoat iaportant,<br />
the baaic features of e system ara Identified,<br />
aval the say in shlch thay ara lifted out of<br />
(abstracted froa) the less iaportant fseturas<br />
of thet system. This process is something dona<br />
in the atnd In en attempt to find out anion<br />
aspects of a society ere basic to that society -<br />
and shlch era superficial. The aethod of<br />
abstraction - of removing fundamental processes<br />
end etructuras fro» lass iaportant ones so that<br />
thay can be examined - la tied up elth tha<br />
atteapt to understand reality, rather then<br />
accepting that things ara tha aay thay aeea to<br />
be (IIP 19:Ze)),<br />
A nuaber of the abstract relatione end processes<br />
Identified neve concrete effecta In tha real aorld:<br />
for exajpl*! th * changing ralationahlps between<br />
necessary and surplus lebour tlae in practice<br />
involvee struggles bstaaen aorkera and employers ovar<br />
the length of tha aorking day, overtime,<br />
mechanleotion, and tha epeed and lnteneity of aork.<br />
Conflicts over these Issues tend to indicate en<br />
ettempt by either cepltel or lebour to change tha
divisions of ths working dsy. The rsapsctlvs<br />
PWWT, vovUnUon and strength of ths tso<br />
conflicting clsssss will, in asch csss, dsclds how<br />
e»ch leaus is rasolvad.<br />
In such ths ssn way, it sss argusd thst ths<br />
ssttlng of ths vslus of labour power sss sn<br />
important procsss in soclsty. Conflicts snd<br />
struggles ovsr this show up in SBQS disputsa,<br />
ohsnQinQ rslstlons bstsssn lndustrlsl snd rursi<br />
irNs, snd in s ssriss of othsr wsys.<br />
Anothsr important sbstrsct rslstlonshlp<br />
discussad lnvolvsd ths diffsrlng positions of tha<br />
, vsrious clsssss to ths sssna of production. There<br />
srs s nusbsr of dlffsrsnt aays in which ths<br />
Cspltmlist clsss csn osn snd control ths assns of<br />
production - Involving formal shsrs ownership,<br />
ststs lnvolvaasnt, aanagsrlsl rsprsssntstivss<br />
noting as sgsnts for owner*, ste.<br />
Ths relation of ths votfeing clsss to ths<br />
sstarlal sssns of production slso chsngss within ths<br />
capitalist sconosy. And, laportsntly, non-<br />
capltallat soclstlss (so fsudsl, socialist) Involvs<br />
vswy dlffsrsnt rslstlons of bath dirsct producsrs<br />
and non-producsrs to lsndt sschlnsry snd tools.<br />
This, then, hss bsen ths ssjor sin of ths<br />
I ssriss on political sconosyt to identify s sst of<br />
important sbstrsct economic relations, and to sss<br />
shot thay tall uo about capitalist aocisty In gsnsrsl +<br />
Thoss rslstlons which exist within production hsvs<br />
bssn concsntrstsd on. Hossvsr, shlls thsy srs ^mry<br />
lsportsnt, othsr fsctors hsvs to bs taken into<br />
sccount to undsrstand sny soclsty. Ths conditions<br />
undsr vhioh cowsloditiss srs praducsd tolls s lot<br />
sbout car tain bssic procsssss in cspltsilst soclsty.<br />
•vt to undsntsnd apaolflo soolstlss, othsr dynsslcs<br />
which do not rslsts only to ths sconosy slso hsvs<br />
to bs snslyssd snd understood.<br />
m<br />
'ORGANISING<br />
WOMEN.' : w<br />
Response 1<br />
A controvsrsisl fasiniat ones cospsrsd ths connsctioi<br />
bstwssn narxiwa and faainie* to 'ths asrrlsgs of<br />
husband snd wifs dsplctsd in English DO—a last<br />
mer-ia* snd fsslnias srs ons snd thst ons Is<br />
marxism'. 1 Hartman contlnuss hsr si«Ue, 'either wS<br />
nssd s hsslthlsr marriage or ws naad s divorca*. Ths<br />
srtlcls 'Organising woman' (»JIP 21) is sn Important<br />
contribution towards a sors squsl ststs of affairs,<br />
but both ths srtlcls snd Hartasn'a sis41s suffsr fros<br />
s similar dafact: thsy fsll to go bsyond ths<br />
convsntlonally sccsptsd socisl and political fom.<br />
Shlls Hartman falls to problssoUss ths Institution<br />
of.serrlsgs, ths authors of 'Orgsnising Somen 1 foil<br />
to push bsyond ths convsntlcnsl sitss snd fonts of<br />
political struggls.<br />
Ths thrust of ths srtlcls is how to lntsgrata<br />
sossn into clsss struggls. Ths authors ahow vary<br />
clssrly thst wording class sossn experience<br />
exploitation and oppression, both ss women snd ss<br />
SSSbsrs of ths black marking class. Ths thsorstlcsl<br />
assumption behind thsir SUM—I sssss to bs thst<br />
clsaa atructurds dsfins ths forms of ssxusl<br />
opprssslon to which wossn srs subject. Hossvsr, thsy<br />
fan to follow through ths political ispliostiona of<br />
thalr argument. This is essential if fsainiss la to<br />
bs prlorltissd, and put on ths sgende for political<br />
action, and not aiaply subsumed undsr class struggle.<br />
In ths first plaost two themes within fe-inism<br />
t which hsvs consldsrsbls foros hsvs to bs confrontsd If<br />
ths prsdcwilnant concsption of fewdnlaa ss s 'ssspon<br />
2 *<br />
of lspsrlsllss' or 'bourgsols Indulgsnos' srs to bs<br />
dispsllsd. A rsdlcsl fsainiss which sssusas thst ths<br />
ssxusl opprssaion of wossn trsnscsnds class divisions<br />
sust bat attacked on sll fronts. This psrspsctlvs la<br />
exemplified in ths aloosn *A sossn nssds s ssn ilka<br />
s fish nssds a blcycls*. wMls this sight exprwse<br />
s notion of female autonomy snd lndspsndsncs whloh is<br />
valusbls in sons contsxts, it la dangerous snd<br />
dlvislvs In s soclsty llKs or own, whsrs progressiva<br />
ssn snd wossn hava to units in s corson struggle<br />
against exploitation snd opprssslon in sll its fonas.<br />
A liberal or bourgsols fssiniss which sssks<br />
squsllty with ssn within ths existing order sust slso<br />
bs attacked. This kind of fsslnlsa is on ths<br />
aacsndsney In South Africs snd fits in vsry wsll<br />
with ths 'total strategy' to which capital and ths<br />
ststs srs cosslttsd. Totsl etratsgy involvss<br />
utUisino sll ths rssourcss svsilsbls to change<br />
South Africs in ssys thst ansbla thoss in povsr to<br />
rewaiin in possr. Xt lnvolvsa giving privileges to<br />
s sslsct group of people - apsclflcslly aoas groups<br />
of urtosn blscks - st ths SKpsnss of ths *vaat majority<br />
of blocks in ths rursl srsss. In ths ssss ssy,<br />
bourgsols feminism involvss lncrsssing ths prlvllsgss<br />
of sows groups of Middle clsss sossn st ths axpanss<br />
of the vast ssjorlty of sossn in South Africs. This<br />
kind of fssiniss sight involvs change, but not<br />
progrsas.<br />
In ths crisis SS Srs presently fscing there is<br />
no roos for sny slllsnos vlth rsdlcsl or bourgsols<br />
feminists. Ths euthors of 'Orgsnising Sossn' srs<br />
clearly ssntlng to distance thsaaalvsa fros both<br />
positions, but this rsojjirss s sors rigorous<br />
ststsssnt of ths socialist fssinlst position. Ths<br />
wsy forward for socialist fsednlata doss not lis in<br />
ths 'equal snd active psrtlclpstlon of wossn in sll<br />
orgsniaatlona ' (*XP 21i22). Obviously tha<br />
authors srs ssnsltlvs to ths *pull* ths organisations<br />
snd lssuss thsy cits hsvs for black working clsss<br />
sossn, but in ths present situation more crsstlvs<br />
and Innovative strategies are demanded. St rat eg lea<br />
suoh ss organising around ths sitss in which working<br />
clsss wossn are oppressed hsvs not been prioritised<br />
by socialist or national 1st aovsnsnts in South<br />
Africs. Sites auch as tha hsslth osrs systas In<br />
which woman, both as ths Mjority of producsrs snd<br />
consumer* of hsslth csrs ssrvloss, ars sxploltsd snd<br />
P«fts J6
pega 17<br />
oppressed BOTH by capital and by een. Sites such a*<br />
tha household in ehieh tM elfe's unpaid labour<br />
benefits BOTH capital and mm. Looking at altaa of<br />
oppression such as th« household and tha health car*<br />
system hes tha potential far mobilising women because<br />
it involves raising questions about 'the private<br />
domain', about our most dooply intieete and paraonal<br />
affairs. These question* en* not noneelly tha subject<br />
of political struggle. ^ Making these laauaa part<br />
of politics, feminism he* bagun to break doan tha<br />
barriara ahlch hava kept 00 aany paopla - especially<br />
eoeen - out of political struggle. It haa thla<br />
potantUl bacauaa it la calling for a 'total<br />
politics*, a polltlca atilch flghta oppression on<br />
all fronta- Tha notion of tha totality of oppression<br />
la cantrml to tha amdit theoretical tradition, but<br />
haa baan lost In racialist politics - In methods of<br />
organising. It la a tradition on ehicn feminism can<br />
build.<br />
To raturn to HartsaVt'e alalia, a divorce la<br />
needed - not fro* marxism, but froa bourgaola and<br />
radical faainlsai and tha divlaiva and dlatractlng<br />
atrataglaa they* hava generated. A 'healthier<br />
aerrlage* bataaan amrxle* and feminism lnvolvaa<br />
prioritising foadnist polltlca in a aora craatlva eey.<br />
•Organising eYjaen* leave* "any Important quaaUona<br />
unaneeereds<br />
1. *hat la tha rola of tha ahita middle claaa<br />
faminiat In our atruggla; a struggle In ahlch aa<br />
ara both tha oppraaaad and tha oppressors? Joaaph<br />
haa arguad that it la necaasary for ahita feminists to<br />
(l) racognlaa thair implication In tha<br />
partnership (of capital and patriarchy) aa<br />
banafactors and tools;<br />
(ii) address tha unique problaaa of black eoeen<br />
In tha labour force*; and<br />
(ill) distinguish bataaan tha rola of ahita een<br />
and black nan in tha partnership of capital<br />
and patriarchy (Joaaph, 1901:102).<br />
2. Ihat Is tha rale of tha progressiva een In<br />
relation to feeinlee? The currant 'politic** of<br />
adoption' 4 la hardly a strong platform froa ahlch<br />
alliances could be forge*. One version of this hea<br />
boen articulated aa follows:<br />
To tha eittent that feminist daaanda flow froa<br />
m^ experience of oppression ahlch is specific<br />
to eoasn, which een can never themselves<br />
emparlance and to ahich they actively contribute,<br />
all they can do *e listen, agree and support*<br />
Thus male socialists can support women's<br />
struggles for tM see* raaaon that they support<br />
the struggles of ell oppressed people, and<br />
faalnlaa is linked to socialise, through the<br />
general cetegory of oppression. This kind of<br />
aele solidarity elth faalnlaa aeeas to offer e<br />
nee version of an old problem facing ahita<br />
middle dees aala lntellactuela: the fact that<br />
tha objects of tnelr polltlcel concern have<br />
alaays been external and other - the poor, the<br />
black, the colonieed, exploited and physically or<br />
spiritually crushed in soae Inaccessible<br />
combination (Politics and Poeer: 1991:3).<br />
3. la there a case U> be aada for a speclficolly<br />
black faainlat politics? Soma time ago, Kollontai<br />
posed the question of ehether a united eoeen's<br />
aovaaent aas possible in a aoclety based on class<br />
contradict lone* ee harve to take thle further and<br />
aak ehat are the possibilities for faalnlaa in a<br />
v<br />
society shot through elth racial Inequality and<br />
antagonises? The eexual inequality beteeen black<br />
een and somen haa very different historical and<br />
cultural beginnings tP those beteeen ehltes, and<br />
clearly calls for dlffsrent atrategiee for change.<br />
Angela Oavls has ergued that tha inetltutlon of<br />
elavery pleyed a curloua role in bringing about<br />
equality aaong black een end eoeen. In South<br />
Africa, the structure* of apartheid hava created a<br />
shared senae of oppression aaong blacks, and generated<br />
ymrf particular foree of sexual inequality. Thla<br />
eould auggest that tha peculiar dynamics of racial<br />
oppression have to be confronted and not subsuaad in<br />
claas anelyele.<br />
4. Hoe much dialogue 1* there beteeen ahita and<br />
black soman in South Africa at preeent? joaaph<br />
seea a prooase of mutual •creation aa the key to<br />
political action:<br />
Aa black and shite feminists combine forcts In<br />
the atruggla against eele aupraascy and ahita<br />
supremacy, they rust be willing to communicate<br />
and follow a ror-et consisting of dialogue,<br />
practise, more dialogue, and acre practise -<br />
moving slowly and Inexorably toaerds advanced<br />
levela of underetandlng and reepect for one<br />
another's dlfferencee. The similarities among<br />
eoeen era aaalar to understand and ahould be<br />
used es building blocks toearde understanding<br />
and respect for racial and claaa dlfferencee.<br />
The possibility of an alliance beteeen black and<br />
ahita women c*n only bs realised If enite eoeen<br />
understend the nature of their oppression<br />
eithin the context of the oppression of blacks<br />
[Joaaph, 1961:106).<br />
Only at that point "ill »• be able to unite in a Lueauii<br />
struggle agelnet reclel, saxuel end claas inequality.<br />
But tha different forme and structures demanded in<br />
thla struggle have to be specified very clearly.<br />
Tha authors of 'Organising Women* begin their<br />
article by quoting froa the Women's Charter of the<br />
Federation of South African Women, l9S4t ahlch etatee,<br />
'we eoeen have stood and will stand shoulder to<br />
shoulder (ay aaphesl*) *ith our menfolk In e coaaon<br />
struggle egalnst poverty, race and claaa<br />
dlscrtadnatiom,*.*. 'finouloer to shoulder' mas<br />
a rallying cry among the militant auffragettae of<br />
the •o-en's Social and Political Union (ISPU) In<br />
Britain early In this century, thla powerful leaps<br />
of alliance raise* difficult questions ln the South<br />
African context. Thla ooaaent hee simply triad to<br />
focus on aoae of thee.<br />
Jacklyn Cock (February 196?)<br />
•sas<br />
'1. Hertaan, H - 'The unhappy aarrlaga of marxism<br />
1979 and feeinlam*, ln Capital and Class.<br />
Number 6, ttuaeor 1999.<br />
2. da Chungare, 0 - Let mm Speak. Testimony of<br />
1976 ' DreiitlaTT^oaan of t*e Bolivian elnos,<br />
(Qtage 1, London).<br />
3. Joaaph, 0 - 'The incompatible eenege a trois:<br />
1961 aanciaSJ, faalnlaa and reciea 1 In<br />
L Sargent (ed) WOaen and Revolution<br />
[Pluto Prase, London J.<br />
4. Politics and Pcmrny 111. (Routladge and Kegan Paul,<br />
5. Kollontai, A - Selected Tritings. Allison and<br />
1977 Bueoyt LondonJ.<br />
6. Oevie, A * •Refleetiona on the black eoeen *s role<br />
1971 in Che coeemjnlty of sieves 4 , ln The t<br />
Blacx Scholar, vol 3 no 4, December 1971.
Response 2<br />
A few years ago BOM beat-forgotten group put out a<br />
hunp«r sticker baring the slogan 'Peaceful change<br />
no*l ' Our response to 'Organising Soman?' (flIP 21)<br />
MB auch thai aajaa aa our raaponaa to that sticker,<br />
ayepathy alth the atrong faallnga of tha authora,<br />
but disquiet at their logic<br />
Tha conclusion to 'Organising eoeanT* -<br />
It to only through tha equal and active<br />
participation of somen in all organisations,<br />
not, that aowen'e baaic demands will ba met in<br />
a future daaocratio South Africa<br />
- fllaa in tha faca of tha authora* oan data and of<br />
tha politic*! raalltiaa of t*la country.<br />
Shila appreciating tha 18 montha' raaaarch dona<br />
by tha voaan's etudy group Into tha form of<br />
oppraaaion paouliar to black working; class aoaan and<br />
raoognlalng, aa thay do, tha need for a radical changa<br />
In sexual ettltudee, ee ballava that thara ara aoaa<br />
aarloua flan in their erguaante.<br />
Firstly, aftar stating aaphatically that<br />
'tha aajortty of aoaan* ara not raady to partlclpata<br />
In mass politics (an aaaartlon aa would diaputa In<br />
Ita present form), thay than demand *ao|jal and actlua<br />
participation in all organisations'. Given that tha<br />
majority of aoaan are not raady {to quota tha<br />
authora) to partlclpata in aaia politics, ara thay<br />
suggesting that x number of aueh 'unready* aoaan<br />
gat dragged In off tha atraata to fill thalr SOT*<br />
quota In tha ranka of thaaa 'organiaationa 1 ?<br />
Or ara tha authora perhaps looking a littlo<br />
cloaar to hoaa? Ara thay aodaatly auggaatlng that<br />
thay aVe raady to ahouldar thia haavy burden<br />
thaeaelvee - being, presumedly, liberated, and thus<br />
unancuabarad with -eubeervlence, paaalvlty and lack<br />
of aalf-confidanca*?<br />
Coaa now, lac's ba raallatic. aomen ara<br />
oppraaaad becaueo that oppraaaion aarvaa carta in<br />
interests, not bacauaa thalr male counterparts<br />
don't lika mixed atoluala.<br />
•<br />
No-ona aould augpeet that undar tha praaant<br />
regime tha working clmi could eoaehow gain control<br />
of tha means of production. Why than do tha<br />
authora expect anything dlffarant In tha realms<br />
of sexual polltlca?<br />
Aftar pagaa of axaaplaa demonstrating ahy aoaan<br />
do not partlclpata aojually in 'all organiaationa'<br />
(ahatavar that aay mean), tha authora blandly demand,<br />
In thalr laat aantancat that thay ahould.<br />
Surely thay cannot ba auggaatlng that tha<br />
structural and Ideological conatralnta of South<br />
African aociaty ara accidental, and that Barely t»y<br />
aanting to, thaaa 'organiaationa 1 oan eoaehoe steal a<br />
march on mocaablqua and implement aaxual liberation<br />
before economic and political liberation?<br />
In addition, the authora aeea to ballava that<br />
the nature of faaala participation in lnduetrlal or<br />
coaaunlty action la aoeehoe different froa that of<br />
male participation. The faaala rent protaatora In<br />
Soaeto aantloned by tha authora did not necessarily<br />
participate in thet action aa aoaan; nor did thoae<br />
involved* in the Sea Harveet or Freaatex strikes* involve<br />
thaaaelvaa bacauaa thay eere aoaan. ThU aould onty<br />
ba tha case if It could ba ehoen that aoaan only act<br />
aa aoaan, and never aa part of a broader, non-<br />
aaxuelly defined coaatunlty.<br />
Poaan auffar aa auch aa aan froa non-aexuel<br />
foraa of oppraaaion and exploitation. Ihy than do<br />
the authora appear to aaa the above aotiona by aoaan<br />
aa aoaa sort of victory for faalnlat conaclouanaea?<br />
Thoae aoaan aere reacting aa people affected by<br />
particular circumstances. For aoman to partlclpata<br />
in political or Industrial action la nothing new.<br />
atwmrever people - aula or faaala - have the naceeeery<br />
opportunltiaa to act against oppraaaion, thay do.<br />
True, there era ailliona of aoaajn aho do not<br />
participate in 'mess polities'* There ara also<br />
ailliona of aan. The point of aeee political<br />
activity aould appear to be to ajoblllae ae many<br />
people ae possible over laeuee that affect thaa<br />
Jointly, not to do a heed-count of tha aexee.<br />
The structure of our aociaty diotataa a larger<br />
eada partlclpatipn, and until thet structure la<br />
s 1 tared, that diaproport Ion will remain, no aatter<br />
how undesirable*<br />
Tha article also makes auch of 'organleatione...<br />
already serving to connect working clasa aoaan*. It<br />
ahould ba pointed out that not all structures serving<br />
to connect working class aoaan are, of themselves,<br />
e Good Thing. Neither, for that Batter, are thoae<br />
serving to connect working clasa aan, or mash are of<br />
tha working class generally. One only has to<br />
consider Inkathe, ahoea strength among working<br />
claaa aan and aoaan in Natal la indisputable.<br />
And to take a atructura apparently favoured by<br />
tha authora! tha Catholic Church aoaan*a groups.<br />
One aould have to search long and hard to find a<br />
sexually progreesive coaponent In an organisation<br />
!*«• 18<br />
ahlch coidaana absolutely contraception and abortion m<br />
two major factora In tha liberation of eorklng claaa<br />
aoaan from a purely domeetlc role - and haa as lta<br />
ideological basis the inherent euperlorlty of melee.<br />
To aay nothing of tha sawing clrclea and houeaaivae'<br />
leagues ahlch appear to find auch favour aa eltaa of<br />
struggle.<br />
Yet for aoaa raeeon tha authora aaa auch groups<br />
aa having progreaeive potential, ehile rejecting<br />
the National Union of Clothing Wort ere. How does an<br />
organisation dedicated to the ralnforcaaant of<br />
aoaan's domes tic role have progreaeive potential,<br />
ahlla an organlaatlon alth a aambarehip of 20 000-<br />
plus Indisputably eorting claaa aoaan doaa not?<br />
Merely because of Us Bwbalo'a-laadarehip?<br />
It should be pointed out that while tha<br />
housewives 1 leagues and sawing circles twiddled , *<br />
thalr thumbs during tha 1976 atay eeaya, in at laaat<br />
one, ?« of Ms aVubelo'a maatoarahlp answered the<br />
students* call to etey at hoaa, ..<br />
And than there U the laaue of asperate eeaan'm<br />
organiaationa. Or rather, than thara lan*t. Surely<br />
thia la one of the fundaaantal leauea ahlch needa to •<br />
ba examined. Yet the authors of 'Qrffanlalng soman?-<br />
skip over tha laaue aa If all the arguaanta are i<br />
coaa on knowledge, and only the conclusion (that thay<br />
are e Good Thing To Have - In moderation), le worth<br />
putting on paper.<br />
Finally, ae aould lika to take laaue with tha
I suthors' contention thmt it il oxpadiant to organism<br />
rw&mI only to drm« the* in to thm main stream of<br />
political organisation. Why also? Bacauaa thay art<br />
nicer paapla than man?<br />
•Wan naad to be organlaad bacauaa thay hava not<br />
. aa yat ihoultfarad thalr Full share of tha burden of<br />
struggle against a system ahlch tha authora thamsalvma<br />
* recognise oppraaa tham mora harahly than It doaa tha<br />
i<br />
othar half of tha *oppraaaad masses'.<br />
Sorely tha quaation which tha aomsii's study<br />
* oroop ahould hava aslcad ems: any bo •BUM not<br />
participate 'equally and actively', and ho* to gat<br />
thaa to do ao. Omawnding that thay do - ehmthar tha<br />
• daamnd la mmda to man or aoman * la a llttla baalda<br />
•<br />
tha point until that quaation haa baan mnaamrad.<br />
Urtfortunataly, 'Organising Wornon?' did not<br />
anmemr it. It merely confuaad tha quaation.<br />
Response 3<br />
THE artlcla 'Organising toman?' («P 21) la walcoma<br />
bacauaa thara la a good daal about aoman'a oppraaalon,<br />
daaa division and organlsablllty In South Africa that<br />
naada to ba dabatad froa both practical and<br />
thaoratlcal viewpoints. Tha artlcla providaa a vivid<br />
plctura of soma aortclng claaa aoman'a axparianca, and<br />
haa triad to ba raadabla and colloquial*<br />
Ita central aaafcnass ft earns to aa tO ba tha<br />
inadaquata dlatinction betaaen oppraaalon and mconomic<br />
p axploitatlon. • Thla raaulta In tha vagua generalities<br />
of tha conclusion; no claar anaaar la givan to tha<br />
quaatlona poaad at tha beginning of tha artlcla.<br />
Time and again, oppraaalon la rafarrad to aa<br />
tha apaciflc and concrete axparianca of exploitation*<br />
By opprmaalon aa ara talking about tha way In<br />
f ahlch aorfcing people axparianca tha affaota of<br />
thla amploitmtion In thalr daily llvaa. For<br />
axampla, loaar amgaa aaan inadaquata food,<br />
poor housing and Inadaquata education.<br />
Tha authora aaaa to mean that non-oanarahlp of<br />
tha mamna of production laada to olaaa exploitation;<br />
ahlch in turn causas loa aaqaa; ahlch in turn<br />
raaulta in auffaring and deprivation, ahlch la tha<br />
aa**) thing aa oppraaalon. Woman auffar daprivatlona<br />
ovar and abova thoaa of tha morfclng claaa, ahila<br />
aharlng thoaa aa mall.<br />
Aa far aa I oan aam, economic claaa mxploitation<br />
arialng from tha moda of pro-party oanarahlp undar<br />
capitalism ia ragardad by tha authora aa tha aola<br />
basis of all forma of oppraaalon in aociaty; and<br />
individual or group axparianca of that axploitatlon<br />
la ahat tha authora undaratand by oppraaalon.<br />
anile tha authora glva mn explanation for claaa<br />
axploitatlon (non-oanarahlp of tha mamna of production)<br />
thay noahara glva a raaaon for tha apaciflc and axtra<br />
penalties auffarad by aoman. Thay daacrlba thasa<br />
lntaraatlngly and movingly, but aithout any axplanatlon<br />
aa to any woman aa an Idantlflable group ahould auffar<br />
tha axtra penalties of oppraaalon. Thay seem ovar*<br />
anxious not to dapict aoman'a oppraaalon aa arialng<br />
froa a contradiction aaparata or avan dlatingulahabla<br />
from claaa oppraaalon; thay avoid any mention of<br />
patriarchy and tha dabataa around it, or discussion<br />
of auch iaauaa aa tha technical diviaion of labour.<br />
Aa a raaulta tha authora ara unabla to conaldar<br />
any forma of famala oppraaalon othar than aorfclng<br />
class oppraaalon - in fact* according to thalr<br />
conceptualisation t only working class eommn oan<br />
auffar oppraaalon. Thla daaplta tha fact that a<br />
numbar of tha axamplaa thay put foraard for aorklng<br />
claaa aoman*a oppraaalon * tha doubla day, aaxual<br />
abuaa lnalda and outalda aarriaga, being cut off<br />
from aldar social activity by family atructuraa and<br />
raatrictiona - ara axparlancad by woman in othar<br />
clessee.<br />
Thara is noahara any augpaatlon that tha ability<br />
to oppraaa ia a function of political poamr, and<br />
convaraaly that oppraaalon la a consequence of<br />
political poaarlaasnaaa. Oppraaalon derives from<br />
political poamr, political poaar doaa not alamys derive<br />
from aconcaiic poaar. (If political poamr alaaya<br />
dartvad from aconomlc poamr, state poaar could nmvilr B<br />
changa handa onca hald by mn economically dominant<br />
claaa. Burmly any thought about tha split bataman<br />
political poaar and aconomlc control in tha third<br />
aorld aould ahom that tha kind of raductlonlam<br />
that la unabla to aam poamr aourcaa aaparata from<br />
economic/property ownership la going to go vary far<br />
aatray).<br />
Polltloal poamr can ba understood in tha<br />
brondost sense aa tha ability, by sanction or<br />
coercion, to protect or advance ona's interests<br />
aa mn Individual, a group or a claaa. Economic<br />
and/or atata poaar arm not tha only aourcaa of<br />
poaar and potantially of oppraaalon in a aociaty i<br />
aithln many - If not all - social organisations and<br />
atructuraa thara ia a potential for sanction and<br />
coarclon aithln tha organiaation, and in ralation to<br />
othara, according to tha organisation's scope.<br />
Aa tha authora damonstrata, avan aithln tha working<br />
claaa thara la dlffarmntlal mccmaa to organisational,<br />
community, family and othar atructural baaaa of<br />
authority mnd poaar.<br />
Tha artlcla describes tha authority of aorfclrvj<br />
claaa mmn within tha family, and thalr ability to<br />
oppraaa on that level. Gonamojuancas of thla arm<br />
fait in community and trada union organisation aa a<br />
raault of axtrm difficulties axpmrlancmd by aoman<br />
In participating- in thmm at all, nmvar mind on<br />
equal terns.<br />
•omen's oppraaalon * tha doubla day; axtra<br />
aaarlnmaa and no tlma for activity outalda eor+c and<br />
tha family; aaxual abuaa; unahmrmd rmaponalbllity<br />
for children; marginaliaatlon in tha labour force -<br />
muat spring from aoman'a poamrlmaanmaa In social<br />
atructuraa, baginnlng alth tha fmally. It<br />
reproduces itself in othar social aranas, including<br />
tha labour market, ahlch la many woman's hopm of aoma<br />
material baaia for ultimata lndapandmnca of family<br />
authority.<br />
All thla la obvloualy not a almpla apln-off of<br />
thalr aconomlc position aa aorfcara: famala * super<br />
axploitatlon* la mmda possible by thm structures of<br />
specifically aommn'a oppraaalon. In an exploited<br />
claaa, thla alll ba mora acuta, bacauaa powarlaasnaaa<br />
aa woman ia not altlgatad by claaa privilaga and<br />
thm increased options it brings.<br />
By oaalng working; clasa aoman aa simply a type
of aurjer*-oppressed group within the working class,<br />
thvt Is no ultiaate Justification for ecaan -<br />
wording class or otherwise - to organise separately,<br />
axcspt insofar as it is a aora practical say for<br />
organisers to pet at thee. Tha artlcls doas not go<br />
this far, and rightly classifies such an attitude as<br />
'expedient'; but having tantatlvaly accaptsd that<br />
separate woeen*a organisations havo soaa role, it<br />
doas not explore tha alternatives.<br />
Tha authors say<br />
*e faal that to esauee that ssparata soaen*e<br />
political organisations hava tha capacity by.<br />
thaasalvas to deal alth all tha issuas faced<br />
by aoaan la to aaka a nuabar of sarious<br />
aletafcee.<br />
Cartalnly: but what are tha Issuas and objectives<br />
that can, and parhaps aust, be dealt with by<br />
saparata spawn's organisations. ihet is aesnt by<br />
tha claia that eoaen'a organisations 'can only ba<br />
affactlva if thay exist within tha context of tha<br />
organisation of aoaan, and of aan and aoaan, at<br />
different lev*l3'(eIP 21:21-??)? *het level*?<br />
Are tha organlsatlona "of aoaan* saan as social<br />
bodlas aaallorating tha condition of tha aoaan<br />
aantionad in tha intervieea, or supplanting tha<br />
aarvloas provided by atofcvels, or woaan's wings of<br />
political and labour organisations, or any of thoaa<br />
depending on a particular group's naana? What is tha<br />
rola of non aorfcing class aoaan, aaaajl with aora<br />
options of t lac and participation in thasa issuas?<br />
Ay lapllcatlon tha articla anaaars its Questions<br />
as to why aorfcing class aoaan and aoaan's organisations<br />
hava baan alaost solaly issua-rasponslvw in tha past:<br />
tha Intarvisws show why thasa aoaan would raact<br />
defensively to furthar erosions of alraady tanuous<br />
positions, and raapond to aobilisatlon around issuas<br />
such as pass laws, rant lncroanas, etc. But thay<br />
hava not tha tlaa nor tha option to lnvolva thaa<br />
salvas in on-going long twra organisation.<br />
This ralsas tha problee* of organisablllty on<br />
a long tara basis of *tha aost opprassad of tha<br />
oppressed* - thoaa aho llva on tha bars bonas of<br />
survival. Soaa alnlaua of tlaa and fraadoa la<br />
nawdad to partioipata socially and politically.<br />
The description of participation in stofcvals and<br />
church groups shows that a tiny option of social<br />
participation aust ba usad in organisations that<br />
halp tha aoaan and thair faalllas in tha daily<br />
battle to survive. Cartalnly such aoaan would<br />
benefit froa health and child cars pi'OQiuawioa.<br />
But how far would thay be abla to participate<br />
on an ongoing basis?<br />
Prugiajaasj alaed at this category of woaan would<br />
naad to hava aa a ahort tara goal tha provision of<br />
options, particularly soaa -ability and soars tlaa,<br />
which opan tha possibility of a broader social<br />
lnvolvaaant. fhia aay sail ba resisted by tha heeds<br />
of aorfcing class faedliee, as wall as eaployers, but<br />
long tara involvaasnt and participation by substantial<br />
members of worfcing class aoaan in organisation seeas<br />
pretty wall laposalbla if this cannot ba done.<br />
Susan Brown<br />
TEACHERS<br />
IN SA<br />
DCTntPUCTIW<br />
EDUCATIONAL change is part of the broader subject of<br />
social change. Social change, as aany students and<br />
teachers have coae to realise through the 1976 and<br />
1980 school uprisings, is a highly coaplax and little<br />
understood ohenoeenon*<br />
In thia paper the aajor political and social<br />
page 20<br />
questions are acknowledged as being of central laport-<br />
ance in a discussion of teachers' strategies. The<br />
importance of the devalopaant of a theoretical fraae-<br />
worfc which guides and relates educational strategies<br />
to tha broader social change strategies la also seen<br />
as vital. Teachers in tha aadiua tara will naad to<br />
link into and coordinate their efforta with other<br />
bodies on a national scale if the society Is to be<br />
trensforead. However, in this paper the concern la<br />
with tha *here and noe'. ahat steps can teachers<br />
take in the short-tsra?<br />
POSSIBLE APPWQAOCS:<br />
Theoretical Dleenslons<br />
PEOPLE'S actions are believed to be directly related<br />
to their understandings of their situations. It is<br />
for this reason that educational lata like Frelre,<br />
Bowles end Olntis, Gelpl, etc, believe that tha<br />
teachers' understanding of their situation Is so<br />
iaportant. Each parson operates froa a theoretical<br />
frwawwortc. It is, therefore, iaportant that teacher*<br />
bacoaa aora salf-conscioua in their teaching, of their<br />
own Ideologies.<br />
Teachers naad to be clear about tha lapliclt or<br />
explicit values thay are conveying to pupils. Self-<br />
awareness or sal f-consc iouansas la an iaportant<br />
aspect of teachere' personal davalqceint which will<br />
influence their ability to understand and Manipulate<br />
thair anvironaant. For exaaple, by analysing the<br />
classrooa and school situation with a variety of
Q ' analytical tools*( like role theory, class analysis,<br />
mnd personality theory (when and where appropriate),<br />
K M of the external forcss end the personal motives<br />
csn be port clearly understood and sctsd upon.<br />
Another theoretlcel dimeneion is the need for<br />
tsschsrs to hsvs s brooder under* tan3I**g of education.<br />
Ths educational prablss) Is sbovs all • political<br />
problem and, therefore, aducatlonal stratagias naad<br />
to start out from an analysis of social and political<br />
forces, lhat happans in a clessrooe can aithar raflact<br />
the status quo In ths broadar society, or It can<br />
analyse th« aoclaty critically and attempt to<br />
construct alternative reletionships. Tha latter<br />
approach would laad into an analysis of issues<br />
Uke poaar relationships, control end authority.<br />
Practical Olaenslon<br />
IN order that taachara can -or* toaarda a greater<br />
eelf-eonecioueneas of their oen actions in the school<br />
end classroom, and in order to develop e broader<br />
perapectlve on educational problems, three approaches<br />
• ill be mentioned briefly, Tha reason for the choice<br />
of these approaches is releted to the belief that<br />
taachara in South Africa need to play a critical and<br />
dynamic role in the schools end coamunlty.<br />
1. heesarch ceientetioni<br />
Many writers believe that change in schools eill<br />
only occur ahan teachers bacoaa asare of the school<br />
•nil hoe it function*. It la acknowledged by writers<br />
that acadaalc aducatlonal researchers have got e<br />
role to play but in tha end aducetionel change<br />
dapende on the understanding and the actions of<br />
taachara. Taachara, as was inferred above, therefore<br />
naad to acquire enelyticel skills and ahat<br />
could be celled e research orlentetlon.<br />
Ideally, for a school to develop this Idea<br />
affectively tha principal and/or leading taachara<br />
ahould be actively involved. To develop tha Idee of<br />
e taacher*r• • sercher and to encourage e 'research 1<br />
climate will be difficult under aost circumstances.<br />
However, if a teacher or e group of teachers eanta to<br />
begin to teet tha idea, perhaps a eeall ad hoc<br />
resaeroh group could be fonaed. This group, by<br />
drawing on their own resources or external help.<br />
could decide on approaches to classroom reeeerch<br />
ahlch, preferably, would lnvolvw atudants as well.<br />
2. Study of innovatiom<br />
The study of failed innovations can help to<br />
develop a deeper underetandlng of aducatlonal and<br />
social change. For example, in the event of an SBC<br />
having been created which than fails to attain lta<br />
goals, a careful analysis of the 'failure* by those<br />
involved and by others, can reveal the 11*1 te to<br />
change in a particular situation. This information<br />
can than be used to guide the implementation of futura<br />
change strategies.<br />
In the South African situation, ahere changee have<br />
occurred at certain times, the need for taachara and<br />
pupils to become reflexive and to enelyeo whet hea<br />
happened weens to be e crucial task. Other axaaplea<br />
Of innovations nay be the more active participation<br />
of pupils in the cleesroow, change In curricula<br />
content, or change in teaching stylas. Thaaa could<br />
possibly provide tha aaterlel from which puplla end<br />
teachere could constructively ieam.<br />
3. Supportive action:<br />
Teachers are in general in a confrontation poeltion<br />
where the contradictiona Inherent In their roles can<br />
and do create atresa. In South Africa the teachers*<br />
poeltion is extreme and teachers' reactions to various<br />
situations heve ranged from bitterness, anxiety,<br />
exhaustion, to wxcitament, 'Survival' teaching la a<br />
common response. Many writers believe that teachers<br />
require extensive support and thet they also need<br />
help In order to be able to transcend the eituetion.<br />
One writer proposes a counselling aodel which<br />
may be one way of helping teachers transcend their<br />
circumstances. He believes that trenecending the<br />
situation aaens that e stete of sufficiently Internal<br />
ised principles of 'good' practice neede to be achieved.<br />
Thia could help taachara cope with uncertainty or<br />
anxiety generated by change.<br />
In South Africa tha uaa of e Counselling* •oaejl «hlch<br />
involves Individual, group, or peer counselling mey<br />
have some relevance. It could be used to help<br />
teachers locate themselves more accurately in the<br />
aoclaty. Perhape it could facilitate the development<br />
of a aelf and aoclal ewerenesa which hea bean mentioned<br />
ea neceeeary if they are to play a dynamic and<br />
creative role. In addition it may help identify the<br />
problems for which action etretaglee naad to be<br />
developed which could relets to specific training<br />
needs. The acquisition of counselling akilla amongst<br />
teachers could havs advantagss both in the claaarooa<br />
and In tha staffroom.<br />
Tha three atrstegles, ie the development of the<br />
•twacner-rwswerther:t the collective analysis of<br />
innovations, and the engagement in aupportlva action,<br />
ell link in with the development of theoretical<br />
undarttandinge. They ere concerned with taachara'<br />
present socisl reelity and have bean proposed as<br />
possible starting points for tha analysis and tha<br />
development of the teacher*! role. There are several<br />
other strategies which could heve bean put forward.<br />
However, the main purpose hae bean to try and<br />
demonstrate that even in a repressive system there<br />
aay be eoms degree of autonomy for educational action.<br />
Short, Medlua or Long-Term Strategies<br />
XT la accepted thet action strategies should be<br />
related to a broadar conceptual framewortt. It is also<br />
accepted that the consciousness of the people ehioh<br />
la developed In the 'transitional atagee 1 should be<br />
congruent with a long-tern vision of e future soclsty.<br />
Long-tens strategies will focus upon feoturee<br />
of an aducetionel eystem which would cherecteriee a<br />
•hoped for' social and political dispensation.<br />
However, the likelihood of e coherent, acceptable<br />
political framewortc emerging ahlch le adopted by the<br />
majority of people in South Africa, and which can<br />
provide the basis for teachere* 'hare end now'<br />
stratagias, seema remote. It la, therefore, proposed<br />
that in order for teachers to develop their roles<br />
in a way which both helps them to cope with the<br />
current situetion, and which conetructively contribute*<br />
to the long-term transformation of tha society,<br />
some basic critarle for action naad to be agreed.<br />
Siitie idaee ere tentatively offered as examplae of<br />
possible working criteria.<br />
1. There Is no blueprint for transforming education<br />
and aoclaty. Ae has bean stressed already.
strategies can only prow out of analysis of local<br />
conditions, needs and Interests. The teachers*<br />
position is intimately bound up with the expectations<br />
of their role-SBt. Therefore, the development of<br />
strategies needs to take into account the expectations<br />
and the roles of pupils, parents, col leagues and<br />
authorities. Teachers can undertake to increase the<br />
communlcations between oil members of the role-set In<br />
order to de-escalata the levels of conflict end than<br />
encourage co-operation. A working criteria could be<br />
to open up communications between all members of the<br />
role—sat.<br />
2. The slat of education for transformation must be<br />
that of helping pupils, other teachers, parents<br />
and themselves to understand the material and social<br />
world around them. As many educationalists believe,<br />
it Is not the content but the educational process<br />
which is aost important. The organisation of the<br />
school and of the clsssrooa should therefore proaote<br />
critical understanding. Participation in tha<br />
educational process should be encouraged. Gelpi, the<br />
current head of UNESCO's Lifelong Education unit,<br />
believes that self-directed learning by Individuals<br />
and groups should be promoted as 'it is s danger for<br />
every repressive force, and it's upon self-direct ion<br />
that we aust insist*. He goes on, '(r)adlcel change<br />
in social, aorel, aesthetic and political affairs is<br />
often the out COM of a process of self directed<br />
learning in opposition to tha educational message<br />
imposed f rcai el thout * *<br />
Several writers who are concerned with education<br />
al transformation insist that the development of<br />
critical thinking Is fundamental to the task. This<br />
means that trying to indoctrinate pupils with an<br />
alternative Ideology is the worst way of progressing•<br />
A dialectical educational philosophy needs to farm tiie<br />
cornerstone for change. Education needs to enhance the<br />
chances for a genuinely democratic and participatory<br />
society. Tha second working criteria could therefore<br />
be a ooaatltSKsnt to the development of e critical and<br />
dlalectlcel educational philosophy.<br />
If criteria like the above were accepted as key<br />
principles in the strategies adoptmd'by teachers.<br />
perhaps a constructive start could be made to the<br />
building of a unified community of teachers, where<br />
"divergant-typ*< thinking is encouraged and teachers<br />
are able to play an important role In facilitating<br />
positive educational developments, which both begins<br />
to meat the present needs and can also contribute to<br />
the foundations Qr * future, more desirable education<br />
system.<br />
CONCLUSION<br />
THE teacher in this article is treated as one in<br />
opposition. Therefore strategies which are projected<br />
need to be concerned with "re-def inition• , relatively<br />
small-scale, low-cost, and ones which draw primarily<br />
on teachers' Own resources.<br />
Shirley "alters<br />
Note: The author of this article has developed ideas<br />
that serve as background to the strategies discussed<br />
in the erticla above, in an U Ed dissertation at the<br />
University of Manchester. Readers who might be<br />
interested in this dissertation are asked to<br />
contact Shirley Baiters through the editors of IP<br />
(address on the index page of this publication).<br />
subscribe to<br />
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COUKITVE<br />
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fctAAJrftWTZIN, 2D17<br />
ETHNICITY<br />
AND CLASS<br />
IN GAZANKULU<br />
IF there is agreement about anything regarding<br />
Gazankulu, it is a sense of surprise at the<br />
bantustan's very existence. Cos Desmond, who<br />
visited the Northern Transvaal in 1969, wrote that<br />
the Tswanastan belles the idea of a nation*<br />
state In that its sections are often hundreds<br />
of miles apart. But the Vendastan and<br />
T&ongastan woke the idea of creating a viable<br />
nation-state even less plausible.<br />
Vet only three years later. Commissioner-<br />
General EF Potgieter ems able to tell the Gazankulu<br />
legislative assembly that<br />
I very much realise that there was a time when<br />
you were grouped together with the Bavende on<br />
the one side and with the Besutho on the other<br />
and that you eere not a people as you are today<br />
in this meeting hall.<br />
The decision to create Gerankuiu as a separate<br />
political entity for the Tsonga/9*angoen ethnic<br />
group was almost an afterthought in the South<br />
African state's grand scheme of 'separate development'<br />
Ihus, the problem which this article addresses Itself<br />
to can be stated quite simply: how is it that in<br />
little over a decade, ethnic consciousness has been<br />
aroused to the extent thet Gazankulu is nom well on<br />
the way to bentustan * independence*?<br />
as an analytical category, ethnicity or<br />
nationalism has always presented a massive problem<br />
to materialist writers. In an important article,<br />
John Saul writes that 'progressive writers on Africa<br />
generally approach the Issue of "tribalism* as one<br />
mould approach a minefield - and with good reason'.<br />
Saul makes the point that It Is useless to slogenisa<br />
ethnit consciousness away as 'false consciousness** •<br />
The vary fact that ethnic consciousness has so often<br />
been mobilised into e powerful political platform<br />
demands an explanation of the availability of<br />
t*xje «V
page 2&<br />
•officiant nuebers of the population to erxept such<br />
identification. Thus, atilla It la arang to regard<br />
ethnic conacioueneea a* an independent aetaphyelcel<br />
'for* 1 , It la politically and intellectually absurd to<br />
disregard lta existence entirely, anat needs to ba<br />
dona is to link tha polltlcleatlun of athnlc .<br />
dlffarancaa to tha procaaa of claaa foraatlon and<br />
to traat tha changing political and aconoalc<br />
aignlficanca of ethnicity historically,<br />
lhan aa apply thla projact to tha caaa of<br />
Bazankulu, tha eolution to tha problaa of athnlcity<br />
la eurprielngly streightforeard: politiciaad<br />
athnlcity - though by no aeons tha naatly peckaged<br />
product of a cynical conapiracy aaongst tha doainant<br />
* olaaaaa - la undarlald by aany claar aatarlal<br />
concarne. It ia therefore tha teak of this artlcla<br />
to axaapllfy and analyaa thoaa aatarlal forcaa which<br />
hava maturated tha development of politiciaad<br />
athnlcity In Gezankulu.<br />
A Taonoo/Shangaan 'Tribe'?<br />
ACCORDING to South African govornaont sources, thara<br />
aara In 1975 aoaa 7de 400 Teonge in tha Northam<br />
Tranavaal of ahoa only 266 100 actually llvad in<br />
Gezankulu. Tha Taonga orlglnatad in Uocaabloua,<br />
balng aim or laaa bataaan tha 21at and 27th dagraaa<br />
latitude. Thay arrived in tha Northam Tranavaal<br />
throughout tha 14th cantury In a nueber of aavaa of<br />
iaadgratlon. Tha flrat aava of laalgration Into tha<br />
Tranavaal aaa a raault of claahaa with Ngunl<br />
rafugaa laadara (ilka Qhoanangana), aho flad praaant<br />
day Natal aa a raault of tha tffecane. A aacond aava<br />
of Taonga iaadgratlon froa Hocanbiqua occurrad In<br />
1850-6?, dua to a auccaaalon diaputa bataaan tao of<br />
ahoahangana*a aona. A third atraaa of rafugaaa<br />
arrived In tha Tranavaal bataaan 1646 and 1900 aa a<br />
raault of tha Portugueee destruction of tha Gaza<br />
kingdom. Tha othar coaponant of Tranavaal Taonga<br />
arrivad In small groupa aftar baing aaployad aa<br />
algrant labourara on tha Tranavaal alnee.<br />
Tha crucial laportanca of tha foregoing auaawry<br />
ia that tha Taonga In tha Tranavaal aara navar<br />
| coaprlaad of unlfiad tribaa alth poaarful chiefs.<br />
Thay aara distributed over a alda geographical<br />
araa and aara concerned only to find a place to<br />
live under the protection of whatever chief aould<br />
give thaa) land. Aa a raault, Taongaa have been<br />
ecettared throughout tha Tranavaal, living eulnly<br />
amongst Venda- and Sotho-speafcera. Aa the govarneemt<br />
ethnologiet, NJ van aaraalo* put it In 1935,<br />
Tha Taonga In tha Tranavaal ara, eith aoae<br />
exceptions, not organlaad into tribes at all,<br />
but represent a larga fonaleee population, the<br />
aaka-up of ahlch elmoet defies anelyela....<br />
tha bulk of thaa live under haadaan of no real<br />
rank or atandlng or alee fora part, sometimes<br />
even the greater part, of tha folloeing of<br />
Sotho and Vande chiefs of high end loa degree. 3<br />
Tha concept of a Taonga tribe aaa conceived<br />
largaly aa a raault of the aortt of the anthropologist<br />
HA Junod in the early 20th cantury. According to<br />
Patrick Harriee, Junod, trapped in tha 19th century<br />
European Ideology of the nation-etata, attaapted<br />
•to creoto clarity ahere clarity did not axlat* by<br />
classifying the Taonga aa a group*<br />
Tha araa knoen today aa Gezankulu has eleaya<br />
bean noticeably devoid of poaarful Shangaen chlefe,<br />
and unlike tha caaa of the KeaZulu or the Tranaksi,<br />
thara hee never been a paramount Shangean chief.<br />
Yet deaplte tha abaanca of any clearly defined<br />
Taonga or Shengaan nation, the Promotion of Bantu<br />
Self Governeaint Act of 1969 racognlaad the Taonga/<br />
Shengaan aa a separate population group • Thla Act<br />
aaa folloaad in 1962 eith tha craation of a llaahangana<br />
tarritorlal authority and the subsequent granting of<br />
a legislative aaseably in 1971. In t972, tha nee*<br />
Gazankulu aaa coined, and In 1973 the nee bentuatan<br />
aaa daclared a aalf-governing tarritory eeelting<br />
* Independence •.<br />
It 1* not, hoaever, tha concern of thie<br />
contribution to explain the declalone of the South<br />
African stata in lta creetlon of Gazankulu. Aa in<br />
tha case of the other 8 bantuatana, a conplex matrix<br />
of Nationalist ideology, tha need to export tfie reeervo<br />
aray of unemployed, atteepte to fragaant afrlcana *<br />
politically, etc, all played foraatlve rolaa in the<br />
craation of tha bantuatana. Bather than diacuaaing<br />
thla aspect of bentuatan craation, it la our concern<br />
to explain hoe ethnic nationalise has been aoblliasd<br />
within Gazankulu aa a neceeeary precondition to the<br />
aucceasful execution of the hoaxtlend strategy.<br />
Class and Ethnicity<br />
IN recent atudiaa of the poet-colonial atata in<br />
Africa, it hee been coaaonly argued (eith varying<br />
degreee of sophietlcation) that nationalise) haa been<br />
the cleaa projact of tha Indigenous petty bourgeolelo<br />
in lta atteepte to eecure political and economic<br />
doalnence. Thie la qualified with the proviso that<br />
no claaa aver consplrea in unlaon to conceive an<br />
ideological bluaprint for clasa domination. Tha caaa<br />
of Gazankulu broadly aupporta thla theela. It hea In<br />
feet bean precisely because tha petty bourgeolala<br />
believee lte oen ideology that lta ideology haa gained<br />
auch force.<br />
David Dieon note* that Gezankulu's formtlon<br />
haa bean unique beceuae of the fact that a aeparata<br />
Shengaan entity aaa rmtv envisaged in tha original<br />
plan to balkaniaa South Africa. It did not groe up<br />
in tha *claaalc hoaaland aould' 7 - out of pertlaa made<br />
up of chiefs and their eupportera. Rather, its<br />
foraatlon aaa mediated through e group of &tangean<br />
buslnasaaisn, taechera and bureaucrats, under the<br />
leadership of Professor Hudaon Ntsane/iei of tha<br />
Unlvaralty of the North, and former moderator of<br />
the Taonga Presbyterian church.<br />
Olaon pernaps overetatee tha unlojuanaaa of tha<br />
foraatlon of Gazankulu. Aa ee shell praeantly aaa,<br />
the rola of chiefe and hsaoaen aalarlad by the Couth<br />
African atata haa baan a oruclal factor in Gezankulu'a<br />
craation, Navarthalaaa, It la to tha rola of tha<br />
entrepeneurial patty bourgeolala that aa should turn<br />
to flrat.<br />
During ay visit to Gazankulu in Oacaabar 1961, I<br />
apoke to only tao ehopfcaepere at any length,<br />
Intereetingly. both readily aacrlbed their eaitarial<br />
advancaasnt to the craation of Gazankulu. Evan aura<br />
lntereatlngly, both buelnssaaan edeltted that they<br />
aara tha flrat paople to live in their raepective<br />
arees. Since both thaaa bualnssaaan aara living in<br />
areas neely oocupied by raaattled paopla, the
Implication la clnr that they hod received advance<br />
notice of masa population removals,<br />
Oia of tha businessman I spoke to llvad in<br />
Lulekanl. an area Just east of Pholaboree, which seams<br />
to t>a destined to bacoaa) a alta of M U resettlement<br />
for Gezankulu citizens. A* a Gezankulu citizen, ha<br />
had recently moved acrose tha main road froa tha<br />
raamakoale location ahere ha had owned a tihop and<br />
butchery. (It seems that namafcgale la to become pert<br />
of Lebowa, ahlla Lulekanl - ahere Ha now Uvea -<br />
la to bacoaa part of GaxanKulu. Both settlements are<br />
therefore deatined to bacoaa bantuatan dormitory towns<br />
serving Phelaborea}.<br />
Thla businessmen, (Ur uV)t la a caricature of tha<br />
patty bourgeois 'on the make'. Hia large corrugated-*<br />
Iron housa-cum-office la situated In tha aidat of<br />
shanty-town structures. In contraat to tha general<br />
atmosphere of heat and squalor, hla office la filled<br />
alth ostentatious furniture, ornaaants and paintings.<br />
A Persian-looking rug aas draped over his desk<br />
and a cablnat to tha rear aas filled alth huge books<br />
and a sat of encyclopedias. Tha bizarre situetlon aaa<br />
compounded by hia boabastit self-importance - ha<br />
Initially rafusad to sea a* because I had not aade an<br />
appointment with his 'secretary'.<br />
It would be comforting to believe that Mr hmi<br />
la unique - unfortunately, ha la not.. He is one of<br />
e nee generation of petty bourgeois businessmen<br />
aho are the direct beneflciarlee of bantuatan<br />
consolidation and population resettlement. It is<br />
hardly surprising therefor* th*t ar HI Is i hearty<br />
supporter of the development of Gazankulu. A<br />
particularly revealing expression of the benefits to<br />
be gained by businessman aho gain trading licenses by<br />
virtue of bantuatan consolidation is seen In tha<br />
following extract from tha Gazankulu legislative<br />
assembly debates: 8<br />
Mr N Chauke: Things stildi aorry ma most era<br />
tha shops of foreigners, wnat permits these<br />
shops to be situated in our areas?...Thla Is<br />
disgraceful. Especially non-ehlte shops....<br />
me may sympethlee a little alth ehites because<br />
ee are asking for batter and bigger businesses<br />
from whites with which they muat come and help<br />
us But a non-white? He will only use our<br />
money and go aaay with tha money, we do not<br />
*<br />
need e foreign non—white parson to manage our<br />
businesses.<br />
The granting of trading licenses to citizena of<br />
a particular bantuatan is thus a primary reason for<br />
tha support which tha petty bourgeoisie gives to<br />
bantuatan consolidation. Traders, however, are<br />
not tha only beneficiaries within the petty<br />
bourgeoisie. In 1973 it waa alleged in the Gazankulu<br />
legislative assembly that soma Shengaans ware<br />
'buying cars, hoping that the business of removing<br />
paople would bring them a flubatantlal income*.<br />
Similarly, owners of tha ubiquitoua Japanese<br />
bakkles and taxla who ply ttair respective trades<br />
throughout Gazankulu are beneficiaries of the systaa<br />
by exploiting tha opportunltlea afforded to tha full-<br />
On account of their vested interests they too must<br />
therefore be conaiderad sympathetic to the process<br />
of ethnic rrmgmantetion.<br />
It is a prerequisite that inspectors of schools,<br />
principals, nurses end bureaucrats of tha capital<br />
Glyanl must all be citizens, of Gazankulu in order to<br />
hold their Jobs. For thes% members of tha petty<br />
bourgeoisie the existence of Gazankulu Is of mora than<br />
mere sentimental significance - it la the basis of<br />
their power, status and class position.<br />
Chiefs<br />
TnOTe la no doubt that chiefs mnd headman have played<br />
an instrumental role in fostering ethnic consciousness<br />
amongst their subjects. Tna series of apartheid Acts<br />
following tha 1951 Bantu Authorities Act involved an<br />
attempt by the South African state to conserve<br />
'traditional tribal' structures in a restructured form.<br />
Specifically, they ware almtd at restoring economic,<br />
political and social control to chiefs and headmen<br />
who Had lost these powere aa a consequence of the<br />
penetration of capitalist relatione. By Investing<br />
chiefly elements with administrative control, and by<br />
effectively incorporating them Into tha civil service,<br />
chiefs end headmen ware dr*en into a class alliance<br />
with tha proponents of separate development.<br />
Throughout Gezanfculu I aaa told hoe chiefs and heariann<br />
were bribed and corrupted by promises and often<br />
- -•'- 1 •* - A ' " * T * •<br />
material glfta. In a strategy raminiscant of gifts<br />
of worthless trinkwts to chlafs during the colonial<br />
era, one man described to ma how chiefs were given<br />
'dignity bags' (briefcases) at preliminary meetings<br />
with tha South African government.<br />
Significantly, chlafs and headmen now receive<br />
salariee directly from tha bantuatan government,<br />
page H<br />
according to the numbers of subjecta living under them.<br />
This has bean of crucial importance with respect to<br />
population removals since chiefs have often encouraged<br />
such ramovala in tha hope of gaining mora subjects.<br />
In motivating ^n amount of fl16 600 for payments<br />
to chiefs and haooaan In 19?2, Professor Ntsanwisi<br />
told the legislative assembly<br />
Oia ou manse hat gese tint die sLano baweag oadat<br />
hy dense hat. One kaptelna an hoof manna la<br />
ook diasalfde - dmartlla slang eat bmwewg omoat<br />
hy denes hat. 0ns all dus hi dat hlerdle<br />
slenge van ons dams w»t he.<br />
The graphic image of snakes and Intestines<br />
can hardly be mora apposite alth regard to tha<br />
payment of chiefs. Thus, It is no surprise that a<br />
year later Ntsanwisi told tha legislative assembly*<br />
that<br />
A chief will now be paid twice; ha shall be peld<br />
for the wot* ha does at home and also be paid for<br />
being a member of tha legislative assembly.<br />
Tha foregoing dlscuasion does not suggeest that<br />
each and ewry chief and headman has benefitted from<br />
bantuatan consolidation. In many Instances they have<br />
bean moved together with th*lr people and against<br />
their will. Thla has frequently occurred whan, for<br />
example, a Shengnen chief has bean moved In order tft f<br />
facilitate tha consolidation of Vanda. But even<br />
forced remove Is do not neceasarily negate the ethnic<br />
consciousness of those chiefs removed with their<br />
people, revealing it as a fraud. Quite tha contrary;<br />
hostility and resentment against being removed la<br />
seldom aimed against the distant South African<br />
government. Since it Is directed against tha ethnic<br />
group amongst whom the removed people have bean<br />
living, ethnic consciousness can be. engendered among<br />
chiefs, headman and their people, irrespective of<br />
whether they stand to gain or loam by being removed.
gar.<br />
rgthnicjty: the ordinary people<br />
THROUGH listening to missionaries, church—n,<br />
teachers and ordinary people, there la overahelalng<br />
evidence that Teonga-epeakers hava baan living<br />
perfectly easily amongst Vandaa and Sothoa for tha<br />
last 100 years. Throughout tha Northern Tranevaal,<br />
X aaa repeatedly Informed, Tscopes have intaraerrled<br />
extensively eith Vandaa and Sothoa and hava lived alda<br />
by alda with tnaa. In aany araaa tha conatltuency of<br />
Vanda chlafa aaa predominantly Taonga, and tha convarsa<br />
appllad too* Those to whom I spoke wvn virtually<br />
unanimous in declaring that sustained friction<br />
bataean athnlc groupa la a ralatlvaly racant<br />
phanoaanon, a dlract consequence of tha implementation<br />
of tha Bantu Authorities system.<br />
A Sotho haalth inspector ehoa I met at a cafe<br />
naar »lluuane told aa that *bafora aaparata develop-<br />
aent I llvad amongst Taongas and sent to achool aith<br />
thaw. Horn I would rathar hava a ahite men In ay<br />
houaa than a Shangean'.-<br />
Throughout these araas poised between<br />
coneoUdetion into althar Vanda or Gezankulu, Taonga-<br />
apaaKara expressed horror at balng 'Vendafied'.<br />
Friction arupts everywhere. At Ghlluvana naar<br />
Txanaan tha Oouglaa Salt hoapltal ahlch eas built<br />
after World War 1 to aarva tha local population aa*<br />
declared pert of Gazankulu In 1961. In retaliation<br />
Phatudl of Laboaa ordered tha removal of all Sotho<br />
ataff froa tha hospital in Aprll/aay 1981,<br />
Moreover, Sotho patlanta (soma on drips i] vara<br />
reached by ambulance to a 'Sotho 1 hoapltal some 15cm<br />
•way. At preaent, tanalona ajaongat Sotho and Taonga<br />
epeakara at Shiluvane ara close to breaking point -<br />
all this in en araa ahlch churchman daacrlba aa<br />
having baan a modal of haraxmloua huaan inter-<br />
ralationehlp.<br />
How, than, ara inter-ethnic tanalona stimulated<br />
aaongat tha ordinary paopla aho atand only to lota<br />
froa bantuatan consolidation? Tha key to thla<br />
quaation llaa in the fact ttiet there ia no<br />
altarnatlva; facad with tha raallty of bantuatan<br />
consolidation, ordinary paopla ara foread to oparata<br />
within tha ayataa In ardor to survive. In tha fight<br />
for survival, gladiators auat hava hotad ona another<br />
with more intanaity than thay did tha Roman<br />
aristocracy responsible for placing than in tha<br />
arana in tha firat placa. Tha aaaa prlnclpla<br />
undarllaa tha davalopaant of athnic hostility in<br />
tha Northam Transvaal.<br />
Tha aatabllahmant of boundariaai bantuatan<br />
consolidation and population raaovala ara aaong tha<br />
aaln masons for athnic dlffarancaa asaualng a<br />
politicised fora. Oiviaiona ara anforcad through tha<br />
aatabllahaant of aaparata cllnice, schools, labour<br />
bureaux, poat offlcaa and othar adalnlatratlva<br />
atructuraa for aacn population group. On a aaln road<br />
In Gazankulu, tha road suddenly narroaa and la pittad<br />
because It haa brlafly antarad Vanda territory and la<br />
tharafora of no algnlficanca for 5ezankulu euthoritiee.<br />
It becomes Incraaaingly difficult for pensioners<br />
to racalva their aonthly handouta if thay ara living<br />
outside of thalr 'nation' * even If they have baan<br />
living in the same placa all thalr Uvea.<br />
One of tha greatest reasons for tha eaargence of<br />
athnlc hostility relates to tha establlahaant of<br />
slngle^nediua schools. Whan schools ara auddanly<br />
daclarad 'Vanda' or 'Qhangaan' or 'Sotho 1 . It bacoaaa<br />
Impossible for children to receive aother*tongue<br />
Instruction. Faced «ith this problem, cultural<br />
traditions can only be upheld by removing to onee<br />
'homeland*.<br />
Tne relationship bataean the davalopaant of tha<br />
bantustans and tha acceptance of their existence by<br />
thalr 'citizens* is a product of a vicious circle.<br />
The South African state establishes boundaries in<br />
the name of 'homeland 1 consolidation and those people<br />
caught outalda their 'hoaeland' euffer victimisation<br />
and uncertelnty as a result, victimisation with<br />
regard to schooling, tha awarding of labour contracts,<br />
pensions, hospital aervlces» etc, together exert<br />
treaendoue pressure on people to eove* In addition,<br />
a favourite tactic of tha 'GO' 12 ia to intlaldata tno*o<br />
threatened eith removal over an amended period of<br />
tlaa. As a raeult of these threats of removal, those<br />
in poaaaaelon of relatively greater aatarial nmmn*<br />
move before the eltamatlvee offered to thaa become<br />
laaa and leaa attractive. The community la therefore<br />
split and It is inevitably tha pooreet alaaenta aho<br />
are finally carted easy and duapad by the M trucks<br />
or their bantuatan functionaries. Within these<br />
peraaetere it la therafore virtually lapoaaible not<br />
to accept homeland 'independence• in aoaa form. Tha<br />
South African govarnaant seta the situation and the<br />
nechenlea of ethnic fragaantat1on acquires a dynamic<br />
of its own. *<br />
Conclusion<br />
Tha tragedy of ethnicity in the Northam Transvaal<br />
le that it la real. At a political level tha<br />
lapllcetlona ara extremely depressing; tha South<br />
African atate ahlch ia ultleately responsible for<br />
the polltlcleetlon of ethnicity through its pushing of<br />
separate davalopaant. ia seen by soaa aa an honeet<br />
broker. The greatest amount of antagonism in<br />
Gaxankulu ia reserved for Vends end Laboaa -<br />
ehile Koornhof la respectfully approached by<br />
'deputations 1 . Rev Sydney Ngobet general secretary<br />
of the Evangelical Presbyterian Church , e*plolne that<br />
'ethnic feelings have increased ao much since<br />
separate davalopaant that people apeak of "aa Sotho"<br />
or "ae Taonga" rethar than "we people" or "aa<br />
afrlcane". People aho uaad to aay "aa blacks are not<br />
allowed to go there" no* aay "aa Shangaen aay not go<br />
there'.<br />
It ia tharafora at their peril that progressives<br />
blithely dismiss tha eaargence of ethnicity In the<br />
Northern Transvaal es 'false consciousness'* Falae<br />
it is in tha sense that the real source of edeery and<br />
Oppression - the South African state - becomes<br />
obscured. But this falae conecloueness le not e aare<br />
ephemeral ideology ahlch can be ignored. Its basis<br />
le dletlnctly aatarial; rooted on the one hand In<br />
tha claas interests of tha new afrlcan petty<br />
bourgeoisie, and on the othar hand in the atruggle<br />
for survival faced by the ordinary aaae of exploited<br />
end ccpressed paopla.<br />
Saul Ouboa
1 Desmond, C. The DJmoerdad People. Johannesburg,<br />
2 Cezankulu Legislative Assembly dtottw, volume 1,<br />
1973:45.<br />
3 Saul, J. "The dialectic of cUu and tribe', in<br />
Race and Clitl, XXt 4, 19?g.<br />
,4 Gazartulu Economic Revise, Benbo, 1976:11.<br />
5 Van warmelo, MJ- A preliminary survey of tha<br />
Bantu tribes of 8outh Africa. Department of<br />
Native Affair* Ethnological publlcetlone, vol 5.<br />
Pretoria, 1936:40.<br />
6 Harries, P. 'Tha anthropQlogiet aa historian and<br />
liberal: HA Junod and th* Tsonge' in Journal of<br />
Southern African Studies, vol 8 no 1, Octobar 1961.<br />
7 Olson. D. 'Opposition politics in Vendo and<br />
Gazankulu*, in Conference on thai Hiatory of<br />
exposition in Boutham Africa, Development Studies<br />
Group, Johanneeburg. WST<br />
6 First Gazankulu Legislative AsfleePly. vol 6,<br />
Gazankulu Appropriation BUI. p 126.<br />
9 ibid, p 123. Speech by «i Baloyi (RltHrtpwene).<br />
10 Gazankulu Legislative **>%mbly- April 1977,<br />
vol 1. p 1507. Literally translated, 'The<br />
novas because it ha* intestines'.<br />
11 Gawfculu Lanlslativa Assembly, fey 1973. vol 5 p 74<br />
12 '66* t awning Govertv&ent Garage, ara tha initials<br />
of tha trucks owned by the South African stata<br />
which affact population rweovals, *06' is often<br />
used a& a tana of dislike to describe tha stata*<br />
INFORMATION<br />
Strikes in the<br />
Metal Industry<br />
OVER tha past Lao months, tha East Rand's metal<br />
lnduatry has ageln become a kay cantra of mortar<br />
struggle, with 24 wort stoppages/disputes,<br />
occurring against a backdrop of tha panding annual<br />
wage talks between tha Staal and Engineering<br />
Industries Fadaratlon of South Africa (SEIFSA) and<br />
tha unions in tha industry. IS of ths stoppages have<br />
involved FOSATU'e registered eetoi and Allied<br />
Barters' Union (aWPU). Last year, too, saw the<br />
East Rand metal industry becoming tha focus of Labour<br />
action with 24 stoppages in eadevnie. Benoni,<br />
Boksburg and Springs, involving a total of 10 772<br />
workers. In thle year's disputes 6 000 UAMU aeebars<br />
hava bean involved and approximately 2 400 vorkars<br />
at fines without unions.<br />
In the 13 stoppages involving WAIU, 33)1 eere<br />
over diamlsssle, 5Ji over wages, 1 strike over a<br />
night ahift dispute, and 1 strike over the disbanding<br />
of a liaison coanlttee end recognition of MAW. This<br />
coaperas with 50)1 of last veer's disputes over<br />
diaelssala, 25£ over wages, end 29)1 in opposition to<br />
managerial staff behaving in an arbitrary fashion.<br />
This analysis will focus mainly on tlAVlTa<br />
involvement in the recent work stoppages and disputes.<br />
The nature of the daeenda in tha disputes and lasuas<br />
related to thaai will be discussed,<br />
Oamende for the relnstetaaent of dismissed<br />
sorters were made in 33% of tha disputes, and UWJ<br />
eaafasrs were successful in two such struggles: at<br />
Lltaaastar Products in eedevllle, 22 wortara were<br />
dismissed last yaar in October* Until tha resolution<br />
of tha issue, tha union helped support the mortars<br />
who did not seek naw aaployaant, welting rether for<br />
the outcome of tha issue. Up to January, aanegeeent<br />
refused to nagotieta with the union despite its<br />
majority representation amongst the firm's 260 workers.<br />
UAWU arranged for an Industrial Court hearing at the<br />
and of January to chellenege the firm's refusel to<br />
negotiate with a representative union. In the<br />
meantime, shop stewards in the factory put continual<br />
pressure on mansgeasnt, stnd workers boycotted<br />
overtiee. Just before the court hearing was due<br />
Llteeester eenageeent capltuletad end rehired ell<br />
22 worters. A recognition agreement with MAVU has<br />
a Laos t bean coaplatad.<br />
A second victory over a disaissals issue ess<br />
eon at Transvaal Malleable Foundries in March,<br />
workers came out on strike for three days in support<br />
of two dismissed colleague*. Initially, eanagement<br />
fired the entire wortforce end aald that It would<br />
selectively re aaploy sorters, Vorter solidarity on<br />
the issue aes ao strong that no one re-applied for<br />
their Jobs and scab labour see not forthcoming,<br />
hence, aenagawent re-eeployed the entire workforce,<br />
even the shop etawerds, and the two woWeeTS initially<br />
dismissed. (A successful strike over dismissals<br />
occurred at TIF late lest year es well).<br />
oage 26<br />
The struggle at Meeker Siddaley Hschinaa over<br />
the dismissal of two workers was fought unsuccessfully,<br />
in that sorters were 'selectively re eauloyed* end<br />
the 30 trade union aeejbers lost their Jobs. However,<br />
the eedevllle organiser does not rwgert thia as e<br />
total failure, for he seys that these 30 workers ere<br />
united end determined to carry on eith the struggle.<br />
He seys that whether dieniseed or not, the feeling<br />
of the wortsrs is not affected - they become<br />
strengthened through their struggles rsther the**<br />
disillusioned.<br />
At present e struggle Is continuing at Flaks^r<br />
(in wedeville) over the ntrenchment of three MAW<br />
members. 200 worters are out on strike end the<br />
outcome is not yet known.<br />
Wage daaends accounted for 53]L of leVJU's disputes<br />
during the present spate of strikes. At present the<br />
minimum wage for the metal industry, em determined<br />
by the June, 1961, wage talks, is R1,13 par hour.<br />
In all the disputes the demand mas for e R1 per 4 hour<br />
increase, or for a R2 per hour minimum wage - e<br />
standard F08ATU target. (This daeand h*s Just been<br />
successfully negotieted et Colgate-Palmolive where<br />
FOSATU'e CftlU has Just negotiated e minimum wage of<br />
Rir95 an hour, and all other other grades will<br />
receive over R2 par hour. In Now amber the minimum<br />
wage will be increased to ft2,04 per hour.<br />
lege increases were demanded at Pressor 8A,<br />
(eadeville). Lasher Tools (Gareiston), McKlnnon<br />
Chaiii (oiatermaritzburgjT Chubb. Hubco. ifcXachnle<br />
Brotherj (wadeville), Hawker Siddaley Transformers<br />
and Automatic Plating {IsandcJ. The Bedevilla<br />
organiser relates these demands to the high cost of<br />
living, snd poor reins In the bentustehs (ahich neve<br />
eroded the migrant worters' supplementary rural<br />
Incomes). None of these demands have been met -<br />
slight increases have been granted: at UcKachnie<br />
Brothers s 12c per hour Increase eea granted, es<br />
well ss a 2c par hour attandance bonus rise, end et<br />
Leuher Tools e 4c per hour increase hag bean granted.<br />
Host firms have refused to negotiate mages until the<br />
Industrial Council wage talks between SEIFSA end the<br />
unions hava been completed.<br />
Tha wage demands must be seen in the context<br />
of the system of wage determination in the metal<br />
lnduatry. The demands ere elso e statwmant about<br />
hoe workers fsel merrs are to be negotiated - et<br />
plant level rether then Industrial council level.<br />
SEIFSA, the tough employer body representing<br />
some a 500 bosses (FCtt, 05.11.61), meets unions<br />
in the metal and engineering Industry each year for<br />
negotiations on the Industrial Council, to determine<br />
«eges and working conditions for the industry's<br />
approximately 440 000 worters (ttml, 03.11.61),<br />
nationwide, unions end employers have an equal number<br />
of representatives on tha Industrial Council. The<br />
bosses, sithough competing far eertets, are prepared<br />
to equalise many factors and Inputs of production,
particularly •egaa, end hence wort from « position of<br />
unity end strength on the Council. On the other hand.<br />
the -hoi* spectrum of unions, with widely difVering<br />
policial and demands, ara expected to ait together<br />
on the Council, thus awaking for weakneee and division<br />
(eg In tha prasant wags talks ths Steel, Engineering<br />
and Allied Sorters' Union has taken a completely<br />
independent stanca from that of othar unlona in its<br />
demands).<br />
Kore significantly, tha barfMiring procass Is<br />
isolated from tha work place, where workers hava<br />
tha strength of ttiair organisation, and tha poaar to<br />
withdraw their labour in order to reinforce demands.<br />
On tha council, tha participatory natura c4 mortar<br />
involvement in thair union is diminished* for they<br />
ara not negotiating «ith thair own employer through<br />
thair alactad ahop stawards or raprasantatlvas: thay<br />
COM to play a poaslva role, for thair aandata is not<br />
(lawjedletely) required by thair union - thay merely<br />
receive a 'report back*. Thus, tha council systaa<br />
weakens unions' bargaining power snd encourages<br />
buraaucracy, and hanca aost sections of tha prograsaiva<br />
union movement rafuaa to participate on tha industrial<br />
councils.<br />
Thus, in tha prasant Industrial Council sag*.<br />
talks in tha metal and engineering industriaa (ahich<br />
bagan on 9 Uerch, but hava baan postponed to aid-<br />
April aftar daadlock was raachad - with unlona<br />
flatly rejecting a waga offer made by aaployars)<br />
tha General Workers 1 Union (GHUh tha National<br />
Automobile and Allied sorters* Union (NAWu) and<br />
UMVU hava rafusad to partlclpata. Unragistarad<br />
unions wara invltad to partlclpata informally as<br />
obsarvara for tha firat time, but only tha Black<br />
Alllad (tartars' Union (Bflflj) and SEM-J hava accepted,<br />
TUC8A is of coursa participating - at thair annual<br />
confaranca In East London in September last yaar,<br />
delegates declared thair support for tha 'triad and<br />
trus" council systaa. Tha GVU statad that it had<br />
rasarvatlons about tha industrial council structure»<br />
mrtd would not join tha asm caucus as TUCSA affiliates<br />
bacausa of TUCSA's conslstant hostility to tha<br />
independent unlona. and its 'appalling* stanca on<br />
Nail Aggett'e daath. (TUCSA criticlsad protaat<br />
which roaa froa tha daath in datantlon of Nail<br />
Aggett. Central secretary Arthur Grace1oar said<br />
in a etatamant that tha Council 'unhesitatingly<br />
distancas itaalf * froa wny calls for industrial action<br />
in connaction with Dr Aggatt'a daath - bacausa TUCSA<br />
'cannot aubscrlba to atrikss or work stoppagas<br />
which ara not dlractly related to aanioyar-aaployaa<br />
ralatlonahipa*)- G*U **Y» that tha Industrial Council<br />
allows for nagotlatlons not by workers, but by<br />
'professional bureaucrats*.<br />
Tha 14 registered unions prasantly on tha Council<br />
raprasant only a third of metal workers, but ara<br />
negotiating for tha entire Industry with 45 SEIFSA<br />
employer associations.<br />
UAwXI rejects the industrial council systaa) as<br />
i it atends. Tha VaJeville organiser says that UAtu<br />
ia not agalnat negotiating for sagaa at a national<br />
level par aa, but that these talks should be more<br />
dacentralieed into national bargaining for separata<br />
categories, such as electrical, rubber, natal<br />
industries, ate- Bargaining st national level, ha<br />
said, would be favourable for those sorters who ara<br />
not 'yet organised, but tha national-level<br />
bargaining should not eliminate tha right for<br />
organised wortere to bargain at plant level with<br />
individual aaployars, as many can afford to pay wall<br />
above Council-determined minimum*. *tAHU -ill only<br />
be prepared to negotiate at national level when<br />
only representative unions are allowed to participate.<br />
(On 24 March, eVWJ'e national executive was to ejeet<br />
an Industrial Council eepanate committee to discuss<br />
why the union was not prepared to sit on tha Council).<br />
Thle is similar to tha GaTU's stance: tha GaV<br />
la 'not in principle opposed to multi-plant bargaining<br />
aa long as it facilitates a procass of direct<br />
negotiation between elected sorter representatives<br />
and management? It believet that 'bargaining in tha<br />
ateal Industrial Council hinders this direct<br />
participation in tha bargaining procass by virtue of<br />
the size of the Council and its highly bureaucratic<br />
etructures'.<br />
SEIF6A, however, in its Iwjvember (1961) guidelines<br />
reitereted its support for the council systaa (eaying,<br />
though, that reforms wara necessary) and its opposition<br />
to bargaining by Individual efnployers on- aatters<br />
covered by council agreements. They suggested<br />
incentives to unions to serve on councils» such<br />
as advising aaployars to grant these unlona atop<br />
order facilities, accaaa to workers for recruitment,<br />
eccaas by union officiala to ahop stawards, end<br />
access to company notice boards for union<br />
announcaaants. Graham Bruatred, chairperson of<br />
Anglo American's Hlghveld Stsel, said: 'Joining a<br />
council will give tha unions •ore influence than<br />
before'. The guldelinee did accept though, for the<br />
first tJjat, a factory floor role for representative<br />
unions, whether registered or unregietered, in<br />
consultations over Issues not covered by council<br />
agreements. This shoes a new ccaeaittaent to<br />
bargaining with representstl^t unions and an approach<br />
of persuasion, rather than coercion, in getting the<br />
9 unions outaide tha council system to Join up.<br />
Unionists, responding last yaar to these guldelinee,<br />
said that thay represented • 'shift 4 , but that *the<br />
real issue is our demand to bargain on wagea and<br />
wort conditions outside tha council systaa, and 9EIFSA<br />
has not changed its stance on that*.<br />
SEIFSA'e stanca is contrasted somewhat by that<br />
of the country's largest industrial capital grouping,<br />
Barlow Rand, whose Executive Director of Industrial<br />
Relatione, Hofeeyr, aaid in December last yeart<br />
'Employers will have to llva with tha fact that there<br />
will be parallel negotiations with trada unions st<br />
both industry level and ehoP floor level*.<br />
The 'ideal' situation, ha aaid, is for aaployer<br />
bodies, employee representatives, and registered nonracial<br />
unlona to aaet at national level, and to hold<br />
aupplementary negotiations on domestic Issues at<br />
plant level through worts councils. Hs realised<br />
this Is impossible as unions rejected the present<br />
XC system, and ha admitted that ICa could suffer tha<br />
same fate es works and liaison committees. He aaid<br />
further: '•» appreciate the problems that can arise<br />
through parallel negotietione at shop floor and<br />
industry level, but believe thle is not necessarily<br />
fatal and is in fact something which South African<br />
amployera will have to learn to llva with 1 *<br />
However, StIFSA etreeaas that it will not allow<br />
unions who agree to sit on tha Council to negotiate<br />
wages at plant level. Van Collar, SEIF8A chairperaon,<br />
stressed that thay earn tha boycott of the Council by<br />
feet-growing unions aa a serious problem 'i"a want<br />
to negotiate with rapraaentatlva unlona. So aa aant<br />
thoee unlona who do represent wortere to do so on tha<br />
Council* (RDM, 05.11.61)* However, thle is clearly<br />
not likely to happen as recant atrugglas and eucceases<br />
on tha plant floor considarably weaken SEIFSA'a<br />
position, SCIF6A la trying to evolve counter<br />
strategies. For example, thle month, a confidential<br />
paper was distributed to aaployars on etrlke<br />
handling in tha wake of the etrlke wave which haa<br />
gripped the tadavilla-Garnlston area. Companies<br />
era warned in it that by agreeing to bargain outaide<br />
the council system, thay ara 'in affect establishing<br />
an alternative bargaining arrangement to tha Council*.<br />
It edvlees setting of deadlines for return to wort,<br />
and in tha event of these being ignored, that tha<br />
company dismissal all wortere* It also advises<br />
members not to negotiate with strikers until thay<br />
have returned to wort.<br />
stoat responses by wadevllle and Germlston aatal<br />
companies to the strikes have bean consietent with<br />
theae guidelines. In aoaa of the un-unionised<br />
factories these strategies have been successful,<br />
for example, at Baldwin's Steal and Alumco. where<br />
all strikers were fired and replaced. At hubco.<br />
after workers failed to meat the management deadline,<br />
thay wars regarded as having 'dismissed themselves'<br />
(nagotiatione between Hubco and avwj ara still<br />
continuing). At Hpllosec and EMJETS, where nagotietions<br />
took place after workers returned to wort, tha wage<br />
demands were not eat. At ftand Scrap Iron, tha 350<br />
workers who did not return by the deadline, were<br />
regarded aa fired, to be followed by 'selective<br />
re-employment'. Thle is a typical mnevsment strategy<br />
by which those thay regard aa "troublemakers' lose<br />
thair Jobe (as happened at Hawker Siddoley}.<br />
Employers charged (ROU, 03.03.82) that tha recant<br />
unreat was a *co-ordinated campaign 1 by UAau. One<br />
said, *Thay era trying to influence the negotiations +<br />
or ara flexing their muaclee'* mWrG denies this:<br />
'few had nothing to do with It. It la tha aortara aho<br />
have decided to take action. One day wa might decide<br />
to call our saabers out, but wa haven*t dona it thle<br />
tiag* (ROM, 04.03.62)*<br />
Tha MAWU organiser at aadeville, Hoses esiyekleo.<br />
explains tha present strength of MAVU by its grassroots<br />
organisation. Struggles ara articulated by ahop<br />
stewards, tha central leadership group in tha union,<br />
and than tha union is called in to negotiate. Although<br />
UMU was started in 1995, it has only grown in the<br />
lest year to its present strength of 29 000 signedup<br />
members, of whom 20 000 are wall organised. In<br />
the peat, ha said, tha union relied too much on<br />
organisation by individual officiala. Since than,<br />
orgeniaation had become the task of tha mortars<br />
themselves, through shop stewards. The ahop ataward<br />
council meats regularly for seminars on orgeniaation
and negotiation techniques. Thara ia also intensive<br />
discussion in tha planning coealttaee at aach 'local'<br />
on probleaa and dlaputee-, and a raport bade westing to<br />
tha antira union every three aonthe by tha shop<br />
stewards council.<br />
Tha union aleo grew rapidly through tha ealectlon<br />
of 'target factorlaa' - uaually tha biggest firsa -<br />
for 1 lntenolva organisation. Through coeaunloation<br />
bataaan workers in tha toanahipa and hoatala other<br />
workers from aaaller factorlaa in tha area ware<br />
attracted to tha union.<br />
Ueyekleo aaid that 'Hero in *adavilla, no<br />
union can challenge UW f . (At National Springe in<br />
Hadevillo, for axaaple, •e-bers of GEA*U left that<br />
union in favour of UAW), Only ahan WttU haa * 60*<br />
wemberehip in a factory doaa it approach aanagaaant<br />
for recognition. Thraa recognition opTaawjents have<br />
bean concluded with aVWJ in tha paat year, with aore<br />
In tha pipeline after the current atrike wave. For<br />
axaaple. at Kroat Brothers In Harriotdale, 1 300<br />
aorlcers cane out on atrlka demanding tha disbanding<br />
of tha liaison cow It tee and its replacement by union<br />
ahop stewards. The liaison coaalttea haa been<br />
disbanded, and tha company la conducting recognition<br />
talks -ith MAVU.<br />
Uayeklao aaid he ama happy with tha outcoao of<br />
the atrugglee in the Vedevllle area, for there hod<br />
been «orw euccaaaee than failures. Oaapite the<br />
fallurae, he aaid, eortcere had learnt to struggle<br />
together.<br />
Xn the recent events on the East Rand ffljnaoaaent<br />
atrategies and the SEIFSA stance repreaant capital'a<br />
attaapt to lnetltutlonellae lnduatrlal conflict and<br />
articulate It in an organised, aalf-ragulatlog wanner.<br />
Tha recant ahop floor atrugglee in the natal industry<br />
are evidence of worfcere 1 determination to resist this<br />
atratagy and thua to aeakan capital *e poeition.<br />
S (torch, 1962)<br />
Labour Action<br />
NATIONAL fTOPPABE<br />
Shortly after tne death In aacurlty pollce4Cuatody<br />
of Hell Aggett waa announced, the union of which he<br />
aas Transvaal aacretary (Food .and Canning Horkare'<br />
Union - aae above) called for a national half-hour<br />
worfc etoppege to mourn hie death. Alaoet<br />
laawdiataly, the Majority of the independent union<br />
groupings supported the call: FOSATU, CJSA, G*U(<br />
CCAWU3A, BWU, Orange-veal GW, 8AAW, aVOUBA.<br />
MM.<br />
The proposed stoppage aas aet for Thursday, 11<br />
February, free) 11h30 to noon. The unions aafcad<br />
eaployers to agree to thla daaonetratlon strike -<br />
end e nuaber of tha largeat aeployer groupe (eg<br />
FCT. KIF8A) rwcoaaended that no action be t*cen<br />
againat thoea workars aha Joined the stoppage.<br />
Only deye before tha propoaad stoppage, police<br />
eelzed 20 000 etoppege aupport etickera froa a<br />
Johannesburg printer - theee had been ordered by tha<br />
7ranavaal Unions 1 Solidarity Cowaittee. Certain<br />
awployere, for axaaple SAPP11 thraetenad workers with<br />
dismissal if they Joined the stoppage,- ahlla TUCSA<br />
ran true to lte long history of acabblng on other<br />
working, class organisations by distancing Itself<br />
from tha stoppage.<br />
Shortly before tha stoppage was due to begin,<br />
it aas announced that the Australian Council of Trade<br />
Uniona (ACTU) had lapoaed a week-long ban on South<br />
African shipping and air travel - thla action aas In<br />
proteat againat the death of Hall Aggett and the<br />
continued detention of trade unlonlets in South<br />
Africa, and followed on a oall for protest aada by<br />
the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions<br />
(ICFTU).<br />
The uniona ware Joined in the work stoppage<br />
by other organisations - cowaunity groupe, universities<br />
and Journal leta.<br />
Promptly at 11h30 on 11 February» tana of<br />
thouaanda of workers downed tools. Estleatee of tha<br />
numbers of aorlcers involved in the stoppage ranged<br />
froa a aanagaaant figure of 30 000 to a union figure<br />
of 100 000. Host co—mtatora "ave euggested<br />
that the higher figura is the aora accurst*.<br />
Tha Joint action by so aany uniona aas an<br />
indication of their growing unity on aoaa issues.<br />
Thla waa reflected in the apeach given by the<br />
GK'e David Lewie at tha union-organised funeral for<br />
Neil Aggettt<br />
Hell's death le a great price to pey for the<br />
unity of the trade union aovpeent. la auat take<br />
the axaaple ahowad on Thursday ahan they stopped<br />
work and the exaapIs of thla funeral and eg<br />
aust start uniting tha trade union aoveaant,<br />
said Laaia.<br />
ihile the work stoppage waa ignored by 6AflC~TV,<br />
other saw it as vary significant. Nunerlcally very<br />
largo, It involved aa aany workers ae want on etrlke<br />
during the whole of 1973 - e year in which the Incidents<br />
of strike* was the highest of the 1970s. Equally<br />
ae laportant, it was an explicitly political atrlka.<br />
thlla there have bean aany political etrikea before<br />
in South Africa - the stay aaay caapalgna of 1976<br />
for axaaple - thle wortc stoppage involved workera<br />
taking action on tha factory floor rather than in<br />
the townships. Soae critiques of tha stay aaay<br />
tactic have suggested that atay aweys eeperete workers<br />
froa their aost laportant place of power - the factory<br />
floor. In tare* of the nuaber of workers involved,<br />
tha unity shown by trade unions, and the neture of<br />
tha laeue, the half-hour wot* etoppege of 11<br />
FEbruary can be seen as an laportant indicator of<br />
poasible future trends.<br />
*<br />
TFUKSVAAl<br />
A^on^a ^V^eear (Doomfontaln); Mora than WO workera<br />
staged a brier wortc etoppege on 2 March. They ware<br />
protesting about the dlaaisaal of a ahop Stewart who<br />
put forward thwir wage deaands to aanagaaant. They<br />
raturned to work after they ware proaleed a R2t0Q<br />
lncraaae on their weekly wagesv and the reinatataaant<br />
of the shop steward.<br />
Afrox Gas Equipment (Gemlaton): About 300 worker* at<br />
Afro* downed toola on 6 March. The atrlka aas In<br />
support of an increase to 1*8,30 per hour. Host of<br />
the workers at Afro* do not belong to any unicn,<br />
although aoaa are "wntoere of tha Steel and Allied<br />
aortcars Union (KAffU). Four negotiators ware appointed<br />
by tha work are to talk to amnagaaant on their behalf.<br />
No further news.<br />
Allied Publishing (Johannesburg)i (Background on the<br />
company Is Qlvn In w|Pl?: 1-3; atrlka action at this<br />
company is covered in aiP16 and «P17i46; CCAtUSA<br />
objections to the uaw of child labour in the distribution<br />
of newapapara is covered in 1TP1?I4?)<br />
In March, 1961, CCAVUBA already expressed slam<br />
at Allied** advertlseaente requesting Johannesburg's<br />
northern suburbs children to deliver their newspapers<br />
(see «PV7:47). In February this year talks began i<br />
batween (XAwUBA ehot> atawerds and Allied. The<br />
Ccwewrclal, Catering and Allied aorkare' Union'e<br />
concern la that the greater uee of child eellere will<br />
cost workera their Jobs, aanagaaant is responding<br />
by saying that workers whose Jobs are thraatanad or<br />
aado rwdundant will be re eaployed elsewhere in the<br />
coapeny. and ia assuming that there will be no aaas<br />
firing (PW, J7.02.WJ.<br />
No further news.<br />
Aluaco awtal IndustMea (aedevllle)f 40 workers ware<br />
fired when they struck on 6 Kerch, 1902. They vera<br />
daaandlng e rer«l**r*-hour increase. ttanegewent aaid<br />
that they had bean Replaced (Star, 12.03.62).<br />
Autowatlc Plating (laando): A one day atrlka,<br />
involving 150 workers occurred et Autowatlc Plating<br />
- a coapany in the Oorbyl Group. Uanagawent and tha<br />
Hvtal and Allied Venters Union (FOGATU-affiliated UAwu)<br />
had talks over aage* but the deaands ware not aet<br />
(Star, 13.03.62).<br />
Baldwins Steel (Brakpan): 13 driver* eant on atrike<br />
at thla flra, daaandlng a wage lncraaae. They wmr%<br />
diacontantad with the eystea whereby thay were paid<br />
a ainlaua wage aa wall aa an incentive bonue. They<br />
agreed to call off the atrlka the following day, after<br />
talks with aanagaaant. flhen thay failed to return<br />
to work aanagaaant inforaed than that thay had<br />
'dlealssed theaeelvwa 1 and atartad hiring rmm '<br />
drivers (Star, 12.02.62).<br />
Chubb Lock and Safe Coapany (eedevUle)! 2*0 aorkere<br />
at this flra downed toola in support of a R2,00 an<br />
hour ainlaua wage. The etrlke laatad for two dsya,<br />
sfter ehic* aanagaaant sacked tha striking workers<br />
(Star, 06.03.62).<br />
Clifford Harris (Veresnlging)i For previous strike<br />
action wmm MP19zS3-g.<br />
A two day atrike occurred at the coapany.<br />
'700 aorkere aupportad It. Tha aorkara returned to ais*<br />
on 9 etarch, after aanagaaant had agraad to eaet aoaa<br />
of their deaands, except thoea Involving wegae.<br />
The aortcere had daaendad that thay be peld at<br />
Wh30 Inetaad of Kh30 on Fridays, In order to be able<br />
*r"
£o natch 'their transport to gat home on weekends -<br />
f which the coapany agreed to. Tha company also agreed<br />
* to review tha cancellation of overtime on sookende.<br />
Dewmnda involving wagee could only be reviewed in<br />
J April and Octobar, coapany officials said. Tha<br />
negotiations took place betas en management and tha<br />
Oranga-vaal General workere* Union.<br />
Coca Col* Itorahouas (Florida): Drivers at Coca Cola<br />
stoppsd work for a few hour*- Thay wanted to discuss<br />
working conditions, apaclfically tha long hours they<br />
vara required to won* (Star, 20.02.62).<br />
Ho further news*<br />
Colotte-Palaolive (Sokaburg)i For background, sea<br />
WP 18144-5; 19:34-5; 20:43, A recognition egrssmsnt<br />
between Colgate-Palmolive and the F06ATU-effilleted<br />
Chemical lorkara* Industrial Union (CWIU) eae signed<br />
, In August. 1981 (see VIP 20:43). Vega negotiations<br />
vent on for moat of February this year. They were the<br />
first negotiations since the recognition egreemont<br />
(m result of a 4 month strike). Workers et Colgate-<br />
Pelmollve will not receive a minimum of R1,95 an<br />
hour In Hey, to be Increased to a minimum of R2,04<br />
in November.<br />
Corobrlk (Bedfordwiew): Abeut 500 workers downed<br />
tools at Corobrlk on 1 February. Thay sere demanding<br />
that Corobrlk sign e recognition agreement eith their<br />
FOSATU-affiliated Glass and Allied Itorkers' Union.<br />
The union clelmed that management wee demanding<br />
Industrie! council membership as a prerequisite for<br />
union recognition, Workers elso clelmed that the<br />
company ems refusing to recognise the union because it<br />
was not registered, management seld that it see merely<br />
reateting its position, adopted in December last year.<br />
The striking workers eere considered to have<br />
'discharged themselves'. Imvtegement maid that they<br />
eould bm re employed selectively if they applied for<br />
their Job*.<br />
Diamond Cutting Industry: (For earlier information<br />
on the diamond cutting industry, see WIP7:3Si 16:44).<br />
L.J ven dan Bergh (25) sppeorsrt in the magistrate's<br />
court In llsrch, 1982, for allegedly breaking an<br />
Industrial council agreement. The agreement states<br />
that if a diamond cutter leevse hie Job, he must melt<br />
three monthe before joining another employer within<br />
tha trade* If he re-enters the trade lnalda three<br />
months, he is bound to return to his former employer.<br />
Van dan Bergh pleaded not guilty. He said ha<br />
mme employed by Jooste Diamond Cutting Works until<br />
July 24, 1981. Intending to become a carpenter, ha<br />
left the firm. Before leaving he signed a document<br />
setting out the conditions (outlined above) under ehich<br />
he could return to the trade. The following Monday<br />
he Joined LC Diamond Cutting works. Ha said that he<br />
was under the impression that the agreement was not<br />
binding on him because he had resigned from the SA<br />
Oiaaond Cut tare' Union.<br />
The magistrate found the agrsmaent to be binding.<br />
He also found Van den Bergh guilty of breaking It.<br />
Distillers Corporation (ffadeville): The dismissal of<br />
three workers et Distillers Corporation resulted in<br />
about 800 workers downing tools. The workers claimed<br />
that management had broken en agreement between them<br />
when the workers eere fired. According to the j<br />
agreement management was required to cbnault the shop<br />
stewards whan disputes arose. Workers aeld that<br />
the three had been victimised for their union activities<br />
(Sowatan, 24.02.62).<br />
No further news.<br />
Dresser SA (wadevllle): Between 300 and 400 workers<br />
downed tools demanding e rand-en-hour Increase on<br />
their wages. Workers said that a coapany official had<br />
not addresssd them when they had initially aaked for<br />
the Increase. How that thay ware on strike the worker a<br />
refused to enter into negotiations with management.<br />
They wanted an ens ear of 'yes' or 'no* to their<br />
demands.<br />
After three deys the workers agreed to return to<br />
work on condition that aanagament had talks with UASJU<br />
on a recognition and procedural agreement. The terms<br />
elso included telks with an interim committee of<br />
workers which would replace the existing works<br />
committee, end an assurance that tha striking workers<br />
would not be victimised.<br />
Dunlop Industrial Products (Benonl)t On 1 February,<br />
199?, 300 workers demanded higher wages (Boweten,<br />
02.03.62).<br />
No further news. *<br />
EMES (Geraiston): 40 workers demanded pay increases*<br />
They downed tools for a day amd then returned to work<br />
although their demmnds had not been mat (Star,<br />
12.03.82).<br />
Fensecure (Geraiston): At this firm 30 worksrs went<br />
on atrlks demanding to be paid a minimum wage of<br />
R2,00 en hour. Thay elso expressed dissatisfaction<br />
that their pay slips did not reflect their hourly<br />
wage, and that their weekly wages ware not consistent,<br />
ie they were sometimes paid R47,00 and sometimes<br />
paid R60.00 par week (6owetant 09.03.8?).<br />
Ho further news.<br />
Fanner SA (laando)i At this firm about ISO workers<br />
struck demanding an Increase of R1,00 an hour. Thay<br />
returned to work efter management said that they would<br />
not discuss e new increase until after the Industrial<br />
Council negotiation* next month (ROM, 17.03,62).<br />
Flak ear (wadevllle) i Workers at this metal company<br />
downed toole on 18 March, in protest against the<br />
dismissal of three of their co-workers. A union shop<br />
steward was sent to negotiate with aanagament, who<br />
claimed that the workers eere just being laid off<br />
for e month. The striking workers claimed that the<br />
dismissed workers had been victimised.<br />
The following day thw striking workers returned<br />
to worH, but threatened further action if tne sew* were<br />
not reinstated. MMU said that it eae attempting<br />
further negotiations with management on the dispute<br />
(RDM, 20.03.62).<br />
No further news,<br />
fuens Electrical Industries (Alberton): About 600<br />
worksrs downed tools and demmnded higher wegee. Ihen<br />
the strike had entered its fourth day the eorkere<br />
elected representatives to negotiate on their<br />
behelf, and returned to work (Sowatan* 17.03.82).<br />
Oreyhound Bus Lines (Krugsredarp): (For background<br />
on this firm sew wTP17i4flj 20*43).<br />
Following the etrlke in February, 1961, a<br />
preliminary recognition agreement was drawn up by<br />
tha Traneport and Allied Workers* Union (TAWU).<br />
The compeny signed it In December, 1901 (flOU, 17.f2.Bl).<br />
Harvey Tiles (Bcksburg): Workere et Harvey Tiles<br />
claimed that their employers had breeched en agreement<br />
about night shifts. Management had originally<br />
stated that night shift mould cease on 9 December,<br />
and had then Ordered it to ceeee on 4 Dec amber.<br />
Workers ware locked out when thay arrived for<br />
their night ehlft on 7 December, mnd told to return<br />
the following morning. On thmt morning 30 workers<br />
refused to work the dey shift, end were ell dismissed.<br />
then the company reopened on 6 January, 1982, efter<br />
the Christmas break, the dismissed workers were not<br />
allowed baok.<br />
Forty of their co-workers want on strike in their<br />
support. All 70 worksrs sere offered their Jobs<br />
back but refused end ware ell dismissed. UAHj claims<br />
that tha compeny has violetad an Industrial Council<br />
sgreemsnt compelling companies to notify tha Council<br />
when dismissing worksrs. HAWU is considering charging<br />
the company for heving locked out lte employees on<br />
7 Oeceaber (Sowatan, 20.01.82).<br />
No further news.<br />
Hawker Slddeley Africa: 150 employees et Hewker<br />
Slddeley downed tools demanding the reinstatement of<br />
two of their colleagues and en Increase of R1,00 an<br />
hour. They returned to work while management held<br />
talks with IWTU (Sowatan, 04.03.62).<br />
Henkel (Isendo): A helf-hour work atoppage occurred<br />
at this firm, takers et the Isanda plant cam* out<br />
in support of a strike by fellow workers at the Natal<br />
plant (see below) (RON, 11.03,62). .<br />
JH Henochsberg (Ooornfontain)t About 140 worker*<br />
staged a briar work stoppage at thle firm on 6 March.<br />
The National Union of Clothing workers (NUCW) said<br />
that ths cause was an Industrial Council agreement<br />
that was sxplring in June, •orkere were demanding<br />
pay increases and management granted a A3,00 weakly<br />
increase efter the stoppage,<br />
HlghvBld Bua Company : A strlks occurred at this<br />
company during October, 1961. No further news<br />
(ROW, 15.10.61).<br />
Holloaac (Gerraiston): A strike by B0 workers<br />
occurred on 10 Usrch, 1962. Their wage demands<br />
were not met, but they returned to work tha following<br />
day. management said that negotiations with a works<br />
council were proceeding (Star, 12.03.62).
Hubco metal Industries (lmdevllle): 180 workers want<br />
on strike on 3 March, demanding an increase of R1,00<br />
an hour. .They returned to work tha following day after<br />
aanagvaant had agreed to nagotlata with an elected<br />
workere' committee.<br />
I»cor (Varaanlglng): About 200 workers aera dismissed<br />
after e two eaak pay strike In October, 1981. The<br />
workers aare mainly employed as shunters. Most of<br />
thaej aare migrants froej the Trmnakei, the Cleksl;<br />
KeaZultj and other arwae. Ae they aera no longer Iacor<br />
eeployeea the secksd workers vera told to vecete their<br />
rooms et the Iscor hostel. Their dlsalssel would<br />
elao have meant their removal to the bentuetans<br />
(Soeetmn, 20.10.81).<br />
Strikes et Jays, Lovable, and Raw Clothing (all three<br />
In Johannesburg): Strikes at tha above clothing<br />
factories have annoyed the TUCSA-affiliated unions to<br />
ahlch tha workers belong. The strikes in support of<br />
higher wages, have occurred in the context of a new<br />
aage agreement to be negotiated by employers,<br />
the Garment Workers' Union and the National Union of<br />
Clothing Workers. The agreement la to be negotiated<br />
in march, end will take effect In Jul/. The unions<br />
hove Issued e earning that 'workers must not think*<br />
they can strike and negotiate their omn increase<br />
over and ebove thm union increase*! They appealad<br />
to workers not to take this issue Into their own<br />
hands in the interim (ROM, 24.02.62).<br />
Also erne strikes et 8A weatherwear, Suki<br />
Crmeford, RUB Ores*, Adonis Knitwear, Remerque<br />
tear, JH hwrachsbergp end Patona and Baldwins<br />
Textiles, in this Issue of VIP, and e forthcoming<br />
article.<br />
Johannesburg underwear firm: Over 300 woHcers struck<br />
et this fine over mage demands. They rejected a<br />
R1,00 attendance bonus end demmnded a RS,(X) incraasa<br />
In weekly wages. The workers claim that they were<br />
ordered to leave If they refused to accept tha<br />
bonua offer (ROM, 10.02.82).<br />
No further name.<br />
Kroat Brothers (hwtrriotdale): A dispute Involving<br />
union recognition arose et this firm. workers sent<br />
a petition to their employers celling for the llelson<br />
ccewtlttee to be disbanded end replaced by a shop<br />
stewards committee of etAJU. The firm's managing<br />
director agreed to diabend the llelson committee<br />
and ask the woikerw to elect e nee one until such<br />
time ee eVenJ had been formally recognised. He<br />
added that MA*u shop stewards would only be recognised<br />
whan tha union gained recognition.<br />
At this point, 1 300 workers went on etrlke.<br />
After negotiations with avwu, the company agreed to<br />
recognise union shop stewards, and to sign a mrlttmn<br />
recognition egremment with the union. The workers<br />
then agieed to cell off their 1 day strike<br />
(Star, 04.02.82).<br />
Kuaak Dairy (Vest Rand): On Thuadey, 12 March. 90<br />
workers from this, the only dairy in the area,<br />
stopped work. The etrlke Involved dissstisfaction<br />
over deduction from their wages. Abel van Vyk,<br />
managing director of the delry, eeid that he feared<br />
that the strike would continue, but he hoped to have<br />
the workers back et their Jobs on Monday. The<br />
remainder of the only two reports on this strike<br />
dealt with practical arrangements for peopls to gat<br />
milk, including thw involvement of Radio Hlghveld.<br />
Lasher Tools (Germiston); More then 2O0 employees<br />
(thw entire workforce) et Lasher Tools went on strike<br />
on 1 February, 1962. They demanded en increase of<br />
Hi ,00 an hour. One of the workers told e reporter<br />
that thev ware being paid R2S,00 a week (Star,<br />
03.02.82).<br />
No further news.<br />
Lovable (see Jays).<br />
McKachMe Brothers (eadeviHe): Over 1 000 workers<br />
downed tools on 1 March demanding an Increase of<br />
R1,00 an hour. The demand was later charged to<br />
one for a R2,00 aft hour minimum wage. After three<br />
devs the worksra agreed to return to work, on<br />
condition thet management negotiates on their<br />
later demand.<br />
Kampak Recycling Industrisa (Edenvale): About 75<br />
workers went on strike in support of a R1,00 an<br />
hour Increase. The following day the workers had<br />
returned to work pending talks between management end<br />
the FOSATU-effllleted Paper, Mood and Allied workers'<br />
Union leter thet months (Star, 04.02.82).<br />
No further news.<br />
Patons and Baldwins Textiles (Rendfontein); A three<br />
hour work stoppage occurred at this firm on 8<br />
February. Over 200 workers threatened to go on<br />
etrlke if money that had bean deducted from their<br />
wages ems not returned to them. Negotiations<br />
began between management end the Textile Workers'<br />
Union. The workers agreed to return to work on<br />
condition that management suspend ell further<br />
deductions while negotiations were taking place.<br />
The explanation thet management gave for the<br />
deductions was that the computer had meda tax<br />
deductions that were too low during 1981. A<br />
spokesperson for the union said that It was trying to<br />
get a full explanation from management and would<br />
then decide on possible further ection (Sew*tan,<br />
09.02.82).<br />
Power Steel (wadeville): For information of earlier<br />
strike action aae WP 21:56.<br />
An undisclosed rx*rt>er of workers damned tools<br />
in early March, demanding mage increases. Vorker<br />
representetives and management T * reported to be<br />
holding talks (Sowetan, 03.03.82).<br />
No further news.<br />
•<br />
Rand Scrap Iron (Germlston): 500 workers downed tools<br />
at this plant on 10 mwrch, 1982, asking for higher<br />
wages. The company alleged that striking workers<br />
had stoned vehlclee attempting to enter the plant.<br />
About 150 workers returned to work and management<br />
eeid they would take back most of the rest, sxcept<br />
for those who had been involved in stone throwing<br />
(BOM, 11.03.82).<br />
page 30<br />
Remarque Wwar (Doornfontein, Johannesburg): On Tuesday,<br />
2 march, more than 100 workers at this clothing firm<br />
went on strike, over the dismissal of e shop steward<br />
who had taken wage dmwande to management,<br />
The workers went beck to work shortly efter the<br />
strike began efter being granted a R2,00 weakly<br />
increase, and having tha shop steward reinstated.<br />
Ram Clothing (see Jeys).<br />
RmB Dress flBWEm 1: * brief steppage occurred on<br />
12 March. Ho further news.<br />
SA Abbatolr Company (Krugersdorp): Workers downed<br />
tools at this firm protesting about tha dismissal<br />
of a unman shop steward. The general secretary of<br />
the CUBA-affiliated Food, Beverage and Allied<br />
Workers' Union said thet the firm had previously<br />
refused to recognise the union because it was not<br />
registered. He claimed the union had a membership of<br />
about 200 workers at tha plant (ROM, 02.03.02).<br />
The following day workers returned to work<br />
after assurances from management that no further<br />
workers mould be fired (Star, 03.03.82).<br />
Sapakoa Tea Plantations (Tzaneen): MP has Juet come<br />
across a report dating back to late last year, and<br />
referring to strikes at the Sapakoa Tea Plantations*<br />
It appears that on Friday, 30 October, 1961,<br />
400 women frtjm the company's Grenshoek tea plantation<br />
marched on Tinmen. They eere stopped by pollcs when<br />
about ten kea, from the town. On Saturday morning<br />
they ware paid off, but management said that the<br />
next Monday, 2 November, they were all back at work.<br />
On Monday, 2 November, 600 workers from the<br />
Hlddelkop plantation marched on Tzaneen, but were,<br />
in turn stopoed by police a few kas from Tzaneen.<br />
They eere said to have been carrying flags, sticks<br />
and singing while marching in an orderly column.<br />
DJ Penwill, managing director of the company, eeid<br />
that they had no mage demands, although an amount<br />
of a monthly increase of R36,00 had been mentioned<br />
(Seeld, 03.11.81).<br />
Ww have no further information on these events.<br />
•<br />
SA epatherwmsr (mayfair, Johannesburg): On 9 March,<br />
1962, workers struck demanding wage increases.<br />
They returned to eork tha following day efter<br />
management had offered a R5,Q0 par weak production<br />
bonus.<br />
Sharp: A strike at a firm Identified as 'Sharp' by<br />
workwrs was mentioned in e report (ROM, 04.03.82).<br />
Sukl iCrawfqrg (Johannesburg): A brief stoppage<br />
took place on 12 March. 39 workers struck demanding<br />
wage incraases. They returned to eork after they<br />
had been promised a R3,00 weakly increase.<br />
Transvaal mailamble Foundries: 360 workers refused
&C..31<br />
to work in protest against tha dismissal of two<br />
colleagues* MX "*re dismissed but later reemploy**<br />
(Star, 05*03.62).<br />
Unilever (Boksburg): About 200 writer* et the Lever<br />
Brothers plant struck for o few hours on 25 February.<br />
This wee in protest over the dismissal of some of<br />
their colleagues. The return to work happened In<br />
tereis of a dispute procedure agreed upon by the<br />
CU&A-effiliated Food, Beverage and Allied workers*<br />
Union and Unilever laat rwjvember*<br />
A Wolff General Engineers (taltltu, Pratorle): At<br />
this factory 40 coloured painter* and welders resigned.<br />
They were protesting about the fact that they were to<br />
be replaced by african workers. One of then said,<br />
•If blexka take our poaitions they will work for lastpay*<br />
(Star. 21.01.62).<br />
aoltube (Cwrmleton): About ?60 workers struck<br />
demanding the dlsajissal of a white security guard.<br />
He was dismissed two days later and the atrlkers<br />
returned to work*<br />
KATAL<br />
Beta (trading as KweZulu Shoe Cofrpanv) (Loskop, near<br />
Cetcourt): this factory is owned Jointly by the<br />
(Canadian based) Beta company (holding a teo thirds<br />
share), and the state**. Corporation for Economic<br />
Development (CEO) (one third share).<br />
The F08ATU-affiliated National Union of Textile<br />
Woxkere (MJTw) has been active in organising tha<br />
workers at the factory. At a union meeting a woman<br />
worker nad coaplslned of ill-treatment by a supervisor<br />
at tha firm. She wee subseojuantly dl&misssed and<br />
another 100 woifeers were told that they would also<br />
be fired if they attended union meetings.<br />
On Monday, 22 February, TOO eorkara et the KSC<br />
want on strike in support of tha dismissed worker*<br />
workers ears eeid to be earning 1)14 e week. When the<br />
Industrial Council for the Leather Industry was asked<br />
to coawont on these wages, they aald that there was<br />
nothing they could do as tha factory 'was not in<br />
South Africa*! (Natal Usrcuryt 24,02.62).<br />
The IC spokeaparaon confirmed that the wages<br />
paid by the KSC were far below tha minimum laid<br />
down by tha IC for tha factories in the induetry '<br />
('e^n e flinking worker, responsible for cutting out<br />
the uppers, was paid a minimum of R7dt41 a week,<br />
ectordlng to tha (IC) agreement").<br />
Philip Kotxenberg, ftsnlor llaleon officer<br />
of the CEO, said that the Corporation "did not interfere<br />
in eny of the homeland Industries' eat up by tha<br />
CEO. It was a matter between management end workers.<br />
Ha aald tha primary objective of the corporation<br />
wee to provide work in tha rural areas. It<br />
could not do thia if it had to adhere to tha<br />
minimum wages laid down for metropolitan areas<br />
by tha various Industrial councils,<br />
(Natal mercury. 2a.02.62)<br />
Obed Zume, general secretary of the NUTV, said<br />
that the matter had also been taken up with the<br />
KwaZulu Legislative Assembly and the local chief,<br />
esklng them to exert pressurs.<br />
On fednesday, Za February, workers allegedly<br />
decided to return to work, after an NUTS meeting.<br />
'Community councillors' (?) had earlier asked ths<br />
worksrs (at management's request) to return to work.<br />
The workers refused to listen to this request.<br />
There is e considerable broek in the coverage of<br />
this strike that aa have at our disposal, dealing<br />
with tha next few weeks.<br />
It was reported on 16 March that 700 workers<br />
had been fired 'lest Thursday* (la 11 Merer*}. xn<br />
tha saw report it was said that tha NUTV said<br />
that management would not speak to them or to the<br />
KwaZulu 'labour officer*. The union also said that<br />
there had been no production at the factory since<br />
the dismissals.<br />
Howevsr, another report (Echo, supplement to<br />
the Natal (fitness, 18.03.62) said that ZA Khenyile,<br />
the KwaZulu 'labour officer' had mat with manmgeaint.<br />
Evan on the flimsy newe wa have on thia etrlke<br />
It Is obvious that there are eeverel important<br />
aspmcts to it: It draws attention to tha nature of<br />
foreign investment (some of it) in South Africa,<br />
willing to make the most of the extremely exploitable<br />
conditions that exist in tha bsntustana; it draws<br />
attention to links between foreign companies and the<br />
CEO, under the guise of providing employment<br />
opportunities; it shows up the llmltetions to the<br />
Industrial council system whan it comes to setting<br />
wages; the difficulties of organising workers In<br />
conditions of poverty end unemployment are present;<br />
and it raises the interesting aspect of the<br />
reletlonehlp between the bantustan authorities<br />
(in this cane the pro-Investment Buthelezl region)<br />
end (he workers situated etthln their areas - ehat<br />
was the line that the 'labour officer' took with the<br />
KSC management, and how did tha chief respond to the<br />
reouest that he exert pressure on the company?<br />
Hopefully one of our readers will be able to<br />
fill ua In on these and many other Questions that<br />
arise out of thia strike.<br />
Defy (Jacobs, Ourban): See) IIP21:S2.<br />
The evening shift on Monday, 1 Februory, refused to<br />
start work and by tha next day all 1 200 workers<br />
ware on strike. The issue was, once more, workers*<br />
contributions to and withdrawal from the pension<br />
fund administered through tha Induetrlal Council<br />
for tha steel industry, to which Defy belongs.<br />
The South African Allied Workers Union (SAMU),<br />
representing most of the Defy workare, were taic<br />
to be holding talks with representative* of the<br />
pension fund.Oefy dlrectora said that tha company<br />
had applied to tha Industrial Council to withdraw from<br />
the the Group metal Industries Pension Fund, and to<br />
establish a private schema.<br />
SCIFSA, the employer body in tha industi-y, said<br />
that it was examining the pension lasue * but at the<br />
monmnt contrlbutiona cannot be withdrawn unite* the<br />
employee laavea tha induetry, end then only *ft*r six<br />
montha have expired. This was already e change from<br />
the previous 'frozen' pension sltuetion (frozen until<br />
death or retirement] - e condition the earns *is that<br />
proposed and dropped In tha state's Psntion Bin. As<br />
for tha six month delay, Sam von Caller (SEIFfiA<br />
director) said that *ww have asaumad that for tha first<br />
six months after a worker loaae a Job, ha will be ebie<br />
to cleim from the uViemployment Insurance Fund' [HOM,<br />
10.02.62),<br />
On Thursday, 4 February, after an ultimatum to<br />
return to eorkt all workers eare fired aa 'tha<br />
coapeny could no longer tolerate the eorkere*<br />
continued absence and refusal to work' (R0II, 05.02.82).<br />
Herbert 8ernabus, notional organiser of tha<br />
SAAftU, said that a workers' committee had told<br />
management that they would meat the ultimatum "if<br />
Omfy could settle the pension issue within tha next<br />
two weeks' (Natel Mercury, 09.02.62). The workare<br />
were elso awaiting tha arrival of their lawyer,<br />
Graham Dyson, from Johannesburg.<br />
Defy was reported to be taking on workers from<br />
Monday, 8 February. 8y that day tha atrlka was said<br />
(by director R Collie) to have cost tha firm ft1,4-n.<br />
Fired employe** could reapply for their Jobe but<br />
would lose long-service beneflta.<br />
No further lnfonestion at present.<br />
Herkel Chemical manufacturers (Prospecton, Ourban):<br />
Bee SIP 21:53. 230 workers were fired on 10 March<br />
after being on atrlka (from reports at hand It is<br />
not clear for now long) over pension fund refunds,<br />
wages, and the nee shift system which decreased the<br />
difference'in wee** paid to shift and day workers,<br />
Tha FOBATU-affiliated CWIU and mnagemwnt warm<br />
set to meat on 24 March. Tha International Chemical<br />
and Energy Federation (Geneva-based, with mora than<br />
6HP affiliated workers Internationally) said that<br />
they would support a boycott of Henkel products if<br />
eorkere mere not reinstated, 75 workers had been<br />
taken bee*. Among thoee left out eaa CttlU national<br />
president, Able Cesle (Sunday Tribune, 21.03,62).<br />
(Information seams to Indicate that tha tftrtke<br />
started on Monday, 8 March).<br />
Iscor (Newcastle): Sea *IP 20:4? for coverage of the<br />
strike at thle plant. The Industrial Council for<br />
the Iron, Steal, Engineering and Metallurgical<br />
Industry, could not resolve the dispute batwean Iscor<br />
and the Black Allied workers' Union (BAKU). Tha<br />
meeting of tha IC (in October 1961) discus sad tha<br />
call by tha union for reinstatement with full pay<br />
of tha 76 fired workers. lecor would only take them<br />
beck -on merit* (Star, 15.10.B1). •<br />
McKlnnpn Cftaln (Pietermerltiburg): 90 workers, who<br />
had downed tools on Monday, 15 February, over<br />
alleged non-payaant of promised eage increesee<br />
ware evicted from the company T s premises by police<br />
that same afternoon. The next day they ware told<br />
that they had bean dismissed.<br />
A UAWU organiser had said that managament<br />
inelsted thet wege decisions be negotiated at<br />
Industrial council level. Tha union ems considering<br />
contacting tha USA parent company of VcKlnnon Chain.<br />
Mgndi Umber mill (Port Ournford, north coaat):<br />
All 131 workera (120 of them members of the FOBATlHeffiliated<br />
Paper, flood and Allied workare Union),<br />
were dismissed on Friday, 5 February, after having gone
cxi atrika the grovioua day. Tho issue aaa ovar panaion<br />
fund contributions which th« workers demanded to hava<br />
repaid. Manmflaaent said that they would hava to<br />
ration to oat the money back. Tha workara refused<br />
to resign, but also rafuaad to work.<br />
They aould not accapt their wages. Said PtMU<br />
organiser, Pat Horn, 'Mondi workers ara emphatically<br />
oppoaad to belonging to tha panaion schema and thay<br />
ara deaandlng that thay ba consulted on thla bafora<br />
final policy daclalona ara aada^Natal Mercury,<br />
06.02*82).<br />
Tha aanageewjnt at tha Anglo American<br />
owned firm, steadfastly rafuaad to daal with tha<br />
Ptmu, until lata in tha atrika.<br />
On 15 February, all 131 eorkere -ara tafcan on<br />
again, alth tha undaratandlng that tha panaion<br />
scheme aould ba investigated, and aorkara kept<br />
Informed of prooraaa (Natal Mercury, 16.02.62}.<br />
Natal African Blind Soclaty (Ualaxl): Aftar having<br />
baan on atrika for a week, 99 blind aorkara at thia<br />
cana aork factory aara fired on Thursday, 11<br />
Fabruary. Thay aara diaaatiafiad with an incraaaa<br />
in tha boarding rata fro- R1.90 to R2,fl0 a aaak<br />
(In aomw.casee) (ona-aigth of thalr aalary). Thla<br />
increase aaa said to ba necessary to cut 'the<br />
trawandoui lows* at ahlch thalr hoatal aaa aaid<br />
(by NWS eecretary, Lovall Oraana) to ba running.<br />
Tha aorkara aara glvan a daadllna of tOhOO<br />
on Saturday, 13 Fabruary, to leave tha hoatal and<br />
had not baan fad since tha day bafora thay aara<br />
fired ('because thay aara no longar employed by<br />
tha factory*, aald director J nandels).<br />
H Gerrabue, of tha Blind Allied workers'<br />
union, aald that aorkara aantad to ba chargad tha<br />
same rata for lodging, and not a proportional aaount<br />
of thalr aalarlaa (aald to ranga froa Re,00 to 822,00)*<br />
then tha aorkara rafuaad to laava thay aara<br />
chargad alth traapaaalng in tha hoatal, ahlch tha<br />
aorkara aald thay regarded aa 'thalr home*;*<br />
Randala aaa la tar persuaded, by KaaZulu authority<br />
officials to feerj tha aorkara (KaaZulu oana tha<br />
factory building* run by tha NABS on an agency baala ).<br />
On Monday, 15 Fabruary, 62 aorkara appaarad in<br />
tha uWazi magistrates* court, chargad alth<br />
trespassing. On 1? February, thay aara found<br />
guilty and thalr sentences (R30,00 or 30 dayo)<br />
aara suspended on condition that thay laava tha<br />
praalaaa. CJ Albartyn, for tha dafanca, arrangad a<br />
stay of ona night at tha hoatal.<br />
Tha aorkara applied to tha Supreme Court to<br />
ba alloaad to atay in tha hoatal. Randala aaa<br />
ordarad to ahoa cauaa (by 5 March) any ha ahould not<br />
ba pravarrtad froat ejecting tha aorkara.<br />
No furthar inforaatlon available to ua.<br />
Progress Industrlas (llamaarsdale): 80 aorkara loat<br />
thalr Jobs on Friday. 12 March (?), after protesting<br />
ovaraagaa (Star, 16.03.82). Tha flrad aorkara<br />
demanded that all of thaa ba ralnatatad. eenapmaent<br />
rafuaad and another 900 than aant on atrika. Thay<br />
aara given until Vadnaaday, 1? March, to raturn to<br />
aork. It aaa than announoad that aanagaaant would<br />
take on tha 80 aho had baan flrad.<br />
Tha National union of Taxtlla aorkara aald that<br />
thay aould talk to managsaint about aorkara* ahort<br />
pay, and recognition of tha union.<br />
Richards Bay Minerals (Rlchexda Bay): Saa «P19;a6.<br />
Following tha atrika in 1981, tha Intamational Metalworkers*<br />
Fadaratlon (HF) aald that Canadian aorkara<br />
aara baing asked "to uaa thalr Influence' to win tha<br />
reinstatement of ASM aorkara (tha IMF aald that a<br />
Canadian company oanad 31% of tha aharaa in R8**)•<br />
Matthews Oliphant (now detained), ganaral<br />
eecretary of tha National Fadaratlon of torkara (NFW),<br />
whosa afflllata tha National Iron, Steel, Metal and<br />
Alllad Workers* union was aald to hava baan involved<br />
In tha dispute, aaid that a handling boycott of<br />
staal exported by W might ba requested. Ha aaid that<br />
life 'had baan aada "hall" for workers since tha<br />
stoppage' (KM, W.02.62).<br />
T and C Organic (Mandinl): Morkers on two shifts at<br />
thla factory want on atrika on Friday, 6 February,<br />
protesting at tha diawiisaal of two shop stewards<br />
tha previous day ( Cltlzen,06.02.82).<br />
No further information.<br />
Tongeat Milling (Eatcourt)t An incomplete report<br />
said that tSO aorkara had baan flrad on Thursday,<br />
11 March (?), after demanding tha dlaaiaaal of a foreman<br />
(Star, 18.03.62). Tha Sweat, Food and Alllad<br />
workers 1 Union aaa aald to ba Involved in recognition<br />
talks at the factory* Workers eeie calling for full<br />
reinstatement, while manug—nt ware aald to be •<br />
planning 'selective 1 re employment.<br />
No furthar naaa available to ua.<br />
Tumall Ltd (Jacobs): About 400 aorkara downed toola<br />
during tha aaak ending Friday, 12 March over union<br />
recognition demands ('Echo', euppleaejnt to tha Natal<br />
witness, 18.03.62).<br />
From another report (Natal Mercury, 16.03.82) it<br />
appears that tha aorkara had downed toola on wwoneeday,<br />
K) March. aWvjgeaant aaid that moat of tha aorkara<br />
had raturned by tha Friday.<br />
Vlckers Lenning (isithaba): On 16 November, 1961,<br />
265 workers (almost tha entire workforce) aara<br />
diaalasad following a strike, and deaanda to ba paid<br />
while on strike.<br />
The aorkara* action at thla 'growth point*<br />
factory In KaaZulu, aaa aald to hava started on<br />
12 Noveaber, over 'grievance procedure*. Management<br />
aaid that 'eoma' workara aould ba rehired (Natal<br />
UwTCUTy, 18.11.61).<br />
No furthar information available to ua.<br />
Zlnkwexl Caravan Park (north coaat): (See tIP21:66).<br />
Tha trespass trial of 43 workers continued in February*<br />
21 of tha aorkara ware found guilty, cautioned aod<br />
discharged.<br />
WYSTETW CAPE<br />
Ley!and (Cope Town): Saw W1P20:49 for previous<br />
coverage and references. Lata In 1961 tha Layland<br />
company aada an offer of R1(m) par hour as Its minimum<br />
page 3?<br />
wage rate for tha 2 000 workers employed at ita two<br />
Cape Town plante. Thla aaa rejected by the F08ATUaffiliated<br />
National Automobile and Allied aorkara*<br />
Union (NAAWJ), aho aakad for A1,80 an hour ainlmua.<br />
Early in Fabruary the company asked the state to<br />
appoint a conciliation board to mediate in tha dispute<br />
between it and tha NAAVU. Failure to settle after<br />
this step could have led to a legal lock-out by *<br />
Layland of tha aorkara employed by tha company.<br />
NAAVU members had aald that thay would accapt<br />
R1.96, if new negotiations aara held In June (after<br />
alx months). Layland wanted the rata to stand for "<br />
12 montha.<br />
On 12 march it was announced that tha diapute aaa<br />
settled. From preas reports it appears that NAAJIU<br />
won their demand for aage negotiations in June, and<br />
accepted the R1»76 and hour ainlmua rata froa January<br />
to thla data.<br />
EASTERN CAPE<br />
VolkswagenTuitenhoge): On Friday, 5 Fabruary, two •<br />
workers were fired, for 'disciplinary reasons'. On<br />
Tuesday 200 workara vent on strike end ahut down several<br />
production llnee. Thay returned to work on thw same<br />
day while NAAMU shop stewards and officials continued<br />
negotiations with managamant.<br />
No furthar neve available to ue.<br />
Saw WIP20:49 for previoue coverage. Alao MIP21:60.<br />
Wilson-ftowntree (East London): Saa «P2l:o6-8;<br />
WIP20:50.<br />
The British Distributive and Allied Mockers'<br />
Union (OAWU) and tha Transport and General Workers*<br />
Union (TGwXJ) demanded In aloXJanuary that KleOfr-<br />
Rowntrea recognise tha South African Alllad starkera*<br />
Union (SAAtu) and reinstate the dismissed workara,<br />
otherwise action would be taken against tha LK-ba&ed<br />
parent company, Aoantrae-4leck 1 ntosh.<br />
Later that month people marched through tha<br />
streets of York, demanding reinstatement of the fired<br />
workwra. York la tha International haadouartara of<br />
Ro wo tree Mackintosh, flown tree Mackintosh shop<br />
stewerde proposed, in February, that the matter of<br />
the fata of tha South African workara ba raised<br />
within tha British Trade Union Congraaa.<br />
MINING<br />
Veal fleefs gold mine (Orkney): Miner George Nortje<br />
was stabbed to death after an underground argument<br />
on 26 January. No furthar Information available, other<br />
than that a man was to hava appaarad in tha local<br />
magistrate's court tha next day in connection with<br />
tha incident*<br />
Buffelefontaln Mine (Stllfontain): Miner Leonard<br />
Johanna* Woeat was stabbed to death on 12 Fabruary<br />
by an afrlcan miner after an argument while on duty.<br />
No further Information other than thet a mlner<br />
me* to hava appaarad in tha 8tllfontoin magistrate's<br />
court on Monday, 15 February.<br />
Ermelo coal mine (Ermelo): On 17 March 900 african<br />
Miners 'rioted* for three houra, demanding that tha<br />
last Saturday of every month ba free to allow thaa) to
[fmgn 33<br />
mturn to th«lr homes In the bantuetens. It appears<br />
Chat they were willing to work in time to make this<br />
possible.<br />
Conflicting statements by officials of the<br />
o«n»ra of tha mine, Gwncor, described demege as<br />
'minimal' end as ( tha worst I hava 9mmn % (Star,<br />
18.03.02).<br />
Tha situation wee atill tansa tha n**t morning<br />
and tha trouble was expected to spread to otner mine*<br />
at aome atage. Horkere agreed to raturn to vork while<br />
tha matter was being discussed with tha white unions.<br />
Thasa unions coma into tha picture because thay had<br />
agreed to an 11-day fortnight, on tha way to establishing<br />
a five-day working week (chair ultimata demand).<br />
Tha african miners' demends would, therefore, mean that<br />
not all white miners would have a regular 11-day<br />
fortnight.<br />
Arrie Paulus, generel secretary of the Uineworfcera'<br />
Union, said that he hod refused the request for the<br />
and of the month frm Saturday - 'the only change<br />
his union would favour would be a five-day weak*.<br />
Negotiations between Gencor and white (!) unions<br />
were aaid to be continuing.<br />
TRADE UHIOTS AMD uMONISTS<br />
Tha Ciskei authorities are taking a long hard look at<br />
the South African Allied workers Union (SAAtfU) after<br />
the lateat trial of strength between the two bodies.<br />
A mammoth court cese which lad to the conviction<br />
of 35 SAAmU members under tha Riotous Assemblies Act<br />
waa only the lest of severel clashes betwaen the tract*<br />
union and the 'government' it so atrongly rejects.<br />
Held in the Zwelitsha magistrate's court, the<br />
case was completed some three months after it opened,<br />
whan 35 'ciakelent* were charged under one of several<br />
eecurlty lews retained whan the bantuaten opted for<br />
South Africa's version of 'Independence'. Forty-two<br />
SAAiU members were originajly charged with inciting<br />
public violence at a bus terminus In Udantsane<br />
during September last year (see *IP20:S0). They were<br />
ell erreated after getting off a bua tmklng them home<br />
froa a SAAWU meeting held at the height of the<br />
•11son Rowntree dispute.<br />
They elao allegedly sang Inflammatory songs<br />
calling for the head of the Ciakai Central Intelligence<br />
Service (the CCIS), Uejor General Charles Sebe, to be<br />
killed.<br />
During the trial CCIS members told how the bus<br />
arrived at the terminus with people singing loudly,<br />
while other atuck clenched fleta out of tha windows.<br />
Some passengers were allegedly elnging 'Charles Saba<br />
will die' and said that thay would -always follow<br />
Gqweta', « reference to SAAWU preaident Thozemlle<br />
Gqwete.<br />
At the end of the state'e came SAAPJPJ's advocate,<br />
M Brassey, celled for ell 42 to be discharged, eeylng<br />
thet the prosecutor had felled to prove who the<br />
principal perpetretors were and what their cowman cause<br />
was.<br />
The magistrate. J Kotie, turned down the<br />
application, saying that he could not reject ell the<br />
fttata evidence.<br />
Of the original 4?f 36 were found guilty on the<br />
•eln -Jrirpe of incitement end sentenced to pay P10G<br />
fines. They were elso sentenced to nine months<br />
Imprisonment each, suspended conditionally for five<br />
years.<br />
five were found not guilty end discharged eftar<br />
claiming they wwrw 'innocent bystanders', A warrant<br />
of arrest was issued for m sixth accused, Nuku Koliai,<br />
who felled to eppeer on the day of Judgement,<br />
The 42nd accused did not live to see the end of<br />
the trail. He was stabbed to death over the Christmas<br />
period in a brawl.<br />
After sentence was p»sed Sebe warned that the<br />
Clekel was considering banning SAAVU.<br />
'X have seld on various occasions they (SAWJ)<br />
do not atand for any trade union*, he told the Oelly<br />
Dispatch newspaper. 'Today we have brought them to<br />
court and got a conviction. X em glad we have proven<br />
our case to the »rld.<br />
•ww have b—n accused, particularly mm, of<br />
harassing SAA*U members. U is now in the hands of<br />
the government whether to ben SAAVU.*<br />
The Ciskelan threat ccjnws et the end of e long,<br />
sometimes vicious war between the two bodies.<br />
Just over two years BQO the Ciskei authorities<br />
fired the first shots in tha war when it refused to<br />
give 8ANPAJ officee in the Mdantsa/iw shopping complex<br />
- Sebe cleimed trade union* were redundant in the<br />
Ciskei because tha 'government of Ciskei looks Into<br />
the problems of wvery worker*.<br />
Since then approximately 300 SAAMu membere have<br />
been detelned, either by the South African security<br />
police or the CCIS.<br />
Thozemlle Oqwete himself has been detained<br />
five tinw without being convicted of en offence, and<br />
wee also picked up during tha Zwelitsha trial. After<br />
being accused by CCIS officers of 'waking petrel<br />
bombs end pamphlets 1 , he ems released.<br />
Lest year 6Qweta*s home was mysteriously set<br />
elight end two close relatives - his mother and an<br />
uncle - died in the fire, allegedly because somebody<br />
had wirwd bcth entrances closed (see «P21:61-3).<br />
At their funerel Gamete's girlfriend, Oeliswe<br />
Roxiso, was shot deed when shots were fired et a<br />
crowd of mourners.<br />
Recently Thoiemlle Gq%eta was detained for 66<br />
days by the South African security police. He wee<br />
released *for heelth reesone* efter being admitted<br />
to a psychiatric ward.<br />
- Eastern Cape correspondent.<br />
The deeth In detention of mall Aggett hee domineted<br />
the labour scene both locally and Internationally.<br />
It la quite remarkable how the atete and its media/<br />
propaganda arm, the 9A8C, has toned down its coveregw<br />
of the Polish situetlon now thet the local repression<br />
of the working class and its leaders hee hed such<br />
internetlonel coverege.<br />
Hell Aggett was not the first, end will probebly<br />
not be the lest. Trade unionists who ere known to<br />
have died in detention:<br />
Looksmert Ngudle September 1963<br />
Celeb mwyeklso 1969<br />
Luke wwzwembe 1976<br />
Lawrence Ndzenge January iffTfi<br />
Elijah LOM 1977<br />
Neil Aggett February 1982<br />
The offices of the Black Allied worker* Union<br />
(BAeU) in Nmwceetle were raided by security police en<br />
Tuesday, 19 Jenuery, 1961. Documents end some<br />
correspondence waa removed,<br />
A preyer meeting that was to be held by the<br />
Uwdle fforkers 1 Association of South Africa (sVASA)<br />
was cancelled when the security police intimidated the<br />
prleat in whose church It was to have teken place.<br />
Cers of MMASA members who were already et the venue<br />
were searched {Star, 15.02.62).<br />
The South African Allied Vorkers* Union (SAAVU)<br />
has come in for more than lte shere of the lntlmldetion<br />
and harassment of the security policw, both In the<br />
Ciskei bentustan (see above) and the national security<br />
police. During the first week of February the offices<br />
of the union in Eest London were raided three times in<br />
tec deys. The officlels present were told thet they<br />
had no right to be In South Africa as they were<br />
foreigners from the Ciekei. The need of the security<br />
police in East London, Colonel *P >M> der mwrwe, said<br />
thet the officee had Hot been 'raided' but thet they<br />
hod been 'visited 1 , and that some documentation had<br />
been removed. The union was using a disused church<br />
hell a* offices, heving been evicted from their offices<br />
in the city.<br />
Two officials had been taken away by thw security<br />
police for questioning. They were releesed two hours<br />
later.<br />
It is feared by trade unlonista thet enother tool<br />
could be added to the Array of security mmesures thet<br />
can already be, and is being used agalnat them. This<br />
is the recommendation by the Reels Commission thet<br />
'lntlmldetion' be declered a crime (this would prohibit<br />
anybody 'from compelling or inducing another person<br />
from doing any act or forcing, another to adopt or<br />
abandon e certain viewpoint')* Anyone found guilty of<br />
this 'crime' would be lleole to a R20 000 fine or<br />
ten yeers imprisonment* or both. Picketing la et<br />
present being 'dlecourmged' through the eppllcetlon<br />
of the Riotous Assemblies Act.<br />
The case in which 40 workers who hed been involved<br />
in the strike et Rely Precision Casting are suing the<br />
Minister of Police for R1 500 each, continued during<br />
January and Februery. The workera allege thet they<br />
were beaten up by the police. Thia cese will be<br />
written up later. See 1IP21:59 for references<br />
to previous coverege of the strike et the fire).<br />
The Minister of Police eeld in reply to e queetion in<br />
perliement thet e totel of 21 trade unlonista hed been<br />
detelned in South Africe since the beginning of 1961.<br />
Ten of these people, according to the Minister, had<br />
benn released without cherge and the othmra were in<br />
detention under the Terrorism Act (RDM, 26.02.8?).
Trade union related people known to b<br />
at 15.03,8? (central stete):<br />
Gate of detention *jwwe<br />
24.09.81 Alan Fine<br />
23-11.81<br />
27.11.B1<br />
OB-12-81<br />
11.1Z.81<br />
? .12.81<br />
13.03.82<br />
• In detention as<br />
•onty Nersoo<br />
wfeshlnlni<br />
Klklna<br />
Mflou<br />
Rita Ndzange<br />
Maria Favls<br />
Liz Fiord<br />
Sisa Njlkelt<br />
Eric Hntonga<br />
H Teho<br />
BMW<br />
eatthews Oliphant Gen~Sac, eFl<br />
unlon/cfojenlsatipn<br />
Ass Sec Itt««ter!;rand<br />
Liquor and Catering Trade<br />
ex-ohb municipal Employees'<br />
Gan-Sact CCAwYJSA<br />
Gen-Gee, SAJWJ<br />
Proa, GMU<br />
Org-Sac; GMU<br />
Editor, SHB<br />
Assoclatad alth IAS<br />
V-Pres, SAMU<br />
Branch Chelr, SAA*U<br />
Trade union related people released fraa detention;<br />
03,06 81 -1S.02.82) Ouslie wmkhende Uw*ir, MAC-USA<br />
wmxwell eadlingozi Official. UACWUSA<br />
Zandlie ejuza Official, HAOtUSA<br />
wVolisi Oldlzw 0rgt WC8UGA<br />
26.06 81<br />
Sipho Pitymna Org, UftCWSA G GaUSA<br />
27.11. 01 03.03-82) Thozmaile Gome the Pras, SAA*U<br />
29.01<br />
0?,G3<br />
-12.02-8?)<br />
09.03.8?)<br />
Ifiaac Ngcotoo<br />
wary Ntaefce<br />
wu ;;v*:><br />
Gen-Sec, GA*U<br />
05.03-82) Solly Pholoto BMU<br />
Elliot Tshebangu GAM<br />
13.03.82 15-03.82) Four unnamed trade. unionists detained<br />
•1th wntLhew* Oliphant Qf the NrV<br />
(a TA - Twrroriaa Act; GLA - General Lm Attfndeant Act<br />
• • Data In brackets la the data of release]<br />
STOP PfCSS<br />
OT the detainees mentioned above. Alan Vine appeared<br />
In court on Frlomry, 26 earch, charged under the<br />
Tmrroriae tet together eith Barbara Hoga/i and<br />
Oniric *ir' J "*<br />
On the same day, Liz Floyd of the IAS<br />
released fraa detention, and unconfirmed<br />
•pail that Itonty Pwsreoo has bean transferred<br />
to section 12(b) of the Internal Security Act.<br />
STATISTICS AMD PWJUATIOaB<br />
A Centre for Black Advancement haa been formed eith<br />
the intention of 'helping mwrmgwmnnta throughout the<br />
country to sat up grievance procedures and also build<br />
up linea of coeeBjnlcatlon with workers fco minimise<br />
the poaalblllty of strikes (Citizen, 2D.01.62).<br />
Orlas Beater, Industrial psychologist at Potchafstrooe<br />
university, bellevea that ttie spate of strikes in<br />
South Arrlca ere the 'birth pangs of a nee Industrial<br />
order' rather than anything to eorry eftwjut. Hi arguem<br />
fraa the point of viae that conflict la functional to<br />
roclety, in that it stimulates change I Owe Id, 03.02.82)<br />
( *<br />
According to the Oepextamrit of there<br />
strike* during<br />
strike* am<br />
1981 then during<br />
), involving<br />
Section<br />
8<br />
6<br />
6<br />
6<br />
6<br />
6<br />
6<br />
6<br />
6<br />
6<br />
6<br />
22<br />
6<br />
6<br />
f><br />
6<br />
6<br />
6<br />
22<br />
22<br />
22<br />
1k<br />
TA<br />
TA<br />
TA<br />
TA<br />
TA<br />
TA<br />
TA<br />
TA<br />
TA<br />
TA<br />
GLA<br />
TA<br />
TA<br />
TA<br />
TA<br />
TA<br />
TA<br />
GLA<br />
GLA<br />
Q_A<br />
22 O.A<br />
9a 802 workers, all black (mi, 05.02.82). These<br />
strikes cost 226 550 shifts. These official figures<br />
do, of course, only reflect strikes reported to the<br />
Department of manpower.<br />
After the annual plenary session of the Catholic<br />
Bishops* Conference, seating in Pretoria early In<br />
February, the church Issued a statement that it eould<br />
'throe the morel eaight of the church' behind the<br />
struggle of eorfcers In South Africa. This statement<br />
folloeed emny references made to the parallels eith<br />
the Polish sltustlon. Archbishop Hurley said that<br />
the majority of the members of the church, mho mere<br />
blacfct mould support the statement. *<br />
The Old mutual's pensions manmger sold that it<br />
ems lack of undmrstanding of the pension issue that<br />
led to the strikes around this issue during 1961<br />
(Transveler, 12-02.61).<br />
Courts<br />
TEFPnOTlSM ACT TRIALS<br />
Oscar epwthe (?l)( Lawrence Lerotholl ( 18] . morgan<br />
makubaie (19), Aaron Tshangama (28), Peter Kubs (IB),<br />
Alton Sabums (18), Fuaanlklle Bool (16), Vuylslla<br />
Kzaze (19), Johannes Nhlapo (?0), Jeffrey Beeroemn (20]<br />
Vuylslla Oiba (2l), Richard Aaapondo (20)t aalile<br />
mnzothana (21) and 5 youths.<br />
Charge: The stete alleges that beteeen August 6 and<br />
August 12, 1980, the accused Incited people to damage<br />
motor vehicles by throwing stones and petrol bombs,<br />
and setting alight the vehicles. The accused are<br />
charged eith assaulting 6 people, teo of shorn<br />
subsequently died. Other charges relets to the<br />
barrLcedlng of Kllpfonteln Road by placing stones,<br />
tree stumps and tyres in the street; earthing in<br />
singing groups armed with sticks, stones end other<br />
weapons; ordering the closure of block schools;<br />
end congregstlng in various churches to encourage<br />
people to participate in 'terroristic* ectlvltlea.<br />
For previous details, see sip 20:36-40, end<br />
•IP 21:42-43.<br />
then court re-opened on 9 February, Justice<br />
•llllamson ruled that In respect of statements made<br />
by teo of the accused to magistrates - both of ehich<br />
•ere confessions - the onus eas on the state to prove<br />
that they eere freely and voluntarily made, eithout<br />
the imposition of pressure or undue influence.<br />
The statements of three other accused eere<br />
ruled by the Judge to be admissions, and the accused<br />
had to bear the anus of disproving that they eere<br />
voluntarily made.<br />
Since court re-opened In 1982, the state has<br />
called some 20 witnesses In connection eith the trialelthin-e-trial<br />
relating to teo of the confessions.<br />
State witnesses have denied assaulting the accus<br />
and promising to release them from detention if<br />
they Made statements. The accused allege assaults,<br />
threats and promises of release on asking statements -<br />
Esaentlellv, this issue revolved around the<br />
credibility of the stete eitneasms and the accused<br />
es to the eoMsslbllity of the ate tea in ta.<br />
During the course of the trial, the health ef<br />
the first accused, Oscar w*pethe, has been cause<br />
for much concern. tfpetha, eho is 72 and suffers<br />
from diabetes, has been hospitalised a number of<br />
times during the trial. Ha has been In custody<br />
since August 13, I960, and the state has<br />
consistently refused him bail. Host recently,<br />
ha eas hospitalised elth chronic diabetes, and<br />
underwent mn operation for an enlarged prostate<br />
gland-<br />
In another development, security police<br />
raided the offices of the Cape Town Students*<br />
Representative Council In February* seizing<br />
hundreds of posters portraying mpetne.<br />
The trlel t which has now run for wall over<br />
100 court bays, continues In the Cape Town Supreme<br />
Court,<br />
34
paga 36 - _ '<br />
Fane Qeorge dibhole, Jebolard Vilfrad fctocofao, and<br />
Till Alocla Khenwane,<br />
Chorgo: The eccuaed feca teo counts under the<br />
Terrorise Act, and accaaad nuaber 1 (Slthole)<br />
faces a furthar t5 counts under tha Internal<br />
Security Act, reletlng to the breaking of hla<br />
bannlnQ order.<br />
Tha etate allege* that tha accused Foraed an<br />
organisation knoan aa tha African Youth Congress<br />
(AVC)f alth tha intention of furthering the elm<br />
of the banned African National Congress. They are<br />
alleged to have Incited others to leave tha country<br />
for allltary training, and assisting thea to Leave<br />
via the organisation of transport.<br />
The accused are also charged alth obtaining<br />
inforaatlon regarding security arrsnguaonts at the<br />
Caltav Oil Terminal In Durban, and to hava obtained .<br />
explosives.<br />
The accused, aho first appeared in court In<br />
Durban on 5 January, 198?, eere rnaanded In custody<br />
until February 23. than tha trial began In the Durban<br />
Regional Court, bhey ell pleaded not guilty to all<br />
charges.<br />
Bheflfca Hgobese told tha court of a aaating of<br />
tha AYC ahich elected ax Hobben Island prisoner<br />
Phillip Vatheas as president. At this aaating,<br />
bathees said he aould arita to Oliver Taabo asking<br />
for financial assistance, Mthanyane said that a reply<br />
swld indicate that *ea aould be having recognition<br />
froa tha ANC and aould knoa that the AYC is one<br />
alth the «cv Tha aaating, according to tha<br />
eltneaa, also decided to sand eaaaagei to Mandela<br />
and Glsulu on Bobber. Inland via a lawyer aho aould<br />
be visiting the*.<br />
The state than applied for tha cross exaalnatlon<br />
of Mgobeae to be held In c as ere, as he had received<br />
threatening telephone calls earning hie not to<br />
continue testifying In tha trial. This application<br />
aas turned dosn by the presiding aaglstrate, aho<br />
ruled that tha eltneaa aas already exposed, and<br />
closing the court at this stage aould do nothing to<br />
protect hla.<br />
After tha aaglstrate had heard tha evidence<br />
of e psychiatrist, ttheijans aas ordered to be placed<br />
under observation at tha aaritrburg Prlaon Hoapltal.<br />
Or E veljee eaa called by the defence to give<br />
evidence on Hthenjane'a eental state, eftar<br />
Itthanjana claiaad that he eaa having difficulty<br />
following the court procaadlnga.<br />
Or Valjoe told the court that Khenjane had<br />
soaa disorder in his thinking process. He shoeed<br />
signs of depression end eaa experiencir^i<br />
hallucinations. ha see elao suffering froa loss of<br />
eelght and had lost his appetite.<br />
Prior to his appearance In court as Bn accused,<br />
tfthanjene had bean detained e nuaber of tiaes by<br />
security police. Since 1976, he has spent eany<br />
lengthy periods in detention. In addition, he served<br />
en 18 Booth Jell sentence for refusing to testify<br />
against co-SSRC a asp or, Paul Langs, in a Terrorise<br />
Act trial.<br />
The hearing ees adjourned until parch 1967,<br />
Khoteo Sydney Saethlolo (25) and aery baa » he the<br />
Loete (23).<br />
Chaxoje: The state alleged that Saethlolo, a forear<br />
prenldant of the noe-benned SERC, helped fora tha<br />
South African Youth Revolutionary Council ( SAYRCO)<br />
ehlle in exile. ha eaa chalnaan of the Nlgerlanbased<br />
Council, a allltary group foread by otudants<br />
aho left the country eftar the 1776 riots, and eho<br />
did not Join either the ANC or PAC.<br />
According to tha charge sheet, SAYRCO elea to<br />
incite blacks to over-throe the governeent by<br />
violence, and in achieving this, to recruit people<br />
for allltary training. Tha state also alleges that<br />
SAYfCO ease contact eith certain organisations elthln<br />
South Africa in an attaapt to furtttmr its also.<br />
Aaong the acts detailed in count 1, it eaa<br />
alleged that tha accused conspired alth other aaabers<br />
of SAYfCO to ettaapt to destroy laa and order<br />
In South Africa through violence. It eaa also claiaad<br />
that GAYfCO paaphleta aara distributed at a aaating In<br />
Soaato on 16 June, 19B1; that during June 19B1, one<br />
of tha accused brought teo people froa Boteeana into<br />
contact with Thabo Noabenl, national organiser of<br />
AZAPO; that Saethlolo Joined AZAMYU and introduced<br />
the national chelraen mvS president of the organlsstlon<br />
to people in Soaato; that Loete arranged a aaating<br />
beteaen various AZAPQ and AZAffYU aaapera, and BAfflCO;<br />
that aha airshed a aaating beteaen Saethlolo end<br />
Thaal atonal, naaa editor of tha Soaetan naaeoapar;<br />
that aha arranged accoaaodation for eeabers of<br />
SAYfCO eho entered South Africa; and that she had<br />
requested three people to apply for passports, ehlch<br />
she took and kapt for use by aoafjari of SAYfCO.<br />
The second count alleged that Baathlolo and<br />
Loate had incited 5 persona froa Soaato to undergo<br />
allltary training outside South Africa. They both<br />
pleaded not guilty to ell the charges agalnat thee.<br />
At tha start of the trial, in tha Vender*!jlperfc<br />
Regional Court, on February 8, tha court heard<br />
security police eltnessea describe the arrest of<br />
tha teo accused. Captain EG Clapton described a raid<br />
on a houaa in Orlando aaat shore SAYRCO docuaants aara<br />
sailed. Alao found in this house ass a forged<br />
Botseana passport and talagraas to Botsaana.<br />
A young girl aho aay not be neasd and for ahoa<br />
the aaglstrate cleared tha court, rafused to ||ive<br />
evidence. She said aha aould rather go to Jell<br />
then taatlfy against her colleagues.<br />
Another eltneaa, aho aay also" not be naaed,<br />
told tha court of a trip to Gaborone eada by<br />
hieeelf and a group of church eeabers. Ha said he<br />
ees introduced by the previous eltne&a to three<br />
youthe, teo of ahoa he reaeabere as 'Teboho* and<br />
*Paul*. Teboho had told hla that SAYRCO aould<br />
liberate blacks through violence and that 6TJ0 -<br />
1 000 aaaaara had coaaltted thaasalvaa to the<br />
organ 1 set ion -<br />
The altnasa said that the folloalng day he had<br />
eat Seethlolo, eho told hla that tha organisation<br />
considered ltaalf to be a third force and did not<br />
align ltaalf alth either tha AfC or PAC.<br />
Saethlolo elao aefced hla if ha could get eapa<br />
of Soap to. SAYRCO aaabera hod offered tha aitnaaa<br />
and his colleagues booklets about tret organisation<br />
and about tha Uvea at oVejhneu and aao for<br />
dlatrlbutlon in Soaato. They adapted tha<br />
booklets, but carried out none of tha Instruction<br />
7 eltraaaaa refused to give evidence for tha<br />
state: they aara<br />
Fraedoa Mazlbuko (20),<br />
Theal batesl (38),<br />
Carter Seleke (24),<br />
Thabo Mdabenl (25),<br />
Alex Selent (27),<br />
Sloho Soaacale (281. and<br />
Elsie aathlbedl (??).<br />
They aara all sentenced to teree of laprlsonaant<br />
ranging froa 9-16 aontha.<br />
Verdict: Both eccuaed guilty on both counts.<br />
Sentence: Saethlolo - 10 years on count 1, 5 yeare on<br />
count 2t to run concurrently, ia 10 yaara iaprlsonaent.<br />
Loate - 5 yaara on each count, to run concurrently,<br />
le S yaara iaprlsonaent,<br />
(vanderbljlperk Regional Court, 11.03.6?).<br />
Shortly after sentence, Saethlolo aas ra-oatalned<br />
under aactlon 6 of the Tarrorlaa Act by aecurlty<br />
police,<br />
tllliaa eabone Ouaa (31), Oualsena Blrette aanln>ai<br />
(31), Bayi Keye (S), and Luyanda aayeklso (»).<br />
Charge: In thie, tha first Clsfcei Tarrorlaa Act<br />
trial alnca the territory attained -lndapandenca*<br />
last Opceaber, tha eccuaed era alleged to hava bean<br />
•aefauiu of tha banned African National Congraaa.<br />
During June 1900 to Auguet 19B1 they era alleged to<br />
have been actively angagad in tha oparetlonal<br />
activities of tha ANC, thus identifying theaaalvas<br />
alth its revolutionary alaa.<br />
They ere elso ellagad to have recruited people<br />
to undergo allltary training, and to have po«aaaad<br />
banned- literature. Tha trial opened in the £eellteha<br />
Cipraei Court on 22 February ehen tha 4 accuaed<br />
appeared briefly before tha Clakel Cnlef Justice,<br />
Judge de Sat end teo assessors, aovocataa B Pohl and<br />
F Hal .<br />
The case aas adjournal for 4 daye to alloe the<br />
oldeat accused, ar Keye, to be eaaalned by a doctor<br />
"to Inquire Into hie aental and physical condition',<br />
ar Keye claiaad ha had been assaulted in detention.<br />
•hen tha trial laopened on 26 February, Clakel*a<br />
attorney general aT Jurgana announcad that Kmym had<br />
been sent to Cape Toan'e Groote Schuur hoapltal for<br />
tests, and aald that Keye had e previous history of<br />
achirophranlc paychotlc reaction.<br />
According to a partite! report froa Groote<br />
Schuur * aubaitted ehen Keye reappeared on « aaroh -<br />
no evidence of current paychoals aaa found.<br />
Hcaever, a hospital payohologlst said that Keye<br />
appeared aoderataly depressed end analoue* Tha<br />
Groote Schuur report eald Keye had denied any<br />
serious accidents or head Injuries, but ahan anked<br />
ehether ha hod been hit or kicked on tha head ehile<br />
in detention he replied: *Yee, they did everything to<br />
me' (js, hulls net ellea gaooan by ay). Tha<br />
psychologist's laport laqnoatert that Keye should<br />
not be kept in solitary canf lnaasnt.<br />
In another aatflcal report, subaitted inaapandently<br />
by a Or ID huaklaaonf it aas stated 'This patient
alleged onnnl assaults and ther- Is no doubt he<br />
had « ecMzophrenlc-llke illness with auditory<br />
heilucinations mhen admitted to hospital*. Or<br />
Huafcleson Hid In his report that Keye had told Ma<br />
h* aaa essmultmd during hit tmo months of<br />
lnterregetion, to try and make hie talk about a<br />
certain meeting ha had attended* Keye also told<br />
tha doctor that ha had been hit alth flats and kicked<br />
on tha haad durlnQ Interrogation. The f^xt thing ha<br />
raaaabarvd aaa being sent to Komanl Hospital in •<br />
CeJainatoan ahara ha aas kept for tao months. Ha<br />
said that after being baatan his nose aas sore end<br />
he could not aaa out of his left eye.<br />
-Tha trial reopened on 15 -arch »lth ttr Jurgens<br />
contesting the allegatlona of esaault and asking<br />
several emmndment* to the indictment, tith er Keys<br />
hart in court, the defence coaplalnad that another<br />
of tha accused, ar Uayeklso, had been taken froa<br />
prison to give a henderltlng aaaple elthout his<br />
leeyers being consulted. Jurgens conceded that the<br />
police had ande *en error of Judgement' but said they<br />
had not tried to force evidence out of ar aavaklso.<br />
In the state** evidence a South African security<br />
policeman* aerrent Officer ED Flsdon delated he end<br />
his colleagues had dug up banned literature - one<br />
leaflet eea ellegedly entitled 'Mandela says<br />
unite* - In the beck gardens of teo houses in<br />
ebentaane.<br />
The proaecutlon called a lecturer In political<br />
science et nand Afrlkaana University, ID da Vrles,<br />
te > Br v * * hlatory of revcplutloaery groups In<br />
South Africa'. De Vrles said that tha east<br />
Important movements sere trie ANC, SACP, SACTU<br />
era) MC. Hs pointed out that the JVC ees opposed<br />
to 'homelands' and did not recognise Clakel's<br />
Indaaartdanoe. Oe Vrles also clelmmd that the<br />
conetltutlon of the South African Allied workers'<br />
Uhlon (*$MW> correspondejf, «Hh eaall ajteeptlons,<br />
to that of SACTU.<br />
The trial continues.<br />
Robert Martin Adam (26) end Jinnd la mthmmbu (23).<br />
Charge: The eccueed era alleged to heve conspired<br />
elth trie African National Congress to obtain<br />
information regarding the transmission system and<br />
other aspects of tha SABC TV toear in Brixton.<br />
During July iMit it eea alleged thet they visited<br />
the toear and obtained information about it,<br />
including the taking of photographs.<br />
Adam is alleged to heve dreen up e report<br />
for tret ANC entitled 'Report on the reconnaissance<br />
of the SABC-TV system in Auckland Park 1 , mhieh eas<br />
placed In a dead letter box together elth certeln<br />
photographs. These eere collected by en A*C courier.<br />
The accused are also Jointly charged elth<br />
attempting to recruit a person for the ANC, end<br />
poaeeaslon of ANC literature.<br />
Adam has admitted in court that he If an<br />
ANC member, end that he prepared the report on<br />
ttwj SABC toeer for the ANC. Homever, ha claims<br />
that the intention aas not to sabotage the toear,<br />
but to rlamaga machinery and the building next to the<br />
toeer. eHhmmuu hme admitted taking photographa<br />
of trie Brixton toear, but clalmm that these eere<br />
done for the purposes of writing an article for<br />
e magazine on ehlch he Is eaployed.<br />
Irthembu has contested the admissibility of<br />
a statement he made after his arrest, claiming<br />
that it ehouid not be accepted as evidence against<br />
hie by the court.<br />
The triel continues In the Johannesburg<br />
Supreme Court before the Judge President of the<br />
Province, Judge Boshoff •<br />
INTERNAL gCUMTY ACT TRIALS<br />
Elaine dohaeaatf (20), Leslie Lax (23), kUchael<br />
O'Oonoven (21), Benjamin Greyllng (20).<br />
Charge: The accused aere charged eith distributing<br />
and producing posters ehlch cslebreted the 60th<br />
anniversary of the founding of the South Afridhn<br />
Communist Party (SACP).<br />
The stete celled fiend Afrikaans University lecturer<br />
ID de Vrles to give expert evidence on<br />
'revolutionary tactics*. Ha clalaad that a<br />
poster sheen to hie last year carried the eords<br />
'eorkers unite' ehlch he said eas extracted from<br />
Hsrx*s Communist manifesto. The poster, he said,<br />
could be seen ae a eey of publicising an unlaeful<br />
organisation.<br />
Ban Greyllng told the court of hie eel-treetieant<br />
by police after his detention. Ha claimed thet after<br />
three security police arrested hie, his hands mere<br />
tied behind hie back, and he eas throttled,<br />
* Throughout the day until midnight he eas bound fund<br />
and foot end forced to stand for 14 hours of<br />
questioning at John Vorater Souare. He ems forced<br />
to remove all his clothes and a bunch of keys eas<br />
pushed against his private parte.<br />
ehen ha reported having been assaulted to a<br />
doctor, the r*oort «*s referred beck to his<br />
Interrogator*.<br />
unexpectedly, in the middle of proceedings,<br />
the eccused changed their plea to guilty. It appears<br />
thet the presiding magistrate eas due to go on leave,<br />
and thia eould have extended court proceedings for<br />
some time, ehlle the accused remained In custody.<br />
Couneel for the defence then aaked for eholly<br />
suspended sentences to be imposed: the accused had<br />
already been in Jail for some time, end ell eere<br />
keen to resume their unlveraities studies if given<br />
the opportunity.<br />
Verdict: Guilty<br />
Sentence: 360 days Imprisonment, of ehlch 3S0 days<br />
mere conditionally suspended for 5 years.<br />
(Johannesburg Regional Court, 10.03.62).<br />
Of Interest eas the state's policy regarding<br />
ball in this case, end the previous Official Secrets<br />
Act triel ehlch Greyllng eas involved in. In the<br />
first trial, tha stete opposed bell strongly, and<br />
security police indicated that if ball eas granted.<br />
Greyllng eould be radetalned. Ha eas subsequently<br />
acquitted.<br />
In tha aacond trial, the attorney general<br />
prohibited bell by means of a onrtlflcate. The<br />
accused mee thus held In prison aa eeeltl'ng triel<br />
prisoners throughout the triel. They eere then<br />
sentenced to only 10 days imprisonment.<br />
peg*<br />
tthmmmt **» Omar (25).<br />
Charge: Photocopying end distributing en AJC pamphlet.<br />
The accused claimed thet he had received the pamphlet<br />
froa an unknown person, end read it. It contained e<br />
message from Oliver Tambo on the 69th anniversary of<br />
the ANC'a foundation. Ha gave tha pamphlet to a<br />
friend, making her to make copies ss he intended<br />
taking them to a political science class ehlch aaa<br />
part of his journalise course.<br />
Verdict; Guilty.<br />
Sentence: 12 months imprisonment, suspended for<br />
5 years*<br />
(Durban Regional Court, 22.0t.83).<br />
APPEAL PROCEEDINGS<br />
Guy perger and Devendira Pllley.<br />
The original charges against Berger end Pllley<br />
related to the provision of information on trade<br />
unions to SACTU, membership and furthering the aims<br />
of the ANC, and the possession and distribution of<br />
unlaeful literature.<br />
Effective sentence in Berger's esse eas a years*<br />
Pillay receiving 2 years.<br />
They appealed against sentence, and mere<br />
successful, in that Plllay*s sentence eas reduced to<br />
one year* Berger's to teo.<br />
(Grahaaatoen Supreme Court, eerch 1962).<br />
Nclmbithl Johnson Lublsl (29), Petrua Vashego (20),<br />
and hmphtali Uenane (24).<br />
(For trial details, see VIP 14:39-4!; VIP 15:40-41;<br />
MP 16:3-5).<br />
The eppellents eere found guilty of high treason<br />
in November I960, end sentenced to death. The major<br />
act for ehlch they received the death aentence Involved<br />
their participation in an AJC attack on the Soekmekaer<br />
police station in January 1960.<br />
On appeal. they argued that tha death sentence<br />
•as Inappropriate beceuee they had deliberately<br />
refrained froa killing those inside the police<br />
stetlon et the time of the attack. Various other<br />
factors such as their ages, the social disruption of<br />
their lives et the tie* they Joined the AFC<br />
(involving the June 1976 events end efter), and<br />
the disparity beteeen their sentences and other<br />
accused i eere put forward by the eppellents.<br />
Judgement has bean reserved in this important<br />
appeal.<br />
Wilfred efereane (20).<br />
mermane mas tried and convicted In BophutheTseana<br />
in terns of South Africa's Terrorism Act, The<br />
trial Judge, in summing up, said that ehlle the<br />
Terrariee Act aaa passed in South Africa, it still<br />
applied In BophuthaTemana after "independence*<br />
because it had not been repealed, tsjraane eas<br />
sentenced to 15 years imprisonment*<br />
Tha appeal, heard In South Africa's Apellete<br />
Division in Bloamfontein - ehlch has Juriadictlon<br />
over the) 'lndapmnoent'bantustans - eas on tha grounds<br />
that the Terroriem Act mee in conflict with the<br />
conetltutlon of BophutheTseane. This constitution<br />
has a bill of rights attached, ehlch couneel for tha
peg* T/<br />
appellant c la lea overrule* the Terrorise) tat.<br />
The appael, being haard by a full banc* of 11<br />
Judges, la proceeding.<br />
PHIS0H5 ACT TRIALS<br />
ettchmel Jenfcin {31), Pram Naidoa (33) and<br />
Enlrlah Femebhei (44).<br />
The accused, having bean detained for soee tlae<br />
under section 6 of the Terrorise) Act, aara charged<br />
alth harbouring a political prisoner aho escaped from<br />
Pretoria Central prison In 1979. Staphen Lee ascapad<br />
mitt Alexander eouebarls and Tlaotny Jvnkln,<br />
brother of one of tha accused, and all 3 subsequently<br />
esnaged to laava South Africa.<br />
Jar* In has bean relaasad on bail of R5G0, ehlla<br />
feiidoo and Nanebhel are In custody.<br />
Dyson.<br />
Attorney Gi anise Oyson la charged alth attempting<br />
to enuoBla a letter erlten by a prisoner out of tha<br />
Fort Prison, Johannesburg. Tha prlaonar Involved<br />
ess allegedly Elaine Mohaeaid, recently convicted<br />
in tares of tha intaraal Security Act (see above)*
pegs 1<br />
The article which follows was originally presented<br />
as e seminar paper in tha Paper taant of Political<br />
Science «t tha University of Oar £m Saloon on<br />
Friday, 26 November, 1960. The paper, delivered<br />
by Dan O'Meera - than of the History Department at<br />
tha University - was titled '"Muldergata". the<br />
politics of Afrikaner nationalise end the crisis of<br />
the capitalist state In South Africa'. The paper<br />
is due to be published elsewhere, in s substantially<br />
revised form, at a later date.<br />
The 'Muldergate' article has been included In<br />
this MP because of its importance in the<br />
analysis end understanding of tha recent break<br />
assy of the Treurnicht group from the National Party<br />
Not only does O'Maara provide essential background<br />
to the latest crisis in both party end government„<br />
he also provides a aathodology for interpreting<br />
ehat is happening in the National Party as an<br />
Indicator of a generalised crisis of the capitalist<br />
state in South Africa.<br />
The contemporary importance of this Is that<br />
it enables one to identify the various class<br />
interests et work, not only within party and<br />
governaent, but within the capitalist ruling class<br />
aa a whole- The identification of theee interests<br />
allows for en assessment of the content of the<br />
'reform* Initiative which the alliance of tha<br />
PM Botha led military group end monopoly capital<br />
is attaaptlng to implement - and ehlch has bean<br />
rejected by tha Trwumicht led alliance*<br />
The editors of f^P only received permission<br />
to publish the 'Muldergate* article shortly before<br />
going to print. As such. It has not been edited<br />
for typing consistenQy in tares of<br />
the use of capital letters, underlining and other<br />
eatters of presentetion. Apologies ere offered to<br />
both the author and to VIP readers for this.<br />
•MULDERGATE'<br />
AND THE<br />
POLITICS OF<br />
AFRIKANER<br />
NATIONALISM<br />
ThTOUGHOUT 1976 and much of 1979, the ruling<br />
Nationalist Party (NP) In South Africa, led by<br />
Prima Minister BJ Vorster, was shaken by en ongoing<br />
aeries of political and financial scandals. The<br />
opposition Engiiah-language press immediately oubbed<br />
the effalr 'Muldergate*f after its leading scapegoat,<br />
Or Connie Mulder - then Minister of Information and<br />
Plural Relations and Development, leader of the<br />
Transvaal Nationalist Party, and Vorster's clear heir<br />
apparent. WlQely trumpeted press end Judicial<br />
revelations about fhe misappropriation of funds and<br />
other abuses elthln Mulder's Department of Information<br />
began to siauaaj tha tone of e moral cruaada against<br />
political corruption. In September 1976 Vorster<br />
dramatically announced his resignation on 'health'<br />
grounds from the premiership and as national leader<br />
of the NP. He was promptly elevated to the purely<br />
ceremonial post of State rVesldent. vorster**<br />
resignation m%& closely followed by that of his<br />
longtime political crony and arguably the second<br />
most powerful polltlcel figure In South Africa,<br />
General Handrlk van den Bergh, head of the notorious<br />
Bureau of State Security (BOSS)* In e bitterly fought<br />
election within the NP caucus to select Vorster's<br />
successor as national leader of tha NP, and hence the<br />
Prima Minister, Connie Mulder was narrowly defeated<br />
by the Minister of Defence and leader of tha Cape<br />
Nationalist Party, PW Botha. Tha nee Prime Minister<br />
plsdged himself to run a 'clean' povernmmnt, and In<br />
rapid succession Mulder was driven out of the Cabinet ,<br />
the leadership of the Transvaal Nationalist Party*<br />
Parliament, and eventuelly tha NP itself. Ha now<br />
heads en extreaa right-wing opposition group.<br />
Muldergate attracted a greet dwal of moralising<br />
coeaejntary and etrtdent demands for the government's<br />
resignation In the bourgeois press. It has bean<br />
almost universally interpreted es e symbol of We<br />
corruption of Afrikaner rationalism, reinforcing the<br />
wldmly held view that tha root causa of social conflict<br />
In South Africa lies almost exclusively within tha<br />
apartheid policies of a monolithicelly conceived<br />
'Afrikaner* ethnic group. This supposed 'ruling<br />
ethnic group* is than presumed to use the etate to<br />
pursue tha narrow (and egjeln mcnolithicaOly conceived)<br />
interests of the Afrikaner volk. 1 Mora often then not,<br />
this kind of analysis continues further to poeo a<br />
fundamental contradiction between Afrikaner nationalism<br />
and 'its* apartheid policies on the one hand, and the<br />
supposedly ratlonel, inherently colour-blind<br />
Imperatives of capitalism on the other - e<br />
contradiction In which the latter are fettered and<br />
distorted by the former, 2<br />
This conventional conception of Afrikaner<br />
nationalism rests upon a number of mutually re<br />
inforcing logical and analytical errors ehlch<br />
togathar result in logical circularity and political<br />
confusion. Firstly, and aoat fundamentally, the<br />
highly disparate and dlfferentieted Afrikaans*<br />
speaking ahlta population of South Africa is<br />
unpi-oblematlcally charactarieed as a monolithic<br />
•ethnic group', with a presumably inherent organic<br />
unity and a set of common interests overriding all<br />
dlfferances. This is taken as self-evident, thereby<br />
neatly and uncritically reproducing the basic tenet<br />
of Afrikaner nationalist Ideology. Once this first<br />
untenable assumption is made, a seriea of others<br />
then follow naturally. The shifting and contradictory<br />
base of support for a political party (the NP) la<br />
simply collapsed Into this 'ethnic* category. Given<br />
that the NP has been the ruling party since 1908,<br />
this Illegitimate confletlon of perty and ethnic group<br />
then loads to the argument that Afrikaners monopolise<br />
polltlcel power in South Africa and hence comprise a
'ruling •tunic group'» or eo*etia*s 'a political class'.<br />
All this too is taken as self-evident.<br />
In this say, tha vary dlffarant social categories<br />
of coavaon language, ethnic group, class, political<br />
party* government and stata ara glibly collapsad Into<br />
aach other, and usad Interchangeably. Hara tha<br />
dlatlnctlon bataaan tha vastly dlffarant areas, levaIs<br />
and typas of social action and organisation to anion<br />
thasa dlffarant catagorlas rafsr is sieply obliterated*<br />
This conflation closes a naat logical clrcla, in ehlch<br />
tha atata is raducad to an Afrikanar entity, and<br />
concalyad as a simple instrument In tha hands of this<br />
alleged ruling athnic group. Thasa numerous arrors<br />
and confusions apart, ahat gats concaalad in thla<br />
concaptlon of tha atata Is precisely its character as<br />
a capitalist stata. And thus tha political problaas<br />
of South Africa ara raducad to tha problem of 'the<br />
Afrikaner*. 81nca 'they* ara hald solaly responsible<br />
for tha situation of aocial confrontation In South<br />
Africa, on 'the*' alona llaa tha onua to changa.<br />
In tha eords of a racant bookt<br />
Tha graat problem for South Africa...la<br />
assantlally a problem for tha Afrikaners slnca<br />
thay hold tha poamr In avarything that matters.<br />
Thua tha raal political questions in South Africa -<br />
thoaa of tha capitalist stata, and the social relations<br />
on ohjch it raats - ara naatly mvoidad and displaced,<br />
ao legitimising bourgeois politlca.<br />
An analysis of muldergata as a crials for both<br />
government and ruling party must nacasaarlly break<br />
alth thasa myriad confusions to confront tha problem<br />
of tha capitalist atata In South Africa. In racant<br />
yaars a growing body of South African litaratura has<br />
ralsad this question. Hoeaver, as Volga's racant<br />
revle-s of this litaratura has demonstrated, all tha<br />
varioua tandanclaa hava remained trappad althin an<br />
instrumentalist concaptlon. Hara, tha state ia in<br />
affact analysed aa an lnatltution external to class<br />
struggle, available for uaa as an undiffarantlatad<br />
instrument in tha hands of a political party<br />
raprasantlng spaciflc and puraly economic Interests,<br />
Thla litaratura haa fallad to grasp tha charactar of<br />
tha stata as a diffarantlatad and contradictory<br />
unit/t ltsalf conatltutad througn, and a sits of, „<br />
class atruggla.<br />
Such a concaptlon of tha stata aa a aita of class<br />
struggls furthar poses tha problem of tha relationship<br />
bataaan classas dafined at tha laval of relations of<br />
production, and tha concrata ldaologlcal and<br />
organisational fonts through which class struggls is<br />
fought out. As hara concaivad, classas dafinad at<br />
tha laval of ralatlons of production exist in class<br />
struggls in and through multiple fonts of concrata<br />
organisation. Thus, in any conjunctura, tha unity<br />
of this or that class as a social force cannot simply<br />
be rsad off fro* tha ralatlons of production, but<br />
needs to ba constructed via tha ensemble of concrata<br />
organisational and ldaologlcal forms in and through<br />
which that claaa axiats. In thaaa tarsia than, an<br />
analysla of tha atata concaivad as a alta of class<br />
atruggla lnvolvaa, intar alia, a focus on praclsaly<br />
tha contradictions and conflicts althin and bataaan<br />
tha varioua institutions and apparatuses of tha state.<br />
This papar rapraaants a flrat attempt to bagln<br />
such an analysis. It focuses mainly on but ona aspact<br />
of tha stata - tha signlflcanca of tha currant crisis<br />
in Afrikanar nationalism for tha stata as a ahola.<br />
This la takan as a uaaful antry point into tha much<br />
aora Caspian quastlons of class struggls and tha atata<br />
as a ahola. Thua the analysla prasantad hara la<br />
nacasaarlly partial and tentative, leaving unraaolvad<br />
nutrous thaoratical and saiplrlcal problema* Thaaa<br />
ara hopafully to ba confrontad in futura rasaarch.<br />
Tha lluldargata itibrogllo aaa tha culmination of<br />
a long-aiaaiaring crisis in both tha Nationalist Party<br />
and tha HP government, than plunging both party and<br />
government still daapar into crisis* Yat it rapraaants<br />
much mora than tha simple lntamal crisis of Afrikaner<br />
nationalissi as it is usually daplctad. I would argue<br />
that It aaa but an aspact of, and a product of a crisis<br />
for tha capitalist stata as a ahola in South Africa.<br />
Ita 'resolution' llkasriaa rapraaants an attaaptad<br />
resolution of tha wider crisis of tha South African<br />
atata.<br />
If this if in fact tha caaa, to assess tha<br />
signlflcanca of Wuldergate for tha stata as a ahola,<br />
it ia necessary to answer thrsa intarralatad quastlons:<br />
Ihat aara tha broad features of thla crisis of tha<br />
capitalist stata in South Africa? «hat mas tha<br />
q»q«<br />
signlflcanca of tha particular for* that it assumed in<br />
tanas of tha contradictions and conflicts althin tha<br />
Nationoliat Party and govarnmant? And ahat la tha<br />
signlflcanca of its for* of resolution for tha —<br />
contradictions and conflicts althin tha stata?<br />
Tha Crisis of tha 1970a<br />
THE crisis confronting tha South African stata and<br />
ruling class in tha arid* 1970a aaa complex and eultl-<br />
lavallad - an ensemble of simultaneous and mutually<br />
dwtemining economic, political and ldaologlcal crials,<br />
producing significant shifts In tha balanca and<br />
alignment of class forces, A graat daal of furthar<br />
rasaarch la nacasaary to arrive at an adequate analysis<br />
of this ganarallsad criaia. Hara Is examined vith vary<br />
dlffarant oepheees but three of its elements: firstly,<br />
aspects of tha growing crisis of capital accumulation<br />
In tha 1970a: tacondly, tha rapid Intensification of<br />
tha class struggls during this decade; and thirdly,<br />
in thaaa contexta, tha aorfelnga of Afrikanar<br />
nationalist politics. Tha alsi la to attempt to<br />
understand hos tha flrat tao elements both structured<br />
and articulated alth the internal dynamic of<br />
Afrikaner nationalist politlca to produce a political<br />
crisis in its particular for* of muldergata. Thla<br />
• ill provide a basis for a tantatlva aeasisment of<br />
tha signlfloanca of tha changes occurring in tha<br />
sake of lluldargata.<br />
Ourlng tha 1960a tha South African economy had<br />
expanded mora rapidly than that of any other capitalist<br />
country except Japan, averaging an annual growth rata<br />
of GOP of bataaan 6 and S parcant. A number of<br />
features of this boo* should ba noted, aa hera aara<br />
established tha condltiona for this crisis of tha<br />
1970s. Flratly* the brutal aupprasalon of tha<br />
national liberation movement by 1963 created the<br />
requisite condltiona for rapid capitalist growth*<br />
Particularly significant hare ass tha eamshing of<br />
tha econoalc organe of tha stocking class. Thus,<br />
bataaan 1964 and 1969, leas than 2 000 africen eorfcars<br />
par annus) aant on atrlka. Secondly, tha moat notable
page 3<br />
Koranic aspect of this boom was that It lad to e<br />
dramatic concentration «nd centrelieation of capital<br />
on the basis of cv*r more capital inteneive production,<br />
leading to significant shifts in relatione within the<br />
capitalist class. Prior to the 1960s, South African<br />
industry was characterised by a sharp economic<br />
distinction and political antagonist between local<br />
undertakings and foreign capital. "•> & 00 * 9 f ^ha<br />
i9€Oa produced the rapid intervenetratIon of capitals<br />
and the consolidation of the dominance of diversified<br />
monopolies within the economy generally, and in all<br />
the major sectors of capitalist production. This<br />
process was effect^ on the basis of a_ massive influx<br />
of foreign capital, in a country where the return on<br />
capital was amongst the highest in the world. By<br />
1970. total foreign investment was estimated at<br />
R5 81&-milllon, and a total of R3 559-million foreign<br />
investment capital flowed into South Africa in the<br />
period 196S - 19?o\ 6<br />
Consequent on this Increasing dominance of<br />
capital-intensive production, these years further saw<br />
significant changes in the organisation of the<br />
proletariat within production, accelerating the process<br />
of the simultaneous attraction and extrusion of workers<br />
from production. The introduction of Increasingly<br />
sophisticated technology into the production process<br />
on an ever expanding scale, leads to a relative<br />
reduction in the number of workers needed to operate<br />
it. moreover, it simultaneously Introduces a new<br />
industrial division of labour between semi-skilled<br />
operatives on the one hand, and technical/supervisory<br />
labour on the other, replacing the old unskilled/<br />
skilled division of labour. Thus, during this period,<br />
whilst large numbers of sami-skilled operatives were<br />
being drawn into production, even lerger numbers of<br />
unskilled african migrant workers lost their Jobs as<br />
they became 'redundant 1 . Throughout the 'boom',<br />
african unemployment stood at over 1 million. The<br />
Influx control measures and pass laws of the apartheid<br />
system operated to expel the unemployed from the<br />
cities end dump and barricade them In the festering<br />
rural slums of bantustano. This process marked a<br />
decisive shift aw«y from the reliance on cheep,<br />
unakillad migrant labour so long charactar 1 Stic of<br />
South African industry, towards the consolidation of<br />
a stable, ssml-ekllled workforce.<br />
Similarly during this period, large numbers of<br />
skilled (white) workers eere also rendered relatival/<br />
superfluous to capital Intensive production, as their<br />
skills were superceded by the need for technical/<br />
supervisory labour. Yet in apartheid South Africe.<br />
the Jobs of white workers were protected. The rigid<br />
industrial colour bar reserved all supervisory,<br />
technical and professional work for whites. Thus in<br />
this changing organisation of the labour process, few<br />
shite workers lost their Jobs, but were either<br />
retrained and/or converted into supervisors of efrican<br />
workers. However, this process of reclassifying white<br />
workers was unable to fill the growing need for<br />
technical labour. The boom period was thus also<br />
characterised by a severe and growing shortage of<br />
labour in technical, professional and semi-<br />
professional grades of work - a shortage estimate*.<br />
at some 47 000 workers In 1969.<br />
In these years the monopoly element of the<br />
capitalist class did demand measures which would mase<br />
restriction on trie mobility, employment and training<br />
of african workers, to permit its acquisition of a<br />
stable supoly of semi-skilled operatives end to retrain<br />
african workers for technical labour. However, the<br />
over-all conditions of expansion and high profitability<br />
edtlgated the adverse effects of such labour<br />
shortages flncJ thus did not lead to an all out assault<br />
by capital on the existing rigid racial division of<br />
labcxir. During this period, the economy was further<br />
'cushioned' against such labour shortages hy the<br />
continuing large influx of foreign investment capital.<br />
Thua, while the boom conditions persisted, the<br />
maintenance of the rigid racial division of labour in<br />
industry did not seriously threaten the interests of<br />
the capitaliat class.<br />
As the 1970s unfolded, the great boom of the<br />
sixties gave way to a deepening recession. By 1976<br />
the country was facing the worst economic crisis in<br />
its history and an actual decline of GOP of 0,29)1 in<br />
1977-76. 9 By the mid* 1970s, confronted both with an<br />
international recession and growing industrial,<br />
political and economic instability within South Africa<br />
itself and the region as a whole, the very large doses<br />
of foreign capital which had sustained the growth<br />
of the 1960s began to dry up. South African Reserve<br />
Bank statistics show a reduction in the inflow of<br />
long-term foreign investment from R1 561-mllllon in<br />
1975-76 to Ra52-mlllion in 1975-77. If this<br />
redaction is coupled with the actual net outflow<br />
of short-term capital from the private sector, the<br />
year 1976-77 saw a total capital outflow of some<br />
R12l-mllllan. Similarly, the recession dramatically<br />
increased the growing structural unemployment of<br />
african workers. In 1976, before the recession had<br />
reached its full height, it was estimated that<br />
african unemployment stood at 2,3 million workers*<br />
moreover, simply to stabilise unemployment at this<br />
huge number it was calculated that the economy would<br />
have to grow at 6,7% per annum. Ironically, in<br />
the face of this acuta unemployment of african<br />
workers, the shortages of technical workers in<br />
the economy accelerated* By 1977, government figures<br />
show vacancies Tor 99 000 workers in the professional,<br />
semi •'professional and technical grade*. The pages<br />
of authoritative economic Journals were filled with<br />
reports of bankruptcies, and the r.t it* was forced to<br />
abandon or defer major infrastructwal Investment<br />
programmes in steel, petro-chee)ical»f transport and<br />
other sectors.<br />
The above specification of som% of the Indices<br />
of the crisis of accumulation cannot substitute for<br />
lte actual analysis. A detailed analysis would have<br />
to grapple particularly with the differential<br />
barriers to accumulation for veriou* capitals, and<br />
the differential impact of the crisis on various<br />
capitals. Thle analysis remains to be done. Thus,<br />
the assessment of the effects of thl* crisis of capital<br />
accumulation remains necessarily incomplete. However,<br />
one general point can be made. Thia *as far more<br />
than a cyclical recession normal to capitalist<br />
economies, but represented in effect a profound<br />
structural crisis for South Africmn capitalism.<br />
The rapid growth of the South African economy
in the 1960s extended the process of eecondary<br />
industrialisation baaad on import substitution, which<br />
had begun in earnest in tha 1920s. Tha impressive<br />
flQuras indicating, tha growth of sacondary industry<br />
in South Africa 1920-90 tand to concaal tha fact that<br />
thass industriaa were concentrated vary heevily in<br />
tha wage goods sector, producing artlclat of<br />
consumption. Tha procass of Industrialisation behind<br />
protactlva tariffs did not laad to tha davalopaant of<br />
a significant capital goods ssctor. As tha ragular and<br />
growing balancs of payments daflclts throughout tba<br />
1960s lndloatadt Industry in South Africa raaainad<br />
vary haavily dependent on tha importetion of capital<br />
equipment froa tha developed capitalist economies.<br />
Thasa imparts were financad through tha axport of<br />
primary commodities - agricultural products and<br />
minerals, but particularly gold. Thus, in a wary<br />
fundaaantal sense, tha limits of capital accumulation<br />
in South Africa remain sat by tha primary axport<br />
sactors - la agriculture and minerals t aith gold baing<br />
by far tha aost important.<br />
Tha economic crises of tha mid-1970s revealed<br />
vary claarly that, undvr tha prevailing political<br />
and social conditions within tha country, tha<br />
South African aconomy mas raachlng tha limits of<br />
industrial expansion based on Import substitution.<br />
By 1977, facad mith little apparent prospect of an<br />
early or rapid lncraasa in tha price of goldt<br />
virtually all South African aconomlsts mere agreed<br />
that furthar industrial axpanslon mould hava to ba<br />
basad on tha development of a strong capital goods<br />
ssctor, and a shift In tha emphasis of exports<br />
tomsrds industrial rathar than primary products.<br />
Tha aconomlc crisis of tha mid-1970s thus<br />
presented both differential barriers for accumulation<br />
for particular capitals, and mora fundamentally, for<br />
capital as a ehols In South Africa. Tha resolution<br />
of this crisis spomared to damand a complex restructur<br />
ing of capital in all aactore of tha economy, a<br />
restructuring ehich mould render labour more<br />
productive, Thle Implied the nmed for an even more<br />
capital intenelve basis to South African industry.<br />
now linked to the need to rsep the owneflts of<br />
M<br />
economies of scale. Thue the racaeelon posed very.<br />
eterkly vthe urgent need for change In a number of<br />
the conditions of accumulation of capital in South<br />
Africa. ( In broadest terms, the entire eat of<br />
conditions under which labour ems utilised within tha<br />
economy on the one hand, and the structure of the<br />
market on the other hand, warm poaed aa urgent<br />
political problems for the capitalist cless as a whole.<br />
Here, however, tha differential impact of tha<br />
recession on various capitals becomes Important. The<br />
forms of resolution of these problems and tha<br />
policies desired by various capitals differed<br />
substantially. This is an Brea requiring much<br />
f^rtf^r investigation.<br />
Before analysing the unprecedented proliferation<br />
of politicking-on these issues by the entire complex<br />
gamut of bourgeois organisations, tha other side of<br />
this economic crisis needs to be mentioned. The<br />
process of cepltallet eecumuletion of the mid-1970s<br />
took piece In the context of, and was indeed largely<br />
a product of, a rapid intensification of the cless<br />
struggle. The decede saw a growing militancy on<br />
the part of an increasingly organised efrican working<br />
class. It began with a massive strike of contract<br />
workere in Nemible. Prom 1972 onwards. South African<br />
industry was rocked by wave upon wave of strlkea by<br />
african workers demanding higher wages and tha right<br />
to organise. These strikes began at the tall end<br />
of tha great boom or the 1960s, and in many mays<br />
heralded the onset of the recession of the 1970s.<br />
These struggles are well known end neod not ba<br />
documented here. The mining Industry too was shaken<br />
by bitter disputes, stoppages end strikes between<br />
1973 and 1976, These were liirgely suppressed with<br />
violence - In one instance in Carletonville In 1ff73,<br />
11 etriking miners were shot oy police summoned by<br />
the Anglo--Amarican Corporation. During the Soweto<br />
uprisings, two massive general strikes in August<br />
and September 1976 virtually paralysed South African<br />
Industry,<br />
These working cless struggles apart, political<br />
stability was further shattered by other mass<br />
struggles against apartheid. Tha regime was rocked<br />
•<br />
by maaeive uprlelnge in 1976, by the collepse of<br />
Portuguese colonlellam and particularly the<br />
humllletlng defeat of tha South African army In<br />
Angola. Significantly, beginning in 1976 a slowly<br />
escalating guerilla war inside South Africa waa waged<br />
1 by the militants of tha armed wing of the banned<br />
African National Congress, Umkhonto We Sizwe. As<br />
PW Botha claimed on assuming office, the state did<br />
indeed seem to be confronted with e 'total onslaught*.<br />
Certainly amongst South African businessmen there wee<br />
an almoat panle-etricken recognition that these<br />
struggles went beyond mere demands for the and to<br />
reclal discrimination. In the words of one worried<br />
cepltallet, 'there is e general tendency for young<br />
africans to be enti-free enterprise.*<br />
Again, tha above simple cetalogue of some of tha<br />
events of this intensifying class struggle of the<br />
1970s Is no substitute for its analysis. Uuch furthar<br />
research is needed in this area. 8ut one general<br />
conclusion Is clear. By 1977-78 both tha economic<br />
and political conditions which had underlain end given<br />
rise to the unprecedented boom of 1961-71 had been<br />
decisively shattered. •hilet the economic end<br />
political crises of tha 1970a are not immediately<br />
reduceable to each other, they both raised, in<br />
differing ways, as tha central issue of polltlcel<br />
struggle, the question of the requisite state<br />
policies to ensure renewed capitalist growth and<br />
stability. Moreover, they did so in ways which<br />
began to shake loose the existing political<br />
alignments within South Africa, leading to Intensified<br />
political conflict and significant political<br />
reorganisation of varioua class forces.<br />
The Pressure for Reform<br />
.IT is necessary to note that by 1996 a significant<br />
change had occurred in the alignment of the economic<br />
organisation of the capitalist claas. With the<br />
important exception of organised agriculture, by 1978<br />
ell the economic organisations of the cepltallet<br />
claae were united in agreement over the need for<br />
significant reforms in economic and political<br />
policy. Even given the differential Impact of tha<br />
page 4
page 5<br />
recession, tnern was broad agreement over the nature<br />
of tots* desired reforms* The Most significant of<br />
these can ba broadly specified. Firstly, aith raganl<br />
to aconomlc policy, there was wide agreement on tha<br />
naad to ease substantially legislative raatrictions<br />
on tha mobility of african labour (influx control,<br />
pass lava, tha labour bureaux system), to permit i<br />
its mora profitable utilisation. This aas<br />
accompanied alth a general damand that raatrictions<br />
on the training and employment of skilled african<br />
labour ba likewise aboilahad or rafor mad, to parmlt<br />
tha reorganisation of production on tha basis of<br />
highar productivity. Thasa two vary basic issues<br />
further ralsad tha naad for s negotiated reorganisation<br />
of tha labour procasa in many branchas of capitalist<br />
production. Again, all employers' organisation* vara<br />
united on the naad for some kind of state recognition<br />
end control of organisations of collective bargaining<br />
for african workers* In 197S, the various employers*<br />
organisations in South Africa formed an umbrella body<br />
to press these views on government. The evidence of<br />
tha various employers* organisations to tha government<br />
Commissions of Enquiry on Manpower Utilisation<br />
(Rlekert Commission) and Labour Legislation (Vlehahn<br />
Commission) is strikingly similar on these issues.<br />
There aas likewise unanimity between all the<br />
organisations of the capitalist class on the urgent<br />
need for e drastic reduction in state ownership and<br />
control In the economy.<br />
The particular emphasis given to economic policy<br />
by all the various employers' organisations iamediately<br />
posed tha question of the necessary reforms to ensure<br />
the political stability so vital to further economic<br />
growth. Here were raised questions of both foreign<br />
and domestic policy. Tha flight of foreign capital,<br />
the intensifying wars of national liberation in<br />
Namlble and Zimbabwe, and the increasingly desperate<br />
need for export markets for South African industrial<br />
commodities, highlighted very clearly the relationship<br />
between International acceptability, regional<br />
stability and renewed prosperity. Once again, all<br />
the various employers* organisation* put strong<br />
pressure on the government to Introduce reforms<br />
which would emee the international leoletion of the<br />
country, renew th« flow of foreign investment,<br />
(Marwntee Western support in Namibia and Zimbabwe, and,<br />
if possible, open the African continental market to<br />
South*African goods.<br />
But tha most overriding concern was tha need to<br />
secure Immediate domestic stability. Hare particular<br />
emphasis was placed on tha position of a newly<br />
discovered creature, 'the Urban African'. In mid-<br />
1976, in the aftermath of Soweto, e whole host of<br />
business-funded and cross-cutting organisations<br />
sprang up to 'deal' with the problem. The most<br />
Important of these was tha Urban Foundation,<br />
jointly established, and massively financed, by<br />
many of the major corporations in South Africa*<br />
Numerous proposals warm made for 'Improving' the<br />
lot of the urban african* that was essentially<br />
being proposed here was the removal of those<br />
apartheid restrictions which unnecessarily inflamed<br />
workers, and more particularly, lead to collective<br />
action between african workers and the african patty<br />
bourgeoisie. Thus the most widely trumpeted and<br />
major scheme of the Urban Foundation was an attempt<br />
to initiate a system of private home ownership for<br />
the very few Africans able to afford housing. In<br />
reality, thes* various organisations envisaged<br />
isolating various groups of efricans from each other,<br />
attending to their specific needs separately, hopefully<br />
to polarise them politically. Thus a slight<br />
amelioration in the living conditions of those<br />
africans who possessed the right under section 10<br />
of the Urban Areas Act to remain in the cities<br />
would effectively separate them permanently from<br />
tha vast reserve army of the unemployed barricaded<br />
in the rural slums of the bantustans by tha influx<br />
control system. But more particularly, the sudden<br />
obsession of all these organisations with the (again<br />
newly discovered) 'black middle cless', and the need<br />
to develop it very rapidly, was premised on the need<br />
to drive a wedge between black workers and the petty<br />
I bourgeoisie. Certain sections of the capitalist claas<br />
I had long been arguing for this course. By 1978 It had<br />
I become the universal litany of all employers and other<br />
bourgeois organisations.<br />
Once again, much further research le required<br />
before an adequate analysla of tharaectlons of the<br />
capitalist class to these aconomlc and political<br />
crises can be made. However, 5 preliminary general<br />
points can be stressed. Firstly, the combination of (<br />
economic and political crisis gave rise to a atrong<br />
demand for urgent reform from virtually all sections<br />
of tha organised capitalist class. It earn a rapid<br />
proliferation of business-funded organisations and<br />
pressure groups to push for reform. In other words,<br />
through the various cross cutting organisations<br />
through which it exists as a class, tha bourgeoisie<br />
engaged in a desperate flurry of open politicking<br />
on a previously unheard of scale.<br />
Secondly, this flurry of bourgeois politics was<br />
in no sense confined to the party and parliamentary<br />
level. For reasons which thaajselves require detailed<br />
analysis, parliamentary politics are a relatively<br />
insignificant form of political struggle In South<br />
Africa. Rather, what took place aas intense<br />
politicking on the one hand within and between the<br />
various (and proliferating) organisations of the<br />
capitalist class - ranging from directly economic<br />
interest grouos to church organisations, women's<br />
group*, etc - and within and between the various<br />
state apparatuses and such bourgeois organisations on<br />
the other hand.<br />
Thirdly, any consideration of this explosion of<br />
bourgeois politics must come to terms with the<br />
increasingly open and direct political role of tha<br />
military. Particularly under the new Chief of<br />
Staff, General amgrws Helen, the military ems now<br />
openly canvassing for state policies which ware<br />
'militarily defensible'. This is examined In greater<br />
detail below, but here it is Important to note that<br />
this now openly political role of the military<br />
brought it into increasing conflict with other<br />
elements In the state apparatus, particularly the<br />
security services.<br />
Fourthly, during these crises, long existing<br />
political alignments and alliances both within the<br />
bourgeoisie end between sections of the bourgeoisie
and othar claaa forces, began to crumble and shift.<br />
Of apaolal significance aaa the position of various<br />
large Afrikaner undertakings, both at Individual<br />
companies, and organised collectively through tha<br />
Afrikaanse Hsndeleinstltuut (Afrikaner Commerciel<br />
Institute). This points to tha need for datallad<br />
research on tha development of Afrikaner undertakings<br />
over tha pravious IS years. But it can ba notad that<br />
tha now strongly-expressed demand by Afrikanar<br />
buainaas for raform in tha raatrlctiona on tha<br />
aobllityt employment, training and organisation of<br />
african labour, togathar with a vahaaant attack on<br />
atata lntarfaranca in the aconoay and a vigorous<br />
caapalgn for *tha davalopaant of tha black middle<br />
dees', was shaking loos* a long-standing political<br />
allianca batwaan Afrikanar buainaas on tha ona hand,<br />
and cartain strata of white workers and tha patty<br />
bourgeoisla on tha other.<br />
This laada fifthly to tha point at tha heart of<br />
. this paper. Tha exploeion of politicking over tha<br />
appropriate economic end political responses to<br />
these crises, whan taken together with this shift<br />
in traditional political alliances, began to raise in<br />
vary atark form another problem a the political<br />
capacity of tha Nationalist Party government to<br />
implement tha necessary reforms* This Is not to pose<br />
the hackneyed and discredited view of a contradiction<br />
between the requirements of a rational capitalism on<br />
the one hand, end tha irrational 'ethnic' concema of<br />
the Nationalist Party on tha othar, in which the<br />
latter dominates end distort* tha former. Indeed,<br />
elsewhere I have argued that tha election of the hP<br />
government in t943 represented e form of solution to<br />
an earlier political crisis of the capitalist state,<br />
and that its apartheid policies facilitated rapid<br />
capital accumulation in all branches of capitalist<br />
production. Thus, at no stage during Its rule up<br />
to the 1970s had the capitalist class seriously<br />
challenged the notionalist government, precleely<br />
because tha role of capital Itself wes not challenged*<br />
But the coterminous collapse of capitalist prosperity<br />
and the intensification of class struggles in the<br />
early 1970a began to pose the political Question of<br />
the role of the W> as the governing party in the<br />
capitalist State.<br />
This is tha context of Uuldergatef Tha general<br />
economic and political crlawe want hand in hand with and<br />
helped to shape a growing crisis within both tha NP<br />
government, and tha party itself outside of government.<br />
Put another way, Uuldwrgate reproeented in condeneed<br />
form the complex articulation of three separate<br />
political crises:<br />
a) tha crisis both for individual capitals and the<br />
capltellet claae aa a whole in tha economic and<br />
political conditions of accumulation;<br />
b) for tha Natlonallat Party as the governing party<br />
in tha capitalist state; and<br />
c} for the Natlonallat Party cutalde of government<br />
M an Afrikaner natlonallat party built on a<br />
particular eat of political alliances.<br />
It la crucial to realise that though inextricably<br />
interconnectedt these three different levels of the<br />
crisis of the South African atata in 1978 refer to<br />
very different alignments of sets of organisational<br />
and Ideological class forcee. Thua, the political<br />
crlele confronting the NP government aa the ruling<br />
party in the capitalist state, was not the same as,<br />
and cannot ba reduced to, tha political crisis<br />
confronting the NP as a political party representing<br />
a particular alignment of clews forcee within the<br />
social formation. Existing accounts of both<br />
muldergate and the development of Afrikaner nationalist<br />
19<br />
politico have glibly collapsed thess levels. To<br />
understand Uuldargate as a crisis for tha capitalist<br />
state aa a wholea it Is necessary to grasp these<br />
verloue crises both in their aeparateness and<br />
articulation.<br />
The Struggle Inalde the Nationalist Party<br />
THE Nationalist Party has been In power in South<br />
Africa since 1906. It is conventionally seen as a<br />
monolithic omaniaetlon rapreaanting 'the Afrikaner*<br />
in South African politics. Such a static,<br />
undifferentiated .view of the NP la profoundly<br />
misleading. As I have shown elsewhere tha NP camm<br />
into office in 1948 as tha political organisation of<br />
a ehlftlng, highly differentiated end contradictory<br />
cleas alliance. Far from being a monolithic force,<br />
the NP has always been wracked by vigorous, oftwn<br />
bitter and sometimes violent conflicts between the<br />
various forces comprising its social basis. To the<br />
vary limited extent that these conflicts have avwn<br />
bean recognised in the literature, they have been<br />
univereally depicted In purely ideological termet<br />
often overlaid with a regional 1st emphasis. Thua,<br />
tha so-called 'moderate* nationalists of 'the South'<br />
Pmge G<br />
(la the Cepe province) are supposed to be at loggerheads<br />
with the hardlinare of 'the North' (tha Provinces of<br />
ths Transvaal and the Orange Free State). This la<br />
usually taken es given. Now clearly there are deep<br />
ideological and regional differancaa in the character<br />
of Afrikaner nationallme. Yet these are hardly their<br />
own explanations. They must needs ba understood in<br />
terms of the significantly different social bases of<br />
the various provlnciel NPs, and tha forms in and<br />
through which these class differences have bean<br />
Institutionalised in nationalist politics.<br />
Tha NP la no single 'national' party, but rather<br />
a loose federation of 4 autonomous provincial parties,<br />
wmch with its own distinct social basis, party<br />
organisation, membership, constitution, leadership,<br />
press, and political and ideological etyle. The NP<br />
qua party has a 'national' existence only through 4<br />
institutions: the National Leader elected by the<br />
Parliamentary caucus; a 'Federal Council*<br />
representing each provincial party, and which meets<br />
but rarely; the 'Federal Congreas', which meets even<br />
more rarely; and the Parliamentary caucus in which sit<br />
tha Nationalist ammmmTt of Parliament from all 4<br />
provinces. Tha cabinet makes up a fifth National Party<br />
institution, but le simultaneously engaged at a vary<br />
different level of politlca, and subject to a much<br />
wider sat of pressures and struggles.<br />
Each of these 'national• institutions of tha party<br />
ia a site of widely differing etrugglea and represente<br />
widely varying Interests* Tha much-neglected structure<br />
of tha NP la vital to an understanding of its<br />
operation, as tha real locus of power within the<br />
party oye party. Ilea in the Provincial party
7<br />
onjanlaationt, rather than tha national institution*,<br />
within tha Provincial partlaa, tha Provincial leaders<br />
of tan hava graatar lnfluanca than tha National Laadar<br />
(aho is usually alao a laadar of ona of tha Provincial +<br />
partita - this coaprises hia raal poaar baaa within<br />
tha party). within tha party qua party (aa distinct<br />
froa tha cabinet) tha Provincial leader* wield aa audi<br />
poaar aa tha National Laadar hlaaalf. Tha Provincial<br />
partlaa hava alaaya vary Jaaloualy guarded their<br />
particular lntaraata, prerogatives and idantltiaa<br />
both froa aach othar, and froa tha 'National*<br />
institutions of tha party.<br />
Thua, tha 'raglonallat' or *provlnclaliat'<br />
strugglaa ahlch hava alaaya plagued Afrikaner -<br />
nationalist politic*, raat at ona laval on thaaa<br />
4 distinct party atrvcturaa. Hoaavar, »ia<br />
raglonaliaa and tha oftan aida policy and ideological<br />
dlffaranca* bataaan tha political partlaa ara a*plainad<br />
by tha fact that aach party has a distinct claaa baaia:<br />
aach la tha inatitutionollaatlon of a distinct fora.<br />
of claaa alllanca ahlch diffara in important raapacta<br />
froa that of lta fadaral partners. Thua, aa<br />
aaparataly organlaad, aaparataly financad and<br />
aaparataly lad political lnatltutiona alth differential<br />
aoclal baaaat tha 4 provincial Natlonaliat Partlaa<br />
hava acqulrad distinct lnatltutlonal practices,<br />
ldaoloolcal atylaaand lntaraata. Far fro* baing<br />
aonolithic organisations, thay hava changad<br />
aignifioantly during tha parlod of tha »'a rula.<br />
IhUat it la ooaposad of a federation of 4<br />
provincial partlaa, tha HP la In fact alaoat totally<br />
doalnatad by tha tao largaat of thaaa, tha Transvaal<br />
and Capa Nationalist Partlaa. Tha-ft* of*tha Oranga<br />
Fraa State haa tandad to folloa that of tha Tranavaal<br />
(although thara raaaln significant dlffarancaa),<br />
and tha NP of Natal la ao aaak aa to bo almost<br />
inaignifleant. Thua, for tha aafca of brevity, in<br />
tha analysis of tha growing crisis in tha Natlonaliat<br />
Party during tha 1970a, I ahall concantrata<br />
predominant!/ on tha tan largar provincial partlaa.<br />
Vary achaaatlcaUy, in tha Tranavaal in t948<br />
tha NP aanagad for tha first ti-e In ita history to<br />
organiaa politically a claaa allianca of tha (alaoat<br />
axdualvaly Afrllraani apaafciimj) capitalist faraars of<br />
tha Provlnca; apaciflc strata of ahita workers<br />
in tha adnlng, conatruotlon, ataal and transport<br />
lnduatriaat' tha larga AfrUcaana apaateing patty<br />
bourgeoisie in tha state apparatus and tha profaaalona;<br />
and finally, aaarglng out of thla latter group, a<br />
aaall claaa of aspirant coaswrclal and financial<br />
capitalists organlaad in tha ftaddlnp^oaadbaaaging<br />
(literally, tha '-ova-ant for tha act of rascue).<br />
Thla lattar group aara haavily dapandant on tha ra-<br />
invaatad aurpluaaa of agricultura and tha savings of<br />
Afrlkaana apaatears of all claaaaa. Indaad, long<br />
bafora tha NP aaa abla to organlsa thaaa diaparata<br />
clasa foraaa into a political alllanca, through tha<br />
various organisations of tha RaddingsdaadbasaginQ,<br />
tha patty bourgaoiala had organlaad thaa into a fora<br />
of aoonoaic allianca.<br />
Elaaahara I hava analyaad in datall tha condition*<br />
giving rlaa to, and tha apaciflc fora of, thla<br />
allianca. 21 Hara It should be straaaad, hoaavar, that<br />
alongslda tha NP, Transvaal Natlonaliat politics aaa<br />
doalnatad by a aacrat aociaty knoan aa tha Afrikanar<br />
Broedsrbond. Tha Afrikaner Qroadarfaond aaa affaotlvaly<br />
tha institution through ahlch tha apaciflc lntaraata<br />
of tha Afrikaner patty bourgsoieis cams to ba<br />
lndapandantly organlaad and artlculatad. Tha<br />
Broadarbond aasuaad a aalf-conacioua rola aa tha<br />
vanguard of Afrikaner nationalism. Through It tha<br />
Afrikaner patty bourgeoisie axarclaad ideological<br />
dominance ovar tha Tranavaal NP and othar organs of<br />
Afrikaner nationalism in tha province (and ths<br />
Oranga Fraa State). Thua, in both tha vldar .<br />
Afrlkanar natlonaliat aovaaant in tha Tranavaal, and<br />
tha NP In particular, an idaology of tha Afrikaner<br />
yolk aaa artlculatad ahlch atraaaad a particular fora<br />
of •snti-iaperlalisa' and tha lntaraata of tha<br />
(ahita) 'aaall eavV against tha large (and<br />
predominantly English apaateing) eonopcJies ahlch<br />
doalnatad tha accraty.<br />
Tha situation in tha Capa differed aaricadly.<br />
Hara tha NP had long rastad on an aconoaic and<br />
political alllanca bataaan tha aaalthlar capitalist<br />
far-era, particularly of tha eastern Capa, on tha<br />
ona hsjnd, and a aaall group of financial capltaliata<br />
in tha oanlaai (and later Raeorandt) to-canie* Off ttta<br />
othar. Tha aoving spirits in Sanle-n had if* feet<br />
doalnatad tha Capa *F right frxm its inception in<br />
1913. Thua tha Capa party aaa far aora opanly<br />
capitalist in oriantatlon and sympathies than that<br />
of tha Tiwiavaal. Ita lntarpratatlon of ahat<br />
constitutes tha *Afrlkanar volk' and 'iU 1 lntaraata<br />
like.ua varied considerably, laying far graatar<br />
aaphaaia on tha condltiona to aacura stable capitalist<br />
profit, ttoat significantly, tha Afrlkanar Biuadeibond<br />
aaa not a particularly iaportant forca in Capa'<br />
natlonaliat polltlca. Indaad, tha Broadartond aaa<br />
of tan characterised aa tha aajor oooooiticnal forca<br />
to tha 'Capa finance power* - ahlch bacaaa tha<br />
Tranavaal an%ar phraaa for tha Cape party.<br />
This la not tha place for a detailed analyala<br />
of tha regioneiisa In tha NP after 1906. Tap points<br />
hoaavar ahould ba noted. Firstly, during tha 1980a,<br />
tha previous Capa doainanca ovar tha NP as a ahola<br />
began to give aay to tha now aora powerful forces<br />
of tha Tranavaal- IMa ia raflactad in tha success<br />
of tha tao Tranavaal candidate* (JG Strfjdoa and hF<br />
Varaoard) ovar tha Capa candidates (H Havanga and<br />
C Oongaa) In tha leadership elections of 1964 and<br />
1956. Thla groaing Tranavaal doalnanca raflacU<br />
tha incraaaing isolation of 'Capa financa poaar*<br />
•<br />
froa tha forcaa aafcing up tha Tranavaal la*.<br />
Secondlyt during tha 1960a a crucial shift began<br />
to take place in tha econoaic alllances underpinning<br />
tha Capa fcff\ Tha accumulation atratagy of tha<br />
natlonaliat economic -eovawwjnt (tha namaJlTyjadaea^asaBtng)<br />
during tha 19at)a rested on tha centralisation into<br />
Afrikaner financial unoajrtafelnga of surplus aoney-<br />
capital erassulatad in agrloultura, and lta<br />
conversion hara Into productive capital. Hoaavar,<br />
tha aavlnga of Afrllcanar workers and tha patty<br />
bourgeoisie aara alao an iaportant oacondary source<br />
of finance. Hoaavar, tha rata and pattern of<br />
accuaulatlon in tha varioua aconoaic undertakings<br />
established by tha Rat« 1 noadaadbaaapina aaa unavan.<br />
Aa by far tha largaat and aoat powerful Afrlkanar<br />
financial ttsapany, Sanlaa had inspired tha economic
movement (In collaboration with the Broederbond),<br />
dominated its various organisations, and was the<br />
prime economic beneficiary of the alliance. Largely<br />
as a result of HP policy after 1946, the growth of<br />
Senlem aftar 1946 wee nothing short of remarkable.<br />
By i960 the funds uodar its control had been<br />
increased by over 1 500)1. The real eignificance<br />
of thie growth lies in the fact that by 1960, long<br />
before any other Afrikaner financial undertaking<br />
(with the possible exception of the Rembrandt<br />
Corporation) eas in a similar position, Senlem's<br />
total aconoailc dependence on an alliance elth<br />
farmers and workers as the eejor source of its capital<br />
had been broken. Freed from the need for an economic<br />
alliance elth agriculture. Senlaa began to pursue<br />
Independent (and previously unthinkable) economic and<br />
political policies. After 1960, it moved into ever<br />
closer cooperation eith the Anglo-American Corporation<br />
in a number of undertakings, culminating in a Joint<br />
take over of the General etining and Finance Corporation<br />
- thua gaining the first ever entry of an Afrikaner<br />
company into the 'mammy territory' of mining finance.<br />
This cooperation eith the arch epltoee of<br />
'Hoggenheimer' aroused bitter condemnation of Sanlam<br />
within Afrikaner nationalist ranks. ZS<br />
The differentiel development of Afrikaner<br />
finance after 1905 la yet another area requiring<br />
much further research. Yet the basic point is<br />
clear. By 1960 the process of capital accumulation<br />
was rapidly loosening the economic alliance between<br />
Cepe finence capital and agriculture. This vital<br />
shift in the alignment of forces organised by the<br />
Cape NP, had algnificant effects for the politics of<br />
the Cape party. Sanlem retained its overwhelming<br />
dominance of the Cepe nP, which began to engage in<br />
increasingly open conflict with the other provincial<br />
parties on precisely the basic questions of the<br />
constitution of the Afrikaner volk and the nature of<br />
ff ita B interests. * In the period 1960-66, the Cepe<br />
NP eas regarded in nationalist circlee ee 'the<br />
mm<br />
opposition party'. This conflict then raged In<br />
all the organisations of Afrikaner nationalism,<br />
from business groupings^ the Broederbond (itself used<br />
;as a counter force to the Cepe party), churches,<br />
Parliament and cabinet.<br />
Here the vital question of the relationship<br />
between party, government and state must be posed.<br />
The yeers immediately before the W> came to power had<br />
seen an intense end open politic!eatIon of the state<br />
bureaucrecy in South Africa. Political struggles<br />
within the capitalist class, and between it and '<br />
specific strata of the petty bourgaolsle and whita<br />
workers were fought out so vehemently within the<br />
civil service that policy Initiatives of the then-<br />
ruling united Party were effectively paralysed.<br />
The Afrikaner Broederbond MS particularly ective in<br />
this process, commonly referred to as the nationalist<br />
'white-anting• of the government. 27 Immediately on<br />
assuming office in 1MB, as Q matter of priority, the<br />
NP government began a systematic purge of the senior<br />
ranks of the civil eervice end Installed pro-<br />
Nationelist eleaante. These purges were carried out<br />
by individual Ministers, and Involved a protracted<br />
process of struggla within the state apperatuaee. In<br />
the process, particular government ministries became<br />
powerful political bases for e number of politicians.<br />
This should be seen neither in purely subjective nor<br />
instrumentalist terms. Rather, it implies thet<br />
through the struggle to transform the state apparatus*<br />
the state apparatus Itself become a site of ongoing<br />
conflict between the cless forces organised in the<br />
NP. Specific ministries were identified with<br />
specific •regionalist' political lines, end the<br />
regionalist struggles were fought out pertielly<br />
between particular state Institutions.<br />
This led to significant anomalies. Under the<br />
Premiership of Or OF Halan, I9a8-5d, a disjuncture<br />
developed between the relative regionalist etrengths<br />
in the perty on the one hand, and the government on<br />
the other. By virtue of the results of the 1948<br />
and 1953 election results, the Transvaal party had<br />
finally emerged as the most powerful of the<br />
provlnciel NPs. Yet, as simultaneously Prime Minister<br />
and leader of the. Cape HP, leslan uastf his prerogatlvea<br />
of appointment in en ettempt to shore up Cape<br />
dominance in .the government, His first Cab3.net<br />
1 * page G<br />
contained but two Transvaal appointments.in<br />
relatively insignificant portfolios, whilst 7<br />
Cape attnlatara (in a Cabinet of 12) virtually<br />
monopolised the Important poets. Thus, under Malan,<br />
particularly powerful Ministries became associated<br />
with the 'Cape line* (especially Finance and<br />
Transport) whilst the Transvaal struggle against<br />
the Cape 'moderation 11 was waged largely from the<br />
base of Strljdom and Verwoerd in the Uinistrlss<br />
of Lends end Netive Affaire.<br />
Thuefar it has been argued that the e<br />
separate NPs rest on different social bases and<br />
hence have institutionalised significantly varied<br />
politics. An lmportent feature of Nationalist<br />
politics lies In the ongoing struggle between these<br />
various class forces, a struggle institutloneUsed<br />
within the verlous parties, and taking the fora of<br />
often bitter 'regionalist 1 conflict between them.<br />
This conflict ie largely expressed in ideological<br />
terms aa deep differences over what constitutes<br />
the Afrikaner volk end 'Ite* intereete. It la waged<br />
not only through the ftP itself, but the numerous<br />
organisations which collectivly comprise organised<br />
Afrikaner nationalism.<br />
At a second level, this struggla is over whet<br />
types of policies should be pursued by the NP as the<br />
governing party. The fact that the NP was also the<br />
governing perty gave e particular character to the<br />
ways in which these conflicts are fought out within<br />
the state apparatus. I do not aant to be misunderetood<br />
here. This is not to reduce the state as a site of<br />
class struggle to a simple conflict between the<br />
various tendencies in Afrikaner nationalism.<br />
These nmmtt to be situated in their erticulatlon with<br />
the wider class struggles end contradictions within<br />
and between the state apparatuses. But here I am<br />
particularly concerned eith the question of how the<br />
effects of the contradictions within Afrikaner<br />
nationalise themselves helped structure the particular<br />
form of the criais of the South African atate in the<br />
mid - late 1970a. Thus, as conflict between organised<br />
class forces ovsr state pollcyt these Afrikaner<br />
nationalist politics teke piece at three levele
within t>e st«t« apparatus: the Parliamentary<br />
caucus; the cabinet; and within and between the<br />
various state apparatuses.<br />
Acute conflicts and struggle* within Afrikaner<br />
nationalist ranks were a constant feature of South<br />
African politics after 1W8 (and indeed before).<br />
But these were not static struggles. Their content<br />
and forms shifted with the changes in the social<br />
bases of the various provincial NPs* most significant<br />
here was the changing relationship between Caps<br />
finance and agriculture, which began to shift the<br />
Cepe NP into an even more openly oppositional role<br />
within the party. In the immediate aftermath of<br />
the Sherpevllle crlets of I960, particularly whilst<br />
Dr Verwoerd was recovering from %n assassination<br />
attempt, end the forces of the traditional<br />
nationalist alliance were temporarily leederless,<br />
the struggle within the NP was very finely balanced.<br />
However, once Verwoerd returned to political life,<br />
he succeeded in mobilising against the Cepe financial<br />
intereats, all the other elaes forces in the NP. This<br />
wes echieved pertly by epproprieting for the right the<br />
mantle of true Afrikaner nationalism, with<br />
Verwoerd es Its lnfellible leader. For the<br />
remainder of hie Premiership, he M 9<br />
keeping the Cape politically iaolated.<br />
successful in<br />
Verwoerd was able to maintain this alliance<br />
against Cape finance by centrelleing power in both<br />
party and government into hie rolee as National<br />
Leader or the NP and Prime Minister respectively.<br />
.This was unprecedented in the hiatory of the NP. Thus,<br />
the Cape was doubly Isolated - within the party as a<br />
whole, and in the state apparatus Itself. Verwoert's<br />
period as Prime Minister saw a narked diminution in<br />
the powers of both individual Ministers and the<br />
Cabinet itself, with the Prime Minister taking<br />
final responsibility for all crucial decisions, and<br />
often announcing these to Cabinet without coneultation.<br />
Likewise, the NP caucua had its political independence<br />
severely curtailed, and was simply not informed of a<br />
number of crucial political decisions (such as the<br />
vitally important 1959 Promotion of Bantu Self-<br />
Government Bill) before they were laid before<br />
Perliement. Verwoerd was able to operate Ilka this<br />
because of his personal political power base within<br />
the Afrikaner Browdertond. During his Premiership,<br />
the AS Executive Council in many senses displaced<br />
•<br />
the Cabinet as a policy making body. And given thet<br />
the Cepe had no influence within the Broederbond, it<br />
was the ldeel institution through which to mobilise<br />
all class forcea in the nationalist alliance egalnst<br />
the Cepe*<br />
Yet the contradictions and conflicta within<br />
organised Afrikaner netionaliea were in no senee<br />
brought to en end under Verwoerd's authoriterlan<br />
leadership, they were aimply displaced. If an iron<br />
discipline of the mejority eas mainteined in the<br />
party to keep the Cape in line, these struggles<br />
spilled over into bitter conflict in ail the other<br />
orgenisetions of Afrikaner netlonelism, from church<br />
and cultural groups to buslneas organisations, etc.<br />
Here the Sanlam group managed to maintain its control<br />
over the very influential Afrlkaanse Handel sins tltuut<br />
(AHI) ae a major pletfora from which to challanga<br />
the dominant line In the party. Despite e bitter<br />
struggle for power et the 196fl AHI congress, Sanlam<br />
could not be dislodged, and it was predominantly<br />
through the AHI that the Cape line was articulated.<br />
8y 1965, it was openly acknowledged thet Afrikaner<br />
nationalism had Its 'verllote' ('enlightened*) and<br />
'verkrempt* (•reactionary*) wings. The main base of<br />
the verllgtea ley in the Cape party, with elenly<br />
gathering support for ite position amongst certain<br />
business groups In the Transvaal. The so-called<br />
verkrempte wing was' led by Verwoerd. The main<br />
differencee ware over labour policy and relations<br />
with English capitalists* The Cape groups favoured<br />
much looser restrictions on the mobility and training<br />
of afrlcan labour and close co-operation with<br />
English buslneae. But these were in many respects<br />
the fundamental questions around which Afrikaner<br />
netlonelism es a claaa alliance hinged - these<br />
issues touched directly the Intereats of all the<br />
verious class forces organised under Afrikaner<br />
nationalism), tt eae precisely the accumulation of<br />
capital by the Cepe financiers and their new<br />
independence from the economic support of Afrikaner<br />
fanners, petty bourgeoleie and sorters, which led to<br />
this change in Sanlam's position on the crucial<br />
issues of influx control, skilled labour, finance<br />
policy, etc. Thus, what the verllgtea eere in feet<br />
advocating wes e new Interpretation of the interests,<br />
of the Afrikaner volk, one which concentrated<br />
particularly on the needs of the rapidly growing<br />
group of powerful Afrikaner capitalist* led by Swnlem.<br />
The assassination of Or Verwoen) in September<br />
1966 brought these contredictlons out into the open,<br />
Into a vicioua fight within the NP itself. In these ^<br />
atrugglea, the personal political poaition of the<br />
new NP leader, John Voreter, became vitally Important,<br />
in that it was a significant factor in the form taken<br />
by these struggles.<br />
From the viewpoint of all 'normal* political<br />
considerations. 8J Voreter should never have been<br />
elected leeder of the NP and Prime Minister. Almost<br />
everything in hie political past told against him.<br />
During the 19eOs he had b—n e leader of the bitterly<br />
enti-NP and Nexl-orlented Oasewa Branding. In the<br />
1948 election Voreter had attacked the NP aa anti<br />
democratic whan It opposed his candidacy for the W»*s<br />
election partner, the Afrikaner Party. Defying perty<br />
discipline, Voreter fought tne election ae en<br />
independent, ioeing by two votee, thereby denying<br />
en otherwise eefe eeat to the Natlonmliet coalition.<br />
He hed only Joined the NP in 1951 and been elected<br />
to Parliament in 1933. He hed nm^r developed a<br />
strong personal political beam within the Tranavaal<br />
perty. In 1966 he ranked a lowly thirteenth in<br />
Cabinet seniority, end as Minister of Police, had<br />
been the man ultimately responsible for ttie Prime<br />
Minister's safety when Verwoerd waa killed. The only<br />
other candidate for the leadership eea the moat eenior<br />
member of the cabinet. Transport Minister Ben ScJvjemmn,<br />
deputy leader of the Treneveal Party before the death<br />
of Verwoerd. But Bchoaman's political paet told<br />
against him too. He waa one of the diminishing band<br />
of so-called oud-ameIters, le Natlonmliata who in<br />
the 19Xe had split the Nationalist Party to join<br />
the United Party. He hed come back to the fold In
1939, but aoaa aaabars of the Nationalist right wing<br />
hid long •WDTltt, and regarded the smelters as far<br />
•ori objectionable than tha aaaaara of tha Ojjw<br />
Brandwag.<br />
Given that thera was no clear and obvious<br />
auccaaaor to varaoard, whose total dominance of both<br />
party and govarnaant had thoroughly precluded tha<br />
— f — of a nuatoar two in both, and In tha light<br />
of tha axtraaa factionallaa within tha party,<br />
Voratar'a vary politioal aaaxnaas stood in hla favour.<br />
Ha waa not firmly identified with any faction of tha<br />
part/, and enjoyed wide respect for hia ruthless<br />
perfccaance aa Htniatarof Juatica. Voratar eventually<br />
eaarpad aa tha unchallenged candidata because ha<br />
anjoyad tha total backing of two apparantly<br />
contradictory alnga of tha party - tha axtraaa right<br />
lad by Or A Hartzog, and tha Capa party. Togathar<br />
thay coaprlaad a Majority of Nationalist aPa,<br />
parsuadlng Schoaaan to withdraw baf ora tha issue<br />
oaiaa to a vote* Tha support of tha axtraaa varkamptaa<br />
for Voratar can ba aaally axplalnad. Hla maabarahlp<br />
of tha pro-Mazi Osaewe Brand wag when couplad with tha<br />
hardllnar reputation aamad aa Minister of Juatica ,<br />
ewwaad to aart hia out aa a cowaiittad partlaan of<br />
tha right. Tha Capa vota ia axplalnad by tha fact<br />
that, in tha abaanca of a cradibla Capa candidata.<br />
voratar's aarriaga to tha daughtar of ona of tha<br />
foundara of tha Capa HP and Sanlaa - PA Helen - aede<br />
hla tha aoat accaptabla candidata. It aaa through<br />
thia connactlon that Voratar had in fact baan ao<br />
Quickly rehabilitated In tha V after 19d8. His<br />
appointaant to tha Cablnat by Verwoard In 1968. but<br />
5 yaara aftar ontaring Parllaaint, aaa widely<br />
lntarpratad in Nationalist clrclaa aa ona of tha<br />
aopa VarwoenJ offarad to tha Capa NP, still bittar<br />
aftar tha dafaat of lta candidata in tha 1958<br />
laadarahip election*<br />
This detail is crucial to an understanding of<br />
tha nature of Vorstar'a laadarahip in both party<br />
and govarnaant. Ha laaadlataly raallsad that ha<br />
could not doainata either in tha style of Verwoard.<br />
In tha party, ha thua triad to stand abova all<br />
factions, and bring Ma togathar by tha praatlps<br />
of hia office. To do so, ha took a stap unprecedented.<br />
In Nationalist politics, ona which aaa to transfer*<br />
tha ralationahlp between party and govarnaant»<br />
Under tha noraal procadura of tha NP, aa tha chosan<br />
National Laadar of tha party in succession to<br />
Varaoard, ha would naturally havs llkaalsa succeeded<br />
varaoard aa Transvaal laadar of tha nP. Evary<br />
national laadar of tha NV alnca ita Incaptlon had <<br />
baan alaultanaoualy tha laadar of tha Party in hia<br />
hoaa Province. Thia coaprlaad tha final political<br />
basa of tha National Laadar. But Voratar had not<br />
rlsan to national laadarahip through tha aatabllahad<br />
path of promotion In his provincial party. Ha had<br />
not anjoyad tha support of tha ovsrshalalng<br />
majority of Tranavaal af>s in tha pariod in which it<br />
aaaaad aa if an alaction between hla and Schoaaan<br />
would ba nacasaary to aalact tha national laadar.<br />
Ha had no natural political basa in tha Transvaal<br />
party, while tha Provincial laadarahip aaa hia to<br />
claia by right, ha auat hava raaliaad that not only<br />
would ha anjoy at bast tha grudging support of tha<br />
party organisation in tha province, but glvan that<br />
tha factionallaa of tha HP was at its worst in tha<br />
Transvaal, ha would gat sucfcad Into thoaa atrugglaa<br />
in a way which could rapidly loaa hla hla support<br />
in othar provinces. Thus rathar than take thasa<br />
risks for llttla ratum Voratar announcad ha would<br />
not accapt tha Transvaal laadarahip. and offarad it<br />
to hla aatonishad and gratlflad opponent, Ben<br />
Schoaaan - thereby placing Schoaaan and his faction<br />
daap in Vorstar'a political dabt, and axplicltly<br />
alavating hia own placa in tha W* to that abova<br />
tha various factions.<br />
Thia dapartura was to ba of vital algnificanca<br />
in tha factional struggle in tha NP. Vith tha<br />
National Laadar of tha party thua affaetivaly<br />
without a local institutions! powar base In tha<br />
party, it meant that tha aachinary of govarnaant<br />
would coma to play an lncraaaingly iaportant rola<br />
in thaaa factional atrugglaa* Oaaplta hla dallbarata<br />
attaapt to elevate hlaaalf abova thaaa atrugglaa,<br />
Voratar could not raaain neutral aa tha hP want into<br />
lta aost sarlous lntarnal splits slnca tha 1940s.<br />
Indeed for tha firat thrae yaara of hie'Praaiership<br />
ha waa attacked froa a nuabar of aides as baing a<br />
weak laadar, Siaply to protact hia own position,<br />
he aaa forcad, witnin tha party, to raly on various<br />
factional groups, in tha aarly yaara of his<br />
laadarahip, 1966-9, whan the axtraaa right attaaptad<br />
to drlva tha verllgtaa out of tha ranka of Afrikaner<br />
natlonallaa (but andad up baing drlvan out of tha<br />
party thaaaalvaa) Voratar was forcad to raly vary<br />
haavlly on tha Capa Party for support. But Voratar<br />
dapandad for political support avan aora haavily on<br />
tha Special Branch of tha South African Police. Aa<br />
Hinietar of Juatica, ha had built tha Security Police<br />
into a vary powarful force In South African polltica.<br />
Tha SB waa used against Voratar'a natlonaliat<br />
opponenta as affaetivaly aa ha had uaad it to break<br />
tha national liberation aovaaent in tha aarly 60s.<br />
Thus, ona of tha aoat algnlfleant features of South<br />
African polltica In tha 1960a waa tha aaaalva<br />
build-up in tha diractly political rola of tha<br />
Sacurity Police under Voratar. Eventually in 1969,<br />
p»g« 10<br />
ha craatad a naw, apaclal aacurlty aarvlca, raaponslbla<br />
only to the Priaa Minister, tha notorious BOSS.<br />
Hencaforth 6086 aaa Voratar'a atrongaat and aost<br />
effective paraonal political basa. But this<br />
development aaant that tha apparatuses of tha state<br />
ware now uaad by tha Priaa Hiniatar to intervene<br />
diractly in internal natlonaliat polltica.<br />
There ia a further iaportant dlaanaion here*<br />
Tha varfcraapta/verllgta conflict waa asaantially<br />
a atruggla batwaan thoaa who wlahad to praaarva<br />
tha claaa allianca of 1948 as an alliance doainated<br />
by tha interests of farmer* and tha patty bourgaolala<br />
against those who raaliaad that In 20 years tha social<br />
basa of Afrikaner natlonallaa had shifted profoundly,<br />
and wantad to transfora tha ideology and polltica to<br />
suit tha changing class composition of tha volk. Tha<br />
varllgte phanomenon was a response to tha aaarganca<br />
particularly In tha 1960s of a class of aggraasiva,<br />
self-confident Afrikaner capitalists, whoaa intaraata<br />
now want beyond thoaa of tha narrow claaa allianca<br />
out of which thay had aaargad. By tha lata ttCQe,<br />
the varliyte element *as no longer confined to tha
Cap*, but aae emarglng u * strong element In the<br />
Transvaal *• ••11. And Just •* he* occurred In the<br />
Cap* a dwcsda earlier, its economic dependence on an<br />
• UUnc> of all classes of Wrikaane apeafrere had<br />
now baan bnfcen. Moa tha Transvaal bualnseeaen<br />
ware alio beginlng to puraua indapandant econoalc<br />
end political policiee.<br />
In lta struggles against tha verllgte wing of<br />
tha party, tha vatkiaaplss attempted to uaa thalr<br />
traditional political organisation, tha Afrikaner<br />
Broodertond, aoalnat ahat thay labelled tha 'flnanca<br />
poaar of tha South'. Indeed, a strong aova was mounted<br />
to portray tha factional etrtsjgle u a alapla conflict<br />
between tha Afrike n#r Broedertwnd aa tha guardian and<br />
soul of traditional Afrikaner values on tha ona hand,<br />
•nd tha nouveeu rich* "money capltallata' of tha<br />
8outh on tha othar hand, Hara again tha Indapandant<br />
•<br />
rola of Voratar ems vital. By 1967 It was clear that<br />
ha au not going to aupport tha vaHcraapta effort,<br />
and ha began to ba attacked aa yet anothar lackey of<br />
tha Gape. Given that Vormtar aaa still vary dependant<br />
on tha Cape party at thla etaga, there aaa aoaa truth<br />
in thla charge. However, Voratar aust have reallead<br />
that If tha Afrikaner feoedertkond aera ueed egminet<br />
hia, he would be totally laolatad politically. Thua<br />
aa National Leader of the HP he deaandad total<br />
loyalty from tha AS, and particularly its arch-<br />
vartcrewpta chairman, Dr PJ Meyer. Uoraovar, ha<br />
further aada aura that ^mty large numbers of eecurlty<br />
policemen aera admitted to tha AB, and hia supporter*<br />
ware thua able to outvote the extreme right in all<br />
laportant instances. 30 Tha affect of thla aaa to<br />
destroy finally tha political independence of tha<br />
Broedwrbond, reducing It for the first tlea) In lta<br />
history largely to a platform for tha leader of the hP.<br />
Thie accoapUahadt Voratar then required of tha<br />
veifcraapta Hayar that ha purge froa tha Broederbond<br />
and party ell the othar verkraaptae aho aould not<br />
too the line. He used tha right to destroy the right.<br />
voratar f s deliberately chosen and carefully<br />
cultivated Bonapertist position within tha UP aa<br />
above tha factions, likawiae had vital consequences<br />
for political struggles both within the government<br />
and etate epperatueee. Given hie own ralatlva<br />
eaefcneae aithin the Cabinet, Voratar discarded<br />
Verwoard'a authoritarian style of leadership<br />
through total doainatlon of each attnlster, and<br />
adopted a 'chairman of the board 1 approach. Full<br />
policy-making reeponsiblllty aas again given back<br />
to Ministers aithin their oen departments, and tha<br />
Prlsa Minister ass knoan not to intervene in any<br />
Minister's running of hie dapartnant. Thle had the<br />
conaequence that individual alnlstriea vara again<br />
rapidly transformed into powerful political fiafdoas<br />
by Individual Ministers. Tha factlonaliat atruggle<br />
aithin tha HP aas again openly eoged aithin, but<br />
aora particularly, between various govarnaent<br />
ainlatriae.<br />
Certain alnlatrles rapidly bacsae identified elth<br />
certain 'lines' aithin the party, and interdepartaeiital<br />
tussles aara openly discussed in ths press. Thus, eg,<br />
the powerful rivalry betaean the Department of Foreign<br />
Affaire as a aaat of the varllgtes, and tha Gmpartaent<br />
of Inforaatlon headed by tha varfcrempte Connie<br />
Mulder, aae legendary. Lass publloslly known,<br />
though ultimately equally laportant, aas tha<br />
growing conflict between tha allltary and security<br />
apparatuses. Through the Dapartaant of Defence<br />
(preelded over by tha leader of tha Cape «\ P*<br />
Botha) tha allltary began to ploy an increasingly<br />
open role in South African politics, arguing for<br />
miitarily defensible policies. Tha reforae desired<br />
by the allltary leadership in aeny aays coincided<br />
with thoae being argued for by Sanlaa, and tha military<br />
aae known to ba growing increasingly restive at the<br />
paralyele which hP factlonallea foletad on the<br />
govarnaent. Indeed, in 1966, at tha height of tha<br />
struggls in tha NP; allltary clrclee aara<br />
reputedly buzzing with talk of a nee political party<br />
to be haadad by PW Botha. Tha eecurlty forces on tha<br />
other hand ears reputed to see South Africa's politi<br />
cal probleaa largely in teras of conspiracies by<br />
agitators, and downplayed any need for rafora. Tha.<br />
conflict between the teo reached breaking point over<br />
the South African Intervention in Angola' in t97fl.<br />
According to top Parliamentary sources, ths allltary<br />
opposed the Intervention, arguing that its liksly<br />
results did not coapeneate for tha political damage it<br />
aould do to to the govarnaent*a 'detente* policies,<br />
whilst ths Bureau of State Security aaa convinced that<br />
strong support in Africa could ba gelned for a South<br />
African defeat of the MPLA. PV Botha aas reported to<br />
have bean particularly aablttered by tha decision to<br />
riek a Halted intervention. 31 Aa it happened, BOSS<br />
aae Voratar'a oen political base within the govarnaent<br />
and after the humiliation of Angola, the increasingly<br />
open conflict between the ailitary and B06B often<br />
pitted Voratar agalnat Pf Botha.<br />
lhllet tha eccnoay was booaing, and tha country<br />
enjoyed relative political atabillty, Voratar aaa able<br />
to maintain hie Bonapertist role within the party<br />
and govarnaent with soaa success* Particularly after<br />
tha extreme verkraaptae ware driven out of tha NP in<br />
1969, hie personal political prastigs and influence<br />
were anoraoua. Following the auccesses of the NP<br />
egelnet the right in the 1970 election, he ess able to<br />
abandon his previously heavy political reliance on<br />
the Cape Party and aaauaa in reality tha role he<br />
had cast for hlaself as ths force uniting in his person<br />
all factions aithin the NP. Hoasvsr, with the rapid<br />
escalation of econoalc and political crisis in tha<br />
mld-1970e, thla Bonapartlet role became Increasingly<br />
difficult to auatain. The verligte wing began to<br />
push for far-reaching policy reforms, particularly with<br />
respect to labour and state control of the economy,<br />
•hich vigorously re-opened the factlonaliat atrugglaa<br />
In tha W. Particularly after the Angola debacle,<br />
Venter's own peraonal position became increasingly<br />
identified with the right-wing of tha NP, now lead by<br />
tha new Transvaal leader and Miniater of Information,<br />
Or Connie Mulder. Tha right aara demanding a<br />
emintananoa of tight influx control aaasuraa.<br />
restrictions on the employment of akilled african<br />
labour, no fone of recognition of african trade unions<br />
and continued etate control of the infrastructural<br />
sectors of the economy. Thle right alng position still<br />
rested on an alliance of capitalist farmers, white<br />
workers and eectione of tha Afrikaner petty bourgaolele,<br />
particularly those employed by tha etate.
An Important caveat needs to be wdi him. The<br />
argument that the contradict ions within and between<br />
the class forces organised by the NP qua part/ were<br />
transposed Into the Cabinet and especially Into the<br />
atata apparatuses themselves must not ba misunderstood.<br />
This is not to imply that these were the only, or<br />
•van the major struggles and contradictions within<br />
and between the state apparatus. The state has been<br />
defined ae % site of class struggle. The specifically<br />
Afrikaner nationalist struglles sere but part of,<br />
and indeed structured by end structuring of, alder<br />
class struggles,Thus a comprehensive analysis of<br />
the state would have to account for the Complex<br />
interaction between these various contradictory class<br />
forces and class struggles within the state.<br />
The point of this long analysis of the faction<br />
alism within the National Party and government is to<br />
situete Muldergate within the wider capitalist<br />
crisis. By late 1977, in the disastrous political<br />
aftermath of the defeat in Angola, the Soamto uprisings,<br />
the deeth of Steve Biko end the panicky banning of IB<br />
afrlcen politlcel and other organisations, confronted<br />
with increasingly organised and militant working class<br />
and mass resistance to Apartheid - a resistance now<br />
taking an openly anti-capitalist form - under severe<br />
international pressure from the Vast to introduce<br />
cosmetic changes, and faced with a massive outflow of<br />
foreign capital, huge unemployment and tha worst<br />
recession in South Africa's history, both the<br />
Nationalist government and Party themselves were<br />
decisively split over precisely the political<br />
questions posed by these multiple crises.<br />
The minutiae of these conflicts within both party<br />
and government could be elaborated if necessary. Hoe-<br />
aver, the point to note is thet in this period of<br />
intense crisis, the party end government were both<br />
effectively paralysed by their oen internal divisions.<br />
It must be emphasised as forcefully_a_s_is possible,<br />
that this mas no simple personality struggle, or<br />
purely ideological difference, but much_mjore profoundly<br />
a crisis of the class alliance on which Afrikaner<br />
nationalism had rested nationally and in tha various<br />
provinces since 19d8.<br />
To oversimplify for the sake of exposition, the<br />
'conservative 1 faction now grouped undar Uulder, and<br />
enjoying the strong tacit support of Vorster, were<br />
committed to retaining the alliance of farmers,<br />
businessmen, workers and petty bourgeoisie intact.<br />
To do so meant resisting moves to reform labour end<br />
industrial policy, end anything more than minimal<br />
concession* to the black middle class. Out it was<br />
equally clear that vmry few Afrikaner businessmen<br />
supported this policy with any enthusiasm. Rather,<br />
from within the Afrikaner business community, and<br />
amongst tha leading Afrikaner intellectuals there was<br />
now strong support for tha 'reformists* nf the party.<br />
This reflected the substantial development of<br />
Afrikaner business particularly in the Transvaal<br />
during the 1960s.^<br />
Thus, Sanlom and the Cape Party were no longer<br />
Isolated (as they hod been in the early 1960s) from<br />
powerful forces in the other provincial parties.<br />
The Transvaal party was now itself decisively<br />
divided along fairly explicit class lines between<br />
conservatives and reformists. The Transvaal leader,<br />
Or Connie Mulder, was the great hope of the conservative<br />
sing. But within the Transvmel Party there nom existed<br />
a powerful reformist opposition, grouped under two<br />
very influential Ministers * the Minister of nines<br />
and Planning, 0r p Koornhof, and tha Minister of<br />
Foreign Affairs, nr Botha. To Transvaal businessman<br />
Mulder was an anathema. One leading Afrikaner<br />
industrialist described him to me as e dpef - 'a fort*.<br />
By 1977 -a virtual politlcel impasse had been<br />
reached in party, cabinet end atata. Mot only was<br />
Vorster's Qonepertlem increasingly untenable within<br />
the party, but inside the Cabinet his practice of<br />
giving individual Hinletare their head made it ^mry<br />
difficult for him to recentrelise control in his own<br />
hands* He was thus unable to intervene decisively to<br />
give a particularly conservative or reformist<br />
direction to this government, but was reduced to the<br />
increasingly sterile role of trying simply to keep all<br />
factions together.<br />
After Angola end pmrticulerly Soweto, virtually<br />
all commentators were agreed thet on all the burning<br />
Issues of economic end political policy, behind the<br />
overt fece of hardline control, the government was<br />
virtually rudderless. Torn in many different B<br />
directions^ it spoke with many different voices. The<br />
political paralysis of the Vorster government when<br />
faced with severe end worsening economic and political<br />
crises, finally catalysed significant shifts in the<br />
alignment of political forces in the state. Tea<br />
groups are crucial hare - the military and the moat<br />
powerful of South Africa's capitalists. An alliance<br />
between these two forces rapidly took shape.<br />
whatever the fears of Afrikaner Intellectuals of<br />
a coup d'etat, senior military officers began to<br />
Intervene directly in these politlcel struggles over<br />
state polity, advocating significant reforms. In 19OT,<br />
through the Minister of Defence, Pi Botha, the military<br />
proclaimed ita programme of a 'total strategy' to meet<br />
the crises confronting the stete. Its fundamental aim<br />
according to the official military Journal, was 'a<br />
guarantee for the system) of trwm enterprise 1 .<br />
This could only be achieved on tha besls of a "coapre-<br />
hensive plan to utilise ell the means svailable to e<br />
state according to en integrated pattern*. Total<br />
strategy hald that 'the resolution bf a conflict In .<br />
the times in ehich we now live demands Interdependent<br />
and coordinated action in ell fields - military,<br />
psychological, economic, ideological, cultural etc<br />
... Ve are today involved in a war .*. the striving<br />
for specific elms ... must be coordinated aith all<br />
the means available to the state**<br />
bjut this 'coordinated action* should not be<br />
understood as simple defence of a static status quo.<br />
- political and economic reforms ware essential to<br />
ensure the defence of the state. In tha worde of the<br />
CJilef of Staffr<br />
The lesson is clear. The South African<br />
Defence force is reedy to beat off any attack<br />
•.. but ee muet take into account the aspirations<br />
of our different population groups, ee must «<br />
gain and keep their trust.<br />
In effect then, the Total Strategy Doctrine argued that<br />
'blacks* had to be given e stake in the capitalist<br />
system, whareby they would begin receiving the<br />
'beneflte' of that system, their 'quality of Ufe<<br />
would have to be Improved, thus supposedly giving
I * blacks' • commitment to tha defence of capitallaa In<br />
South Africa against *tha eterxiet throat'- But this<br />
aaa only possible through tha cloaaat cooparation<br />
bataaan tha atata and 'tha prlvata aactor' - la<br />
monopoly capital. Thua tha Total Strategy Oootrina<br />
> began to create tha basis for an a*plici* alliance<br />
bataaan tha military and monopoly capital. In lata<br />
1977 tha national aanapaaant and<br />
\ Oayalopaant Foundation convanad a aaating of kay<br />
•business leaders', aanlor military officers, and<br />
Papartaant of Labour offlclala, to 'enable aach group<br />
to understand tha othara' naada*. Chaired Jointly<br />
by tha Chairman of a leading bank and a senior<br />
! Oanaralr tha aaating aaa hald In caaara, undar tha<br />
cloak of tha Official Secrete Act. 36<br />
[ At praclalay thla stage of now direct allltary<br />
• intervention in political struggles althln tha atata,<br />
laadlng buainaaaaan alao bicaai dlractly and stridently<br />
lnvolvad In a Caapalgn for reform. Tha chairman of<br />
! Senlam published a awlngaing attack on tha government'a<br />
economic policies, characterising thea aa 'A Fraaaay<br />
to DPaaMdaa) , ><br />
Tha influential Financial tail<br />
arguad that In tha face of govarnaent paralyaia,<br />
organlaad and co-ordinated *Bualnaaa Powar' aaa<br />
j aaaantial to aava 'South Africa* (la capitallaa)<br />
\ froa tha nuaaroua crlaaa confronting it, Uoraover,<br />
: in thla parlod ahan behind tha patant immobility of<br />
tha government important ahlfta ware taking place In<br />
j tha traditional political allgrwwanta of tha capitalist<br />
class, tha bourgaola oppoaltlon partiaa aara under<br />
going a process of dramatic ra-allgnaant. After yaars<br />
of political atarlUty. tha official oppoaltlon<br />
United Party finally oollapaad into a merger with<br />
tha adniacula Daaocratic Party to fora tha Haw<br />
Republic Party. Large matera of United Party aPa<br />
rafuaad to Join thla NAP and eventually allied<br />
thawaalvaa with tha Progressiva Rafara Party which<br />
had already takan on board aailaa froa tha Unitad<br />
Party. Tha PAP changed its naaai yat again to tha<br />
Progressive Federal Party, and aigniflcantly aatarad<br />
tfoan lta libaral progra—a to aaita it aara acoaptabla<br />
to a eide range of bourgeois interests.<br />
Zn October 1977, Voreter callad an early<br />
General El so t ion out of ahloh tha W> eaargad alth an<br />
avan teors aassive Parti aaantary majority and a<br />
aubatantlally aldanad baaa of political aupport.<br />
Campaigning aa tha only party capable of dealing with<br />
tha multiple crises facing South Africa, tha aP for<br />
tha firat time aon support froa tao furthar aodal<br />
forces - larga nuabara of EngUah-apaaking patty<br />
bourgaola ehitaa, and significant sectors of business<br />
which had pravloualy aupportad tha now defunct<br />
Unitad Party. Ironically hoaavar, far froa> producing<br />
bold political Initiatives, thla freer, electoral<br />
aupport simply intanaifiad tha political inartla of<br />
both Nationalist Party and Government by multiplying<br />
tha centrifugal forcaa pulling it In different<br />
dlractlona. Tha contradictiona and conflicts within<br />
tha party and govsmment vara coapoundad , and bacaaa<br />
a alta of avar aora intanaifiad political struggles,<br />
Inartla combined with lncraaaingly vicious and cynical<br />
repression aaaaad tha only oantrlpatal forcaa In tha<br />
NP. 36<br />
Tha victory and consolidation of tha reformist tendency<br />
THE auldergate circus burat into tha open in thla<br />
context of paralyaia of both party and povamaant - a<br />
context which produced a staggering prollfaratlon of<br />
extra-party, cross-cutting organisations and agitation,<br />
largaly by business interests, Huldargata began aa a<br />
aariaa of proas rwvwlwtlons about tha misuse of funds<br />
in Mulder's Department of Information. Juicy detail<br />
followad Juicy details to ravaal a vast aall-financad<br />
and aacrat attaapt by tha Information Department to<br />
aatabllah both inaida tha country and internationally<br />
an apparently independent ccwamjnl cat ions network which<br />
would publlah 'objective' pro-govarnaant material,<br />
Parllaaant had no control ovar, or powar to revise tha<br />
uaa of thaaa funds. One of tha major projacta<br />
lnvolvad tha aacrat channallng of R7**dllion In<br />
atata funda to aatabllah an 'independent', pro-NP<br />
Engllah-languapa nawapapar - Tha Cltlian -* in<br />
oppoaltlon to tha libaral Band Dally wall,<br />
Tha revelations unleashed a massive outcry within<br />
ahita politics. Epithets about tha destruction of<br />
daaocracy and tha fraadoa of tha press, alnlatarlal<br />
corruption ate, abounded, Tha datalla are not<br />
significant here, but tha import of thla scandal la.<br />
At ona level , tha intense moral outrage ovar auldargata*<br />
avan in tha pro-NP Afrikaans newspapers, aaaaa<br />
absurd. Full bourgeois daaocracy has never axlatad<br />
in South Africa, so it could hardly have bswn said to<br />
hava baan daatroyad. Tha last vaatlpaa of tha Fraadoa<br />
of tha Press had baan aboil ahed In tha aarly 1960s,<br />
far woraa examples of collective and individual<br />
alnlatarlal corruption had occurred (such aa tha<br />
Agiiutti affair in tha lata 60a) with virtually no<br />
political consequences. Abuaaa uf poear by tha ruling<br />
party had occurred on a auch aora massive scale, to<br />
be easily dismissed - and defended by aoaa of tha<br />
nawspapara now howling 'corruption' - aa balng<br />
•in tha national lntaraat*. Indaad Mulder had<br />
dafandad tha operations of hia Oapartaant in thaaa<br />
pravloualy halloaad taraa. So why did thla particular<br />
brouhaha aasuai auch aonuaantal proportions?<br />
Tha anawar auat ba aought in tha aany-lavallad<br />
character of tha crisis confronting tha South African<br />
atata and ruling class, crlaaa In tha face of which<br />
tha govarnaant. appeared politically paralyaad.<br />
Thla paralyaia did not grow out of any lack of<br />
political all! on tha part of individual politicians,<br />
but ataaaad froa tha balanca of claaa forcaa within<br />
tha NPt tha natlonallat government and tha atata<br />
apparatuses. Thus, ahan tha report of tha Auditor*<br />
General ravaalad tha first lrragulariUaa in tha<br />
accounta in tha Oapartaant of Information, tha<br />
pro-reform forcaa aara presented with an ideal<br />
opportunity to attaapt tha political dlacradltatlon<br />
of tha aajor politician of tha right, tha Unlatar of<br />
Inforaation Or Connla Mulder. Tha Uuldajgata<br />
incident la significant not for tha degree of<br />
political corruption involved, but in tha way in<br />
which it aaa used aa a oatalyat to effect a raallgnaant<br />
of political forcaa.<br />
Most significant rsrs la the wanner In ahlch tha .<br />
leaks about Oapartaant Of Information practices<br />
aara aada, and tha aay In which thaaa leaks aara than<br />
turned into the raw material of a political vendetta<br />
against tha right wing of tha NP, Huldar in particular,
end Vorster by implication. Although it is impossible<br />
to be sura on this, it la widely taken aa established<br />
fact by Afrikaner intellectuals with close links to<br />
the Cabinet that the first leaks to the press eera<br />
provided by unitary Intelligence. The Minister of<br />
Defence and Cape NP leader, PV Botha, eould probably<br />
not neve been personally Involved in these leeks,<br />
but eaa known to be angry with the loss of RW a<br />
of the approved Defence Budget, now transferred to<br />
the Information Department secret fund. Once the<br />
initial leaks had been made, they were relentlessly<br />
pursued by the Englletwlanguage newspapers of the<br />
Argus and South African Associated Newspapers<br />
groups. Owned ' Jointly by the Anglo-American<br />
Corporation and the largest banks, these press groups<br />
mere clearly hounding Mulder as but part of the wider<br />
campaign to effect vital reforms necessary for the<br />
restoration of capitalist growth* But even more<br />
significantly, after some hesitation, the enti-<br />
Hulder compaign was taken up in the Afrikaans press,<br />
and particularly in the newspapers of the official<br />
Cape hP press group, Ojg Nanionale Pers. In the<br />
Transvaal too, Nationalist newspapers began to<br />
pursue the matter, though the official Transvaal<br />
NP organ, Ola Transvaler. did everything possible to<br />
protect Mulder and claimed he was not involved in the<br />
ebuses * bleming it all on the Secretary of<br />
Inforaetlon. Or Eachel Rhoodie. This involvement of<br />
the officlel Nationalist party press in a campaign<br />
agelnst a government Minister (and by implication<br />
against Vorster himself) was unprecedented. It<br />
Indicated Just how deep were the divisions within<br />
party end government, end the lengths to which the<br />
reformers were prepared to go to discredit the right.<br />
Further evidence of this lias in the belief of the<br />
ebove-amntioned Afrikaner intellectual aources that<br />
once the affair began to unravel cruclel dlscloaures<br />
to the press were made by the wives of (unspecified)<br />
Ceblnet ministers. The 'English press* had long been<br />
depicted es the greatest enemy of Afrikaner nationalism.<br />
Horn it became the crucial medium in which a decisive<br />
confrontation between factions in the hP was fought<br />
put!<br />
Just as the effalr seemed to be building up to a<br />
crescendo, Vorster dramatically announced his<br />
resignation on 'health' grounda. He wes followed<br />
soon afterwards by the head of BOBS, General Hendrlk<br />
van den Bergh. In retrospect, Vorster's resignation<br />
and that of Van den Bergh seem to have bean prompted<br />
by two interrelated factors. Firstly, mm was later<br />
revealed, both were deeply involved in the schemes<br />
elaborated by the Department of Information. Ware<br />
this to coma out whilat Vorster was still Prime<br />
Minister, the political demoge would have been<br />
lmmenaa. Vorster aust have realised ^iet In such a<br />
case he could not rely on support from the mhole NP.<br />
If he were elevated to the State Presidency however,<br />
even his opponents in the NP would be forced to<br />
protect his peraonel position. But secondly,<br />
again it seem* clear that Vorster was attempting to<br />
pre-empt the complete reformist diacredltetion of<br />
the right wing of the party with which he eaa now<br />
Identified* If he rmslgnad early, before the full<br />
detaila of the scandal broke, there was a strong<br />
chance thet Mulder mould be eble to succeed hie, thus<br />
forcing the reformists Into en ettaok on the party<br />
through the position of ite leader, rather than on an<br />
Individual minister. Vorater's preference for<br />
Huider was open* In the run up to the leadership<br />
election, BOBS leaked (distorted) Information<br />
favourable to lajlder to the press - but it was<br />
published only in the Tranavaal W organ. Die<br />
Transvaler.<br />
Vorster**, ploy very nearly succeeded. Hed<br />
Huider been able to maintain discipline in his<br />
Transvaal NP ha eould 1 have been assured of the<br />
Premiership by virtue of the Transvaal majority in<br />
the caucus. Out by 1976, so deep were tha class<br />
conflicts within the NP, particularly within the<br />
Transvaal, that Mulder wee unable to control the<br />
party he led. Defying all party precedent, protocol<br />
and discipline, another Tranavaal Minister, AF (Pik)<br />
Bothet put himself forward as a candidate for tha<br />
National Leadership of the Party* This split tha<br />
Trenevaal vote* ensuring (es eas later admitted to<br />
have been the aim} the defeet of Mulder mod the<br />
election to the Notional Leadership of the Cape<br />
page 14<br />
leader end Minister of Defence, P» Botha (no relation).<br />
This drawing off of tha Transvaal reformist vote<br />
from Mulder was shown to have been decisive when,<br />
in tha election for e new Tranavaal leader<br />
consequent on Mulder's enforced resignation from that<br />
post soon afterwards t tha conservative candidate,<br />
Or Andrlea Treurnlcht, trounced tha reformist<br />
Minister, SP Botha (again no relation).<br />
Thus the long campaign of press revelations and<br />
judicial enquiry fatally weakened tha conservative<br />
wing at a crucial moment of the struggle for dominance<br />
both within tha NP and the government. The defeat of<br />
Mulder marked a significant shift in the balance of<br />
claaa forces orgenlsed by the NP gua party under the<br />
banner of Afrikaner nationalism. By now Afrikaner<br />
business hed effectively established itaalf as tha<br />
dominant force In the allience. Through Bothe It<br />
announced ite Intention to abandon some of the<br />
hallowed policies of thle alliance, policies<br />
which before brought support from white workers<br />
and certain strata of the petty bourgmolaie.<br />
But it cannot be too strongly emphasised that this<br />
eas no simple struggle Internal to Afrikaner<br />
nationalism. Afrikaner capital erne eble to<br />
establlah its political dominance within the NP<br />
over the other forces in the nationaliat alliance<br />
only because of broader political support outside<br />
of the- NP from other bourgeois organisations and<br />
institutions, and the ermy itself. On its oen,<br />
the reformist wing of the NP would not neve been<br />
able to defeet tha conservatives and achieve the<br />
almost total diacreditatlon of tha right eing. To<br />
do so, it eaa forced to rely on, and indeed play a<br />
relatively minor role in, e breeder campaign by<br />
various bourgeois political groups (but partlculerly<br />
the prase) egeinst ths right wing of the Nationalist<br />
Party. Thue, tha defeat of Mulder not only marked<br />
a decisive shift in the belence of forcea within the<br />
Nationalist Party end government, et enother level of<br />
politics it represented e now open allience against<br />
elements of the NP on the pert of elmoat all<br />
crgsnlsetlone of the capitalist class.
mo* 1ft<br />
But to rutin tor a moment with the discredited<br />
and defeated forces of the NP right. The tern HP-<br />
right does not refer to e monolithic group all with<br />
the M M interests. It too represented a political<br />
alliance between specific class force*. Over-<br />
scheamtically thaaa can be Idantlflad aa cartaln<br />
capitalist fansere (particularly thoa* who had not<br />
made tha tranaitlon to tha highly machaniaad, capiUl<br />
inteneive form of production which bscMS increasingly<br />
conion in South African capitalist agriculture in<br />
tha 1960a) t tha lower atrata of whit* workers<br />
(particularly in mining, transport, ataal and various<br />
atata lnduatriaa), and apacific aactlona of tha<br />
Afrikaans apeaklng patty bourgeoisie. Again to put<br />
it in crudaly reductionist tana, for Men of thaaa<br />
claaa forces, tha Apartheid policlaa of tha atata had<br />
producad definite aconoaic and social advantages, '<br />
and raaminad nacaaaary to preserve and dafand their<br />
existing position in society. Farmers naadad a<br />
rigid eyatae of influx control, paaa laws ate to<br />
keep african labour on the feme, white workers<br />
bitterly oppoaad schemes to ratraln african worker*<br />
for cwpitei-lntwnaive lnduatriaa. corractly<br />
seeing in thla a capitalist ploy to aacura chaapar<br />
tachnlcal labour. Similarly both groups vara<br />
bittarly oppoaad to any recognition of african<br />
trada unlona. And for tha lovar lavala of tha<br />
Afrikaner petty bourgeoisie, particularly thoaa<br />
aaployad in tha atata bureaucracy, any talk of reform,<br />
and aapaclally tha now-familiar thaaa of concessions<br />
to tha 'block nlddla claaa' M«*ed to hold out tha<br />
proapact of aavara aconoaic and aocial competition<br />
and thraatan their carafully carvad out and haavlly<br />
protactad nicha of aconcaiic and aocial privilege.<br />
Thua thaaa group* aara unitad In thair iaplacabla<br />
opposition to tha rafora propoaala being truapatad<br />
by Sanlaa and othar Urge Afrlkanar undertaking*.<br />
Yet, thair interests vara not identical, and thair<br />
conceptions of necessary atata policy cannot ba<br />
seen aa identical- Thla ia iaportant to baar in mine<br />
whan usaaalno tha poaalbla political futura of tha<br />
Afrlkanar nationalist right.<br />
In tha factional is: struggle althin tha nP, this<br />
coalition of forcaa on tha * right• had alaaiya<br />
selected as ita ohoden terrain of etruggle, and aa<br />
tha best mean* to dafand it* intareata, ita claim<br />
to constitute tha authantlc voice of tha 'Afrikaner<br />
volk', and tha embodiment or tha intaraata of thla<br />
volk. Wth tha significant exception of tha -oat<br />
reactionary of tha ahlta trada unlona, within tha<br />
HP tha right had deliberately limited tha range of<br />
ita political atruoglw to purely "Afrikaner'<br />
organiaationa. Aftar Muldergete, with Afrlkanar<br />
bualnaaa alllad alth othar capitalist forcaa against<br />
tha right wing in tha NP, tha right wing bloc no*<br />
found thla old atratagy to ba a political trap. It<br />
aaa confined to tha narroa terrain of Afrikaner<br />
politics, and had really lost control of aoet of tha<br />
significant Afrlkanar organiaationa outalda of tha<br />
Party. Thue, the only wmy it could continue with<br />
tha fectlonallet etruggle under tha mantle of genuine<br />
Afrikaner nationalise, aaa to begin to attack the NP<br />
itself. Within the party it had bean daciaively<br />
defeated and could no* only conduct a holding operation<br />
against rafora. A* will ba aeon below, thia holding<br />
operation or brake, still rwaaina an iaportant aspect<br />
of South African politics however.<br />
One last point naeda to be aada with regard to<br />
the defeat of the right wing within the NP. The<br />
different claaa forcaa comprising the right wing<br />
alliance began eloely to fragment, aost aignificantly,<br />
the extreme right wing unlone began to act politically<br />
independently of the NP in an attaapt to force Botha<br />
back Into tha traditional alliance. The Nine Workers'<br />
Union la the most iaportant of th*M. In 1979 it<br />
forced e direct confrontation with the reformists in<br />
party and govamwajnt by coming out on atrika againet<br />
(a government approved) rwcrganisation of Job claeel-<br />
fioatlona on the mines - a reorganisation which would<br />
permit employer* to utilise african labour in skilled<br />
Jabs previously restricted to ahlta workers. In e<br />
siwiler dispute in tha aicK 1960s, the government had<br />
immediately backed down anq supported the white miner*.<br />
Now thla atrika was daciaively dofMted and strikers<br />
dleelaead with the ectlve approval of tha nationalist<br />
Party governMnt.<br />
The Botha Raolaa and tha Form Pf the South African fltate<br />
ANY asaeswaent of the iaplicetlona of tha alactlon of<br />
PI Botha as PriM Minister for the crises confronting<br />
the South African state auat begin by rebutting<br />
teat of tha widespread myths about hie position<br />
within the NP. Immediately after succeeding Vorster<br />
Bothe was almost univeraally depicted in the press<br />
as a 'hawk* and a nationalist hardliner. Aa tha<br />
longtime Minister of Defence, Bothe is clearly<br />
prepared for the most vigorous action to dafand tha<br />
existing atata against tha liberation movement. If<br />
necasaary ha would be quick to approve foreign<br />
military Intervention. Thus, aa the politician who<br />
for well over e decade hod been responsible for the<br />
South African Military apparatue, and who dearly<br />
got on vary Mil with the military high co-wand (Botha's<br />
political nickname in NP circles la 'Plat mmpen 1 -<br />
Pete emapons), end thua can be relied upon to reflect<br />
the military's thinking to some extent, Botha My be<br />
called a allltarlat. But thia tern misrepresent*<br />
both the military's current role in South African<br />
politics, and Botha's own long-held political poaltion<br />
elthln the faitionaliat spectrum. Aa argued above,<br />
for wound military reasons, tha military high cue*and<br />
ia one of the Mat iaportant pro-reform forces in tha<br />
South African atata. Thia neatly coincides with<br />
Bothe'* own personal position. Perhapa aore than any<br />
othar politician in the W>, Bothe concentrates in hie<br />
own political person, the dominant tendency of the<br />
Cape party. He is e political creature of the Cape<br />
party adenine. In the lata 1930s Bothe eaa the first<br />
full-tiM political organiser hired by the Cape NP.<br />
Hia rise to political prominence has occurred through<br />
the organisation of the party - en organisation which<br />
he helped mould, and which he know* better than<br />
anyone else. Thia means that for hia entire political<br />
life, Bothe hea been very cloae to the forces which<br />
dominate the Cape party, ia tha financial interests,<br />
particularly around Benleei, which founded the Cape<br />
NP end elaaya dominated it. There la no othar way<br />
to political prominence in the Cepe. Thua, Botha<br />
concentratee in his own politicel pareon tha intereats
of thit Cape party organisation and the political<br />
outlook of Cape finance, as soil as those of the<br />
military high cownd. Since 1960 at least, within<br />
the context of Nationalist Politics, thet has produced<br />
a strongly reformist orientation. Botha's twin<br />
political roles ee Minister* of Defence end leader<br />
of the Cape party, thus both coepelled hie Into a<br />
reformist political position - which hes elways been<br />
hidden to those who mistake the bluster of political<br />
exchange for its content. The 'total strategy' is<br />
the enbodieent of this reformism, and likewise<br />
concentrates the intereste of Sanlam end the military<br />
in the defence of 'free enterprise 1 .<br />
Thus, es already noteci, Botha's election marks<br />
a clear victory in the W* tnd the government for large<br />
capitalist interests in the Hstlonellst ellience, and<br />
in particular, Sanlam. Thi» has been politically<br />
acknowledged by the Chaliwwjn of Sanlee, who in a<br />
remarkably frenk interview with the infumntiel<br />
Financial wall, adeitted that in the lest years of<br />
Vorster's leadership he had despaired of any movement<br />
out of the governeent; thet his seneetlonel published<br />
etteck of the economic policies of vorster's govern<br />
ment (entitled The Assault on Private Enterprise) was<br />
Intended to stir things up end produce e sheke-up<br />
within the party; and thet he could not be more<br />
delighted with the direction taken by Bothe es it<br />
corresponded exactly with whet he hed long been arguing<br />
for-<br />
mhile in certeln importent respects - particu<br />
larly bentustan policy and state security - the Bothe<br />
regime appears, thus far at least, to be the direct<br />
inheritor end guardians of the policies of the previous<br />
regime, in at leest five areas of economic end political<br />
policy, Botha hes gone e long may towards lmpleeentlng<br />
the changes long fought for by the NP reformists, and<br />
Senlem In particular. Firstly, all restrictions on<br />
Investment by white cepitellsts in the efricen town<br />
ships in the urben erees hwve now been lifted.<br />
Sanlee has embarked on e major campaign to establish<br />
a chain of •Hypermarkets' In areas like Soweto,<br />
in so-called 'Joint participation* ventures with efricen<br />
buslneseean. Secondly, efwj auch more importantly,<br />
erislng out of the Rlekert and Viehehn reports on<br />
Manpower Utilisation and Labour Legislation respect<br />
ively, legislative restrictions on the mobility,<br />
utilisation and training of african labour have been<br />
substantially eased, while this in no say undermines<br />
the basic props of Apartheid as a system of labour<br />
41<br />
legislation. it does go e long way to meeting the<br />
dmeands of big business for a flexible labour policy<br />
which will facilitate the reorganisation of production<br />
along more capital Intensive lines. Thirdly, end<br />
complementary to this, the governeant has ennounced<br />
measures for the recognition of efricen trade unions<br />
in e eay which brings them under much tighter state<br />
42<br />
control than was previously the case. This hes gone<br />
hand in hand, fourthly) with e government committment<br />
in rhetoric et leeet to eeae the minor pinpricks<br />
on the african 'aiddle class*, forming the beginnings<br />
of e recognition of the need for a political strategy<br />
which differentletes between and divides this middle<br />
class from black workers, and further distinguishes<br />
between the 'rights' of urban african workers and<br />
those forced to live in th* rural slums of the<br />
43<br />
bantustans. And fifthly, the Bothe regime is<br />
pledged to a gradual reduction in the state control<br />
of key productive sectors of the economy, opening them<br />
up for private Investment.<br />
Simultaneously, the regime hea taken a number of<br />
steps Intended on the one hand to ensure its continued<br />
support outside of perty and government, end on the<br />
other hand to set up *etate lnetltutional end<br />
organisational structures which will serve to<br />
consolidate the reforejlet position against the right<br />
wing of the W.<br />
Firstly* Botha has gone out of his eay to project<br />
his government as the governeant of e broad ellience<br />
of ell sections of capital, and in this eay to diminish<br />
still further the traditional English-Afrikaner<br />
political division amongst buslneeammn - divisions<br />
which long ego lost any economic meaning. This mas<br />
beet symbolised in the convening in November 1979 of<br />
e much-publicised meeting of the Cabinet end 230<br />
leading South African businessmen - the ruling^cless<br />
lncarnete It might be said. The purpose of this<br />
1 ' muu ' ' J '••• ' ""<br />
peg* 16<br />
meeting was to work out eay* of Implementing the 'total<br />
strategy' egalnst the 'Marxist threat' to private<br />
enterprise and 'civilised stenderds' In South Africa.<br />
Though the proceedings remain secret, the meeting did<br />
produce a number of vitally importent permanent<br />
standing committees composed of members of government<br />
and businessman, with the avowed function of overseeing<br />
and co-ordinating the re-orgenlsatlon of the<br />
odminls tret ion of the state, 44<br />
Secondly, within the NF>t Botha has noe decreed<br />
in his cepecity as National Leeder of the Party that<br />
in future, the annual provincial HP congresses will<br />
no longer neve the power to question government policy,<br />
but may only discuss matter* of 'principle 1 . By<br />
so redefining the relationship between perty and<br />
government, Botha is clearly seeking to limit ttie<br />
ability of the NP right to organise egalnst his<br />
policies within the party, end to force them to fight<br />
rather with the government, where they cen be euch<br />
more easily contelned- This tactic very nearly<br />
forced en open split In the party in early I960 on*<br />
the issue of efrlcan participation in a traditionally<br />
'white' sporting event - the so-called 'Craven week*.<br />
Thirdly. Bothe's polltlcel ettack on the right<br />
has not been confined to the level of the party only,<br />
but the implementation of the *totel etretegy* has<br />
produced vitally important chenQes within the. government<br />
and state es well. As Prima minister he has acted<br />
decisively In en attempt to forestall the struggle In<br />
the government and state apparatuses developing into<br />
an effective ettack on reformist policies. In effect<br />
he has attempted to drive NP factionalism out of these<br />
Institutions, or to contain it so as to render minimal<br />
the political demags to his programme. A number of<br />
steps are significant here. The major portfolios in<br />
the Ceblnet have been largely reserved for hie own<br />
supporters. Bothe has clearly abandoned eny idee<br />
of balancing the NP factions within the Ceblnet a la<br />
Voreter. Thua, although Treumlcht la the elected<br />
leader of by far the largest individual provincial NP,<br />
end In terms of party protocol ranks but second after<br />
the National Leeder, Botha et first kept Ma out of<br />
the Cebinet (by refusing to promote him to full
ministerial rank), and when finally forced to take<br />
Tnumicht Into hit Cabinet, eisigned him the<br />
inaultingiy minor portfolio of Public fcrtto. and<br />
Tourism. Tho recent CoUnot rwahufflw SWAT TrwurnichVs<br />
further demotion to Minister of statistics. Moreover<br />
in m further move to undermine tho Trmnwveel Liidir's<br />
•<br />
position in hia own provincial Pwrty, Botha has* given<br />
an important Cabinet post to tho son who defeated<br />
Trwurnicht and replaced Mm oa Chairman of the<br />
Afrikaner Broadtrtjond - Or. G. Vlljosn, tha praaant<br />
•Administrator' of Namibia. VI1 Joan la aloo a<br />
Trmnsualar and Ma known pro-reform sympathies will<br />
oct as a strong counterbalance to Traurnlcht in<br />
both Trmneveml party and government, Likewioa, 1A<br />
tha recent Cabinet ramhufflw o n^mwjwr of TrwurnichVs<br />
supporters ewrm kicked upeteirw Into tha newly formed,<br />
and puroly wdvlwory 'PTwaldents*'Council', This nova<br />
provoked an angry reaponea by former Minister 8. nMisn-<br />
hataar at tha moat racont Trmneveml bp congrmsa ahan<br />
ho warned that 'The Tronavaal* would oust *Tha Crnea'<br />
aa tha dominant forca in tha hP.<br />
But far aora than this Juggling of individual<br />
politicians of tho riptit, has baan tha structural<br />
changaa introduced Into tho stato apparatus. Utdar<br />
Botha tha Coblnat and 8Uta buraaucrooy hava baan<br />
aaaapingly ra orpaniaad so as to concantrata poaar<br />
In tha hands of tha Prime atlnietwr. In affsct, tha<br />
Cabinat hao boon virtually aboliahad aa a responsible,<br />
dKielon-eeeting politic*! institution. It now Sftldaa<br />
•mats as a body, and loads but a largely fonssl<br />
mxlatencm. much of Its former functions hava boan<br />
taken over by a eyatern of six, broad 'Cabinet<br />
CowwAttmea'. 45 Each of theme is needed by tha Prim<br />
Minister or his nominee, and their activities era co-<br />
ordinatad by tha secretariat of tha Prim*) Minister's<br />
Oapartaant. Horn affectively tha executive bodlae of<br />
gouwrrassnt, tha Cabinat committees ore Goaprlsad<br />
of those Uinlstars shoaa individual portfolios In any<br />
say bear on the'concarne of the Committee, together<br />
•lth an unspecified and flexible number of appointees<br />
of tha PrlM Minister - eho do not hava to be drean<br />
froa Parliament.<br />
This step is highly significant for a nueber of<br />
reason*. Firstly, it hao transformed tha rslationahip<br />
eataeen tha Legislature and EffOOutlvo aithln tha State.<br />
Thaaa Cabinet Commltteaa »n* raaponolble neither<br />
to Parliament nor avan tha r^lisamntary caucus of tha<br />
HP. Aether they aro eneaarmbU only to, ond appointed<br />
solely by, tha Prime Minister, Thus tha antlro<br />
principle of Cabinet raaporetlbUity hem bmsn lifted<br />
into tho Of flea of tha Head Of Government, dramatically<br />
lncraaaing hie poaar. Secondly, tha long established<br />
role of the NP cabinet as an Important arena of<br />
struggle betseen the ropraatfntatlvaa of the various<br />
faction* in tha »> has baan virtually twnsinatmd.<br />
Since it haa effectively bawn aboliehad as a single<br />
body, tha Cabinat can no lofsjsr provide a boss of<br />
political struggle agsinat the dominant tendency in<br />
tha government. Ajein, this represents an enormous<br />
concentration of poear in tne hands of the Head of<br />
Govemeent via A via bis Oan party, and a decisive<br />
•esJcsnlng of many of tho traditionally iaportent<br />
institutional baaoa of political atrugglo.<br />
Tha aatoblishaant of ths Cebinwt Comaitteee<br />
thirdly marks tha introduction of e new constellation<br />
of closs forces into a dlrwct role in the government*<br />
under the former system of cabinet g^vartveant, tha<br />
E»mcutlvm mas draan wxcluaivwly free Nationalist<br />
Party Maabars of both Houama of Parliament* undwr<br />
thie system, tha balance of cUss forces within ths<br />
HP was to soma extant reflected in tha oompoaition<br />
of tha cabinet. Tha internal politics of'tha party<br />
obliged tha Prima Minister to psy duo regard to ths<br />
relativa strongths of the various factions in tha<br />
Party when drawing up tha Cabinet. Sut tha nam<br />
Cabinat Committee aystom hat effectively trwnefoxwwjd<br />
tha relationship bwtwwwn party and government. Nov<br />
membership of tho executive (tha Cabinet Committees)<br />
la raatrictad nalthar to members of the NP nor member•<br />
of Parliament. Through thews commlttaee Botha has<br />
introduced directly into key roles in government a<br />
number of prominent (non-Natlonaliet) buelnasspen<br />
end senior military officwrs. Thua, if Botha's<br />
election confirmed a shift in tha balance of class<br />
forces within the NP, thie bourgaoie domination<br />
of tha party haa been consolidated in government by<br />
directly dreeing into the povetnewjnt wider elements<br />
of the bourgeois clamS. Likewise, In this climate<br />
of -total war* mo Botha has tmrmad it( ths<br />
reorganisation of tha flovwrnmmnt and atmtm apparatuses<br />
ham for tha first time given tha military a vitally<br />
important institutionalised role with the executive.<br />
Over mnd mbovw the central role playwd by tha<br />
military within the ayatam of OSbinat committees.<br />
senior officer* new osoupy key positiona in tha<br />
revamped State Security Council. This Council hao<br />
samipad as perhaps thm moat influmnUal deciaioo-<br />
tafclng political institution In the country and is<br />
tha main forum for formulating mnd planning thW<br />
implementation of the much-trumpeted total Strategy,<br />
Further****, military mdviaora ait on tha 15<br />
Interdepartmental comaitteee covering mil major<br />
sap acts of poverneant and whoso rwc nmamiidat ions arm<br />
co-ordinated through tha state Security Council.<br />
Military man aro likwwisa to bo found on moat of thm<br />
public conadsaions sot up by the Botha regi-*e. this<br />
now institutlonallst central political role aasigned<br />
to tha mUltwry extends oven to tha local level<br />
through tha Joint Planning Cmntrms whloh havw been eat<br />
up In tha 9 military regions into which thm country<br />
Is divided. Finally this military praasnoo in tha<br />
central political and admlnlatrmtlvm apparatuses of<br />
tha state has boon furthor confirmed by tha racont<br />
appointment of tho Hmad of tho Defence Fores -<br />
magnus Helen * aa HinlatOr of Defence, taking ovar the<br />
portfolio from Botha Uflaalf.<br />
Thuo» without undergoing the formal process of<br />
a coup d'etat, the vaatigiml rewvjlne of"Perilammntai y<br />
goverraeant in South Africa hava baan almost totally<br />
abolished, mnd boisrowoiw pontics havw boon militarised<br />
to a vary considerable extant. Botha'e own pwrwonal<br />
political aupport within tha military Is a critically<br />
Important dlmmnalon of these changes. Until vary<br />
rwewntly ha rwtminad thm portfolio of Defence, giving<br />
himaalf a personal political base outside the NP<br />
which ie unequalled and unchallenged by any other<br />
Notionalist politician. Thus if Vorstar triad to<br />
lead from above tha factions of hie party, Botha le<br />
trying to load by going boyond mnd outside hie oan
^ — :—: __.<br />
* party, In «n ettenpt to defsat the opposition to his<br />
l<br />
pollcli* .Uhln the MP.<br />
Finally, it should M noted that the** sweeping<br />
change* In the for* of the state over the post two<br />
mrt, have baan ecccaiaenisd by a paraxial *<br />
raorgeytlsstlon of the state bureaucracy, Tha mater<br />
of Oepsftawnts has been reduced fn» 40 to 22, snd<br />
tha Public Sarvlca Cosed aalon ha* been chs^gad eith<br />
tha task or producing 'a aaasller, but aora affaotlva<br />
and battar paid' public tavlw. Significantly, tho<br />
Prlae Itlniatar has appointed *prlvata sector laadora*<br />
to ovaraoa thla eork of tho Conalaalon, This aova<br />
sea explained aa representing but ono atop In *a<br />
policy of cooperation bstaesn Govarnaant end tho<br />
private sector, inciting selected ecadealc*'/ 7 -<br />
If It la ie*ssbsrsrt that atata saployese have long<br />
constituted a vital basis of support for tha HP, and<br />
In particular for tha M> riant, tho significance of<br />
; thaoo changes bee pass cloarar. In effect, .tha Leader<br />
I of tho HP to relying upon loading non-natlonallat<br />
party buslnassaan representing four of th% biggest<br />
eonopollee . in tha country, to oversea tha reduction<br />
in earning and •• organ! sotlon of a crucial alta of<br />
eoplo,aont for (particularly) tha Afrtksano opaafclng<br />
patty bourgoolaio. Thara could bo llttlo aora<br />
eloquant evidence of tha shift in the balance Of daao<br />
farcaa In the NP,<br />
at tha outoat that tha capitalist atata<br />
not stand outside tha class atruggla aa a alapla,<br />
atatlo ml undlffarantlatad lnatruaant to be laid<br />
hold of by thlo or thto data, and than used to<br />
\ conaolldata tha interests of mat claaa. Rather, as<br />
itaalF a contradictory unity* tho capitalist atata la<br />
I constituted through, snd la ltaalf a slta of, olasa<br />
struggle. This papar haa attempted to ex**ine slsasnts<br />
of tha claaa atruggla vlthln tha atata. If tha<br />
analyalo haa baan W sldad and lnooaplater in that<br />
*t haa foousaad prlaarlly on tha significance of<br />
Afrikaner nstionallet politics, it does S*aa that tha<br />
culainatlon of thaoa struggles in tha election of<br />
Botha aa National Leader of tha W and Pris* Itlniatar<br />
eaeasaaessaaaea-sswaaaa——eaweeeawwa •^•wawwwawa<br />
haa heralded important chengee In tha for* of the<br />
South Afrlcen stete - chengea based on the<br />
InetitutlonallaeUon of a nea political allgnaent<br />
of claaa forces in which tha bourgeoisie attaapta<br />
to secure tha conditions for rapid-capita list expansion<br />
through'the noticeable centralisation of poser In the<br />
hands of a single individual end the militarisation<br />
of politics generally.<br />
The central political question arising cut of<br />
these develop—nts le slsply thlai shst, if any, ara<br />
tha leplicatlons end significance of these changes in<br />
tha fan of the capitalist atate for tha national<br />
liberation struggls in South Africa? At one level<br />
the eraser le clear. These such heralded 'reforms*,<br />
tha sudden concern -ith 'the Quality of life 1 of<br />
South Africa'* black population, tha recognition of<br />
efrloan trade unions, tha conceaslone to tha blade<br />
•lddle claaa etc. In no say herald tha collopoo of<br />
Apsrthaid end tha snd to national oppression in South<br />
Africa. Aa a syataa of brutal end violent<br />
exploitation which control*, directs, channels.<br />
allocates labour on behalf Of all capitalist* and ki<br />
South African sorters divided and opcraaiad and thalr<br />
labour poser cheep, little In Apartheid is changing.<br />
For all of Botha f s clela that hie govarnaant sill not<br />
tolsrata 'hurtful or insulting' legislation ageinat<br />
anybody, for all of Minister Koorntof"s barefaced<br />
statement to Aasrlcan capitalists that -Apartheid<br />
as you kno* it is dying** after tha<br />
proposed refonaa, tha fundasamtal props of Apartheid<br />
as a syataa of labour exploitation rsealn even aora<br />
* firmly In place. Ihe raglaa haa no plana to give<br />
aiactca the vota, or to abolish tha paea lass end influx<br />
control, population registration, group eraes or my<br />
other of the legislative prope of Apartheid la*our<br />
exploitation. Undar the 'nee dispensation' of the<br />
total strategy, African sorters aill go on ouaualng<br />
at tha peas offices and labour bureau, esaetlng In<br />
the alnes by day and cooped up In conpountf* at night.<br />
The millions of jobless will continue to rot In the<br />
esmtuatana, dented all political rlghta, stripped<br />
of their citizenship in tha land of thalr foe*father*f<br />
tha subjects of play-play •states' recognised by<br />
I ~ in H*-m^^***-—+m-M*-*»*m\ ail • i "<br />
nobody but tha capitalists sho night need their labour<br />
occasionally. So, at thia level, little or nothing<br />
has changed. All that haa happened Is that the stata<br />
has bean further aUlterlaad, tha apparatuaaa of<br />
oppression ara now even stronger, aora centralised and<br />
eleldod with intent to crash but even tha slightest<br />
hint of opposition.<br />
But at another level, the changes in the fora of<br />
the South Afrlcen etate analysed in thia paper do neve<br />
great significance for the neture and direction of the<br />
national liberation struggle. The consolidation of<br />
tha Botha regis* has finally atrlppad off tha *<br />
'Afrikaner* **ek anion since 1946 hid tha capitalist<br />
character of tha South African stata frea ao aeny of<br />
the ojporajnta of Apartheid. Total strategy Is a<br />
strategy to save *frae anton-rlee* froa "the Marxist<br />
threat* in Southern Africa. Tha raglaa eafcas no<br />
bones about this. It presents ltaalf quite openly snd<br />
proudly aa a regis* of tha aoat powerful sectors of<br />
tho capltaliat class, in alliance alth and resting<br />
on, the ewtieasly powerful South African are*/* Ho<br />
lonqir can even the aoat blind apologist for<br />
capital lea argus that Apsrthaid euat be bla-ed on<br />
Afrikaners and not capital la*. Bo longer can 'the<br />
Boars* be held to be the anaay. Indeed thla 'Boer*<br />
state ie noa turning on other •Boers' In tha neae<br />
of profit, private property end stability. Thus.<br />
tha changes In the for* of stata in South Africa<br />
clarified the real relation* on which this stata<br />
Tha present crisis of tha capitalist stata in &A<br />
hlngss on the Question of hoe to eertntaln tha continued<br />
untroubled snd prof 1 table rule of capital. That<br />
doss not Ua in the handa of Botha alone, or<br />
in tha hands of tha solitary. It reeta finally<br />
with tha sorting naoaoe. And aa the intensifying<br />
class struggle in South Africa testifies, tha aaaoeo<br />
ara becoalng increasingly aaare of their poaar. Thla<br />
U tha real and lneoluble crlala of tha capltaliat<br />
etate In South Africa.<br />
^°' > f c M "<br />
IT
Pflgp 19<br />
10.<br />
11.<br />
12.<br />
13.<br />
«.<br />
«.<br />
16.<br />
19,<br />
Posing for ltMlf the question 'can South Africa<br />
Survive without destroying Itself V the most<br />
recent and influential wflwmwm:lc treaties on<br />
Afrikaner nationalism arguee that to answer this<br />
question, it la nacaaaary to focue solely on the<br />
'ruling Afrikaner ethnic group 1 . H. Adam A<br />
H. Gillomee, Ethnic Power Mobilised. New Haven,<br />
1979.<br />
The classic statw-wnt of this position is<br />
fl, Horwiti, The Political Economy of South Africa<br />
(London 1967^7"<br />
Again the clearest statement of these Multiple<br />
errore and confusion la Ada* & Glllowee op.clt.<br />
J, de St, Jorre, A House OUldod, New York, 1977,<br />
p3.<br />
H. wolpe. Towards an Anal<br />
African State*. mdmeo<br />
thw South<br />
D* Hobert Houghton, The South African Economy,<br />
Oxford, 1967, p160.<br />
Analysed by Marx in Capital, Vol. 1, Ch 25.<br />
The Economic Development Progrseae ... 1965-70,<br />
Survey of Race Relations In South Africa. 1973,<br />
Johannesburg, 1979, pl36.<br />
Quoted in R. Devles, 'Capital Restructuring and<br />
the Modification of the Reclel Oivialon of Labour',<br />
Jnl of Southwm African Studies. 5t 2, 1979.<br />
Charles Simklne, 'Employment, unemployment end<br />
Growth in South Africa 1961-1979'. Seldnj<br />
working Paper No 4.<br />
Oevlea op. dt.<br />
This la the subject of a Special Survey on<br />
Exports, Financial wall. 19.8.1977.<br />
Quoted In Financial wail. 11,2.1977-<br />
eg the speech by the Managing Director of<br />
General Mining, -The Ideological Orientation of<br />
Afrikaner Business 1 aiawo 1975.<br />
This la clear from the book by the Chairmen of<br />
Sanlamt A.D. wasswneer, Assault on Privwte<br />
Enterprise, Cape Town, 1977.<br />
16. D 0 f Claws Capital and Ideology * n _ tn><br />
t of Afrikaner nationalism, D.Phil,<br />
University, 1979, Ch 12,7,13.<br />
19.<br />
20.<br />
21.<br />
22.<br />
23.<br />
24.<br />
25.<br />
26.<br />
27.<br />
26.<br />
29.<br />
30.<br />
31.<br />
32.<br />
33.<br />
34.<br />
35.<br />
36.<br />
37,<br />
39.<br />
Again moat notably Adwa & Giliomee op.clt.<br />
O'Moara loc.cit.<br />
Ibid.<br />
Ibid. Ch 3.<br />
Ibid.<br />
Sanlmm Annual Report 1961.<br />
See eg The South African Observer. X, 6, March<br />
1966.<br />
See H. Serfonteln, Die Verkrempte Aanslag, Cape<br />
Town, 1770.<br />
Sea eg the Report by the Head of Military<br />
Intelligence, 'The Afrikaner Broederbond'<br />
(n.d. - but from internal abidance, August<br />
1944), Thw Hofmeyr PwjM<br />
t.cit., Ch 12.<br />
Documented in B. Schoemen, Voratar sc 100 Dae,<br />
Cape Town 1974.<br />
Ibid, & Serfonteln op.cit.<br />
Interview with a Front 8ench MP Msy 1976.<br />
The teraa verkraepte and verllgte heve now<br />
been replaced by conservative and reformist<br />
respectively,<br />
Paratus, July, 1979, p36.<br />
Defence White Paper, 1977, p5.<br />
Gen Magnus mslmn, Rend Pally Mall. 13.6.1979.<br />
See the Important article by Glenn Moss, 'Total<br />
Strategy', fork in Proqresa. Ho 11, Feb I960.<br />
PD Vsssanear, Aasault on Private Enterprise^<br />
The Freeway to Communism, Cape Town, 1977.<br />
Two atatemente by the then Minister of Police*<br />
J. Kruger, seemecf to eum this up. After Soweto<br />
he declared that the police had uewd live<br />
ammunition rether than rubber bullets as a method<br />
of crowd control* because Africans had to be 'made<br />
tame to thw gun'. Similarly when the newe first<br />
broke of thw death of Stave Biko In detention<br />
Kruger dwclarwd that it 'left hie cold', end lied<br />
to the Natal NP Congress that Biko had died aa<br />
the result of a hungwr strike. The congress<br />
then congratulated the Minister 'on extwnding. to<br />
Biko thw democratic right to starve hlmewlf to<br />
death'.<br />
This ia in fact what occurred. Bothe instructed<br />
the investigating Judge not to divulge thw degree<br />
of Vorater'e complicity, but hie orders were<br />
Ignored and Voretwr was then forced to resign<br />
from thw State Presidency In disgrace in June<br />
1979.<br />
40, Financial Vail<br />
41, See SACTU<br />
1«0,<br />
ndum to I960 IL0 Conference, June<br />
42. Sea the speech by the Minister of Manpower to<br />
thw 0FS congress of the hP, Quoted in The Star,<br />
8.9.1979.<br />
43. This la particularly clear in the Government white<br />
Paper on the Report of the Commission of Enquiry<br />
into Manpower Legislation (the Riekert Commission).<br />
A Cabinet Committee, which lncludea w numbwr of<br />
leading businessmen has been set up to study the<br />
position of 'the urban African 1 *<br />
44.<br />
45,<br />
« .<br />
Survey of feet Halations In South Africa, 1979,<br />
pp3-6.<br />
Omaiing with Stete Security, Finance, Economical<br />
Internal Affaire, welfare end Legislation and<br />
Parliamentary Affelra.<br />
Magnus Melan la the son of the former Chairmen<br />
of the largest Afrlkeena Bank, Volkakas. His<br />
father ewe for many years one of the leading<br />
•embers of the Broederbondr a Member of Parliament<br />
and prominent verlcrampte. Gen. malen'e personal<br />
and political biography thus makes him the ideal<br />
person to bridge the government, army and<br />
capitalist class.<br />
47. Survey of Race Relations In South Africa. 1979,<br />
pp6f t AJO-»I.<br />
46. Barlow Rand, SA Brwwerias, Old Mutual and General<br />
Mining.