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which is p-plicltly provided for in the detention<br />

•arrant currently used by security police;<br />

B He would neve been visited by the Inspector of<br />

detainees - which presumably did happen;<br />

e The Commissioner of Police could have allowed e<br />

friend or family member to visit hie for a short<br />

period, under police supervision - and this did<br />

occur during December 1961;<br />

e After 30 deys in detention, the police mould have<br />

had to explein to the Minister why Nell could not<br />

be released. They eight neve said that he had not<br />

answered all questions to their satisfaction; or<br />

that other detainees had Implicated him in some<br />

offense; or Just that they had not yet finished<br />

interrogating him. Prasummbly this did happen et<br />

the end of Omcember. and again at the end of January,<br />

as ssctlon 6(2) of the Terrorism Act makes provision<br />

for these procedures. The Minister did not order<br />

Weil Aagett'3 release then. One doubte that the<br />

Rabie proposals, If Implemented, would have made any<br />

difference;<br />

a Of course, if Hell had lived through 6 months of<br />

detention, the Rebio Commissioners would have wanted<br />

e review board appointed by the Minister to exemine<br />

his came. This board would not have been obliged to<br />

hear evidence from Hell - or even to have seen him.<br />

If the board rsccwmmnded hell's release, the Minister<br />

could have ignored this recommendation,<br />

a If Hell - or any other detainee - lived through<br />

ell of this, and waa charged, the attorney generel<br />

could refuse to ellow bail. This la currently the<br />

case, and is also a Ruble Commission proposal. If,<br />

like most detainees, Neil hed not been charged, the<br />

Rabie proposals would have ellowed his continued<br />

detention as a potential state witness, or as a<br />

'danger to state security*. This, too, can happen to<br />

any detainee In terns of already existing security<br />

legislation.<br />

In the light of the above, there seeme little<br />

room for doubt as to hoe auch difference the Rafale<br />

proposals would have made to Heil Aggett's life -<br />

or death, HOT does there seem eny reason to<br />

believe that the proposed edded 'protection* for *<br />

detelneea would neve prevented Thozemlle Gqwetha or<br />

Sam Kiklne from finding themselves under security<br />

police guard in the psychiatric wards of a hospital.<br />

The Rabie Commission accepted that detention for<br />

the. purposes of interrogation by security police was<br />

a necessary part of security legislation. In ttyeir<br />

summary of flndlnga, the commissioners argued that<br />

information obtained froa persona In detention<br />

is the most Important and, to a large extent, the<br />

only weapon of the Police for enticipetlng and<br />

preventing terroristic end other subversive<br />

activities, and also that information obtained<br />

in this eay may in appropriate cases be used as<br />

evidence in the triel of persona charged....<br />

The Ccmmisalon finds that It is essential to<br />

retain this measure (para 14.5)<br />

In its own terms, the commissioners are correct: in<br />

the summary of their terms of reference, they write<br />

that<br />

To be able to Judge realistically < lf the question<br />

(sic) of the necessity, edequocy, fairness end<br />

efficiency of leglsletlon relating to the<br />

protection of lntemel security, regard should<br />

• ••.be hed in the first instance to society as<br />

It la at present end as it is likely to be in<br />

the forsooable future (perm 14.2).<br />

The Report then goes on to state thet there can<br />

be no doubt as to the need for security legislation -<br />

Including detention provisions - given the nature<br />

of society as it currently is, and is likely to be<br />

in the near future. This le particularly so in<br />

the light of<br />

the terrorism and sabotage committed In the<br />

Republic during the past fee years, the<br />

likelihood thet these activities will continue<br />

to increase In the fnreeeaUls future, the fact<br />

that these ectivities are planned and Committed<br />

by the supporters of organisations whose elm<br />

la to over throe by violence the existing order<br />

in the Republic, the fact that in their<br />

ectivities to echleve this aim thaee orgenlsatlona<br />

receive the support and assistence of communist<br />

countries, and the feet that these ectivities<br />

are carried on from territories bordering the<br />

Republic -, end the Commission believes thet<br />

the measures it recowatends are necessitated<br />

by ths exigencies of the situation in which the<br />

Republic finds itself (para 14.2).<br />

what the Commission declines to consider is<br />

the sort of society South Africa is, end why it<br />

needs the protection of security leglsletlon and<br />

detention In order to survive in Its current form.<br />

Indeed, the Commission explicitly exj^udes this from<br />

the terms of Its investigation end report.<br />

Put In its briefest and simplest form. South<br />

Africa Is a society in which the eajority of the<br />

inhabitants are governed without even the sembfonce<br />

of their consent and participation. The Rabie report<br />

acknowledges thet there is a view* which claims that<br />

the 'non-white sectors of the populetion' heve no*<br />

part in governing the country, end thet this is the<br />

reason for resistance which led to the adoption of<br />

security lews. The Commission admits that msny people<br />

have concluded that there is no hope for peaceful<br />

change In South Africa, and that violence is the<br />

only outlet for frustrated political end economic<br />

aspirations. But this ths Commission sees es being<br />

part of the political arena, while ite mandate<br />

involves a Jurldico-legel viewing of security lawa<br />

in the light of present end likely future events.<br />

Of course, it would be facile to suggest thet<br />

in ell societies which are governed without the<br />

active consent end participation of the majority,<br />

repressive security leglsletlon exists in the form *<br />

proposed by Rabie. Those societies which regard<br />

themselves as capitalist democracies Include both<br />

repressive end ideological aechanlame to ensure the<br />

passive consent of the awfcjorlty of people. There is<br />

ruling class and stete repression in, for example.<br />

North Aaerlca end western Europe - but in those areas<br />

the majority of inhabitants have some limited control<br />

over parts of their lives via trade unions, political<br />

parties, the right to vote in elections from city<br />

level upwards, etc. In e South African context,<br />

even these limited institutions for controlling<br />

conflict between rulers end ruled are largely<br />

absent. *<br />

As such, the Rabie Gomel sal oners are correct ehen<br />

they claim that detention end other security<br />

legialation is necessary to maintain society in its<br />

present form. The real issue, then, is whether<br />

society should be emintained as It is, and If not.<br />

In what directions it should be altered. But these<br />

questions are pieced beyond the scope of Rable's<br />

investigation, which llalts Itself to quostione of<br />

how best to protect those interests which currently<br />

P«0* 2

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