m - DISA

within t>e st«t« apparatus: the Parliamentary
caucus; the cabinet; and within and between the
various state apparatuses.
Acute conflicts and struggle* within Afrikaner
nationalist ranks were a constant feature of South
African politics after 1W8 (and indeed before).
But these were not static struggles. Their content
and forms shifted with the changes in the social
bases of the various provincial NPs* most significant
here was the changing relationship between Caps
finance and agriculture, which began to shift the
Cepe NP into an even more openly oppositional role
within the party. In the immediate aftermath of
the Sherpevllle crlets of I960, particularly whilst
Dr Verwoerd was recovering from %n assassination
attempt, end the forces of the traditional
nationalist alliance were temporarily leederless,
the struggle within the NP was very finely balanced.
However, once Verwoerd returned to political life,
he succeeded in mobilising against the Cepe financial
intereats, all the other elaes forces in the NP. This
wes echieved pertly by epproprieting for the right the
mantle of true Afrikaner nationalism, with
Verwoerd es Its lnfellible leader. For the
remainder of hie Premiership, he M 9
keeping the Cape politically iaolated.
successful in
Verwoerd was able to maintain this alliance
against Cape finance by centrelleing power in both
party and government into hie rolee as National
Leader or the NP and Prime Minister respectively.
.This was unprecedented in the hiatory of the NP. Thus,
the Cape was doubly Isolated - within the party as a
whole, and in the state apparatus Itself. Verwoert's
period as Prime Minister saw a narked diminution in
the powers of both individual Ministers and the
Cabinet itself, with the Prime Minister taking
final responsibility for all crucial decisions, and
often announcing these to Cabinet without coneultation.
Likewise, the NP caucua had its political independence
severely curtailed, and was simply not informed of a
number of crucial political decisions (such as the
vitally important 1959 Promotion of Bantu Self-
Government Bill) before they were laid before
Perliement. Verwoerd was able to operate Ilka this
because of his personal political power base within
the Afrikaner Browdertond. During his Premiership,
the AS Executive Council in many senses displaced
•
the Cabinet as a policy making body. And given thet
the Cepe had no influence within the Broederbond, it
was the ldeel institution through which to mobilise
all class forcea in the nationalist alliance egalnst
the Cepe*
Yet the contradictions and conflicta within
organised Afrikaner netionaliea were in no senee
brought to en end under Verwoerd's authoriterlan
leadership, they were aimply displaced. If an iron
discipline of the mejority eas mainteined in the
party to keep the Cape in line, these struggles
spilled over into bitter conflict in ail the other
orgenisetions of Afrikaner netlonelism, from church
and cultural groups to buslneas organisations, etc.
Here the Sanlam group managed to maintain its control
over the very influential Afrlkaanse Handel sins tltuut
(AHI) ae a major pletfora from which to challanga
the dominant line In the party. Despite e bitter
struggle for power et the 196fl AHI congress, Sanlam
could not be dislodged, and it was predominantly
through the AHI that the Cape line was articulated.
8y 1965, it was openly acknowledged thet Afrikaner
nationalism had Its 'verllote' ('enlightened*) and
'verkrempt* (•reactionary*) wings. The main base of
the verllgtea ley in the Cape party, with elenly
gathering support for ite position amongst certain
business groups In the Transvaal. The so-called
verkrempte wing was' led by Verwoerd. The main
differencee ware over labour policy and relations
with English capitalists* The Cape groups favoured
much looser restrictions on the mobility and training
of afrlcan labour and close co-operation with
English buslneae. But these were in many respects
the fundamental questions around which Afrikaner
netlonelism es a claaa alliance hinged - these
issues touched directly the Intereats of all the
verious class forces organised under Afrikaner
nationalism), tt eae precisely the accumulation of
capital by the Cepe financiers and their new
independence from the economic support of Afrikaner
fanners, petty bourgeoleie and sorters, which led to
this change in Sanlam's position on the crucial
issues of influx control, skilled labour, finance
policy, etc. Thus, what the verllgtea eere in feet
advocating wes e new Interpretation of the interests,
of the Afrikaner volk, one which concentrated
particularly on the needs of the rapidly growing
group of powerful Afrikaner capitalist* led by Swnlem.
The assassination of Or Verwoen) in September
1966 brought these contredictlons out into the open,
Into a vicioua fight within the NP itself. In these ^
atrugglea, the personal political poaition of the
new NP leader, John Voreter, became vitally Important,
in that it was a significant factor in the form taken
by these struggles.
From the viewpoint of all 'normal* political
considerations. 8J Voreter should never have been
elected leeder of the NP and Prime Minister. Almost
everything in hie political past told against him.
During the 19eOs he had b—n e leader of the bitterly
enti-NP and Nexl-orlented Oasewa Branding. In the
1948 election Voreter had attacked the NP aa anti­
democratic whan It opposed his candidacy for the W»*s
election partner, the Afrikaner Party. Defying perty
discipline, Voreter fought tne election ae en
independent, ioeing by two votee, thereby denying
en otherwise eefe eeat to the Natlonmliet coalition.
He hed only Joined the NP in 1951 and been elected
to Parliament in 1933. He hed nm^r developed a
strong personal political beam within the Tranavaal
perty. In 1966 he ranked a lowly thirteenth in
Cabinet seniority, end as Minister of Police, had
been the man ultimately responsible for ttie Prime
Minister's safety when Verwoerd waa killed. The only
other candidate for the leadership eea the moat eenior
member of the cabinet. Transport Minister Ben ScJvjemmn,
deputy leader of the Treneveal Party before the death
of Verwoerd. But Bchoaman's political paet told
against him too. He waa one of the diminishing band
of so-called oud-ameIters, le Natlonmliata who in
the 19Xe had split the Nationalist Party to join
the United Party. He hed come back to the fold In