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mo* 1ft But to rutin tor a moment with the discredited and defeated forces of the NP right. The tern HP- right does not refer to e monolithic group all with the M M interests. It too represented a political alliance between specific class force*. Over- scheamtically thaaa can be Idantlflad aa cartaln capitalist fansere (particularly thoa* who had not made tha tranaitlon to tha highly machaniaad, capiUl inteneive form of production which bscMS increasingly conion in South African capitalist agriculture in tha 1960a) t tha lower atrata of whit* workers (particularly in mining, transport, ataal and various atata lnduatriaa), and apacific aactlona of tha Afrikaans apeaklng patty bourgeoisie. Again to put it in crudaly reductionist tana, for Men of thaaa claaa forces, tha Apartheid policlaa of tha atata had producad definite aconoaic and social advantages, ' and raaminad nacaaaary to preserve and dafand their existing position in society. Farmers naadad a rigid eyatae of influx control, paaa laws ate to keep african labour on the feme, white workers bitterly oppoaad schemes to ratraln african worker* for cwpitei-lntwnaive lnduatriaa. corractly seeing in thla a capitalist ploy to aacura chaapar tachnlcal labour. Similarly both groups vara bittarly oppoaad to any recognition of african trada unlona. And for tha lovar lavala of tha Afrikaner petty bourgeoisie, particularly thoaa aaployad in tha atata bureaucracy, any talk of reform, and aapaclally tha now-familiar thaaa of concessions to tha 'block nlddla claaa' M«*ed to hold out tha proapact of aavara aconoaic and aocial competition and thraatan their carafully carvad out and haavlly protactad nicha of aconcaiic and aocial privilege. Thua thaaa group* aara unitad In thair iaplacabla opposition to tha rafora propoaala being truapatad by Sanlaa and othar Urge Afrlkanar undertaking*. Yet, thair interests vara not identical, and thair conceptions of necessary atata policy cannot ba seen aa identical- Thla ia iaportant to baar in mine whan usaaalno tha poaalbla political futura of tha Afrlkanar nationalist right. In tha factional is: struggle althin tha nP, this coalition of forcaa on tha * right• had alaaiya selected as ita ohoden terrain of etruggle, and aa tha best mean* to dafand it* intareata, ita claim to constitute tha authantlc voice of tha 'Afrikaner volk', and tha embodiment or tha intaraata of thla volk. Wth tha significant exception of tha -oat reactionary of tha ahlta trada unlona, within tha HP tha right had deliberately limited tha range of ita political atruoglw to purely "Afrikaner' organiaationa. Aftar Muldergete, with Afrlkanar bualnaaa alllad alth othar capitalist forcaa against tha right wing in tha NP, tha right wing bloc no* found thla old atratagy to ba a political trap. It aaa confined to tha narroa terrain of Afrikaner politics, and had really lost control of aoet of tha significant Afrlkanar organiaationa outalda of tha Party. Thue, the only wmy it could continue with tha fectlonallet etruggle under tha mantle of genuine Afrikaner nationalise, aaa to begin to attack the NP itself. Within the party it had bean daciaively defeated and could no* only conduct a holding operation against rafora. A* will ba aeon below, thia holding operation or brake, still rwaaina an iaportant aspect of South African politics however. One last point naeda to be aada with regard to the defeat of the right wing within the NP. The different claaa forcaa comprising the right wing alliance began eloely to fragment, aost aignificantly, the extreme right wing unlone began to act politically independently of the NP in an attaapt to force Botha back Into tha traditional alliance. The Nine Workers' Union la the most iaportant of th*M. In 1979 it forced e direct confrontation with the reformists in party and govamwajnt by coming out on atrika againet (a government approved) rwcrganisation of Job claeel- fioatlona on the mines - a reorganisation which would permit employer* to utilise african labour in skilled Jabs previously restricted to ahlta workers. In e siwiler dispute in tha aicK 1960s, the government had immediately backed down anq supported the white miner*. Now thla atrika was daciaively dofMted and strikers dleelaead with the ectlve approval of tha nationalist Party governMnt. The Botha Raolaa and tha Form Pf the South African fltate ANY asaeswaent of the iaplicetlona of tha alactlon of PI Botha as PriM Minister for the crises confronting the South African state auat begin by rebutting teat of tha widespread myths about hie position within the NP. Immediately after succeeding Vorster Bothe was almost univeraally depicted in the press as a 'hawk* and a nationalist hardliner. Aa tha longtime Minister of Defence, Bothe is clearly prepared for the most vigorous action to dafand tha existing atata against tha liberation movement. If necasaary ha would be quick to approve foreign military Intervention. Thus, aa the politician who for well over e decade hod been responsible for the South African Military apparatue, and who dearly got on vary Mil with the military high co-wand (Botha's political nickname in NP circles la 'Plat mmpen 1 - Pete emapons), end thua can be relied upon to reflect the military's thinking to some extent, Botha My be called a allltarlat. But thia tern misrepresent* both the military's current role in South African politics, and Botha's own long-held political poaltion elthln the faitionaliat spectrum. Aa argued above, for wound military reasons, tha military high cue*and ia one of the Mat iaportant pro-reform forces in tha South African atata. Thia neatly coincides with Bothe'* own personal position. Perhapa aore than any othar politician in the W>, Bothe concentrates in hie own political person, the dominant tendency of the Cape party. He is e political creature of the Cape party adenine. In the lata 1930s Bothe eaa the first full-tiM political organiser hired by the Cape NP. Hia rise to political prominence has occurred through the organisation of the party - en organisation which he helped mould, and which he know* better than anyone else. Thia means that for hia entire political life, Bothe hea been very cloae to the forces which dominate the Cape party, ia tha financial interests, particularly around Benleei, which founded the Cape NP end elaaya dominated it. There la no othar way to political prominence in the Cepe. Thua, Botha concentratee in his own politicel pareon tha intereats
of thit Cape party organisation and the political outlook of Cape finance, as soil as those of the military high cownd. Since 1960 at least, within the context of Nationalist Politics, thet has produced a strongly reformist orientation. Botha's twin political roles ee Minister* of Defence end leader of the Cape party, thus both coepelled hie Into a reformist political position - which hes elways been hidden to those who mistake the bluster of political exchange for its content. The 'total strategy' is the enbodieent of this reformism, and likewise concentrates the intereste of Sanlam end the military in the defence of 'free enterprise 1 . Thus, es already noteci, Botha's election marks a clear victory in the W* tnd the government for large capitalist interests in the Hstlonellst ellience, and in particular, Sanlam. Thi» has been politically acknowledged by the Chaliwwjn of Sanlee, who in a remarkably frenk interview with the infumntiel Financial wall, adeitted that in the lest years of Vorster's leadership he had despaired of any movement out of the governeent; thet his seneetlonel published etteck of the economic policies of vorster's govern ment (entitled The Assault on Private Enterprise) was Intended to stir things up end produce e sheke-up within the party; and thet he could not be more delighted with the direction taken by Bothe es it corresponded exactly with whet he hed long been arguing for- mhile in certeln importent respects - particu larly bentustan policy and state security - the Bothe regime appears, thus far at least, to be the direct inheritor end guardians of the policies of the previous regime, in at leest five areas of economic end political policy, Botha hes gone e long may towards lmpleeentlng the changes long fought for by the NP reformists, and Senlem In particular. Firstly, all restrictions on Investment by white cepitellsts in the efricen town ships in the urben erees hwve now been lifted. Sanlee has embarked on e major campaign to establish a chain of •Hypermarkets' In areas like Soweto, in so-called 'Joint participation* ventures with efricen buslneseean. Secondly, efwj auch more importantly, erislng out of the Rlekert and Viehehn reports on Manpower Utilisation and Labour Legislation respect ively, legislative restrictions on the mobility, utilisation and training of african labour have been substantially eased, while this in no say undermines the basic props of Apartheid as a system of labour 41 legislation. it does go e long way to meeting the dmeands of big business for a flexible labour policy which will facilitate the reorganisation of production along more capital Intensive lines. Thirdly, end complementary to this, the governeant has ennounced measures for the recognition of efricen trade unions in e eay which brings them under much tighter state 42 control than was previously the case. This hes gone hand in hand, fourthly) with e government committment in rhetoric et leeet to eeae the minor pinpricks on the african 'aiddle class*, forming the beginnings of e recognition of the need for a political strategy which differentletes between and divides this middle class from black workers, and further distinguishes between the 'rights' of urban african workers and those forced to live in th* rural slums of the 43 bantustans. And fifthly, the Bothe regime is pledged to a gradual reduction in the state control of key productive sectors of the economy, opening them up for private Investment. Simultaneously, the regime hea taken a number of steps Intended on the one hand to ensure its continued support outside of perty and government, end on the other hand to set up *etate lnetltutional end organisational structures which will serve to consolidate the reforejlet position against the right wing of the W. Firstly* Botha has gone out of his eay to project his government as the governeant of e broad ellience of ell sections of capital, and in this eay to diminish still further the traditional English-Afrikaner political division amongst buslneeammn - divisions which long ego lost any economic meaning. This mas beet symbolised in the convening in November 1979 of e much-publicised meeting of the Cabinet end 230 leading South African businessmen - the ruling^cless lncarnete It might be said. The purpose of this 1 ' muu ' ' J '••• ' "" peg* 16 meeting was to work out eay* of Implementing the 'total strategy' egalnst the 'Marxist threat' to private enterprise and 'civilised stenderds' In South Africa. Though the proceedings remain secret, the meeting did produce a number of vitally importent permanent standing committees composed of members of government and businessman, with the avowed function of overseeing and co-ordinating the re-orgenlsatlon of the odminls tret ion of the state, 44 Secondly, within the NF>t Botha has noe decreed in his cepecity as National Leeder of the Party that in future, the annual provincial HP congresses will no longer neve the power to question government policy, but may only discuss matter* of 'principle 1 . By so redefining the relationship between perty and government, Botha is clearly seeking to limit ttie ability of the NP right to organise egalnst his policies within the party, end to force them to fight rather with the government, where they cen be euch more easily contelned- This tactic very nearly forced en open split In the party in early I960 on* the issue of efrlcan participation in a traditionally 'white' sporting event - the so-called 'Craven week*. Thirdly. Bothe's polltlcel ettack on the right has not been confined to the level of the party only, but the implementation of the *totel etretegy* has produced vitally important chenQes within the. government and state es well. As Prima minister he has acted decisively In en attempt to forestall the struggle In the government and state apparatuses developing into an effective ettack on reformist policies. In effect he has attempted to drive NP factionalism out of these Institutions, or to contain it so as to render minimal the political demags to his programme. A number of steps are significant here. The major portfolios in the Ceblnet have been largely reserved for hie own supporters. Bothe has clearly abandoned eny idee of balancing the NP factions within the Ceblnet a la Voreter. Thua, although Treumlcht la the elected leader of by far the largest individual provincial NP, end In terms of party protocol ranks but second after the National Leeder, Botha et first kept Ma out of the Cebinet (by refusing to promote him to full
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Page 11 and 12: [DETENTIONS: Investigating Inquests
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Page 15 and 16: page 13 unless Inflicted beforw daa
Page 17 and 18: I 0-B« 15 INTRODUCTION TO POLITICA
Page 19 and 20: pega 17 oppressed BOTH by capital a
Page 21 and 22: I suthors' contention thmt it il ox
Page 23 and 24: Q ' analytical tools*( like role th
Page 25 and 26: page 2& •officiant nuebers of the
Page 27 and 28: gar. rgthnicjty: the ordinary peopl
Page 29 and 30: particularly •egaa, end hence wor
Page 31 and 32: £o natch 'their transport to gat h
Page 33 and 34: &C..31 to work in protest against t
Page 35 and 36: [fmgn 33 mturn to th«lr homes In t
Page 37 and 38: paga 36 - _ ' Fane Qeorge dibhole,
Page 39 and 40: peg* T/ appellant c la lea overrule
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Page 43 and 44: in the 1960s extended the process o
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Page 47 and 48: movement (In collaboration with the
Page 49 and 50: 1939, but aoaa aaabars of the Natio
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Page 53: end Vorster by implication. Althoug
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