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page 3 Koranic aspect of this boom was that It lad to e dramatic concentration «nd centrelieation of capital on the basis of cv*r more capital inteneive production, leading to significant shifts in relatione within the capitalist class. Prior to the 1960s, South African industry was characterised by a sharp economic distinction and political antagonist between local undertakings and foreign capital. "•> & 00 * 9 f ^ha i9€Oa produced the rapid intervenetratIon of capitals and the consolidation of the dominance of diversified monopolies within the economy generally, and in all the major sectors of capitalist production. This process was effect^ on the basis of a_ massive influx of foreign capital, in a country where the return on capital was amongst the highest in the world. By 1970. total foreign investment was estimated at R5 81&-milllon, and a total of R3 559-million foreign investment capital flowed into South Africa in the period 196S - 19?o\ 6 Consequent on this Increasing dominance of capital-intensive production, these years further saw significant changes in the organisation of the proletariat within production, accelerating the process of the simultaneous attraction and extrusion of workers from production. The introduction of Increasingly sophisticated technology into the production process on an ever expanding scale, leads to a relative reduction in the number of workers needed to operate it. moreover, it simultaneously Introduces a new industrial division of labour between semi-skilled operatives on the one hand, and technical/supervisory labour on the other, replacing the old unskilled/ skilled division of labour. Thus, during this period, whilst large numbers of sami-skilled operatives were being drawn into production, even lerger numbers of unskilled african migrant workers lost their Jobs as they became 'redundant 1 . Throughout the 'boom', african unemployment stood at over 1 million. The Influx control measures and pass laws of the apartheid system operated to expel the unemployed from the cities end dump and barricade them In the festering rural slums of bantustano. This process marked a decisive shift aw«y from the reliance on cheep, unakillad migrant labour so long charactar 1 Stic of South African industry, towards the consolidation of a stable, ssml-ekllled workforce. Similarly during this period, large numbers of skilled (white) workers eere also rendered relatival/ superfluous to capital Intensive production, as their skills were superceded by the need for technical/ supervisory labour. Yet in apartheid South Africe. the Jobs of white workers were protected. The rigid industrial colour bar reserved all supervisory, technical and professional work for whites. Thus in this changing organisation of the labour process, few shite workers lost their Jobs, but were either retrained and/or converted into supervisors of efrican workers. However, this process of reclassifying white workers was unable to fill the growing need for technical labour. The boom period was thus also characterised by a severe and growing shortage of labour in technical, professional and semi- professional grades of work - a shortage estimate*. at some 47 000 workers In 1969. In these years the monopoly element of the capitalist class did demand measures which would mase restriction on trie mobility, employment and training of african workers, to permit its acquisition of a stable supoly of semi-skilled operatives end to retrain african workers for technical labour. However, the over-all conditions of expansion and high profitability edtlgated the adverse effects of such labour shortages flncJ thus did not lead to an all out assault by capital on the existing rigid racial division of labcxir. During this period, the economy was further 'cushioned' against such labour shortages hy the continuing large influx of foreign investment capital. Thua, while the boom conditions persisted, the maintenance of the rigid racial division of labour in industry did not seriously threaten the interests of the capitaliat class. As the 1970s unfolded, the great boom of the sixties gave way to a deepening recession. By 1976 the country was facing the worst economic crisis in its history and an actual decline of GOP of 0,29)1 in 1977-76. 9 By the mid* 1970s, confronted both with an international recession and growing industrial, political and economic instability within South Africa itself and the region as a whole, the very large doses of foreign capital which had sustained the growth of the 1960s began to dry up. South African Reserve Bank statistics show a reduction in the inflow of long-term foreign investment from R1 561-mllllon in 1975-76 to Ra52-mlllion in 1975-77. If this redaction is coupled with the actual net outflow of short-term capital from the private sector, the year 1976-77 saw a total capital outflow of some R12l-mllllan. Similarly, the recession dramatically increased the growing structural unemployment of african workers. In 1976, before the recession had reached its full height, it was estimated that african unemployment stood at 2,3 million workers* moreover, simply to stabilise unemployment at this huge number it was calculated that the economy would have to grow at 6,7% per annum. Ironically, in the face of this acuta unemployment of african workers, the shortages of technical workers in the economy accelerated* By 1977, government figures show vacancies Tor 99 000 workers in the professional, semi •'professional and technical grade*. The pages of authoritative economic Journals were filled with reports of bankruptcies, and the r.t it* was forced to abandon or defer major infrastructwal Investment programmes in steel, petro-chee)ical»f transport and other sectors. The above specification of som% of the Indices of the crisis of accumulation cannot substitute for lte actual analysis. A detailed analysis would have to grapple particularly with the differential barriers to accumulation for veriou* capitals, and the differential impact of the crisis on various capitals. Thle analysis remains to be done. Thus, the assessment of the effects of thl* crisis of capital accumulation remains necessarily incomplete. However, one general point can be made. Thia *as far more than a cyclical recession normal to capitalist economies, but represented in effect a profound structural crisis for South Africmn capitalism. The rapid growth of the South African economy
in the 1960s extended the process of eecondary industrialisation baaad on import substitution, which had begun in earnest in tha 1920s. Tha impressive flQuras indicating, tha growth of sacondary industry in South Africa 1920-90 tand to concaal tha fact that thass industriaa were concentrated vary heevily in tha wage goods sector, producing artlclat of consumption. Tha procass of Industrialisation behind protactlva tariffs did not laad to tha davalopaant of a significant capital goods ssctor. As tha ragular and growing balancs of payments daflclts throughout tba 1960s lndloatadt Industry in South Africa raaainad vary haavily dependent on tha importetion of capital equipment froa tha developed capitalist economies. Thasa imparts were financad through tha axport of primary commodities - agricultural products and minerals, but particularly gold. Thus, in a wary fundaaantal sense, tha limits of capital accumulation in South Africa remain sat by tha primary axport sactors - la agriculture and minerals t aith gold baing by far tha aost important. Tha economic crises of tha mid-1970s revealed vary claarly that, undvr tha prevailing political and social conditions within tha country, tha South African aconomy mas raachlng tha limits of industrial expansion based on Import substitution. By 1977, facad mith little apparent prospect of an early or rapid lncraasa in tha price of goldt virtually all South African aconomlsts mere agreed that furthar industrial axpanslon mould hava to ba basad on tha development of a strong capital goods ssctor, and a shift In tha emphasis of exports tomsrds industrial rathar than primary products. Tha aconomlc crisis of tha mid-1970s thus presented both differential barriers for accumulation for particular capitals, and mora fundamentally, for capital as a ehols In South Africa. Tha resolution of this crisis spomared to damand a complex restructur ing of capital in all aactore of tha economy, a restructuring ehich mould render labour more productive, Thle Implied the nmed for an even more capital intenelve basis to South African industry. now linked to the need to rsep the owneflts of M economies of scale. Thue the racaeelon posed very. eterkly vthe urgent need for change In a number of the conditions of accumulation of capital in South Africa. ( In broadest terms, the entire eat of conditions under which labour ems utilised within tha economy on the one hand, and the structure of the market on the other hand, warm poaed aa urgent political problems for the capitalist cless as a whole. Here, however, tha differential impact of tha recession on various capitals becomes Important. The forms of resolution of these problems and tha policies desired by various capitals differed substantially. This is an Brea requiring much f^rtf^r investigation. Before analysing the unprecedented proliferation of politicking-on these issues by the entire complex gamut of bourgeois organisations, tha other side of this economic crisis needs to be mentioned. The process of cepltallet eecumuletion of the mid-1970s took piece In the context of, and was indeed largely a product of, a rapid intensification of the cless struggle. The decede saw a growing militancy on the part of an increasingly organised efrican working class. It began with a massive strike of contract workere in Nemible. Prom 1972 onwards. South African industry was rocked by wave upon wave of strlkea by african workers demanding higher wages and tha right to organise. These strikes began at the tall end of tha great boom or the 1960s, and in many mays heralded the onset of the recession of the 1970s. These struggles are well known end neod not ba documented here. The mining Industry too was shaken by bitter disputes, stoppages end strikes between 1973 and 1976, These were liirgely suppressed with violence - In one instance in Carletonville In 1ff73, 11 etriking miners were shot oy police summoned by the Anglo--Amarican Corporation. During the Soweto uprisings, two massive general strikes in August and September 1976 virtually paralysed South African Industry, These working cless struggles apart, political stability was further shattered by other mass struggles against apartheid. Tha regime was rocked • by maaeive uprlelnge in 1976, by the collepse of Portuguese colonlellam and particularly the humllletlng defeat of tha South African army In Angola. Significantly, beginning in 1976 a slowly escalating guerilla war inside South Africa waa waged 1 by the militants of tha armed wing of the banned African National Congress, Umkhonto We Sizwe. As PW Botha claimed on assuming office, the state did indeed seem to be confronted with e 'total onslaught*. Certainly amongst South African businessmen there wee an almoat panle-etricken recognition that these struggles went beyond mere demands for the and to reclal discrimination. In the words of one worried cepltallet, 'there is e general tendency for young africans to be enti-free enterprise.* Again, tha above simple cetalogue of some of tha events of this intensifying class struggle of the 1970s Is no substitute for its analysis. Uuch furthar research is needed in this area. 8ut one general conclusion Is clear. By 1977-78 both tha economic and political conditions which had underlain end given rise to the unprecedented boom of 1961-71 had been decisively shattered. •hilet the economic end political crises of tha 1970a are not immediately reduceable to each other, they both raised, in differing ways, as tha central issue of polltlcel struggle, the question of the requisite state policies to ensure renewed capitalist growth and stability. Moreover, they did so in ways which began to shake loose the existing political alignments within South Africa, leading to Intensified political conflict and significant political reorganisation of varioua class forces. The Pressure for Reform .IT is necessary to note that by 1996 a significant change had occurred in the alignment of the economic organisation of the capitalist claas. With the important exception of organised agriculture, by 1978 ell the economic organisations of the cepltallet claae were united in agreement over the need for significant reforms in economic and political policy. Even given the differential Impact of tha page 4
Page 1 and 2: nr mm 1982 !'V V \ 1 i • » * s
Page 3 and 4: » DETENTIONS: Rabie Reports JUBT t
Page 5 and 6: dominate In South Africa. In these
Page 7 and 8: Ma+i-lightwd soee of the IMUN invol
Page 9 and 10: Baper* (LK8), beceuoe of *ta anti-u
Page 11 and 12: [DETENTIONS: Investigating Inquests
Page 13 and 14: peg* 11 officially performed post-m
Page 15 and 16: page 13 unless Inflicted beforw daa
Page 17 and 18: I 0-B« 15 INTRODUCTION TO POLITICA
Page 19 and 20: pega 17 oppressed BOTH by capital a
Page 21 and 22: I suthors' contention thmt it il ox
Page 23 and 24: Q ' analytical tools*( like role th
Page 25 and 26: page 2& •officiant nuebers of the
Page 27 and 28: gar. rgthnicjty: the ordinary peopl
Page 29 and 30: particularly •egaa, end hence wor
Page 31 and 32: £o natch 'their transport to gat h
Page 33 and 34: &C..31 to work in protest against t
Page 35 and 36: [fmgn 33 mturn to th«lr homes In t
Page 37 and 38: paga 36 - _ ' Fane Qeorge dibhole,
Page 39 and 40: peg* T/ appellant c la lea overrule
Page 41: 'ruling •tunic group'» or eo*eti
Page 45 and 46: and othar claaa forces, began to cr
Page 47 and 48: movement (In collaboration with the
Page 49 and 50: 1939, but aoaa aaabars of the Natio
Page 51 and 52: An Important caveat needs to be wdi
Page 53 and 54: end Vorster by implication. Althoug
Page 55 and 56: of thit Cape party organisation and
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