m - DISA

end Vorster by implication. Although it is impossible
to be sura on this, it la widely taken aa established
fact by Afrikaner intellectuals with close links to
the Cabinet that the first leaks to the press eera
provided by unitary Intelligence. The Minister of
Defence and Cape NP leader, PV Botha, eould probably
not neve been personally Involved in these leeks,
but eaa known to be angry with the loss of RW a
of the approved Defence Budget, now transferred to
the Information Department secret fund. Once the
initial leaks had been made, they were relentlessly
pursued by the Englletwlanguage newspapers of the
Argus and South African Associated Newspapers
groups. Owned ' Jointly by the Anglo-American
Corporation and the largest banks, these press groups
mere clearly hounding Mulder as but part of the wider
campaign to effect vital reforms necessary for the
restoration of capitalist growth* But even more
significantly, after some hesitation, the enti-
Hulder compaign was taken up in the Afrikaans press,
and particularly in the newspapers of the official
Cape hP press group, Ojg Nanionale Pers. In the
Transvaal too, Nationalist newspapers began to
pursue the matter, though the official Transvaal
NP organ, Ola Transvaler. did everything possible to
protect Mulder and claimed he was not involved in the
ebuses * bleming it all on the Secretary of
Inforaetlon. Or Eachel Rhoodie. This involvement of
the officlel Nationalist party press in a campaign
agelnst a government Minister (and by implication
against Vorster himself) was unprecedented. It
Indicated Just how deep were the divisions within
party end government, end the lengths to which the
reformers were prepared to go to discredit the right.
Further evidence of this lias in the belief of the
ebove-amntioned Afrikaner intellectual aources that
once the affair began to unravel cruclel dlscloaures
to the press were made by the wives of (unspecified)
Ceblnet ministers. The 'English press* had long been
depicted es the greatest enemy of Afrikaner nationalism.
Horn it became the crucial medium in which a decisive
confrontation between factions in the hP was fought
put!
Just as the effalr seemed to be building up to a
crescendo, Vorster dramatically announced his
resignation on 'health' grounda. He wes followed
soon afterwards by the head of BOBS, General Hendrlk
van den Bergh. In retrospect, Vorster's resignation
and that of Van den Bergh seem to have bean prompted
by two interrelated factors. Firstly, mm was later
revealed, both were deeply involved in the schemes
elaborated by the Department of Information. Ware
this to coma out whilat Vorster was still Prime
Minister, the political demoge would have been
lmmenaa. Vorster aust have realised ^iet In such a
case he could not rely on support from the mhole NP.
If he were elevated to the State Presidency however,
even his opponents in the NP would be forced to
protect his peraonel position. But secondly,
again it seem* clear that Vorster was attempting to
pre-empt the complete reformist diacredltetion of
the right wing of the party with which he eaa now
Identified* If he rmslgnad early, before the full
detaila of the scandal broke, there was a strong
chance thet Mulder mould be eble to succeed hie, thus
forcing the reformists Into en ettaok on the party
through the position of ite leader, rather than on an
Individual minister. Vorater's preference for
Huider was open* In the run up to the leadership
election, BOBS leaked (distorted) Information
favourable to lajlder to the press - but it was
published only in the Tranavaal W organ. Die
Transvaler.
Vorster**, ploy very nearly succeeded. Hed
Huider been able to maintain discipline in his
Transvaal NP ha eould 1 have been assured of the
Premiership by virtue of the Transvaal majority in
the caucus. Out by 1976, so deep were tha class
conflicts within the NP, particularly within the
Transvaal, that Mulder wee unable to control the
party he led. Defying all party precedent, protocol
and discipline, another Tranavaal Minister, AF (Pik)
Bothet put himself forward as a candidate for tha
National Leadership of the Party* This split tha
Trenevaal vote* ensuring (es eas later admitted to
have been the aim} the defeet of Mulder mod the
election to the Notional Leadership of the Cape
page 14
leader end Minister of Defence, P» Botha (no relation).
This drawing off of tha Transvaal reformist vote
from Mulder was shown to have been decisive when,
in tha election for e new Tranavaal leader
consequent on Mulder's enforced resignation from that
post soon afterwards t tha conservative candidate,
Or Andrlea Treurnlcht, trounced tha reformist
Minister, SP Botha (again no relation).
Thus the long campaign of press revelations and
judicial enquiry fatally weakened tha conservative
wing at a crucial moment of the struggle for dominance
both within tha NP and the government. The defeat of
Mulder marked a significant shift in the balance of
claaa forces orgenlsed by the NP gua party under the
banner of Afrikaner nationalism. By now Afrikaner
business hed effectively established itaalf as tha
dominant force In the allience. Through Bothe It
announced ite Intention to abandon some of the
hallowed policies of thle alliance, policies
which before brought support from white workers
and certain strata of the petty bourgmolaie.
But it cannot be too strongly emphasised that this
eas no simple struggle Internal to Afrikaner
nationalism. Afrikaner capital erne eble to
establlah its political dominance within the NP
over the other forces in the nationaliat alliance
only because of broader political support outside
of the- NP from other bourgeois organisations and
institutions, and the ermy itself. On its oen,
the reformist wing of the NP would not neve been
able to defeet tha conservatives and achieve the
almost total diacreditatlon of tha right eing. To
do so, it eaa forced to rely on, and indeed play a
relatively minor role in, e breeder campaign by
various bourgeois political groups (but partlculerly
the prase) egeinst ths right wing of the Nationalist
Party. Thue, tha defeat of Mulder not only marked
a decisive shift in the belence of forcea within the
Nationalist Party end government, et enother level of
politics it represented e now open allience against
elements of the NP on the pert of elmoat all
crgsnlsetlone of the capitalist class.