m - DISA

An Important caveat needs to be wdi him. The
argument that the contradict ions within and between
the class forces organised by the NP qua part/ were
transposed Into the Cabinet and especially Into the
atata apparatuses themselves must not ba misunderstood.
This is not to imply that these were the only, or
•van the major struggles and contradictions within
and between the state apparatus. The state has been
defined ae % site of class struggle. The specifically
Afrikaner nationalist struglles sere but part of,
and indeed structured by end structuring of, alder
class struggles,Thus a comprehensive analysis of
the state would have to account for the Complex
interaction between these various contradictory class
forces and class struggles within the state.
The point of this long analysis of the faction­
alism within the National Party and government is to
situete Muldergate within the wider capitalist
crisis. By late 1977, in the disastrous political
aftermath of the defeat in Angola, the Soamto uprisings,
the deeth of Steve Biko end the panicky banning of IB
afrlcen politlcel and other organisations, confronted
with increasingly organised and militant working class
and mass resistance to Apartheid - a resistance now
taking an openly anti-capitalist form - under severe
international pressure from the Vast to introduce
cosmetic changes, and faced with a massive outflow of
foreign capital, huge unemployment and tha worst
recession in South Africa's history, both the
Nationalist government and Party themselves were
decisively split over precisely the political
questions posed by these multiple crises.
The minutiae of these conflicts within both party
and government could be elaborated if necessary. Hoe-
aver, the point to note is thet in this period of
intense crisis, the party end government were both
effectively paralysed by their oen internal divisions.
It must be emphasised as forcefully_a_s_is possible,
that this mas no simple personality struggle, or
purely ideological difference, but much_mjore profoundly
a crisis of the class alliance on which Afrikaner
nationalism had rested nationally and in tha various
provinces since 19d8.
To oversimplify for the sake of exposition, the
'conservative 1 faction now grouped undar Uulder, and
enjoying the strong tacit support of Vorster, were
committed to retaining the alliance of farmers,
businessmen, workers and petty bourgeoisie intact.
To do so meant resisting moves to reform labour end
industrial policy, end anything more than minimal
concession* to the black middle class. Out it was
equally clear that vmry few Afrikaner businessmen
supported this policy with any enthusiasm. Rather,
from within the Afrikaner business community, and
amongst tha leading Afrikaner intellectuals there was
now strong support for tha 'reformists* nf the party.
This reflected the substantial development of
Afrikaner business particularly in the Transvaal
during the 1960s.^
Thus, Sanlom and the Cape Party were no longer
Isolated (as they hod been in the early 1960s) from
powerful forces in the other provincial parties.
The Transvaal party was now itself decisively
divided along fairly explicit class lines between
conservatives and reformists. The Transvaal leader,
Or Connie Mulder, was the great hope of the conservative
sing. But within the Transvmel Party there nom existed
a powerful reformist opposition, grouped under two
very influential Ministers * the Minister of nines
and Planning, 0r p Koornhof, and tha Minister of
Foreign Affairs, nr Botha. To Transvaal businessman
Mulder was an anathema. One leading Afrikaner
industrialist described him to me as e dpef - 'a fort*.
By 1977 -a virtual politlcel impasse had been
reached in party, cabinet end atata. Mot only was
Vorster's Qonepertlem increasingly untenable within
the party, but inside the Cabinet his practice of
giving individual Hinletare their head made it ^mry
difficult for him to recentrelise control in his own
hands* He was thus unable to intervene decisively to
give a particularly conservative or reformist
direction to this government, but was reduced to the
increasingly sterile role of trying simply to keep all
factions together.
After Angola end pmrticulerly Soweto, virtually
all commentators were agreed thet on all the burning
Issues of economic end political policy, behind the
overt fece of hardline control, the government was
virtually rudderless. Torn in many different B
directions^ it spoke with many different voices. The
political paralysis of the Vorster government when
faced with severe end worsening economic and political
crises, finally catalysed significant shifts in the
alignment of political forces in the state. Tea
groups are crucial hare - the military and the moat
powerful of South Africa's capitalists. An alliance
between these two forces rapidly took shape.
whatever the fears of Afrikaner Intellectuals of
a coup d'etat, senior military officers began to
Intervene directly in these politlcel struggles over
state polity, advocating significant reforms. In 19OT,
through the Minister of Defence, Pi Botha, the military
proclaimed ita programme of a 'total strategy' to meet
the crises confronting the stete. Its fundamental aim
according to the official military Journal, was 'a
guarantee for the system) of trwm enterprise 1 .
This could only be achieved on tha besls of a "coapre-
hensive plan to utilise ell the means svailable to e
state according to en integrated pattern*. Total
strategy hald that 'the resolution bf a conflict In .
the times in ehich we now live demands Interdependent
and coordinated action in ell fields - military,
psychological, economic, ideological, cultural etc
... Ve are today involved in a war .*. the striving
for specific elms ... must be coordinated aith all
the means available to the state**
bjut this 'coordinated action* should not be
understood as simple defence of a static status quo.
- political and economic reforms ware essential to
ensure the defence of the state. In tha worde of the
CJilef of Staffr
The lesson is clear. The South African
Defence force is reedy to beat off any attack
•.. but ee muet take into account the aspirations
of our different population groups, ee must «
gain and keep their trust.
In effect then, the Total Strategy Doctrine argued that
'blacks* had to be given e stake in the capitalist
system, whareby they would begin receiving the
'beneflte' of that system, their 'quality of Ufe<
would have to be Improved, thus supposedly giving