Activation of new aaa units - Air Defense Artillery

19-18 ACTIVITIES OF THIRD U.S. AR~IY AAA 5
aircraft. Troops were convinced that these attacks were
made with captured U. S. aircraft operated by the enemy.
XIX TAC investigated many of these incidents and denied
that the planes were German manned. The correctness of
Ihis attitude, regardless of facts, is evident when one con-
~iders that had this belief been allowed to grow unchallenged,
widespread attacks on U. S. aircraft would have
followed, and air support would have become impossible.
These incidents, together with identification difficulties encountered
throughout the operations on the Continent, indicate
the imperative need for development of a reliable
means of identification that can be made available for both
~ oun and automatic weapon units. This is a muSt.
more complicated tasks have been accomplished.
~ lany.
The
~ystem of AAORs was never quite satisfactory .. The time
lag was too great, communications were too uncertain, and
the fighter control rooms were seldom able to furnish prompt
identification of any but their own aircraft.
I January 1945 turned out to be one of the biggest days
on the Continent for antiaircraft. The German Air Force
came out in force with widespread attacks, and for the first
time, made detennined efforts against airfields. One of the
most noteworthy attacks was made on the airfield at Metz.
Twenty-five planes attacked, eighteen were shot down and
four disappeared smoking. Heavy gun units at Metz. participated,
but for most, the altitude was too low for good
90ml11shooting. The Group Commander attributes the
remarkable percentage shot down to the location of automatic
weapons fire units on the field so that most of the
engagements were "right down the barrel."
After pinching out the bulge, the remainder of January
and February was spent in slugging through the Siegfried
Line. Antiaircraft played a frequent ground role in this
phase, smothering opposition for river crossings, cleaning
out wooded areas with air bursts, and supporting infantry.
ACROSS TIlE RmxE
The 4th Armored Division was used to spearhead a
breakthrough that carried to the Rhine River at Koblenz
and then turned south across the i\ loselle. A whirlwind
campaign involving a pincer movement within Third
Army and a pincer movement in conjunction with Seventh
.-\rmy captured all the area west of the Rhine, took but ten
da,'s,and resulted in the destruction of two German Armies.
The next phase, that of crossing the Rhine and the drive
into central Germany, followed in similar lightning fashion .
.\lanv antiaircraft missions were abandoned and units were
mo,'~d so that the bulk of antiaircraft assigned to the Army
was used in defense of the crossing. Days of shooting followed
which equalled those at Avranches. Defenses extended
from Boppard on the north to Oppenheim on the
south. XII Corps made the initial assault crossing. was well
beyond the river in t\\'o days, and swung sharply north.
The VIII Corps crossed on the north Hank and after being
pinched out east of the Rhine, mopped up the pockets left
by the rapid ad,'ance of other units. The xx. Corps, between
VIII and XII headed generally northeast.
The swiftness of the advance made the Rhine Ri,'er
bridges profitable targets for only a short while. As the
armor spearheads of Third Army began to fan out from the
Rhine, the enemy came out in still greater force to stop the
tide which was about to engulf all Germany. Initially
most of the enemy aircraft were on reconnaissance, but as
the full realizatio~ of the situation struck home, a real effort
was made to avert disaster. As the German armies
crumpled, the German Air Force attempted to stop the
drive by attacking forward clements.
On 17 l\,larch the 489th's SPs (4th Armored Division)
and the 452d-40mm's (XII Corps) knocked down 20 out
of 53 aircraft. On 18 March, 235 enemv aircraft attacked
during daylight and 50 were destroyed. On 23 March, 27
out of 53 aircraft were downed with the 452d getting 10.
On the 24th and 25th, 63 more were destroyed, this time
with the I29th Gun Battalion accounting for 23. Activity
started to decline on the 26th, but during the short period,
191 enemy aircraft out of 815 attacking were shot down
with negligible damage to installations and units defended.
Third Army was now headed northeast and east with
XX Corps on the north, XII on the south and VIlI Corps,
after completing its mopping-up assignment, in the middle.
As the month of April opened, the intensity of air attacks
increased. The 4th Annored and 6th Armored were heavily
attacked and autobahn traffic received considerable attention.
On the second of April, automatic weapons battalions
alone accounted for 104 Category I's and II's. Of these,
the 489th (4th Armored Division) was credited with 40
and the 777th (6th Armored Division) with 44. After
another peak on 4 April, activity gradually declined, but
not without several battalions experiencing sharp activity
and achieving fine results. The 778th AAA A\\1 Battalion
(Sp) in one eighteen-hour period got 12 out of 21, and on
10 April, the 390th AAA A\\1 Battalion (SP) shot down
9 out of 13 in five minutes.
During the middle of April, our advance slowed down
somewhat and the German Air Force began to hit supply
installations and increased the percentage of night attacks.
In one month-I3 l\larch to 14 April, Third Army claimed
715 aircraft (455 Cat. 1's and 260 Cat. II's) with an alltime
peak on 2 April of 104.
SOUTH TO AUSTRIA
The last phase of operations saw Third Army turn south.
Bastogne was cold and miserable but this did not interfere
with the alertness of AAA troops .