Activation of new aaa units - Air Defense Artillery

-')
1-
FOR YOURSELF-
A complete, convenient indoor
rifle range, and a safe, accurate
target gun.
FOR YOUR FAMILY-
An ideal "training aid"-accurate
shooting and hours of fun.
FOR YOUR PARTIES-
An unbeatable crowd-pleaser
-and a real highlight in the
game-room-or the living room,
for that matter.
FOR ALL YEAR ROUND-
The perfect gift-lasting, the
finest kind of sport, invaluable
training for hand and eyej safe
for children, more than accurate
enough for the adult sharpshooter.
Johnson Indoor Target Gun
Complete with targets, pellets,
backstop-
$15
EXTRA PARTS
Pellet Carriers $.45 ea.
Propelling Bands
(3 in package) $.40
Pellets (65 to packai:e) , $.'0
Targets S.15 dOL
Order from
Coast Artillery Journal
631 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington 4, D. C.
THE COAST AHTILLERY ]OllHNAL
and military power than some of his associates.
Hitler's spectacular conquests in 1940
presented acute problems. \Ve were deeply
concerned with preventing the French
Reet from falling into Axis hands and in
maintaining French control over North
Africa. This involved us in tortuous relations
with Vichy France. Perhaps no
other phase of our diplomacy has been
more severely criticized, yet Hull thinks
that our policy saved many American lives,
provided valuable information, and made
the successful invasion of North Africa
possible.
Hull devotes many chapters to our relations
with Japanese from the fall of
France to the attack on Pearl Harbor. Our
basic policy as outlined by the President
and Hull in October 1940 aimed at
avoiding a war in the Far East in order to
aid Britain. \Ve were determined to continue
limited aid to China and maintain all
our rights and principles as related to
Japan but not to quarrel with her. And
we would leave the door open for discussion.
Vie had to convey to Japan the impression
that we would use our strength if
necessary. Dealing with Japan on any other
basis reminded Hull of the man in Tennessee
whose chivalrous nature prompted
him to unstrap his revolver and leave
it on a stump seventy-five feet away before
engaging in a conference with a highwayman.
\Vhen the Japanese ambassador
protested our program of licensing exports
of scrap iron and steel in October 1940,
Hull told him abruptly that it wa~ unheard
of "for one country engaged in seizing
another country to insist that a third
nation is unfriendlv if it does not cheerfully
provide the n~cessary implements of
war to aid the aggressor nation in carrying
out its invasion."
Hull was not present at the Atlantic
Charter meeting in August 1941 when
the British and American policy of resisting
fu~her Japanese aggression in the Pacific
was agreed upon. His protracted conversations
with Ambassador Nomura began
in March and lasted until 7 December
1941. While these conversations were
going on, a private group including two
officials of the l\laryknoll Mission in Japan
and Postmaster Frank C. \Valker,
raised the old question of appeasing the
liberal elements in Japan in order to prevent
the military from going berserk. Hull
was informed of these efforts but confined
himself to official channels in dealing with
Japan. The Maryknoll episode is another
illustration of the futility of well meaning
efforts by naive citizens to inRuence the
course of action of their own government
when they had no real knowledge of Japanese
intentions or anv sound basis for
belief that the Japanese- government would
live up to its agreements.
Japan's formal proposals to the United
States showed how far apart our positions
were. According to Hull these called for a
joint overlordship of the Pacific by Japan
and the United States, giving Japan con-
]ulr-A/IO/Ist _ b
trol of about 90 per cent of the popula.
tion and wealth of that area. Japan
even suggested that the government of
the United States refrain from giving aid
to any nation engaged in the European
war. This meant an end to the British aid
program. Japan and the United States
would act jointly to assist in the speedy
restoration of peace in Europe. This meant
a peace on Hitler's terms. The United
States was to request China to negotiate
peace with Japan on terms involving the
recognition of Japan's possession of 1\lanchuria.
This was something we had refused
to recognize ourselves. The United
States was to suspend aid to China in
case Chiang Kai-shek refused to negotiate
with Japan. Normal trade relations would
be restored between Japan and the United
States. Both powers would jointly guarantee
the independence of the Philippines
-as if any such action on the part of the
United States was necessary. A conference
between Roosevelt and Konoye would
follow the basic agreement.
The differences could not be bridged.
Hull, informed through "magic" of Japanese
intentions to submit a deadline date
for our acceptance or refusal of the Japanese
terms, did not expect that Japan
would be deterred from warlike acts by
anything short of complete acceptance of
her demands. He looked upon the time
gained in negotiations as time won fO!
our military preparaticns. He warned our
military chiefs as early as November 2;.
1941 that there was no hope of reaching
an agreement through diplomatic channels
and that war mu:;t be expected at any
time. He was painfully surprised at the lack
of alertness shown by our Pearl Harbor
commanders.
A great debate, already begun, is certain
to rage over t~ question of whether
or not the United States could have
reached a modus vivendi with Japan and
prevented the outbreak of war in December
1941. l\linimizing the importance of Japan's
earlier demands, some writers noW
seem to think that Hull's memorandum of
November 26, 1941 was the "ultimatum"
that touched off the war. Apparently the
Japanese negotiators in \Vashington had
no such views, because on the day Hu~1
handed them his memorandum, they radIoed
to the Foreign Office in Tokyo the
following intercepted message: "Should we
[Japan] during the course of these conversations,
deliberatelv .enter into our
scheduled operation [the Pearl Harbor a:tack],
there is great danger that the r~
sponsibility for the rupture of the neg oU -
ations will be cast on us. There ha\'e ~ed
times in the past when she [the UnH
States] could ha\'e considered discontinuing
com'ersarions because of our in\'a sion
of French Indo-China. Now, should wewithout
clarifying our intentions, force a
rupture ... she may use such a thing ~
that as counter propaganda against us..
On the dav Hull handed his so-called ulumatum
to' the Japanese envoys in \Vas~ington,
a Japanese naval task force of SL\7