Abstracts of the Psychonomic Society — Volume 14 — November ...

Friday Morning Papers 64–66
matters. We will present a theory of semantic categories that assumes both
exemplars and features to vary along a common, latent scale. Evidence for
this theory will be provided through an analysis of exemplar by feature
applicability matrices with the two-parameter logistic model. This item
response model for unidimensional data not only fits the applicability matrices,
its parameters naturally account for the varying representativeness
of the constituting exemplars and features.
11:00–11:15 (64)
Mechanistic and Teleological Explanations in Inference. TANIA
LOMBROZO, University of California, Berkeley—Many objects and
events can be explained either mechanistically, by appeal to preceding
causal mechanisms, or teleologically, by appeal to functions and goals.
For example, a tiger’s stripes can be explained mechanistically by appeal
to gene–environment interactions or teleologically by appeal to camouflage.
What are the cognitive consequences of these distinct kinds of
explanation? In particular, do mechanistic and teleological explanations
reflect or influence basic cognitive processes, such as categorization and
inference? Building on recent work documenting the effects of different
kinds of explanations on categorization (Lombrozo, 2009, Cognition,
110, 248-253), I will present a series of experiments exploring the roles
of functional properties and explanations in inference, focusing on property
generalization in category-based induction.
11:20–11:35 (65)
Logical Rule Models of Classification Response Times. ROBERT M.
NOSOFSKY, Indiana University, Bloomington, & MARIO FIFIC, Max
Planck Institute for Human Development—A classic idea in cognitive
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psychology is that, in many situations involving concept learning and
categorization, people develop and test logical rules as a basis for classification.
What response time (RT) predictions are made by logical rule
models? There is currently a major gap in answering this question. We
develop a set of logical rule models of classification RTs by synthesizing
mental-architecture and random-walk approaches. In initial validation
tests that involve explicit instructions for the use of logical rule strategies,
the logical rule models compare favorably with major alternatives
in the field, including exemplar, distance-from-boundary, and diffusionlike
models. Ongoing work tests the extent to which logical rules are indeed
used as a basis for classification by examining RTs in free-strategy
situations.
11:40–11:55 (66)
Levels of Abstraction: A Bird’s-Eye View. ROBERT G. COOK, Tufts
University—Because of birds’ and mammals’ shared status as highly mobile,
visual animals that interact with the world at similar spatial scales,
the examination of discrimination and categorization across birds and
mammals is a critical part of any complete psychology of cognition.
Focusing primarily on research with pigeons, studies are reviewed that
highlight some of the similarities and differences we have found at different
levels of abstraction across these classes of animals. These studies
include examinations of exemplar and category learning across different
tasks, the learning of same/different relations across different modalities,
and the classification of actions. In particular, the theoretical relations
of exemplar memorization and generalized abstraction and their respective
roles in comparative intelligence and the evolution of cognition are
considered.