Abstracts of the Psychonomic Society — Volume 14 — November ...
Abstracts of the Psychonomic Society — Volume 14 — November ...
Abstracts of the Psychonomic Society — Volume 14 — November ...
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Sunday Morning Papers 272–278<br />
9:00–9:15 (272)<br />
Effects <strong>of</strong> Stress, Working Memory Capacity, and Inferential Complexity<br />
on Foreign Language Reading Comprehension. LESTER<br />
C. LOSCHKY, MANPREET K. RAI, RICHARD J. HARRIS, PATRI-<br />
CIA C. BARROS, & LINDSAY G. COOK, Kansas State University<strong>—</strong><br />
We investigated effects <strong>of</strong> stress, working memory (WM) capacity, and<br />
inferential complexity on foreign language (FL) readers’ inference comprehension,<br />
in terms <strong>of</strong> accuracy (processing effectiveness) and reading<br />
speed (processing efficiency). Fifty-five intermediate-level Spanish<br />
learners’ reading comprehension was measured using questions with<br />
three levels <strong>of</strong> inferential complexity: noninference, bridging-inference,<br />
and pragmatic-inference. We measured participants’ WM capacity and<br />
varied <strong>the</strong>ir stress level using a video camera. The results showed that<br />
higher WM learners were more accurate overall. Stress decreased efficiency,<br />
with a trend toward greater effects on RTs for questions requiring<br />
greater inferential complexity. Consistent with Eysenck et al.’s (2007)<br />
attentional control <strong>the</strong>ory, analyses showed that higher WM learners<br />
strategically traded efficiency for greater effectiveness, whereas lower<br />
WM learners only did so (less successfully) under stress. Thus, <strong>the</strong> results<br />
showed that stress impedes FL reading comprehension through<br />
interactions between WM capacity and inferential complexity but can be<br />
strategically compensated for by increasing processing time.<br />
Divided Attention<br />
Republic Ballroom, Sunday Morning, 8:00–9:55<br />
Chaired by Andrew Heathcote, University <strong>of</strong> Newcastle, Australia<br />
8:00–8:15 (273)<br />
Testing <strong>the</strong> Architecture <strong>of</strong> Cognition. ANDREW HEATHCOTE,<br />
AMI EIDELS, & SCOTT D. BROWN, University <strong>of</strong> Newcastle, Australia<strong>—</strong>Psychologists<br />
have long sought ways to identify <strong>the</strong> architecture<br />
<strong>of</strong> cognition, from Donders’s (1859) subtractive methodology, through<br />
Sternberg’s (1969) additive factors methodology for establishing selective<br />
influence on a processing stage, and culminating in Townsend and<br />
Nozawa’s (1995) system factorial technology (SFT). SFT analyzes response<br />
time distribution, ra<strong>the</strong>r than summaries such as mean RT, allowing<br />
it to avoid <strong>the</strong> limitations <strong>of</strong> earlier approaches and make strong<br />
inferences (Platt, 1964). SFT uses signature functions that identify architectural<br />
variations critical to <strong>the</strong> study <strong>of</strong> attention and perception,<br />
such as whe<strong>the</strong>r a system is serial or parallel and whe<strong>the</strong>r it is affected<br />
by capacity limitations. We propose a nonparametric Bayesian approach,<br />
based on Klugkist, Laudy, and Hoijtink (2005), to statistical inference<br />
for SFT. We benchmark its statistical performance for testing selective<br />
influence, where <strong>the</strong>re exist alternative approaches from econometrics,<br />
and illustrate its broader application to testing SFT hypo<strong>the</strong>ses where no<br />
alternative tests exist.<br />
8:20–8:35 (274)<br />
Dual Task With and Without Cost: An Underlying Modular Architecture.<br />
ASHER COHEN, MORAN ISRAEL, MAYA ZUCKERMAN,<br />
& ARIT GLICKSOHN, Hebrew University <strong>of</strong> Jerusalem<strong>—</strong>Dual task<br />
costs are <strong>of</strong>ten documented, but <strong>the</strong>ir underlying costs are disputed. We<br />
conducted experiments in which participants performed one or two visual<br />
tasks over eight sessions. In <strong>the</strong> first set <strong>of</strong> experiments, <strong>the</strong> input to<br />
both tasks was presented simultaneously. The two tasks ei<strong>the</strong>r shared a<br />
module or did not share a module. Clear dual task costs were observed<br />
when <strong>the</strong> tasks shared a module, and no costs were observed when <strong>the</strong><br />
tasks did not share a module. The very same tasks were performed in a<br />
second set <strong>of</strong> experiments, except that <strong>the</strong> SOA <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> input to <strong>the</strong> two<br />
tasks varied between trials. Here, a clear cost was observed even when<br />
<strong>the</strong> tasks did not share a module. The results suggest that a modular<br />
architecture is an important factor in dual task performance and that <strong>the</strong><br />
PRP paradigm is not adequate for examining structural dual task costs.<br />
8:40–8:55 (275)<br />
Supertaskers: Extraordinary Ability in Multitasking. DAVID L.<br />
STRAYER & JASON M. WATSON, University <strong>of</strong> Utah<strong>—</strong>Theory<br />
suggests that driving should be impaired for all motorists when <strong>the</strong>y<br />
42<br />
concurrently talk on a cell phone. But is everybody impaired by this dualtask<br />
combination? We tested 200 participants in a high-fidelity driving<br />
simulator in both single- and dual-task conditions. The dual-task condition<br />
involved concurrently performing a very demanding auditory version<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> operation span (OSPAN) task. Whereas <strong>the</strong> vast majority <strong>of</strong> participants<br />
showed significant performance decrements in dual-task conditions<br />
(compared to single-task conditions for both <strong>the</strong> driving and OSPAN<br />
tasks), 2% <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> sample showed absolutely no performance decrements<br />
across <strong>the</strong> single- and dual-task conditions. In <strong>the</strong> single-task condition,<br />
<strong>the</strong>se supertaskers scored in <strong>the</strong> top quartile on all dependent measures<br />
associated with driving, and OSPAN tasks and Monte Carlo simulations<br />
indicated that <strong>the</strong> frequency <strong>of</strong> supertaskers was significantly greater than<br />
chance. We suggest that, in demanding dual-task situations, supertaskers<br />
recruit from broader neural regions than do <strong>the</strong> population at large.<br />
9:00–9:15 (276)<br />
Triple-Task Performance Reveals Common Codes for Spatial Information.<br />
PAUL ATCHLEY & DAVID MARSHALL, University <strong>of</strong><br />
Kansas<strong>—</strong>Multiple resource <strong>the</strong>ory (Wickens, 1980, 2002) suggests attention<br />
may use separate resource pools and share common codes (such as<br />
spatial codes). This view is supported by work showing that spatial coding<br />
for verbal and visual attention information may overlap physiologically<br />
in right hemisphere regions. We examined cross-modal dual-task performance<br />
using a dichotic listening task to present verbal information and a<br />
pointing task to collect visual attention data. Participants listened to word<br />
streams <strong>of</strong> directional words and color words in each ear and responded to<br />
one ear on a block <strong>of</strong> trials by producing compatible direction (e.g., “up:<br />
north”) or color (e.g., “ruby: red”) responses while performing a visual<br />
task in which <strong>the</strong>y identified a centrally presented target and <strong>the</strong>n localized<br />
a target presented peripherally along <strong>the</strong> same axes as <strong>the</strong> directional<br />
words. The data showed clear code interference effects; dichotic evidence<br />
for a right lateralized effect for direction was mixed.<br />
9:20–9:35 (277)<br />
Evidence Against a Unitary Central Bottleneck: Reductions <strong>of</strong> Dual-<br />
Task Costs Depend on Modality Pairings. ELIOT HAZELTINE, University<br />
<strong>of</strong> Iowa, ERIC RUTHRUFF, University <strong>of</strong> New Mexico, & TIM<br />
WIFALL, University <strong>of</strong> Iowa<strong>—</strong>Practice can dramatically reduce dualtask<br />
costs, in some cases, completely eliminating <strong>the</strong>m. However, dualtask<br />
costs are reduced at different rates, depending on <strong>the</strong> particular combination<br />
<strong>of</strong> tasks. We examined <strong>the</strong> role that task similarity, in terms <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> input and output modalities, plays in reduction <strong>of</strong> dual-task costs with<br />
practice. Four groups <strong>of</strong> participants performed a visual-manual task that<br />
was paired with ei<strong>the</strong>r ano<strong>the</strong>r visual-manual task, a visual-vocal task, an<br />
auditory-manual task, or an auditory-vocal task. Although task difficulty<br />
was similar across all conditions, only <strong>the</strong> auditory-vocal group was able<br />
to eliminate dual-task costs after 16 sessions <strong>of</strong> practice. These findings<br />
suggest that dual-task costs after practice depend on crosstalk between<br />
modality-specific representations ra<strong>the</strong>r than on competition for amodal<br />
central operations.<br />
9:40–9:55 (278)<br />
When Two Objects Are Easier Than One: Implications for<br />
Object- Based Attention. W. TRAMMELL NEILL, YONGNA LI, &<br />
GEORGE A. SEROR, University at Albany<strong>—</strong>In many studies, subjects<br />
process two features <strong>of</strong> one object more easily than <strong>the</strong>y do two features<br />
<strong>of</strong> two objects. Such within-object superiority suggests that attention is<br />
object based ra<strong>the</strong>r than merely space based. However, o<strong>the</strong>r studies find<br />
<strong>the</strong> opposite result: between-object superiority (e.g., Davis & Holmes,<br />
2005; Neill, O’Connor, & Li, 2008). How can it be easier to divide attention<br />
between features <strong>of</strong> different objects than between features <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
same object? We consider three explanations: (1) Processing capacity<br />
may be initially divided between objects, so that features <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> same<br />
object compete for allocated capacity, but features <strong>of</strong> different objects do<br />
not. (2) Attention to two features <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> same object may cause irrelevant<br />
object information to also be processed. (3) When target features are integral<br />
to object shapes, whole objects may be easier to compare than <strong>the</strong><br />
component features. We report multiple experiments supporting <strong>the</strong> third<br />
explanation.