Abstracts of the Psychonomic Society — Volume 14 — November ...
Abstracts of the Psychonomic Society — Volume 14 — November ...
Abstracts of the Psychonomic Society — Volume 14 — November ...
You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles
YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.
Saturday Afternoon Papers 248–254<br />
well as did <strong>the</strong> original scenes. In Experiment 2, however, conceptually<br />
similar scenes were found to cue recall as well as <strong>the</strong> original scenes.<br />
These experiments show that both <strong>the</strong> original contexts <strong>of</strong> events and contexts<br />
similar to <strong>the</strong> original ones can have robust cuing effects in recall.<br />
5:10–5:25 (248)<br />
Remember Source Memory ROCs Indicate Recollection Is a Continuous<br />
Process. SCOTT D. SLOTNICK, Boston College<strong>—</strong>The dualprocess<br />
model assumes that memory is based on recollection (retrieval<br />
with specific detail) or familiarity (retrieval without specific detail). A<br />
current debate is whe<strong>the</strong>r recollection is a threshold (all-or-none) process<br />
or, like familiarity, is a continuous (graded) process. In <strong>the</strong> present study,<br />
two continuous models and two threshold models <strong>of</strong> recollection were<br />
evaluated using receiver operating characteristic (ROC) analysis. These<br />
models included <strong>the</strong> continuous signal detection unequal variance model<br />
and <strong>the</strong> threshold dual-process model. In <strong>the</strong> study phase <strong>of</strong> two experiments,<br />
objects were presented to <strong>the</strong> right or left <strong>of</strong> fixation. At test,<br />
participants made “remember” or “know” responses and source memory<br />
(spatial location) confidence ratings. Recollection ROCs were generated<br />
from “remember” source memory confidence ratings. Nei<strong>the</strong>r threshold<br />
model adequately fit <strong>the</strong> recollection ROCs. By contrast, <strong>the</strong> continuous<br />
models adequately fit one or both recollection ROCs. The present results<br />
indicate that both recollection and familiarity are continuous processes.<br />
Applications <strong>of</strong> Decision Making<br />
Independence Ballroom, Saturday Afternoon, 3:50–5:25<br />
Chaired by Frederick V. Malmstrom, U.S. Air Force Academy<br />
3:50–4:05 (249)<br />
A Behavioral Economic Model <strong>of</strong> Addiction. FREDERICK V.<br />
MALMSTROM & DAVID MULLIN, U.S. Air Force Academy, & GARY<br />
MEARS, University <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Rockies<strong>—</strong>Economic models <strong>of</strong> addiction behavior<br />
have traditionally emphasized rational decision making by use<br />
<strong>of</strong> intertemporal utility functions. This study modifies previous models<br />
by focusing on interactions between <strong>the</strong> rational and emotional brain<br />
centers. Our model uses an economic barter-exchange framework to<br />
describe steady state demand-side behavior. Chemical models <strong>of</strong> addiction<br />
behavior have been shown to involve a three-way interaction with<br />
<strong>the</strong> prefrontal cortex, <strong>the</strong> nucleus accumbens, and <strong>the</strong> insula. Here, we<br />
pay particular attention to <strong>the</strong> delay <strong>of</strong> gratification. This model may be<br />
simulated through Monte Carlo processes and tested through existing<br />
data from compulsory intervention processes to determine its steady<br />
state equilibrium. Finally, this model investigates why rational models<br />
<strong>of</strong> addiction treatment, such as compulsory (e.g., 12-step court ordered)<br />
and pure informational (e.g., Just-Say-No) programs, have limited<br />
effectiveness.<br />
4:10–4:25 (250)<br />
Dynamics <strong>of</strong> Future Discounting and Fluctuating Blood Glucose.<br />
X. T. WANG & ROBERT D. DVORAK, University <strong>of</strong> South Dakota<strong>—</strong><br />
Little is known about how fluctuating blood glucose levels affect cognitive<br />
functions. The present study explored metabolic mechanisms <strong>of</strong><br />
future discounting, a choice phenomenon where people value present<br />
goods over future goods. Using fluctuating blood glucose as an index <strong>of</strong><br />
body energy budget, optimal discounting should regulate choice among<br />
rewards as a function <strong>of</strong> temporal caloric requirement. We identified<br />
this novel link between glucose levels measured in vivo and future discounting<br />
in an experiment where participants made choices between a<br />
smaller–sooner reward and a larger–later option, with possible actual<br />
monetary consequences. In contrast to <strong>the</strong> zero-sugar drink group, <strong>the</strong><br />
sugar drink group showed a reduced future discount rate after drink,<br />
when controlling for sex, age, body mass index, and <strong>the</strong> taste rating <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> drink. The blood glucose levels not only varied as a result <strong>of</strong> caloric<br />
intake, but also regulated <strong>the</strong> rate <strong>of</strong> future discounting according to<br />
body energy budget.<br />
4:30–4:45 (251)<br />
A Causal Contrast Theory <strong>of</strong> Moral Intuitions in Trolley Dilemmas.<br />
MICHAEL R. WALDMANN & ALEX WIEGMANN, University <strong>of</strong><br />
38<br />
Göttingen<strong>—</strong>In trolley dilemmas, a train is about to kill several victims<br />
who could be saved if, instead, a different victim is harmed. A number <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong>ories have been proposed that assume that permissibility judgments<br />
in <strong>the</strong>se dilemmas are mediated by an assessment <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> causal structure<br />
entailed by <strong>the</strong> proposed interventions. For example, it has been postulated<br />
that it is permissible to harm people as a side effect, but not as a<br />
means <strong>of</strong> saving o<strong>the</strong>rs. We have developed a different causal <strong>the</strong>ory,<br />
according to which reasoners primarily focus on <strong>the</strong> relevant targets <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> proposed interventions (e.g., threats, victims), and contrast <strong>the</strong> moral<br />
consequences <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> causal paths <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se targets in <strong>the</strong> presence versus<br />
absence <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> intervention. We will show that this causal contrast <strong>the</strong>ory<br />
explains intuitions in various types <strong>of</strong> trolley dilemmas better than its<br />
competitors.<br />
4:50–5:05 (252)<br />
Temporal Discounting and Risk: Different Strategies for Different<br />
Tasks. MARY KAY STEVENSON, STEPHEN HONG, & SHARON<br />
ALKIRE, California State University, East Bay<strong>—</strong>Previous research<br />
has shown that when participants judge and define <strong>the</strong>ir preferences<br />
for future losses or risky losses, a slope reversal is reliably obtained.<br />
Participants’ responses are described by a steeper slope across losses<br />
for <strong>the</strong> longest delay and a steeper slope across losses for <strong>the</strong> smallest<br />
probability <strong>of</strong> losing. This study describes <strong>the</strong> impact <strong>of</strong> reversing <strong>the</strong><br />
response scale so that <strong>the</strong> participants judged <strong>the</strong> unattractiveness <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> events and <strong>the</strong> outcomes <strong>the</strong>y preferred <strong>the</strong> least. Participants also<br />
evaluated <strong>the</strong> same stimuli in terms <strong>of</strong> how attractive <strong>the</strong> outcomes were<br />
or how much <strong>the</strong>y preferred one <strong>of</strong> two options. Several prediction strategies<br />
for identifying individual differences were also tested. The results<br />
are discussed in terms <strong>of</strong> a <strong>the</strong>oretical framework that can be used to<br />
account for <strong>the</strong> slope reversal effect.<br />
5:10–5:25 (253)<br />
Managing Exposure to Risk: Strategies and Influences. SANDRA L.<br />
SCHNEIDER, NATHANIEL DECKER, & MOUMITA MUKHERJEE,<br />
University <strong>of</strong> South Florida<strong>—</strong>How decision makers deal with risk is a<br />
topic that is typically studied within <strong>the</strong> “risky choice” paradigm <strong>of</strong>ten<br />
associated with studies based on Kahneman and Tversky’s prospect<br />
<strong>the</strong>ory. In this presentation, we provide a series <strong>of</strong> empirical and simulated<br />
results to show that risk responses are <strong>of</strong>ten qualitatively different<br />
from what would be expected when focusing exclusively on risky choice.<br />
In particular, we demonstrate that risk tolerance is markedly reduced<br />
when individuals take an active role in managing <strong>the</strong>ir risk exposure,<br />
when people feel threatened, and when people make decisions with a<br />
partner. In addition, we show that decision-making models that do not<br />
take into account context-based goals and dynamic contingencies cannot<br />
effectively meet <strong>the</strong> needs <strong>of</strong> decision makers, because <strong>the</strong>re is no<br />
mechanism to protect decision makers from unnecessary exposure to<br />
catastrophic losses or to avail <strong>the</strong>m <strong>of</strong> serendipitous opportunities for<br />
windfall gains.<br />
Cognitive Control II<br />
Back Bay Ballroom C, Saturday Afternoon, 4:10–5:25<br />
Chaired by Ines Jentzsch, University <strong>of</strong> St Andrews<br />
4:10–4:25 (254)<br />
Control Adjustments After Alternation-Based Response Conflict.<br />
INES JENTZSCH, University <strong>of</strong> St Andrews<strong>—</strong>Recently, we proposed<br />
that response alternations in unidimensional tasks can produce response<br />
conflict and subsequent processing adjustments (Jentzsch & Leuthold,<br />
2005, JEP:HPP). The aim <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> present experiments was to more clearly<br />
specify <strong>the</strong> mechanisms <strong>of</strong> such alternation-based response conflict.<br />
In four experiments <strong>the</strong> response–stimulus interval (RSI) and speed–<br />
accuracy instruction were manipulated. Emphasis on speed ra<strong>the</strong>r than<br />
accuracy should reduce <strong>the</strong> amount <strong>of</strong> executive control, leading to a reduced<br />
behavioral adjustment after conflict. Participants responded generally<br />
more slowly and more accurately under accuracy than under speed<br />
instructions. Alternation-based interference was reduced more under<br />
speed than under accuracy instruction and systematically decreased with<br />
increasing RSI. In sum, <strong>the</strong>se finding suggests that control adjustments