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Abstracts of the Psychonomic Society — Volume 14 — November ...

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Saturday Afternoon Papers 248–254<br />

well as did <strong>the</strong> original scenes. In Experiment 2, however, conceptually<br />

similar scenes were found to cue recall as well as <strong>the</strong> original scenes.<br />

These experiments show that both <strong>the</strong> original contexts <strong>of</strong> events and contexts<br />

similar to <strong>the</strong> original ones can have robust cuing effects in recall.<br />

5:10–5:25 (248)<br />

Remember Source Memory ROCs Indicate Recollection Is a Continuous<br />

Process. SCOTT D. SLOTNICK, Boston College<strong>—</strong>The dualprocess<br />

model assumes that memory is based on recollection (retrieval<br />

with specific detail) or familiarity (retrieval without specific detail). A<br />

current debate is whe<strong>the</strong>r recollection is a threshold (all-or-none) process<br />

or, like familiarity, is a continuous (graded) process. In <strong>the</strong> present study,<br />

two continuous models and two threshold models <strong>of</strong> recollection were<br />

evaluated using receiver operating characteristic (ROC) analysis. These<br />

models included <strong>the</strong> continuous signal detection unequal variance model<br />

and <strong>the</strong> threshold dual-process model. In <strong>the</strong> study phase <strong>of</strong> two experiments,<br />

objects were presented to <strong>the</strong> right or left <strong>of</strong> fixation. At test,<br />

participants made “remember” or “know” responses and source memory<br />

(spatial location) confidence ratings. Recollection ROCs were generated<br />

from “remember” source memory confidence ratings. Nei<strong>the</strong>r threshold<br />

model adequately fit <strong>the</strong> recollection ROCs. By contrast, <strong>the</strong> continuous<br />

models adequately fit one or both recollection ROCs. The present results<br />

indicate that both recollection and familiarity are continuous processes.<br />

Applications <strong>of</strong> Decision Making<br />

Independence Ballroom, Saturday Afternoon, 3:50–5:25<br />

Chaired by Frederick V. Malmstrom, U.S. Air Force Academy<br />

3:50–4:05 (249)<br />

A Behavioral Economic Model <strong>of</strong> Addiction. FREDERICK V.<br />

MALMSTROM & DAVID MULLIN, U.S. Air Force Academy, & GARY<br />

MEARS, University <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Rockies<strong>—</strong>Economic models <strong>of</strong> addiction behavior<br />

have traditionally emphasized rational decision making by use<br />

<strong>of</strong> intertemporal utility functions. This study modifies previous models<br />

by focusing on interactions between <strong>the</strong> rational and emotional brain<br />

centers. Our model uses an economic barter-exchange framework to<br />

describe steady state demand-side behavior. Chemical models <strong>of</strong> addiction<br />

behavior have been shown to involve a three-way interaction with<br />

<strong>the</strong> prefrontal cortex, <strong>the</strong> nucleus accumbens, and <strong>the</strong> insula. Here, we<br />

pay particular attention to <strong>the</strong> delay <strong>of</strong> gratification. This model may be<br />

simulated through Monte Carlo processes and tested through existing<br />

data from compulsory intervention processes to determine its steady<br />

state equilibrium. Finally, this model investigates why rational models<br />

<strong>of</strong> addiction treatment, such as compulsory (e.g., 12-step court ordered)<br />

and pure informational (e.g., Just-Say-No) programs, have limited<br />

effectiveness.<br />

4:10–4:25 (250)<br />

Dynamics <strong>of</strong> Future Discounting and Fluctuating Blood Glucose.<br />

X. T. WANG & ROBERT D. DVORAK, University <strong>of</strong> South Dakota<strong>—</strong><br />

Little is known about how fluctuating blood glucose levels affect cognitive<br />

functions. The present study explored metabolic mechanisms <strong>of</strong><br />

future discounting, a choice phenomenon where people value present<br />

goods over future goods. Using fluctuating blood glucose as an index <strong>of</strong><br />

body energy budget, optimal discounting should regulate choice among<br />

rewards as a function <strong>of</strong> temporal caloric requirement. We identified<br />

this novel link between glucose levels measured in vivo and future discounting<br />

in an experiment where participants made choices between a<br />

smaller–sooner reward and a larger–later option, with possible actual<br />

monetary consequences. In contrast to <strong>the</strong> zero-sugar drink group, <strong>the</strong><br />

sugar drink group showed a reduced future discount rate after drink,<br />

when controlling for sex, age, body mass index, and <strong>the</strong> taste rating <strong>of</strong><br />

<strong>the</strong> drink. The blood glucose levels not only varied as a result <strong>of</strong> caloric<br />

intake, but also regulated <strong>the</strong> rate <strong>of</strong> future discounting according to<br />

body energy budget.<br />

4:30–4:45 (251)<br />

A Causal Contrast Theory <strong>of</strong> Moral Intuitions in Trolley Dilemmas.<br />

MICHAEL R. WALDMANN & ALEX WIEGMANN, University <strong>of</strong><br />

38<br />

Göttingen<strong>—</strong>In trolley dilemmas, a train is about to kill several victims<br />

who could be saved if, instead, a different victim is harmed. A number <strong>of</strong><br />

<strong>the</strong>ories have been proposed that assume that permissibility judgments<br />

in <strong>the</strong>se dilemmas are mediated by an assessment <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> causal structure<br />

entailed by <strong>the</strong> proposed interventions. For example, it has been postulated<br />

that it is permissible to harm people as a side effect, but not as a<br />

means <strong>of</strong> saving o<strong>the</strong>rs. We have developed a different causal <strong>the</strong>ory,<br />

according to which reasoners primarily focus on <strong>the</strong> relevant targets <strong>of</strong><br />

<strong>the</strong> proposed interventions (e.g., threats, victims), and contrast <strong>the</strong> moral<br />

consequences <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> causal paths <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se targets in <strong>the</strong> presence versus<br />

absence <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> intervention. We will show that this causal contrast <strong>the</strong>ory<br />

explains intuitions in various types <strong>of</strong> trolley dilemmas better than its<br />

competitors.<br />

4:50–5:05 (252)<br />

Temporal Discounting and Risk: Different Strategies for Different<br />

Tasks. MARY KAY STEVENSON, STEPHEN HONG, & SHARON<br />

ALKIRE, California State University, East Bay<strong>—</strong>Previous research<br />

has shown that when participants judge and define <strong>the</strong>ir preferences<br />

for future losses or risky losses, a slope reversal is reliably obtained.<br />

Participants’ responses are described by a steeper slope across losses<br />

for <strong>the</strong> longest delay and a steeper slope across losses for <strong>the</strong> smallest<br />

probability <strong>of</strong> losing. This study describes <strong>the</strong> impact <strong>of</strong> reversing <strong>the</strong><br />

response scale so that <strong>the</strong> participants judged <strong>the</strong> unattractiveness <strong>of</strong><br />

<strong>the</strong> events and <strong>the</strong> outcomes <strong>the</strong>y preferred <strong>the</strong> least. Participants also<br />

evaluated <strong>the</strong> same stimuli in terms <strong>of</strong> how attractive <strong>the</strong> outcomes were<br />

or how much <strong>the</strong>y preferred one <strong>of</strong> two options. Several prediction strategies<br />

for identifying individual differences were also tested. The results<br />

are discussed in terms <strong>of</strong> a <strong>the</strong>oretical framework that can be used to<br />

account for <strong>the</strong> slope reversal effect.<br />

5:10–5:25 (253)<br />

Managing Exposure to Risk: Strategies and Influences. SANDRA L.<br />

SCHNEIDER, NATHANIEL DECKER, & MOUMITA MUKHERJEE,<br />

University <strong>of</strong> South Florida<strong>—</strong>How decision makers deal with risk is a<br />

topic that is typically studied within <strong>the</strong> “risky choice” paradigm <strong>of</strong>ten<br />

associated with studies based on Kahneman and Tversky’s prospect<br />

<strong>the</strong>ory. In this presentation, we provide a series <strong>of</strong> empirical and simulated<br />

results to show that risk responses are <strong>of</strong>ten qualitatively different<br />

from what would be expected when focusing exclusively on risky choice.<br />

In particular, we demonstrate that risk tolerance is markedly reduced<br />

when individuals take an active role in managing <strong>the</strong>ir risk exposure,<br />

when people feel threatened, and when people make decisions with a<br />

partner. In addition, we show that decision-making models that do not<br />

take into account context-based goals and dynamic contingencies cannot<br />

effectively meet <strong>the</strong> needs <strong>of</strong> decision makers, because <strong>the</strong>re is no<br />

mechanism to protect decision makers from unnecessary exposure to<br />

catastrophic losses or to avail <strong>the</strong>m <strong>of</strong> serendipitous opportunities for<br />

windfall gains.<br />

Cognitive Control II<br />

Back Bay Ballroom C, Saturday Afternoon, 4:10–5:25<br />

Chaired by Ines Jentzsch, University <strong>of</strong> St Andrews<br />

4:10–4:25 (254)<br />

Control Adjustments After Alternation-Based Response Conflict.<br />

INES JENTZSCH, University <strong>of</strong> St Andrews<strong>—</strong>Recently, we proposed<br />

that response alternations in unidimensional tasks can produce response<br />

conflict and subsequent processing adjustments (Jentzsch & Leuthold,<br />

2005, JEP:HPP). The aim <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> present experiments was to more clearly<br />

specify <strong>the</strong> mechanisms <strong>of</strong> such alternation-based response conflict.<br />

In four experiments <strong>the</strong> response–stimulus interval (RSI) and speed–<br />

accuracy instruction were manipulated. Emphasis on speed ra<strong>the</strong>r than<br />

accuracy should reduce <strong>the</strong> amount <strong>of</strong> executive control, leading to a reduced<br />

behavioral adjustment after conflict. Participants responded generally<br />

more slowly and more accurately under accuracy than under speed<br />

instructions. Alternation-based interference was reduced more under<br />

speed than under accuracy instruction and systematically decreased with<br />

increasing RSI. In sum, <strong>the</strong>se finding suggests that control adjustments

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