Consultation Paper on Bioethics - Law Reform Commission
Consultation Paper on Bioethics - Law Reform Commission
Consultation Paper on Bioethics - Law Reform Commission
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“(a) at a later time and in such circumstances as he may specify, a<br />
specified treatment is proposed to be carried out or<br />
c<strong>on</strong>tinued by a pers<strong>on</strong> providing health care for him, and<br />
(b) at that time he lacks capacity to c<strong>on</strong>sent to the carrying out or<br />
c<strong>on</strong>tinuati<strong>on</strong> of the treatment,<br />
the specified treatment is not to be carried out or c<strong>on</strong>tinued.”<br />
1.04 This provisi<strong>on</strong> “c<strong>on</strong>tains c<strong>on</strong>siderable flexibility and carries<br />
c<strong>on</strong>siderable power.” 2 The author of the advance decisi<strong>on</strong> can specify the<br />
treatments at issue, and specify any c<strong>on</strong>diti<strong>on</strong>s for its applicati<strong>on</strong>. It applies to<br />
the commencement and the c<strong>on</strong>tinuati<strong>on</strong> of treatment. However, secti<strong>on</strong> 24(1)<br />
of the English 2005 Act refers <strong>on</strong>ly to advance refusals of treatment. An<br />
advance decisi<strong>on</strong> cannot require a treatment provider to offer a specific<br />
treatment.<br />
C The origin of advance care directives<br />
1.05 The issues of death and dying have become matters of worldwide<br />
public debate in recent years and came to the fore in Ireland in In re a Ward of<br />
Court (No 2). 3 In his dissent in the US Supreme Court decisi<strong>on</strong> of Cruzan v<br />
Director Missouri Department of Health, 4 Stevens J submitted that two factors<br />
were resp<strong>on</strong>sible for this development: first, the envir<strong>on</strong>ment in which the<br />
process of dying occurs is no l<strong>on</strong>ger in the private setting of <strong>on</strong>e‟s home, but<br />
has moved to the more public setting of healthcare instituti<strong>on</strong>s; sec<strong>on</strong>d,<br />
advances in medical technology have made it possible to indefinitely prol<strong>on</strong>g<br />
the lives of terminally ill patients, merging body and machine in a manner that<br />
“some might reas<strong>on</strong>ably regard as an insult to life rather than as its<br />
c<strong>on</strong>tinuati<strong>on</strong>.” The Supreme Court of Ariz<strong>on</strong>a described this development in<br />
Rasmussen v Fleming:<br />
“Not l<strong>on</strong>g ago the realms of life and death were delineated by a bright<br />
line. Now this line is blurred by w<strong>on</strong>drous advances in medical<br />
technology – advances that until recent years were <strong>on</strong>ly ideas<br />
c<strong>on</strong>ceivable by such science-ficti<strong>on</strong> visi<strong>on</strong>aries as Jules Verne and<br />
HG Wells. Medical technology has effectively created a twilight z<strong>on</strong>e<br />
of suspended animati<strong>on</strong> where death commences while life, in some<br />
2 Bartlett Blackst<strong>on</strong>e‟s Guide to the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (Oxford University<br />
Press 2005) at paragraph 2.101.<br />
3 [1996] 2 IR 79<br />
4 (1990) 497 US 261 cited in In re a Ward of Court (withholding medical treatment)<br />
(No 2) [1996] 2 IR 79 at 133-134.<br />
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