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Consultation Paper on Bioethics - Law Reform Commission

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C United States of America<br />

(1) Re Quinlan<br />

2.21 The 1976 New Jersey Supreme Court decisi<strong>on</strong> in Re Quinlan 40<br />

c<strong>on</strong>cerned the plight of a Karen Ann Quinlan, a 22 year-old woman who was in<br />

a persistent vegetative state. Her physicians refused to turn off her respirator,<br />

fearing that to terminate treatment would attract the impositi<strong>on</strong> of criminal<br />

liability and would be c<strong>on</strong>trary to medical practice and standards. Her father<br />

sought a court order empowering him to authorise the disc<strong>on</strong>tinuance of “all<br />

extraordinary medical treatment”, arguing that that was what his daughter would<br />

have wanted. The Supreme Court held that the c<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>al right to privacy<br />

could be extended to the patient who refuses life-sustaining treatment. It<br />

c<strong>on</strong>cluded that the State‟s interest in preserving life:<br />

“…weakens and the individual‟s right to privacy grows as the degree<br />

of bodily invasi<strong>on</strong> increases and the prognosis dims. Ultimately there<br />

comes a point at which the individual‟s rights overcome the state<br />

interest. It is for that reas<strong>on</strong> that we believe Karen‟s choice, if she<br />

were competent to make it, would be vindicated by the law.” 41<br />

Although there was no advance directive in Quinlan, the case highlighted the<br />

horrific plight of Ms Quinlan and her family, and galvanised public interest in<br />

“moving living wills from their shadowy existence as hortatory statements to<br />

officially recognised instructi<strong>on</strong>s.” 42<br />

(2) Legislative developments<br />

2.22 Within m<strong>on</strong>ths of Re Quinlan, the first advance care directive<br />

legislati<strong>on</strong> was enacted in 1976 by the Californian legislature, 43 with other states<br />

quickly following suit. This first generati<strong>on</strong> of „living will‟ statutes was c<strong>on</strong>cerned<br />

<strong>on</strong>ly with the refusal of life-sustaining procedures in the event of „terminal<br />

illness‟ or „imminent death‟. However, such statutes that, for example, required<br />

that death be „imminent‟ or occur within a „short time‟, were criticised as<br />

substituting a time measure for the more appropriate questi<strong>on</strong> regarding the<br />

futility of medical treatment. 44 Given the limited applicati<strong>on</strong> of such statutes, a<br />

40 (1976) 355 A.2d 647.<br />

41 (1976) 355 A.2d 647.<br />

42 Capr<strong>on</strong> “Advance Directives” in Kuhse and Singer (ed) A Compani<strong>on</strong> to <strong>Bioethics</strong><br />

(Blackwell Publishing 1998) at 264.<br />

43 Natural Death Act 1976.<br />

44 Gelfand “Living Will Statutes: The First Decade” (1987) Wisc<strong>on</strong>sin <strong>Law</strong> Review<br />

737, at 744.<br />

43

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