Recent Developments in Indiana Taxation - I.U. School of Law ...

1152 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:1103
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application for exemption. One of the taxpayers filed a refund claim,
whereupon the county auditor filed this action for a declaratory judgment that the
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law was an invalid special law. After a lengthy review of the history behind
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the constitutional probation on special laws, the court addressed the merits of
this case. The taxpayers argued that the law is general because it is not limited
to a single locality, but applies to fraternities located on any of Indiana
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University’s eight campuses. However, the Supreme Court referred to an
earlier decision where it stated that a “statute is general if it applies to all persons
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or places of a specified class throughout the state.” Because “property-owning
fraternities and sororities” is the “smallest relevant class” that is eligible for an
exemption from property tax, a statute that subdivides that class even further is
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necessarily special. The taxpayers argued that they faced unique
circumstances that justified the special law, including that the financial burden
of paying the property tax assessments would increase already high education
517 costs. However, the Supreme Court held that the circumstances faced by these
three taxpayers were no different than those faced by any other fraternity or
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sorority in the state and did not justify the special law. The dissenting justice
believed that the court’s decision was a violation of the Separation of Functions
Clause because the court substituted a test of its own making (whether or not a
class was unique enough to warrant a special law) for the determination of the
GA. 519
E. Packard v. Shoopman 520
521
The Supreme Court upheld a Tax Court decision that, in addition to ruling
on the merits of a property tax assessment, held that the taxpayer’s failure to file
a timely petition for review was not sufficient to deprive the Tax Court of
jurisdiction unless the assessor objected to the timeliness in its first response to
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the petition. Although there was some dispute in the Tax Court about which
deadline applied because of multiple statutory amendments during the case
proceedings, the assessor did not raise an objection to the timeliness of the
petition until almost two years after first raising a motion to dismiss certain
511. Id.
512. Id.
513. Id. at 1134-36.
514. Id. at 1136.
515. Id. (quoting City of South Bend v. Kimsey, 781 N.E.2d 683 (Ind. 2003)) (internal quotes
omitted).
516. Id. at 1136-37.
517. Id. at 1138-39.
518. Id. at 1139.
519. Id. at 1139-40 (J. Sullivan, dissenting).
520. 852 N.E.2d 927 (Ind. 2006).
521. Shoopman v. Clay Twp. Assessor, 827 N.E.2d 662 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2005).
522. Packard, 852 N.E.2d at 928.