Beneficiary Participation in Irrigation Water Management: The Kerala

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commitment on the part of the officials to programmes of decentralisation of power and functions as the real reason. In consequence of the apathy on both sides, Canal Comittees have not played the strategic role intended of them in the CADA Act. In this context, it may be noted that CCs are functioning efficiently in some other States in India and several other countries in the world. Corruption Our field investigation disclosed that a large section of farmers had a feeling that officials were involved in corruptive practices especially in field channel lining. Only three officebearers and 29 ordinary members pleaded ignorance of corruptive practices in field channel lining; four office-bearers and 207 ordinary members were, however, of the opposite view. Interestingly, it was the members of the lower reaches of the canal who were positive about malpractices of officials. Table 4.11 Frequency distribution of corruption in canal-lining and construction by methods according to OBs and OMs Qn. No. 14 a b c d e f Statements OBs OMs Reaches-wise Total UR MR LR F % F % F % F % F % No knowledge of corruption 3 6.3 29 7.1 19 12.5 6 4.4 4 3.3 There is 4 8.3 207 50.6 71 46.7 69 50.7 67 55.4 corruption Reduces the quality of work Adds less cement than is needed Absent from supervision Undue interest in granting contract 17 35.4 148 36.2 35 23.1 56 41.2 57 47.9 22 45.8 181 44.3 54 35.5 69 50.7 58 47.9 19 39.6 92 22.5 30 19.7 32 23.5 30 41.3 25 52.1 140 34.2 42 27.6 48 35.3 50 41.3 Corruption entailed deterioration of the quality of work. Quality was affected adversely by reducing the proportion of cement in the grout, executing the work without supervision of engineers and awarding contract work to favoured parties with undue haste in gross violation of the guidelines of Government of India. The opportunity for members of BFAs to participate through contributions in the form of their labour was not made use of. According to ordinary members and office-bearers of BFAs, the practice of using cement in smaller proportions than the prescribed specification was found in 45 percent of the cases. Undue interest and haste in awarding construction work to contractors of their liking was reported by 52 percent 41
of the office-bearers and more than one-third of the ordinary members. Corrupt practices increased as one moved from the upper reaches of the canal to its tail end areas. Tail-enders are the worst sufferers in irrigation systems. One of the multiple objectives of BFA is to provide an opportunity for mass action against malpractices. If BFA is active and alert, it would resort to such group activity. The extent to which this objective is realised was examined. The responses are presented in the Table 4.12. Table 4.12 Frequency Distribution by Details of Mass Petition against Malpractices Qn. No. 14 a b c Statements O.Bs O.Ms Reaches-wise Total U.R M.R L.R F % F % F % F % F % There was mass petition 10 20.8 14 9.8 15 3.7 5 1.2 20 4.9 No mass petition No effective action taken Nothing done by BFA Source: Field Survey Note: O.Bs - Office Bearers of BFAs, O.Ms - Ordinary Members of BFA, Qn. No - Question Number in the Shedule U.R - Upper Reaches, M.R - Middle Reaches, L.R - Lower Reaches According to 36 OBs, (representing 75 percent) and 339 OMs (forming 83 percent) there were no instances of BFAs submitting petitions against malpractices. Nine OBs (out of 10) admitted that no effective action had ever been taken on such malpractices and that BFAs, in general, had taken no initiative in organising such group actions against malpractices nor had they sought solutions to malpractices and corruption. Thus, it is clear that BFAs, organised for collective action against malpractices and resolution of conflicts, failed miserably in discharging their duties. Recurring functions 36 75.0 339 82.9 112 73.7 121 89.0 106 87.6 9 18.8 62 15.2 39 25.7 9 66 14 11.6 5 10.4 23 5.6 15 9.9 0 0.0 8 6.6 Recurring functions are conferred on BFAs with different objectives in view. A few functions are designed to achieve efficient, effective, and equitable distribution of irrigation water and proper upkeep of the irrigation system, especially the canal network of the project 40 ; another set of functions related to promoting group activity in farming and collective ownership of agricultural assets 41 ; a third set aims at the creation of awareness regarding good irrigation practices and scientific agriculture 42 ; a fourth set has the objective of formulation and implementation of a proper incentive structure 43 ; the last set of functions pertain to proper administration 44 . 42
Page 1 and 2: Beneficiary Participation in Irriga
Page 3 and 4: Contents 1 Introduction 5 2 Concept
Page 5 and 6: No serious in-depth study of the ca
Page 7 and 8: The Malampuzha project has 15 Canal
Page 9 and 10: 2. Concepts, Theory, and Practice o
Page 11 and 12: of a few man-days of labour as is s
Page 13 and 14: 3. Empirical Research on Irrigation
Page 15 and 16: Our interest is neither in the Prod
Page 17 and 18: The author points out how the press
Page 19 and 20: field level officers resemble the c
Page 21 and 22: fields and project demonstration fa
Page 23 and 24: To ameliorate the situation, the Eg
Page 25 and 26: development factors and processes,
Page 27 and 28: Canal Committee (CC) Canal Committe
Page 29 and 30: This fact was endorsed by both offi
Page 31 and 32: Renewal is given based on the lists
Page 33 and 34: Table 4.6 Details of General Body M
Page 35 and 36: Table 4.7 Details of Canal Committe
Page 37 and 38: Table 4.8 Nature of Decisions in Ca
Page 39: ecause of their vital importance to
Page 43 and 44: Table 4.13a Performance of Recurrin
Page 45 and 46: Table 4.13 c Performance of Recurri
Page 47 and 48: inclusion of ineligible persons in
Page 49 and 50: aspect. The reasons reported for in
Page 51 and 52: Table 4.14c Performance of Recurrin
Page 53 and 54: all farmers in an area did this act
Page 55 and 56: Table 4.15a Performance of Recurrin
Page 57 and 58: Table 4.15c Performance of Recurrin
Page 59 and 60: 5. Performance, Administration, and
Page 61 and 62: level of less than one-third [Table
Page 63 and 64: management function, with an expert
Page 65 and 66: the critical phases of growth of pl
Page 67 and 68: Lack of adequate co-operation of th
Page 69 and 70: The failure in the working of BFAs
Page 71 and 72: To sum up: past experience of the w
Page 73 and 74: Table 6.1 Measures of Reforms 74
Page 75 and 76: “Extending better official co-ope
Page 77 and 78: Table 6.3 Staying in the area of op
Page 79 and 80: (ii) Entrust water charges collecti
Page 81 and 82: 7. Summary and Conclusions Most irr
Page 83 and 84: of using less cement than is requir
Page 85 and 86: Appendix - I Number of Beneficiary
Page 87 and 88: Appendix III List of Canal Committe
Page 89 and 90: BFA Sample’ Name of C.C/BFA Reg.
Page 91 and 92:
the assumed losses of 11 to 20 perc
Page 93 and 94:
34 The NIA was a government corpora
Page 95 and 96:
References Bagodion, Benjamin U.
Page 97:
Silva, De, N. G. R. “Involvement
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Beneficiary Participation in Irrigation Water Management: The Kerala

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