Beneficiary Participation in Irrigation Water Management: The Kerala

of using less cement than is required in cement concreting, negligence and evasion of
supervision by engineers and unusual haste in awarding work on contract. No mass action
against malpractices was reported from the study area.
We observed that the organisational pattern and the administrative model of CADA in Kerala
are appropriate. Lack of beneficiary participation cannot, therefore, be attributed to these
factors. At the ideological level, the farming community in Malampuzha project area had
faith in the useful role of BFAs. But at the empirical level, they have come to harbour
serious doubts about the efficiency of BFAs. According to them BFAs were short-term,
adhoc, arrangements for providing benefits which were themselves trivial. Their role as an
instrument of decentralisation in administration, financing, and management of irrigation
system was almost unknown to the community. The seminars, camps, and tours do not seem
to have enlightened them very much on these aspects.
No wonder, under these conditions beneficiary participation on a significant extent did not
come forth as a conflict-resolving agency. The manner in which they were constituted, and
the conditions under which they were made to function, rendered BFA leadership a waste of
time, energy, and finance. The CADA guideline that civil works of a minor nature like field
channel lining should not be given on contract was not adhered to in the majority of cases.
Absenteeism on the part of canal operators / water guards caused by their not staying in the
area of their operation, and negligence of supervising work by the engineers also contributed
to the non-performance of BFAs. Above all, the unenthusiastic approach of officials towards
BFAs, led to its atrophying. Inter-departmental conflicts, absence of a co-ordinating agency
belonging to CADA but drawn from the departments of irrigation, agriculture, and cooperation,
the factional feuds between CADA engineers and engineers of the irrigation
department controlling the operation of the system up to sluice level, their divergent viewpoints
on BFA activities – all these produced disincentive effects on the farming community.
Measures of reform
The following are some of the measures suggested.
1. Legal status of the officials of the irrigation department may be raised by conferring
on them appropriate judicial powers.
2. Alternative methods may be devised for successful awareness creation among ordinary
members since the efforts in the past were inadequate and grossly ineffective.
3. Economic and moral incentives may be given to BFAs on the basis of performance.
Successful performance may be rewarded with larger finding support, merit certificates,
and public recognition.
4. In view of the fact the BFAs have no funds to finance civil works and that they are
unable to raise funds from among their members, BFAs may be given a seed money
to carry out such works under adequate safeguards. Since any BFA is unable to own
costly equipment for itself and since most of the civil works are non-recurring in
nature, costly equipment must be owned and provided to BFAs either by the Canal
Committee or by the PAC. CADA administration should see to it that technical
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