Bytheway - Pedagogická fakulta MU - Masarykova univerzita

O INTRO
Y KENNETH G. HAY
DEFINING THE AESTHETIC
Although consensual judgment may facilitate the differentiation
of contemplative objects which are beautiful from those which
are ugly, it proves more complex to defi ne the beautiful in itself.
Kant gives three inter-related defi nitions of the Beautiful in
the Second, Third and Fourth Moments of his Critique. In the
Second, the beautiful is defi ned as: ...that which, apart from
a concept, pleases universally. 5
In the context of appraising fi ne art doctorates, we will use
the term the aesthetic as a more acceptable, replacement for
the term Beauty, within the particular dynamic of its reception
by an appraising public, as discussed by Mary A. McCloskey,
James O. Young, Timothy Gould and Ted Cohen.
Under this aspect, for a thing (object or mode of
representation) to be classifi ed as Beautiful, it must be
universally accepted as such; Moreover, unlike the objects or
modes of Pure Reason, which Kant dealt with in his previous
Critique, it must do this without having recourse to conceptual
thinking, but must instead, communicate itself to our judgment
through some other kind of (pre- or non-conceptual) mechanism.
Kant, here, is defending not only the right but the necessity
of some (agreeable or beautiful) things (including art-objects)
to appeal directly to our judgment without the mediation of
discourse (verbal, logical, conceptual etc.). In this they are
distinct from and outside of ethical judgments, which must still
rely upon a conceptual framework.
In respect of the good, it is true that judgments also
rightly assert a claim to validity for every one; but the
good is only represented as an Object of a universal
delight by means of a concept, which is the case neither
with the agreeable nor the beautiful. 6
As Mary A. McCloskey observes: whereas,
...with pleasure in the good, universality is thought
to be based upon a concept and necessitation upon
a formulable rule; with pleasure in the beautiful, despite
the fact that there is a comparable universality and
necessitation, there is no concept and no formulable
rule. 7
In other words, it seems that we cannot arrive at an objective
basis for the beautiful and the agreeable in the way that we can
insist upon the objective necessity of morals. Does this mean,
however, that the former remain arbitrary?
In the Third Moment, Kant identifi es Beauty as the Form of
Finality in an object, so far as perceived in it apart from the
representation of an end 8 And in the Fourth Moment, Beauty
is ...that which, apart from a concept, is cognized as object of
a necessary delight. 9
Here, Beauty is the result of a particular organisation of
constitutive elements in the object or mode of representation
which attains to a quality of fi nality (end), in the sense of fi tness
for purpose, which purpose is to elicit the harmonious free play
of the cognitive faculties. Whether or not a given form is or is
5 I. Kant, The Critique of Judgement, op.cit, Second Moment, §9, p.60.
6 Ibid., §7, p. 53.
7 Mary A. McCloskey, Kant’s Aesthetic. London, MacMillan Press, 19..
8 I. Kant, op. cit, §17, p.80.
9 Ibid., §22, p. 85.
not fi nal for perception cannot be determined by the application
of a concept, but can only be intuited or felt. This argument
is the commonest ground of formalist (or idealist) criticism of
whatever kind, and simultaneously, its fatal fl aw. 10
The major attribute of the Beautiful (which Kant defi nes
as the representation to the judging subject by way of the
imagination) is that it is linked to the Good – it calls forth
a desire in us, because desiring the Good is the categorical
imperative – it is that absolute which we are driven to desire
absolutely, (ie with dis-interest). We are hungry (or thirsty) for
the truth. The Good, because desired by everyone, is similar or
parallel to the Beautiful, except that it is based upon a concept
where the Beautiful is not. How, though, can the judgment
of taste attain to the quality of an absolute, if it is still based
upon the particular presentation of an Object to a Subject’s
perception. Its apparent universality cannot spring directly from
concepts because,
...from concepts, there is no transition to the feeling of
pleasure or displeasure but they must instead, ...involve
a claim to validity for all men, and must do so apart
from universality attached to Objects i.e. there must be
coupled with it a claim to subjective universality. 11
The Beautiful must therefore be based upon the curious
principle of subjective universality. Since, for Kant, only those
judgments which are based upon a-priori categories can be
objective, the judgment of the beautiful cannot be deemed
objective unless there exists something resembling a concept
which operates, in the case of judgments about the beautiful,
as simultaneously public (extra-subjective), regulative and
worthwhile in itself. For Kant this is the Form of Finality.
Beauty is the Form of Finality in an object, so far as
perceived in it apart from the representation of an end. 12
As Wittgenstein was to argue subsequently, Kant argues
that individual perceptions cannot be used as the basis of
objective judgments because there is no guarantee that anyone
else shares one’s own intuitions of sense-data. Sensation, then
cannot be used as the defi ning principle of aesthetic judgment.
For Kant, only the form (as distinct from the matter) of sensations
can fulfi ll this rôle. In attempting to defi ne the characteristics of
such an aesthetic form, Kant proposes two inter-related views:
the form is fi nal in the sense that it is the conclusion of its
potential – it has achieved a state of fi nality appropriate to its
own perceptual end; and secondly, it gives rise or occasions the
free play of the cognitive faculties – its end is to stimulate the
faculties of imagination and understanding in an harmonious,
free, play. An aesthetic form, so defi ned, is valuable in itself and
does not need any further justifi cation. It exists as an absolute
for the contemplation of the thinking subject and need follow no
other rule than that it be fi nal for perception.
What this means is that there can be no a-priori formulae
whereby one form or another can be prejudged to guarantee
Beauty – only in the realisation of its own fi nality for perception
can an object attain this state.
10 Cf K. G. Hay, Della Volpe’s Critique of Romantic Aesthetics, Parallax, Vol 1,
Leeds, 1996, 0pp. 181-90.
11 I. Kant, op.cit., p.51.
12 Ibid., §17, p.80
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