The United Kingdom and Human Rights - College of Social ...

Objections Because of the Judicial System 157
Two cases of 1922 and 1967 are used to support that
generalisation about the period up to the time of "the
present troubles." Yet, in this connection, there is no
mention of Lowry C.J.'s remarkable decision in R. v.
Londonderry }],, ex p. Hume in which in 1972 he declared
to be ultra vires regulations purporting to give powers to
the armed forces. Off the cuff, I can think of four
major Lowry judgments which are outstandingly liberal
in a context of increasing violence: R. v. Flynn and
Leonard and R. v. Corey gave the courts a wide
discretion to exclude confessions because of oppression
or undue prejudice; R. v. Donnelly and Others affirmed
the need for corroboration and caution in dealing with
evidence by "super-grasses" 37 ; and R. v. Adams narrowly
interpreted what constitutes the offence of profession of
membership of a prescribed organisation so that fighting
talk on behalf of Sinn Fein and parading with IRA
prisoners in the Maze Prison, did not make Mr. Adams
an IRA member and thus criminally punishable. 38 In
contrast, the Japanese-American cases in the Second
World War show that judges with a 150-year-old
tradition of interpreting a Bill of Rights can be far less
courageous. All depends in any system on the integrity
of the man in the judicial seat. Of course, other
judgments by other judges can be cited as ones that
could or even should have gone the other way. But, as I
said in my second Lecture, overtones of conspiracy
theory too often peep out when critics dislike judgmental
outcomes.
All judges, constrained by the need to write judgments,
let alone by their legal professional traditions, set
out the rational arguments as between competing claims.
In considering the issues raised, judges attempt to be
neutral with regard to interests advanced, trying to avoid
partiality to either the state or the individual, even if
their personal sympathies lie on one side. Similarly, they