Hydro-‐political Baseline of the Upper Jordan River - Ibrahim Abd El Al

Wazzani basin plan (MEDA 2003), the 1978-­‐2000 period of Israeli invasions and occupation
of southern Lebanon has impacted settlement in the area, and the 2007 population is
estimated at roughly one-­‐third of what would be expected with unhampered growth. The
land within the basin is very fertile, though agricultural development is a fraction of the
normal level of development in Lebanon. It is perhaps in the geopolitical domain that the
Hasbani gains importance in Lebanon, however. The construction of a Lebanese pumping
station for drinking water to the un-­‐served villages in 2002 nearly sparked violent conflict
between Lebanon and Israel (the ‘Wazzani dispute’). A significant amount of water
infrastructure was damaged during the 2006 war, and the Hasbani continues to figure in the
discourse of Lebanese officials across the spectrum.
Syria interests
The great bulk of water that Syria withdraws from the Jordan River basin are taken from the
Yarmouk River tributary, which flows into the Lower Jordan. Though official Syrian use of the
Upper Jordan ceased with Israel’s capture of the Golan Heights in 1967, it is important to the
livelihoods of the Syrian residents there, as well as for being wrapped-­‐up in the broader
Syrian-­‐Israeli conflict and negotiations over the Occupied Golan (see e.g. Daoudy 2008, Hof
2009).
Israel interests
The 1967 Israeli military victory served partly to establish a water use pattern that continues
until the present day. While population estimates within the Upper Jordan basin are not
available, the estimated population in the entire Tiberias watershed (which includes the
Golan) is 200,000 (ICBS 2011). Israeli residents use the Upper Jordan River flows partially for
irrigation of crops locally and on the Golan (ICBS 2004: Table 27, Markel 2004). The bulk of
the flows into Tiberias are abstracted by the National Water Carrier and distributed along
demand centres outside of the Basin throughout the length of Israel into the Negev Desert.
This consumption equates to roughly the whole flow of the Upper Jordan River measured at
its confluence point, and over one-­‐third of all Israeli freshwater consumption. These flows
are used for domestic purposes, or are destined for industrial agriculture in the desert, from
where they are exported (as virtual water, in the form of crops) to Europe (seePeraino and
Chen 2008), consumed locally, or sold to Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza.
The Upper Jordan River is also a geopolitically strategic resource for Israel, in the same
manner that it is for Lebanon and Syria. As we will see, the waters are part and parcel of a
deeply held Israeli discourse related to state security. The traditional Israeli security
requirements are counted by a security analyst “as belonging to the "operational sphere"
(they concern defence of the Galilee), while "the need to protect the sources of the water is
a strategic need" (emphasis by the author)” (Schiff 1994b in Libiszewki 1995).
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